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Advisor: Gary Wilder 
 
Uluguru, a small mountain range in eastern Tanzania and one of the rainiest places in 
East Africa, serves as the principal water catchment for Tanzania’s largest city, Dar es Salaam, 
and for commercial farms along the country’s central coast. Home to smallholder farmers who 
cultivate a variety of crops on mostly rain-fed farms, the catchment has been a site of struggle 
over water and nature since the nineteenth century. Today, climate change has rendered rainfall 
increasingly unpredictable, and a wave of “sustainable development” interventions has pressured 
farmers to change their practices and to engage in unpaid forms of ecological labor for the sake 
of downstream water users. Such projects are structured by relations of power across multiple 
scales and by global divisions of nature and labor. These dynamics converge in the space of the 
catchment, rendering it a site for the extraction of both resources and ecological labor.  
Uluguru has also been home to regionally important rainmaking rituals for at least several 
centuries. Rainmaking rituals are a form of “social healing” which link questions of human 
health, agricultural success, and environmental wellbeing to care for the dead and the natural 
places they reside (Feierman 1985). Throughout the history of the mountains, discourses and 




struggle. As political and economic relations have shifted in the mountains, these rituals have 
also changed, but they continue to emerge as spaces of debate over the proper relations between 
humans and the environment. Seen in this way, rainmaking and social healing are a dynamic 
form of politics which center questions of social reproduction. 
Outside interventions aimed at protecting the watershed and the long history of political 
rainmaking can be understood as intertwined struggles over water, nature, and labor. Viewing 
these as struggles over the terms of social reproduction reveals that conflicts over nature are 
fundamentally bound up with questions of gender and with long histories of colonialism and 
neocolonialism. While the invisibility of ecological labor and ecological care has led to growing 
precarity in the mountains, discourses and practices of social healing reveal other possibilities. 
They suggest that human relationships to nature need not be limited to those of harm and 
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Ahmadiyya – a heterodox Muslim movement originating in Pakistan which believes in 
continuing revelation (considered heretical by most mainstream Muslims) 
AGRA – Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
akida – a title under the German administration for mid-level African officials who acted as 
police, tax-collectors, and judges 
Bakwata – the main Muslim civic organization in Tanzania since 1968, often used as a shorthand 
for mainstream Muslims 
baraza – a meeting or council for decision-making 
bibi – grandmother, elder woman; I use this as a honorific throughout the text 
bida – innovations, that which Islamic reformists seek to eliminate from Islamic practice 
CBFM – community-based forest management; a form of participatory forest management with 
administration at the local level 
CCM – Chama cha Mapinduzi; the successor to TANU and Tanzania’s ruling party since 1977 
CSO – civil society organization 
chipsi mayai – Tanzanian street food; french fries cooked in egg 
dawa – medicine 
DAWASCO – Dar es Salaam Water Company; the municipal water utility company in Dar es 
Salaam 
desturi – custom 
dhikr – the Arabic term for devotional chants common in Sufi orders globally, the origin of zikiri 
dini – religion 
DOAG – German East Africa Company (Deutsch-Ostafrikanishe Gesellshaft) 
FAO – the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
GEF – Global Environmental Facility 




hitima – memorial services performed at regular intervals after a death, involving the 
performance of zikiri as well as a shared meal 
IWRM – Integrated Water Resources Management 
JFM – joint forest management; a form of participatory forest management with joint 
government and local control 
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency 
jumbe – a local level official or headman 
kanga – a wrap worn by women 
kaniki – a garment of plain, black cloth 
kazi – work 
Kiluguru (kil. Chiluguru) – the Luguru language; also an adjectival from of Luguru 
Kingalu – an important political figure widely recognized as “chief” of Waluguru. The name/title 
Kingalu has been passed matrilineally since the eighteenth century and designates the 
head of the Bena lineage in Kinole. British, under indirect rule, named Kingalu “chief” of 
Uluguru, but deposed him in 1936. 
Kolero – a powerful mzimu spirit and its attendant place of residence in southern Uluguru 
kurithi (-rithi) – to inherit 
kutawala (-tawala) – to rule 
kuzikiri – see zikiri 
kuzulu – see -zulu 
maadili – ethics 
madrassa – Quranic schools 
mapepo (sing. pepo) – a kind of spirit that resides in natural places; today they are often (but not 
always) considered malevolent 
masika – the long rains which fall from March to May 
matambiko (sing. tambiko) – rituals where the living reconcile with the dead through offerings 
and the recitation of sacred words 




mazimbo – lineage medicine (dawa) 
mganga (pl. waganga) – traditional healer 
miiko (sing. mwiko) – taboos 
mila – tradition 
mitishamba – herbal medicine 
mizimu (sing. mzimu) – ancestral shades or territorial spirits, those to whom offerings are made 
during matambiko 
mjomba – singular of wajomba 
Mkuyuni – a ward in Uluguru, as well as one of the villages in the ward, the central site of my 
research 
Mluguru – sing. of Waluguru 
Morogoro – a city of approximately 300,000 which sits at the northern edge of Uluguru. 
Morogoro is the capital of Morogoro Region and the former capital of Morogoro District, 
in which Uluguru is located 
Muhhabia – singular of Wahhabia 
MVIWATA – Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (National Network of Farmers’ 
Groups in Tanzania), the main smallholder organization in Tanzania and a member to La 
Via Campesina 
mtawala – administrator or “subchief” under British indirect rule 
mwiko – singular of miiko 
mzee (pl. wazee) – elder man; I use this as a honorific throughout the text 
mzimu – singular of mizimu 
Native Authority – the principle institution of British indirect rule. The Native Authority 
consisted of “traditional” or local authorities who administered African populations on 
behalf of the British. 
NGO – nongovernmental organization 
ngoma – lit. dance or drum; mostly used in Uluguru to refer to girls’ initiations 
ngoto – payment in cash or kind paid by outsiders for the use of lineage land 




pepo – singular of mapepo 
PES – Payment for Ecosystem Services 
PFM – participatory forest management 
pombe – locally brewed beer 
pori – wilderness 
Qadariyya – one of the main tariqa in Uluguru 
SAT – Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania 
shamba – farm plot 
sharia – law (Islamic or secular) 
shehe (pl. mashehe) – sheikh, elder or learned Muslim. In Uluguru, the term typically refers to 
the leader of a Sufi order 
shughuli za kibinadamu – human activities 
SUA – Sokoine University of Agriculture 
Sunna – the traditions and practices of Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims 
-tafsiri – to translate or interpret 
tambiko – singular of matambiko 
TANU – Tanganyika African National Union. The main political party in Tanzania from the 
1950s until 1977, when it merged with the leading party in Zanzibar to become CCM 
TANU Youth – the youth wing of TANU, popular in Uluguru prior to independence 
tariqa – Sufi orders 
ugali – stiff cornmeal porridge; the staple food in most of Tanzania 
Ujamaa – lit. familyhood; Tanzanian socialism 
ukoo – matrilineal lineage or clan 
Uluguru – a small mountain range, part of the Eastern Arc Mountains, located in eastern 
Tanzania 
Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS) – a forced terracing program implemented in the 




ULUS – see “Uluguru Land Usage Scheme” 
UNDP – United Nations Development Program 
utamaduni – culture 
VDC – Village Development Committee 
vijana – youth 
waganga – plural of mganga 
wahhabia – Wahhabi; exonym for Islamic reformists associating them with Saudi tradition 
wajomba – matrilineal uncles; in this case, the term refers in particular to the male heads of 
matrilineages 
wali – Sufi saints 
walimu – teachers, including Islamic teachers 
Waluguru – members of the Luguru tribe. Most residents of Uluguru consider themselves 
Waluguru 
wapwa (sing. mpwa) – nephews and nieces 
wazee – elders 
wazungu (sing. mzungu) – white people, Europeans 
WRRBO – Wami-Ruvi River Basin Office 
WUA – Water Users Association 
WWF – the World Wildlife Fund 
zamani – before, in previous times 
ziara – large Sufi gatherings, often but not always related to saints 
zikiri – a Sufi practice of repeating Koranic verses or the names of God; in Uluguru, it refers to a 
more specific collective vocal performance 





 Just after midnight on March 1, 2018, I heard the tinny sound of rain sweep over my 
corrugated metal roof. Masika,1 the long rains which fall on Tanzania from March to May, had 
arrived, almost comically on schedule. Unlike the more fitful “short rains” of November and 
December, this downpour was light but steady. Some of the drops from my roof fell into waiting 
buckets my landlady’s family had placed under the eaves to spare themselves a trip to the tap at 
the foot of the hill. Others ran down the steep, rust-colored slope, soaking into the small and now 
muddy footpaths that connected my house with others on the hillside and spilling into the ditch 
along the packed-earth road a few dozen meters below. During the day, this road rumbled with 
trucks full of fruit and cases of soda, crowded buses, motorcycles, and occasionally the tinted-
window vehicles of government officials and the high, bouncing jeeps of tourists on safari. The 
road was originally constructed under the orders of the German colonial administration to 
connect the settlement at Mikese on the railroad to the north with their outpost at Kisaki a 
hundred kilometers (60 mi.) to the south. Today, it serves as the main artery of the eastern 
Uluguru mountains, a small and breathtakingly steep cluster of peaks that extend a mere 65 
kilometers (40 mi.) from north-south and half that distance east to west, but which reach 
elevations exceeding 2,500 meters (8,200 ft.). 
 




 As I looked out across the road from my house, the line of peaks to the west was lost in 
darkness. For much of the coming months, clouds would obscure the top of the mountains from 
view, hiding the emerald green of the Uluguru Nature Reserve that runs along the mountains’ 
spine, its sharp boundaries another legacy of German rule. Nearly every day, waves of rain 
would sweep over the valley, gradually saturating the road into a thick mud until several 
stretches became nail-biting ordeals, trucks and buses sliding perilously toward the banks or 
sinking into immobility. The mountains’ streams and rivers would swell and turn reddish brown 
with soil as they tumbled from the high forests through twisting valleys before finally spilling 
into the lowlands to the east. The rain that escaped my landlady’s buckets would make its way to 
one of these rivers, known locally as the Mbezi. The Mbezi emerges from the Uluguru Nature 
Reserve high in Tegetero Ward. Another major stream to the north passes through an area known 
as Kinole, where it plunges thirty meters down the dramatic Kisimbi Falls. The two branches 
meet near Kinole market, forming a wide and rapid stream that twists along Kinole road before 
veering to the south to snake along the eastern edges of a village called Mkuyuni, where I sat that 
night listening to the sound of rain on my iron roof. 
Uluguru is one of the rainiest places in East Africa, especially the eastern slopes which 
catch moisture from the Indian Ocean, two hundred kilometers (125 mi.) to the east. Rainfall 
averages 1,500 to 3,000 mm. (60–120 in.) per year (Burgess, Doggart and Lovett 2002: 141; 
Nobert and Skinner 2016). The mountains are also the origin of one of Tanzania’s most 
important rivers, the Ruvu, which serves as the primary source of fresh water for the country’s 
largest city, Dar es Salaam. The Ruvu, which is the name of the Mbezi after it exits the 
mountains, gathers tributaries from all sides of the mountains, first the Mvuha River to the south 




range to the south. As it bends north, wending past century-old sisal plantations, the Ruvu meets 
the Ngerengere, which emerges from northern Uluguru and serves as the main water source for 
the regional capital, Morogoro. Past this juncture, several intake stations draw water for Dar es 
Salaam, while the river itself arcs northward, finally spilling into the Indian Ocean near the 
breezy coastal town of Bagamoyo. Dar es Salaam, already home to over six million people, is 
one of the fastest growing cities on earth and the population is projected to exceed ten million by 
2030 (Rosen 2019; UN DESA 2018). It also serves as Tanzania’s main port and commercial hub. 
While Dar es Salaam expands, however, flows of the Ruvu River are declining. Despite a lack of 
clear evidence of the causes of these declines, official blame for shortages has mostly fallen on 
smallholder farmers in the watershed, especially those in Uluguru near the river’s source. The 
government has responded by enacting measures barring cultivation along riverbanks and 
banning other activities believed to contribute to declining flows, and by launching a series of 
development projects in conjunction with international donors which aim to change the 
purportedly harmful behaviors of the farmers (Lopa et al. 2012; Muthui and Mariki 2018; URT 
2009). 
I had come to Mkuyuni in large part because of the importance of Uluguru as a rainwater 
catchment. I was interested in the ways that conflicts over spirits and rainmaking served as sites 
of ecological and political debate over the responsibility to care for the Earth. I also wanted to 
understand how residents of the mountains, mostly smallholder farmers who use hoes to cultivate 
small rainfed plots, were responding to an increasingly unpredictable climate alongside 
escalating pressure from the government and international agencies to change their practices for 
the sake of downstream water users. The water catchment is a critical vantage point from which 




relationships, as geographical, historical, and political factors converge to render it the source of 
one of the most vital resources for human life, fresh water. The relationship between the 
catchment and downstream areas also at once echoes and overlays further asymmetrical relations 
between Africa and the Global North, rendering Uluguru a nexus of relations of power and 
inequality. 
Dar es Salaam emerged as a commercial center reliant on fresh water from Uluguru out 
of a complex series of historical factors, key among them the selection of the former fishing 
village as the administrative capital of German East Africa in 1891. Through the development of 
this new port town, German administrators hoped to circumvent the commercial dominance of 
Bagamoyo to the north.2 Dar es Salaam lies in a coastal catchment and not at the outlet of a 
major river. The Ruvu Basin encircles Dar es Salaam to the west and north and serves as the 
nearest major source of fresh water. The first Ruvu intake for Dar es Salaam was constructed 
near the Ruvu Bridge on Morogoro Road in 1956, drawing Uluguru and the growing city on the 
coast into a tighter and lasting relationship (DAWASA 2021). Each time water runs short in Dar 
es Salaam and experts look to the mountains for the problem and its solution, the connection 
becomes further sedimented in layers of reports and projects. 
Recent interventions aimed to protect the water supply to Dar es Salaam are the latest in a 
long history of attempts to secure fresh water from the mountains. Since at least the eighteenth 
century, pilgrims from the north and east would visit the mountains’ sacred forests with offerings 
and prayers during times of drought. If the powerful mizimu spirits were pleased, rainclouds 
 
2 The reasons for Dar es Salaam’s selection are complex. The deep harbor was well suited to steamships, but likely a 
more significant factor was the German government’s realization, following the Abushiri Revolt of 1888–89, that 
direct commercial and political control over Bagamoyo would be extremely difficult to achieve and that 
circumventing Bagamoyo’s control over trade routes through the development of an alternative port offered a more 
realistic path to political and economic power in the region. Both Omani and British forces had previously attempted 
to develop a port at Dar es Salaam for the same reason (its name a legacy of the former) but they were unsuccessful 




would gather and follow them home. Early European explorers and missionaries wrote effusively 
of the mountains’ wealth of water. When German colonialists arrived in the late nineteenth 
century, they became alarmed at what they believed was rapid deforestation on the mountains’ 
slopes and demarcated several heavily policed forest reserves to protect the mountains’ water 
sources. The British, who took over administration under a League of Nations Mandate after 
World War I, maintained these reserves and added others. In the 1950s, the British ordered 
farmers in the mountains to dig terraces to stop the erosion they believed threatened downstream 
flows. The farmers responded with escalating protests, leading to a confrontation in which police 
shot and killed a local man, John Mahenge. The outrage that followed helped catalyze the 
growing nationalist movement that would lead the country to independence in 1961. The 
socialist government that led the country over the following decades took a more hands-off 
approach to the mountains, in part out of concern of a repeat of the anti-terracing protests, but by 
the 1980s, the winds of liberalization brought increased investment in Dar es Salaam and in 
commercial agriculture along the central coast.  This resulted in renewed concern about the 
catchment and prompted a wave of laws and projects around watershed management that 
continue today. 
As the following chapters show, efforts which purport to protect the water source have 
served as a pretext for the forcible appropriation of land and resources, the extraction of 
compulsory, unpaid labor, and the extension of colonial, state, and international control into the 
mountains. Rooted in Malthusian ideologies that see humans as existential threats to nature and 
shaped by unequal relationships of power across multiple scales, these patterns of extraction and 
control have marked life in Uluguru for over a century. Today, as climate change renders rainfall 




concerns over water have deepened and a new round of “sustainable development” projects has 
emerged. Like prior interventions, these projects paint smallholders in Uluguru as inherently 
destructive forces that threaten both the sustainability of their own livelihoods in the mountains 
and the flow of water downstream. 
Farmers in the mountains present a different understanding of changes in rainfall and in 
the environment. Drawing on long histories of sacred rainmaking and a wide range of practices 
of environmental care, they suggest that the relationships between humans and ecosystems are 
more complex than Malthusian paradigms suggest. Practices of rainmaking, in which 
reconciliation with ancestor spirits brings good rains, bountiful crops, and human health, show 
the inseparability of human and ecological wellbeing. Longstanding farming techniques that 
today might be labeled agroecology or agroforestry, alongside the maintenance of trees and 
water sources, reveal forms of often ignored and unpaid environmental labor that allow life in the 
mountains to continue. This is not to suggest that residents of Uluguru live in “harmony” with 
nature. Care and destruction exist side by side. In the same way, rainmaking rituals are not only 
expressions of cultural views toward nature but are longstanding sites of political struggle over 
resources and authority. 
The climate crisis marks an uneven geography, its costs accruing far from the sources of 
emissions that are heating the Earth. While it highlights connectivity and defies borders, it has 
also deepened longstanding inequalities across space and along lines of gender, race, and class. 
These uneven relations converge on the catchments, mountains, and forests of the Global South. 
Viewing the climate crisis from these places, then, can reveal not only the deep historical roots of 
present ecological disasters but also the radical solutions these disasters demand. The following 




ecological theorizing and political critique which draws together questions of gender, health, 
environment, and labor across multiple scales. Attending to rainmaking as a space of debate 
marked by history and power, I suggest that the epistemologies and politics it entails open radical 
possibilities to rebuild our relationships to nature. These relationships would be grounded not in 
a shrinking of humanity’s place on Earth but in an expansive view of human capacities to build a 
world of collective flourishing. 
Social Healing and Social Reproduction 
Rainmaking and Social Healing 
 Rainmaking is an old topic in the anthropology of Africa. It was a source of fascination 
for early European explorers and ethnographers, both for the questions it raised about rationality 
and belief, and for its intimate links to politics and power across much of the eastern and 
southern continent (e.g., Cole 1910; Dornan 1927; Flatz 1936; Livingstone 1858; Spire 1905). 
Studies across a broad area and range of time show that rainmaking had a significant role in the 
centralization and exertion of political power in the region for at least five centuries (Feierman 
1990; Kodesh 2007; Krige and Krige 1943; Lan 1985; Landau 1993; McKittrick 2017; Packard 
1981; Schoenbrun 2006).3 In other words, demonstrating control over the medicines, sacred 
sites, and spirits necessary to bring rain was crucial to the power of many precolonial African 
states and their leaders. The linkage between rainmaking and politics, moreover, has continued in 
various forms into the twentieth and twenty-first century, even if it no longer serves as the 
primary paradigm of political power (Lan 1985; Schoenbrun 2006). 
 
3 Another body of literature on rainmaking has explored its intersections with ideas of the body and the social 




My approach to rainmaking builds heavily on the work of Steven Feierman, who several 
decades ago highlighted the social nature of health and healing in much of East Africa. This 
understanding of health means that kinship groups are often implicated in the illness and healing 
of individual members, and that ensuring the health and fertility of people often goes hand-in-
hand with ensuring the health and fertility of the land. In this context, questions of social health 
are also inseparable from questions of politics (Feierman 1985, 1990; Feierman and Janzen 
1992). Rainmaking is the most well-known and important form of social healing in East African 
history, binding political leaders’ authority to their ability to bring rain and heal the land.  In the 
chapters that follow, I show that this form of politics has persisted in East Africa in different 
iterations, serving as a framework for political discourse and praxis that places questions of 
social and ecological health at the center of political legitimacy (Feierman 1985, 1990; Feierman 
and Janzen 1992; Kodesh 2007; Schoenbrun 2006). 
Some historians use the term “public healing” in place of “social healing.” Discussions of 
“public healing” have the benefit of highlighting the political role of practices like rainmaking 
(Kodesh 2007). Here, however, I primarily use the term “social healing” because one of my aims 
is to highlight continuities between the political paradigm of rainmaking at its political apex in 
the centuries before colonialism and other attempts to heal the land across time and away from 
centers of power. This term also highlights the potential for social healing to serve as a form of 
social criticism at critical junctures of political change, rather than only as a tool of the powerful 
(Feierman 1995). Finally, I also use the term because it invokes some of the underlying 
connections to another concept, that of “social reproduction,” which I argue lies at the heart of 





As Cindi Katz (2001: 711) aptly described it, social reproduction refers to that “fleshy, 
messy, and indeterminate stuff of everyday life” through which communities, structures and 
environments are sustained and perpetuated through time. Feminist scholars have long noted that 
capitalism comes into being through the cleaving apart of social reproduction from production, 
and the subordination of the former to the dictates of the latter. In making this claim, they draw 
on the insights of Marx (1990), who identified the origins of capitalism in processes of 
enclosure, whereby the mass of people were separated from the means of their own survival and 
reproduction. These individuals, “freed” of their land, were then forced to sell their labor to 
survive, generating surplus value for the emerging capitalist classes. However, Marxist feminists 
point out, waged labor was not the only form of work on which capital relied. People also carried 
out unpaid work necessary to sustain and reproduce the working class and the conditions of 
society more broadly. A gendered division of labor served to naturalize this work and obscure its 
social value. Capitalism, in short, demands and is subsidized by unpaid reproductive labor, while 
at the same time undermining the material and social basis of social reproduction (Federici 2004, 
2012; Katz 2001; Meillassoux 1972; Picchio 1992; Razavi 2009; Vogel 2013). In recent years, 
converging economic and ecological crises have prompted a resurgence of work about the role of 
social reproduction in society (Bhattacharya 2017a; Cielo, Coba and Vallejo 2016; Cousins et al. 
2018; Fraser 2016; Naidu and Ossome 2016). Social reproduction has proven a powerful 
framework to address these issues because it highlights the inherent connections between gender, 
environment, health, and labor. 
As many of these scholars have argued, issues of social reproduction are deeply linked to 
questions of land. Especially in agrarian contexts, the conflict between social reproduction and 




1972; Moyo 1995; Naidu and Ossome 2016; Razavi 2009). Indeed, processes of primitive 
accumulation, whether in medieval Europe or in the contemporary Global South, have always 
been marked by appropriation of land for capital and the enclosure of commons, undermining 
rural people’s ability to subsist without wage work (Federici 2004). While capitalism tends to 
render land as a productive resource, social reproduction relies on land in its multiplicity, as a 
locus for social relations, sacred geographies, and shared histories as well as a place to live and 
farm (Ferguson 2013; D. Hall 2013; Li 2014). 
Labor has always stood at the heart of feminist discussions of social reproduction 
(Bhattacharya 2017a). Research on reproductive labor has explored the role of unwaged forms of 
work, especially housework, care work, pregnancy, and sexual labor, under capitalism. It has 
also considered the role of race, class, and geography alongside gender in structuring uneven 
distributions of this work in both waged and unwaged forms, highlighting for instance the 
growing role low-paid immigrant women from the Global South play in childcare and 
housework in the North (Constable 2009; Dalla Costa and James 1972; Duffy 2007; Federici 
2012; Fraser 2016; Glenn 1992; Pande 2014; Parreñas 2000; Picchio 1992). Together, this body 
of work explores how the division of reproductive labor relies on and perpetuates interlinked 
forms of inequality. It also illuminates the changing articulations of reproductive work with the 
capitalist economy and asks what liberatory potentials might be found in reproductive work and 
the social alliances and movements it enables.  
In the following chapters, I take an expansive view of reproductive labor, including forms 
of work that have received less attention in this literature. One such form is the work of ritual, 
which includes caring for the dead, passing down cultural knowledge, and healing affliction. 




reproduction, the role of labor in ritual and its place in processes of social reproduction remains 
undertheorized, especially as it relates to questions of gender (Bernal 1994: 58; Cousins et al. 
2018: 1080). Reproductive labor also encompasses forms ecological labor, the work of 
cultivating and caring for ecosystems that support the continued flourishing of human and non-
human life. Marxist ecofeminists have long argued that care for nature is intimately linked to 
other forms of reproductive work (DiNovelli-Lang and Hérbert 2018; Mies and Shiva 1993; 
Salleh 1997, 2010; Shiva 1988). Practices of social healing in Uluguru highlight these 
connections, showing the inseparability of ecology, human health and fertility, the preservation 
of knowledge, and care for the dead. 
Ecologies of Social Reproduction 
Ecological labor is a critical component of social reproduction, but its role is often 
obscured by views which posit nature and society and distinct and opposed spheres. To 
understand it as labor thus invites a radial rethinking of the relationship between humans and 
their environment. Scholars have long pointed out the social construction of nature and 
challenged the nature/culture dualism that has characterized the Western intellectual tradition 
(Coronil 1997; Cronon 1996; Descola 2013). Political ecologists and environmental historians 
have also shown that humans have played active roles in cultivating healthy and biodiverse 
ecosystems for thousands of years (Amanor 1994; Armstrong et al. 2021; Balée 1989, 2013; 
Fairhead and Leach 1996; Fraser, Leach and Fairhead 2014). This work directly contradicts 
pervasive depictions of humans as inherently destructive forces disrupting a natural equilibrium 
that excludes them. Indeed, ecological research in recent decades has highlighted the need to 
rethink ecosystems not through the framework of equilibrium at all, but rather through a more 




interventions around ecological labor, at times lending itself to a romanticized and essentialized 
understanding of both women and nature (Shiva 1988). In contrast, a nonequilibrium approach to 
ecosystem dynamics allows for a more nuanced understanding of the ecological role of this 
labor. Viewed this way, it is not limited to preserving and maintaining a given set of resources 
but is active in cultivating and shaping them for a wide range of purposes and with a wide range 
of ecological outcomes. 
Such an understanding of ecological labor directly undermines Malthusian beliefs that the 
Earth has a natural carrying capacity and that excess human populations pose an existential threat 
to the continuation of life. Rather, attending to ecological labor offers a richer and more 
expansive view of relationships between humans and their ecosystems. Such a perspective is 
partially indebted to Ester Boserup (1965), whose research on agricultural systems countered 
neo-Malthusian assumptions that increasing population would inevitably lead to downward 
ecological and economic cycles. Rather, Boserup showed, increasing population could serve as a 
spark for innovation which would allow for agricultural intensification. At the same time, 
processes of agricultural intensification are hardly coterminous with preserving biodiverse 
ecosystems or life-sustaining climate conditions. Indeed, the opposite is often true. Attending to 
the multiple dimensions of social reproduction allows an analysis that expands beyond measures 
of agricultural output or food production which are essential but not adequate to support life. 
In part to counter Malthusian depictions of people as threats to the environment, some 
scholars have argued incorrectly that reproductive labor can be defined by sustainability or the 
absence of a metabolic rift. If Malthusian views depict racialized peoples as existential threats to 
life, these counternarratives posit those associated with reproductive labor—especially women, 




upended by patriarchy, capitalism, and colonialism. For instance, Ariel Salleh suggests that the 
work of peasants, Indigenous people, and parents is “eco-sufficient without externalized costs in 
social, ecological or embodied debt” (2010: 212). Similarly, although in somewhat different 
language, Vandana Shiva (1998) valorizes peasants’ and women’s work as maintaining 
ecological balance. This view, however, relies on a fundamental simplification of the role of this 
labor. Social reproduction, after all, entails the reproduction of capitalism and unsustainable 
relations of production. Moreover, and more importantly, the levels of consumption that social 
reproduction demands are not metabolically determined but rather are a product of class struggle, 
history, and culture (Bhattacharya 2017b; Thompson 1980). One part of this struggle is shaped 
by capital’s need for increased consumption in the interest of its own reproduction and expansion 
(Bhattacharya 2017b).4 It is true that social reproduction is, by definition, concerned with 
sustaining the conditions for human life, but it does not follow that its consumption of use values 
is limited by metabolic factors. 
Understanding social reproduction as historically and not naturally determined not only 
pushes against romantic views of peasants, Indigenous people, or women as naturally in 
harmony with nature. It also unsettles proposals to solve environmental problems through a 
reduction of consumption based on natural or “authentic” needs (Löwy 2019: 174; Shiva 1988: 
8–9). Rather, this analysis locates the source of current environmental crises in the capitalist “law 
of value” which makes ever-expanding consumption fundamental to the reproduction of the 
system itself. Indeed, the contradiction whereby capitalism demands increasing levels of 
consumption while undermining the material conditions of social reproduction leads to an 
intensifying exploitation not only of reproductive labor but of nature as well. In other words, the 
 
4 This is also the root of Shiva’s deleterious distinction between “culturally perceived poverty” and “real material 




problem is not “growth” or “(over)consumption” as a quantitative factor exceeding natural 
limits, but a qualitative form of growth driven by the tyranny of exchange value maximization. 
The solution, then, is neither a technical fix nor a return to romanticized simplicity but must 
begin with a process of delinking social reproduction from global exchange values. Given the 
elasticity of social reproduction, this would not necessarily lead to sustainability. Rather, it 
would open space for other regimes of value through which less harmful relationships with 
ecosystems and the climate could be struggled for and built. By making ecological labor visible, 
the terrain of this struggle would not only rest on questions of consumption but on the diversity 
of possible relationships between humans and their environments. 
Practices of agroecology provide a useful example. In agroecology, farms and “natural” 
environments are not seen as distinct and opposed spaces. Rather, agriculture is understood as 
situated within ecosystems and reliant on methods of cultivation which support biodiversity and 
sustainability. Agroecology, thus, is built on ecological labor and offers a space in which use 
values for human consumption and ecosystems as such are produced together rather than 
understood in zero-sum terms. As Chapter 4 shows in more detail, agroecology is possible in 
some cases under terms set by capitalism when it is as productive as other forms of agriculture. 
However, as Max Ajl (2018, 2020) suggests, we can also find in agroecological practices a more 
radical potential, in which ecological concerns (understood as use values) can be measured 
alongside the exchange values of agricultural output instead of inherently being subordinated to 
them. For such a practice to become possible, however, it necessary to delink agrarian spaces 
from the tyranny of the market. In making this argument, Ajl builds on the work of Samir Amin 
(1990), who suggested delinking as a strategy by which nations on capitalism’s periphery could 




led to an inevitable draining of value away from the Global South. Ajl reads Amin’s theory 
expansively, showing that although Amin himself largely focused on questions of production, his 
work created space for forms of transformation that could value ecology as “the ultimate use 
value” (2020: 5). Here, I extend Ajl’s argument, suggesting that if we understand use value to be 
bound up in questions of social reproduction, delinking also makes space to revalue reproductive 
labor (including ecological labor) and to bring gender, ecology, and colonialism into a single 
frame. 
Uneven Terrains of Reproductive Labor 
The question of reproductive labor is always also a question of its distribution. Globally, 
reproductive labor tends to fall disproportionately, but not only, on women. A simplistic view of 
this pattern can lead to an essentialized view of gender and sex in which biological reproductive 
capacities inherent in certain bodies naturally bind those bodies to broader processes of social 
reproduction. Such a view is bound up with persistent portrayals of women as inherently closer 
to, and thus better suited to care for, nature (Jackson 1993; Leach 2007; Resurrección 2013). In 
contrast to essentialist explanations, I argue here that gender itself emerges through the division 
of labor which, far from dictated by the “natural” properties of bodies, has been shaped by long 
histories of struggle. This understanding builds on the work of Marxist and postcolonial 
feminists who have challenged the naturalization of “women’s work” by revealing the historical 
processes through which both gender and gendered inequality have emerged over time 
(Amadiume 1987; Engels 1972; Leacock 1972, 1978, 1983; Okeyo 1980; Oyěwùmí 1997; Sacks 
1979; Tamale 2020). Such an approach not only pushes against the naturalization of women’s 
roles in social reproduction but allows us to analyze gender itself as a contested political terrain. 




(see Chapter 2) and increasing anxieties over LGBTQ rights among conservative Muslims and 
Christians illuminate changing political struggles over the terms of social reproduction. 
 Such an anti-essentialist view also draws into focus the ways in which other axes of 
inequality become bound up with struggles over social reproduction. As noted above, a robust 
body of literature has explored the uneven distribution of reproductive labor along lines of race 
and class. For instance, as white women in the Global North are increasingly drawn into the 
waged workforce, their social reproduction in many cases rests on the work of low-paid 
immigrant housekeepers and nannies from the Global South. Processes like this have resulted in 
both the increasing commodification of reproductive labor and the continuing entrenchment of 
racial, ethnic, and class inequalities (Constable 2009; Duffy 2007; Fraser 2016; Glenn 1992; 
Parreñas 2000). Even pregnancy itself has followed this pattern through the increasing use of 
surrogacy in countries like India (Deomampo 2016; Pande 2014). As I will show, ecological 
labor is also distributed unevenly along lines of race and class, falling disproportionately on the 
Black and Indigenous rural poor. 
These inequalities in the division of social reproduction are structured spatially on 
multiple scales, including along urban-rural and North-South axes. In the Global South, as many 
scholars have shown, reproductive labor at the generational level occurs disproportionally in 
rural areas, where children are raised and the sick and elderly cared for, supported by a 
combination of meager remittances, subsistence agriculture, and petty commodity production. 
Wage labor occurs elsewhere—at cities, mines, or plantations. Because the unequal valuation of 
labor underlies the distinction between Global North and Global South, the role of reproductive 
labor (including subsistence agriculture) at the global margins is fundamental to structures of 




146–147). A recent and helpful iteration of these issues has come from Sirisha Naidu and Lyn 
Ossome, who have argued that gendered labor in the agrarian South, including subsistence 
farming, must be understood in part as engaged in the reproduction of a reserve army of labor 
who may never directly enter the ranks of waged workers but whose presence suppresses wages 
and weakens labor’s political strength (Naidu and Ossome 2016; Ossome 2021). Such a 
perspective is helpful understanding social reproduction in Uluguru where relatively few 
residents find long-term wage work but rather move in and out of informal opportunities within 
and beyond the mountains. 
 As Fernando Coronil (1997) has argued, the international division of labor is bound up 
with a parallel division of nature. I argue here that this is not only the case because national 
economies in the Global South disproportionately rely on the sale of raw materials but also 
because the work of social reproduction—including the reproduction of the environment itself—
is unevenly distributed across space. Scholars taking a world-systems approach to environmental 
justice have long shown how colonial patterns of extraction, exploitation, and violence are 
maintained through the circulation of resources and waste in circuits of uneven exchange 
(Doringer et al. 2021; Frey et al. 2018; Givens, Huang and Jorgenson 2019; Hornborg 1998; 
Mintz 1985; Moore 2003). Such processes of uneven exchange occur alongside more grounded 
forms of environmental colonialism through which the principle of “conservation” has served as 
a justification for the territorial expansion of colonial and neocolonial control, the enclosure of 
the global commons, and the displacement of populations (Mei-Singh 2016; Nelson 2003; 
Neumann 1998). 
The work presented here can be read, in part, as a “spatial ethnography of labor” (Chari 




colonialism, I expand on both by showing the ways in which rural labor in the Global South 
continually absorbs ecological costs generated in capitalist centers. Just as the agrarian question 
has been “exported” to the Global South, so has the ecological question with which it is 
entangled (Moyo, Jha and Yeros 2013). Forests of the Global South are touted as solutions for 
climate change, such as the promised “Great Green Wall” which will traverse the Sahel and soak 
up carbon emissions emanating from the North (Baker 2019). That Africa can be imagined as a 
source of clean air and water depends at once on its depiction as empty land and on the 
invisibility of the ecological labor entailed in tending water sources, trees, and other parts of 
“nature.” At the same time, a counter set of racist, Malthusian images paints Africa as crowded, 
the resources it houses under perpetual threat from an unruly, backward, and ever-expanding 
population. Although such depictions stand in apparent contradiction, they work in tandem to 
displace responsibility for care of the Earth toward the South. 
This process enables the appropriation of land and labor not only to meet material needs 
of the global economy but also, and perhaps more importantly, to defuse political threats to 
capital. Global climate change and other ecological crises have sparked a constellation of social 
movements, many of them global in reach. While many such movements operate within a liberal 
or reformist framework, others offer a more fundamental challenge to capitalism. “Sustainable 
development” projects in the Global South have been useful for diverting some of this political 
energy away from the capitalist core. They do so by continually reinscribing peasants, 
pastoralists, and other rural dwellers as both the source of environmental harms and the solution 
to them. The “Great Green Wall” is a powerful example. As a physical entity, it is expected to 
absorb carbon dioxide and cool the earth, but even without its physical instantiation, the promise 




the magnitude of the Great Green Wall project makes it a powerful example, similar patterns are 
repeated on a smaller scale across the Global South through a seemingly endless stream of 
projects enacted through the apparatus of development. These projects, which often focus on 
changing behaviors of rural people, typically demand both land and labor. However, depictions 
of “nature” as a space devoid of human activity obscures these costs, while the global division of 
nature ensures they accrue at the margins. 
As a water catchment, Uluguru is a critical vantage point from which to trace the spatial 
dynamics of social reproduction. As the argument laid out above indicates, the catchment is not 
only a place for the extraction of clean water but also for the extraction of uncompensated 
ecological labor. The material fruit of this labor, clean water, flows downstream. Some of it 
supports the urban working class in its own processes of social reproduction. More is consumed 
in processes of industrial production and endless construction in the urban center. It also feeds a 
variety of large and small agricultural operations. Coca-Cola bottled in Dar es Salaam uses water 
originating in Uluguru. Infused with syrup and carbon, the water returns to the mountains via 
truck for 1000 TSH (0.43 USD) a bottle. Meanwhile, farmers in Uluguru also serve as 
scapegoats when water supplies run dry downstream. It is difficult to know what the effect would 
be on the flow of the Ruvu River if the Uluguru’s farmers were one day evicted, but it is certain 
that the state and international agencies like the World Bank would no longer be able to respond 
to crises of scarcity with a series of rural development interventions in the mountains. 
The Politics of Social Reproduction 
Katz has called for “a politics focused around social reproduction [which] reconnects 
culture, environment, and political economy in opposition to capitalist globalization across a 




that rainmaking is—or can be—such a politics. The language of rainmaking and social healing 
has served to place questions of social reproduction at the heart of political legitimacy in 
Uluguru for at least two centuries. Practices of social healing are premised on the inseparability 
of human health and fertility from the flourishing of the environment. Through rituals known as 
matambiko (sing. tambiko), care for the dead serves to ensure the wellbeing of future 
generations. These relationships are woven through the landscape in a sacred geography that 
links humans, forests, and water. In this context, discussions over ancestors, rituals, and memory 
serve as sites to theorize and make demands about the proper allocation of responsibility for 
social reproduction in general and the climate more specifically. 
The politics of rainmaking are neither singular nor timeless. They have always been sites 
of political struggle, used by powerful men to justify their control over people and land as well as 
by ordinary people to challenge those who abuse their authority and who fail to bring rain. Social 
reproduction, as Katz rightly warns us, is not in itself revolutionary. Indeed, it is concerned with 
reproducing the social relations which have generated inequality in the first place. Discourses of 
rainmaking can be used to support a range of political stances and are neither inherently anti-
capitalist or nor inherently anti-authoritarian. Rather, what the politics of social healing offers is 
a way of un-fragmenting the gendered, environmental, and labor dimensions of social 
reproduction, and instead insisting on their interconnections as a basis for political mobilization. 
By placing social reproduction at the heart of politics, it also serves to shift responsibility for 
reproduction upward toward the centers of power. When the rains fail, the logic of rainmaking 
suggests that those in positions of power are primarily to blame and political change is in order. 
Such a politics has important implications. As Katz wrote: 
Redistributing responsibility for social reproduction back to capitalists and the 




that would pinpoint its widely distributed costs and promulgate increased social 
justice and equality across classes, nations, localities and gender (2001: 719). 
Social healing, by placing responsibility for social reproduction on those in power, bears this 
potential, but its use toward this end depends on how it is taken up, and by whom. 
Katz’s discussion of the politics of social reproduction shares much in common with 
James Scott’s (1976) concept of the moral economy of the peasant. Drawing on work by E.P. 
Thompson which theorized the moral economy as an explanation for marketplace revolts, Scott 
argued that peasant societies tend to form a moral framework around the principles of 
subsistence and reciprocity, rather than an ethic of profit maximization or egalitarian ideas about 
the distribution of resources (Edelman 2005; Scott 1976; Thompson 1971). Violations of these 
principles, Scott showed, gave rise to peasant resistance and sometimes rebellion. The principle 
of subsistence in this formulation is closely related to ideas of social reproduction developed by 
feminist scholars. 
 Recent work has built on Scott’s foundation to consider environmental questions, 
positing a framework of “moral ecology” to understand struggles over nature in a wide range of 
contexts. Griffin, Jones and Robertson (2019) trace this conversation to Karl Jacoby’s (2001) 
synthesis of the idea of moral economy with work on social banditry. Jacoby examined 
poaching, squatting and other violations of North American conservation laws as sites of 
resistance grounded in moral frameworks that stood in contrast to the dominant forces of colonial 
expansion. In José Martinez-Reyes’s (2021) work in Quintana Roo in Mexico, “moral ecology” 
serves as a description of Mayan relationships to nature which contrast to the neoliberal 
understandings of nature imposed by development and conservation agencies. Caterina 
Scaramelli (2021) offers a more dynamic approach to the term, considering the co-constitution of 




 While my work resonates with these discussions, I find the framework of social 
reproduction more useful than moral economies or moral ecologies in part because it allows for a 
deeper analysis of the ways in which ecological concerns intertwine with issues of gender, labor, 
and health under changing political and economic conditions. Indeed, it was my interlocutors’ 
frequent and insistent invocations of work (kazi), especially along gendered lines, that first led 
me to approach my research through a lens of social reproduction. These connections were made 
clear to me by a woman named Mama Kimwe, one of my key interlocutors in Uluguru. As 
Chapter 2 discusses, Mama Kimwe frequently complained that men in her family had abandoned 
their ritual roles, leaving her and other women without necessary help in times of drought or 
illness. “Tradition is work [mila ni kazi],” she explained emphatically. This comment resonated 
with others I heard, such as when Justina John, a traditional healer, reflected: “Healing is work. 
My gosh, healing is hard work” (interview, April 18, 2018), or when Asha Selemani Matikula, 
struggling to answer a question I had posed about local history, exclaimed, “remembering is 
work, really!” (interview, August 15, 2018).  In remarks like these, I heard echoes of feminist 
scholars and activists who had placed unrecognized forms of labor at the center of their 
struggles.  
Attending to practices of social healing through the framework of labor inverts recent 
efforts to decenter humans in environmental scholarship. Discourses of rainmaking challenge the 
human/nature binary not through an emphasis on “more-than-human” agency (Tsing 2013), but 
rather by recognizing nature as bound up with human history and human labor. Natural places 
are not those where humans are absent but where the spirits of those who died long ago reside 
and where ethical relationships between human generations are continually remade. In this sense, 




Uluguru, there is no prior time, no pre-Anthropocene, when the rains existed apart from human 
agency and human politics. This perspective, by turning climate change on its head, renders 
other sorts of relationships between humans and their environments possible. 
 Such a view also draws attention to the uneven spatial dimensions of climate change. As 
the following chapters show, if anything has changed in Uluguru in the “Anthropocene,” it is not 
that humans have begun to shape the weather but that they have lost the ability to do so. This 
perspective reflects the geography of climate change, in which causes and effects become 
separated across space. Climate change is structured by and reproduces longstanding divisions of 
nature (Coronil 1997). As a result, the ghost of colonialism appears to haunt the map. Harms 
flow from the center and accumulate at the margins, reinscribing longstanding boundaries of 
North and South. Seen from the slopes of Uluguru, then, the climate crisis is colonial and 
requires an anticolonial response. 
As Chapters 1 and 4 discuss, critiques of those in power through the language of social 
healing have often suggested that leaders jeopardized social reproduction through the violation of 
taboos. These taboos demanded those in power remain present in Uluguru near the sacred sites 
where social healing practices were carried out and forbade the use of particular “modern” or 
imported technologies and styles. I argue that these confrontations highlight the inherent 
contradictions between the pulls of colonial and global regimes of power and value and the 
situated demands of social reproduction in the mountains. As such, they resonate with Amin’s 
formulation of “delinking” discussed above as a rejection of the capitalist law of value and a turn 
toward locally determined structures of value instead. However, while Amin focuses primarily 
on production and accumulation at the level of the nation, the claims of social healing orient us 




nation remains a key site of decolonial struggle and offers a structure through which the robust 
political action needed for delinking can become possible. However, as the language of 
rainmaking reminds us, such political action does not emanate from the nation as such. Rather, 
the nation itself emerges through the coalescence of political mobilizations across multiple 
scales. 
The claims rendered through the framework of social healing demand not only change on 
the terrain of political economy but also a radical epistemic opening up that emerges when 
knowledge is no longer measured in terms set elsewhere. In Amin’s formulation, the strategy of 
delinking is marked not only by a shift in economic policy toward other regimes of value but 
also by the development of knowledge untethered from colonial and capitalist logics (1990: 60). 
Sylvia Wynter has similarly identified epistemology as critical site of a decolonial and antiracist 
response to climate change (Wynter and McKittrick 2015). Drawing on Aimé Césaire’s call for a 
“science of the Word,” she has suggested that the climate crisis demands not a decentering of the 
human but rather an expanded understanding of humans as homo narrans, linguistic and 
storytelling beings. In understandings of humans as mere biological organisms among others, 
Wynter finds the roots of eugenics, racism, and climate crisis itself, driven by Malthusian ideas 
of natural scarcity and competition. Rather, by comprehending humanness as a praxis irreducible 
to biology, we can see beyond the horizons of the science of homo oeconomicus to new domains 
of knowledge and to other ways of relating to nature. These calls also echo the work of 
Indigenous scholars like Kyle Whyte (2017), Zoe Todd (Davis and Todd 2017), and Nick Estes 
(2019) who have insisted that the climate crisis is inseparable from histories of colonialism and 





Delinking, Amin hoped, would permit the construction of a “polycentric” world (1990: 
ix). At its root, this vision asks us to turn away from the “blinding light” of the market, and 
toward other values, relationships, and forms of knowledge (Coronil 1997: 46). Conflicts over 
rainmaking have long served as sites to theorize questions of nature, climate, gender, health, and 
labor, but their epistemic and political content is largely invisible to the forces of capital, 
“development,” and the state. Several recent works have considered the ethical and 
environmental implications of rainmaking traditions in the context of climate change (Halperin 
2017; Ombati 2017; Omotoso 2019). However, where this work has tended to frame rainmaking 
in cultural terms, I approach it through a lens of history and political economy. By attending to 
social healing as a site of ongoing debate and struggle over the terms of social reproduction, I 
also suggest that the ideas and relationships it entails, although situated in the space of the 
catchment, are not parochial. 
The catchment at once reinscribes and dismantles ideas of the local. If, as Katz (2001: 
709–711) has argued, social reproduction is bound in particular ways to place, the discourses of 
rainmaking described here are tangled up with specific histories and geographies that converge 
in the Uluguru Mountains. At the same time, however, the catchment has only emerged as a 
place in relation to the cities, villages, plantations, and farms downstream. The feminist 
geographer Doreen Massey (1994) warned against associations of place with boundedness, 
suggesting instead that place be understood as a nexus of relationships that necessarily extend 
beyond itself. Such relationships are always contested and continually remade through struggle 
and through work. The catchment reminds us of the porous and political nature of place. The 




tumbling toward the coast, but of the histories which have rendered it a site of struggle over 
nature and social reproduction. 
“Hapa Kazi Tu” 
The chapters that follow, I, like Kathi Weeks (2011), “run roughshod” over traditional 
distinctions between work and labor, using the two words largely interchangeably. Scholars draw 
a variety of distinctions between “work” and “labor,” but the difference usually hinges on the 
social nature of labor and/or on the reduction of an expansive category to its narrow and 
alienated instantiation as wage labor under capitalism (Arendt 1958: 79–93; Braverman 1998: 
31–35; Marx 1990; Weeks 2011: 14–16; Wolf 1982: 74). John and Jean Comaroff (1987) offer a 
particular formulation of this in the context of South Africa, highlighting the ways Tswana 
involved in wage labor in the mines distinguished between two categories, dira (work) and 
bereka (labor), the latter used only for waged work. In contrast, in Uluguru, there was a single 
word invoked in my conversations: kazi. The words work and labor here both stand as 
translations of kazi. “Work” is the more literal translation. However, because I understand certain 
kinds of kazi to fit the framework of what is usually called “reproductive labor,” I also draw on 
that term, placing my interlocutors in dialog with feminist scholars who likewise insist that 
sustaining communities and their environments is, as Mama Kimwe would say, kazi. 
When my interlocutors in Uluguru invoked kazi, I understood them to at once be 
registering a complaint—that their efforts were perhaps not adequately recognized—and 
expressing pride. There is a widespread valuation of hard work in Tanzania, in part a legacy of 
the ideologies of Tanzanian socialism. In the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania’s first president 
Julius Nyerere valorized work and called for Tanzanians to increase their hours of labor as part 




new nation rested on Tanzanians’ ability to work harder and longer, a demand he made of all but 
rural woman whose working hours he recognized as exceeding that of any other demographic 
(1968: 29–31). Tanzania’s president at the time of my research, John Pombe Magufuli, proved 
skilled at invoking Nyerere’s legacy. During his first presidential campaign in 2015, he 
popularized the slogan “hapa kazi tu,” which literally translates as “here, only work.” The phrase 
carried a dual sense, on the one hand a promise from Magufuli that he would roll up his sleeves 
and get down to business, and on the other, an invocation of the need for hard work from all 
Tanzanians. Its popularity shows some of the weight the word kazi carries. At the same time, the 
pride I encountered in the term kazi from women like Mama Kimwe and Justina John was 
something more than simply a state-cultivated work ethic. Rather, the work they described—
from rainmaking and healing to farming and caring for children—was always bound up with 
specialized knowledge and skill. In the discussions of labor that follow, I maintain this sense of 
work not only as a process of expending effort but as a skilled practice inseparable from 
carefully cultivated forms of knowledge and the social relationships through which such 
knowledge is produced and sustained. 
Uluguru 
Most residents of Uluguru are descendants of several waves of famers who arrived in the 
mountains beginning sometime between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The most 
important social institutions among these settlers were matrilineal lineages. Accounts agree that 
by the nineteenth century, these lineages held significant control over land tenure in many areas 
of the mountains. According to accounts recorded since the colonial era, political power in 
lineages was concentrated in the hands of elders while male lineage heads, selected by the 




to lineage members. This depiction of the lineage, as Chapter 1 discusses, was a simplification of 
more complex and contested dynamics and was produced by predominately elite men and the 
colonial administrators, missionaries, and ethnographers who recorded their accounts. In 
practice, lineage control over land and people was often tenuous and stood against other forms of 
social organization and shifting political dynamics within and beyond the mountains. 
Nevertheless, the lineage was not simply an invention of colonial ethnography. Its ubiquity in 
discussions of the mountains’ history for a century and a half indicates that as an institution and 
an idealized charter for social life, it played a significant role in the ordering of politics, land, and 
social relations in the mountains and in making claims about power, obligations, and access to 
resources. 
Figure 1. Map of Uluguru in Tanzania. (Map created using images retrieved from 




Those who settled Uluguru cultivated and maintained a constellation of sacred groves 
where farming was prohibited. These groves were associated with powerful spirits and were the 
site of a set of rituals today known as matambiko. Matambiko varied widely over time and place, 
but in general, they served to maintain relationships between the living and their ancestors, the 
former offering ritual beer and reciting sacred words and the latter bringing health and fertility to 
the lineage and its land, including abundant rains. Many groves were associated with particular 
lineages and their ancestor spirits. Others were home to more powerful territorial spirits. These 
spirits were understood to have the ability to heal or harm both the land and its people and were 
particularly known for their control over rain across broad areas. It is to the sacred forests 
inhabited by these territorial spirits that people would travel from far and wide during times of 
drought, bearing black cloth,5 chickens, and other offerings to secure good rains and fruitful 
harvests. 
Sacred forests served as spaces for the consolidation of political power and were the 
frequent site of political struggle between both individuals and lineages. Indeed, the line between 
lineage and territorial spirits and the forests associated with them changed frequently as centers 
of power rose and fell. Rainmaking was the central and most powerful instantiation of 
matambiko, marking an ability to command the health and fertility of entire regions. As Chapter 
1 shows, powerful leaders did not become so because of their rainmaking abilities, as many early 
colonial observers believed. Rather, rainmaking was a practice through which control over 
people and resources gained in other ways was consolidated and reproduced. At the time of my 
research, both ancestor and territorial spirits were known as mizimu. The slippage between spirit 
categories is also a product of these political struggles. As elsewhere in East and Central Africa, 
 





spirits have long been intimately bound up with questions of power (Feierman 1990, 1995; 
Fields 1985; Glassman 1995: 23–24; Gordon 2012; Hinfelaar 1989; Kodesh 2007; Schoenbrun 
2006). 
By the nineteenth century, residents of the mountains had become known as Waluguru 
(sing. Mluguru), a geographical term meaning “people of the mountains.” The language they 
spoke was referred to as Kiluguru by Swahili speakers and Chiluguru locally, although residents 
of Uluguru often note the wide differences in dialects spoken throughout the mountains. 
“Luguru” was recorded as a tribe by the German and British colonial administrations in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, despite uncertainty about its exact boundaries and 
relations to neighboring groups. Today, “Luguru” is considered an ethnic group although many 
Luguru people note its recent origins. 
Uluguru, like other mountain landscapes, is best defined by its heterogeneity. Rainfall 
varies widely between east and west, but also often falls unevenly from slope to slope. 
Temperatures at the base of the mountains are typically 5–10 degrees Celcius warmer than the 
highest occupied elevations. A biodiversity hotspot, the small range is home to hundreds of 
vertebrate species and thousands of varieties of insects and plants. Fourteen species of vertebrate, 
along with numerous insects and plants, are found only in Uluguru (Bracebridge et al. 2005; 
Doggart et al. 2004). Soils vary widely from ruddy clays and sandy browns to rich black loam. In 
some places, limestone outcroppings tower over patches of forest, frequently concealing 
openings to jumbled caves which serve as gateways to the spirit world below the earth and in 
which Waluguru once hid during times of war. In this rich and variegated landscape, it is 
difficult to make generalizations: about the causes of soil erosion, about how much rain to 




Residence in the mountains is concentrated in villages, largely the result of compulsory 
villagization under the socialist regime of the 1970s in which thousands of families were forced 
to relocate from scattered hamlets to planned villages. Most contemporary residents of Uluguru 
identify farming as their primary occupation, cultivating a few acres of land, most often owned 
but sometimes rented or borrowed. In addition to farming, many also run small businesses and 
engage in a wide range of formal and informal labor in and beyond the mountains. Most houses 
in the mountains are made of baked bricks, with corrugated metal roofs and dirt floors, though 
the wealthy live in cinderblock homes with cement or tile floors and the poorest live in rented 
rooms or in small homes with wattle and daub walls and thatch roofs.6 
Farmers in Uluguru grow a dizzying number of crops, although maize and rice are the 
most common. These crops are primarily grown for household consumption and serve as staples, 
supplemented by cassava and banana. Farmers also grow a variety of vegetables and legumes for 
both consumption and sale. Fruit7 and spices8 serve as the principal cash crops in the eastern 
mountains. Tree crops also include species used for oil, timber, and pole production, along with 
kapok.9 A few farmers in the mountains grow coffee, and sugar is common in small patches of 
wetter land. Millet, once the region’s staple, remains only in small quantities, primarily used to 
brew beer (pombe). Some crops are grown for local sale, most notably cassava, while fruits and 
vegetables are usually sold in the markets of Morogoro, Dar es Salaam and other cities. Some 
spices make their way to international export. Most farmers sell their crops to middlemen either 
at their farms or at the local market since few have vehicles to bring crops to Morogoro or Dar es 
 
6 Unbaked brick sits between wattle and daub and baked brick in terms of expense and desirability but is less 
common than the latter. 
7 Fruits grown include jackfruit, mango, pineapple, guava, soursop, custard apple, avocado, passion fruit, breadfruit, 
coconut, and a variety of citrus fruits, along with berries and peaches at higher elevations. 
8 Most commonly cloves, black pepper, vanilla, and cinnamon 




Salaam themselves. Remittances from relatives working outside the mountains are common. The 
wealthy and upwardly mobile—including a small number of salaried government employees as 
well as some successful traders and shopkeepers—get additional income from a variety of local 
and non-local investments, most commonly buildings and vehicles for rent. Those who invest 
significantly in farmland usually do so outside the mountains, as terrain in most of Uluguru 
renders tractors useless and makes larger-scale cultivation impractical. 
Because of the terrain and the lack of paved roads, areas that are only a few kilometers 
apart on a map can feel much further away and it can take hours to travel short distances. At the 
same time, Uluguru is not “remote” or “isolated” in any sense. Buses and minivans known as 
Noahs10 ferry people to and from Morogoro and Dar es Salaam each day, while trucks haul fruit 
and timber to the markets in the cities or arrive with cases of soda and beer to restock the bars, 
restaurants, and shops along the roads. Meanwhile, hundreds of motorcycles weave across the 
slopes carrying passengers and cargo to villages off the main roads. Only in the height of the 
rainy seasons do areas sometimes become cut off from this constant movement for days or 
occasionally weeks at a time. 
Mkuyuni 
 This study focuses primarily on an area in northeastern Uluguru called Mkuyuni. 
Mkuyuni is at once a village, a ward, and a division, each administrative unit referring to a 
successively larger section of the northeastern mountains. My work traversed these scales, 
although the bulk of my interviews and the entirety of my household survey were conducted in 
Mkuyuni Ward. Mkuyuni emerged as a market town and the seat of the Native Authority early in 
the British colonial period (1920–1961). The central market sits just below the main road as it 
 




curves south to Matombo and the Selous Game Reserve, a jumble of corrugated metal and 
temporary stalls where everything from vegetables to cell phones to Qurans are sold. The village 
itself encompasses a broader area extending behind the market and along the main road to the 
north and south. South along the road from the market, a row of small shops and bars gives away 
to a cluster of three small Pentecostal churches and a small guest house around the turnoff to 
Changa Village. The Catholic and Lutheran churches lie just beyond, alongside a few small 
mosques, satellites of the main Friday mosque, tucked in a valley behind the market. 
Figure 2. Map of Mkuyuni Division. (Map based on terrain and satellite images 




 Mkuyuni Ward includes six villages: Mkuyuni, Changa, Kivuma, Kibwaya, Madamu, 
and Mfumbwe. Seated high above Mkuyuni Ward to the west are Kinole and Tegetero Wards, 
accessible by a road that climbs steeply westward from Kibwaya. To the east lies Kibuko Ward, 
which contains the villages of Luholole, Kibuko, and Mwalazi. The population of Mkuyuni 
Ward is approximately 17,000. Our household survey, conducted between December 2017 and 
March 2018, found an average household size of around five people. Most households had a few 
chickens and at least one cellphone, bed, and mattress, but larger livestock, motor vehicles, large 
appliances, televisions, and gas and electric stoves were rare. A few households near the roads 
had been connected to the electric grid in the preceding decade, but this was not the norm. Indoor 
plumbing was nearly non-existent, and most households fetched water from scattered taps or 
wells, the former only operating on certain days of the week in several villages. Most households 
farmed a few acres of land (avg.=3.5) scattered across two or three separate plots. People 
generally owned their farms individually or jointly with spouses or siblings, but some rented or 
borrowed.11 Plots averaged about fifty minutes from home on foot.12 
 Mkuyuni Ward is in many ways an intermediate area in Uluguru. It lies at a far lower 
elevation than the villages of Kinole and Tegetero, and little more than an hour from Morogoro 
town when conditions of both the weather and the vehicle permit a smooth ride. It is 
predominately Muslim (approximately 90%, with nearly all following Sunni Islam) but it also 
has a sizeable Catholic population and several small but growing Pentecostal churches, as well as 
even smaller Adventist and Lutheran congregations. Kinole, in contrast, sits high on the hills and 
is considered one of the important centers of Luguru tradition (mila). It is the home of Kingalu, a 
 
11 Of farms on which we collected data during our household survey, 70% were owned and 30% were rented or 
borrowed. 





man many consider the hereditary “chief” of Uluguru. This title, in part a result of the careful 
political maneuvering in the early years of British indirect rule and in part a reflection of longer 
processes of consolidation in the nineteenth century, is widely recognized in Mkuyuni and the 
surrounding areas. Kingalu’s home and a neighboring grove containing the graves of his 
predecessors remain an important destination for rainmaking rituals in the mountains. 
 I selected Mkuyuni as a research site because of its position between Morogoro and 
Kinole. Many residents of Uluguru described areas higher in the mountains as more authentically 
“Luguru” and credited those at higher elevations with better knowledge of mila and of Kiluguru, 
the local language which has been largely replaced with Swahili in everyday life. Several people 
told me I should have done my research higher in the hills if I wanted to know about mila and 
utamaduni (culture). In this imaginary, history is mapped onto elevation, and Mkuyuni stands in 
an intermediate place, on the cusp between past and present. Many in Mkuyuni described this as 
a deficit—a space lacking deep historical and cultural roots but also excluded from the 
conveniences of urban life in Morogoro town. At the same time, those who live in Mkuyuni 
travel regularly between the areas uphill and the urban areas further down, traversing both 
vertical space and the temporal senses grafted onto it as they move between markets, farms, 
relatives, jobs, places of worship, and places of business. Put simply, they know their way 
around. 
Environmental Change in Uluguru 
As we have seen, interventions in Uluguru have often been premised on a need to protect 
the water supply, especially in light of declining downstream flows. These concerns date back to 
the earliest years of colonialism and while they have been intensified by the growth of Dar es 




enterprises in the central coast region. There is little doubt that flows of the Ruvu have declined, 
but the reason is unclear. While many interventions focus on Uluguru, measurements showing 
the river’s decline come from far downstream and thus reflect not only changes in the mountains 
but growing agricultural, industrial, and residential uses in the lowlands below (Lopa et al. 
2012). Most reports suggest in addition to increased upstream water use, soil erosion plays a 
particular role in decreasing flows as well as increasing turbidity and pollution. In eastern 
Uluguru, some furrow and hosepipe irrigation diverts flows from the Ruvu’s tributaries, but most 
farms are rainfed. Erosion and deforestation are thus the primary points of intervention. The 
cutting and burning of trees, along with other poor farming practices, experts suggest, have led to 
increasing erosion, threatening not only the rivers but also the livelihoods of farmers in the 
mountains. 
 While there seems to be broad consensus in official reports that erosion has threatened 
downstream flows, it is unclear whether the rains in Uluguru are also changing, and if so why. 
While at least one official report suggests there has been no change in rainfall in the Ruvu Basin 
since the 1950s, this conclusion was based on dry-season averages at three downstream stations 
(Lopa et al. 2012). The climate patterns in Eastern Uluguru are significantly different from those 
in other parts of the basin, so this data is inconclusive. Conflicting predictions about the long-
term effect of global climate change on rainfall in Uluguru abound, although most agree that 
rainfall patterns will grow more erratic and polarization between wet and dry seasons will 
accelerate, increasing the risk of both floods and droughts (Chamshama, Iddi and Mvena 2008: 
3; Muthui and Mariki 2018: 79; Ngana, Mahay and Cross 2010: 29; Paavola 2008). Farmers I 
spoke with in the mountains most often stated that rainfall had declined overall, while others 




predictable, making it difficult for farmers to prepare their fields each season. Moreover, many 
farmers told me that the government largely agreed that rainfall was decreasing, and that local 
deforestation was primarily to blame. These messages, apparently received from extension 
agents, outreach campaigns, and a variety of other official sources, warned farmers that tree 
cutting would lead to processes of desertification and decrease the rains upon which farmers 
rely.13 There are no clear data on overall changes to rainfall in the eastern mountains, let alone 
data that would point conclusively to local or global factors. At the same time, concerns about 
declines caused by local deforestation bleed into concerns about the role of deforestation in 
increased erosion, which, as we have seen, is also believed to have contributed to declining flows 
downstream. Thus, while there is widespread consensus that tree loss bears some of the blame 
for decreases in the availability of water, there is considerable confusion about the exact 
mechanisms through which this happens both on the part of officials and on the part of residents 
of the mountains. 
Depictions of Uluguru from scientists, government officials, and development agencies 
tend to paint a Malthusian view of the mountains as overcrowded and increasingly degraded. 
Many such reports predict that the mountains will become uninhabitable within a few years, and 
official discussions about the feasibility of evicting the whole population from the mountains 
have recurred since the early colonial period (see Chapters 1 and 4). It is true that Uluguru is 
densely populated (although exact statistics are difficult to find) and that soil fertility has 
declined in many areas. There are few within the mountains or outside of them who question that 
forest cover has also been significantly reduced both from cutting wood for timber and firewood 
 
13 It is possible that some of these messages have focused on the processes of desertification and deforestation in 
general and that they were not accompanied by claims that this had already occurred in Uluguru. The latter 





and from the clearing of new fields through controlled burns. At the same time, when the erosion 
began, when the flows declined, and when the forests were cut are difficult to pinpoint. Reports 
from a hundred years ago and from today are remarkably similar. Whatever the case, the 
mountains’ farmers have defied these fatalistic predictions for over a century, continuing to eke 
out a living on the mountains’ steep slopes. 
 One of the reasons they have been able to do so is by diversifying livelihood strategies 
and finding ways to increase yields (Mdee et al. 2018; Ponte 2001). Another reason is that 
residents of Uluguru engage in significant but often unseen forms of ecological labor, caring for 
critical aspects of the environment under conditions of increasing constraint and scarcity. This is 
not to suggest that Waluguru are inherent environmentalists or that they have lived “in harmony” 
with the ecosystem. I do not question that many farmers in the mountains have engaged in 
unsustainable practices of tree cutting and water usage. However, I also argue that many people 
in the mountains also work hard to maintain the ecosystems on which their own livelihoods rely, 
and that they do so in the face of increasing economic and political constraint and the breakdown 
of collective institutions which once helped to manage resources and heal the earth. This 
ecological labor, however, is not distributed evenly and has been the source of gendered, 
generational, and classed struggles since people settled in the mountains several centuries ago. 
Research Methods 
My research was conducted over 18 months: 15 months from October 2017 to January 
2019, and three months in the summers of 2015 and 2016. Over this time, I carried out a 
household survey of 224 households in Mkuyuni Ward, conducted over 150 interviews, and 
engaged in a number of activities that fall under the broad umbrella of participant-observation. I 




Africana Collection at the University of Dar es Salaam, and the archives of the Sokoine National 
Agricultural Library. I also spent many Friday mornings in the clerk’s office at the Mkuyuni 
primary court, where the clerk and judge generously let me dig through piles of dusty folders to 
review hundreds of civil and criminal cases related to land, inheritance, forests, and water. As a 
foreign researcher in Tanzania, I was affiliated with the Department of Agricultural Extension 
and Community Development at Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Morogoro with the 
official title of research associate. From January 2018 to January 2019, I lived in a rented house 
in Mkuyuni Village, a five-minute walk from the market. During the summers of 2015 and 2016 
and for the first few months of my main research period, I lived in Morogoro town, with periodic 
stays in Dar es Salaam. 
Throughout this research I collaborated with my research assistant, Gerald Berege, whom 
I first met in 2015 in Falkland, a small area on the edge of Morogoro near SUA. Gerald was with 
friends and he rather pointedly introduced the group: “We are the unemployed graduates of the 
university.” Gerald had graduated from SUA with a degree in Rural Development but, aside 
from a few short stints, had been unable to secure a job, an issue he attributed in large part to a 
lack of family connections. Gerald, whose mother is Mluguru from the western side of the 
mountains, soon began assisting me with my research and attendant logistical hurdles. As 
someone of partial Luguru descent but who grew up in town, graduated from university, and 
lacked family connections in Mkuyuni, Gerald was mostly seen as an outsider by those we 
interviewed. At the same time, he was much less of an outsider than I was, as a white American, 
and his social proximity to communities in Uluguru helped put at least some of those we spoke 
to at ease, especially through conversations about his lineage and their home on the other side of 




together. However, he commuted from Morogoro town and only came to Mkuyuni four or five 
days a week. The archival research, participant-observation, and informal interviews and 
conversations I did mostly alone. 
All research was carried out in Swahili, which is the most spoken language in daily life in 
the mountains. Kiluguru is also spoken in greetings and ritual settings, to baffle nosy outsiders, 
and to simply to relish in the sorts of social and cultural connections the shared language 
represents to residents of Uluguru. Many in Mkuyuni took time to tutor me in Kiluguru and by 
the end of my time there, I could engage in lengthy but basic pleasantries with my neighbors. 
Because Kiluguru and Kiswahili share significant similarities in grammar and vocabulary, it was 
also possible for me to make out some meaning in conversations that otherwise exceeded my 
linguistic abilities. 
The household survey (n=224), which was conducted from December 2017 to March 
2018, used a random walk sampling method.14 We surveyed every fifteenth house in the six 
villages of Mkuyuni Ward, asking about household composition, age, place of birth, religion, 
clan, occupation, education, socioeconomic markers (such as house type and ownership of 
livestock and household items), farm ownership, size, and location and crop selection. We also 
asked which crops were sold and where. We further attempted to capture information on sources 
of income such as remittances but found the answers we received inconsistent and ultimately 
 
14 Households were defined as those who prepared a majority of their meals together. We paid local government 
officials or individuals they recommended to us 10,000 TSH (4.00 USD) per day to help find the locations of hamlet 
and homes, since many are scattered away from the main roads and boundaries of villages are not clearly marked. 
However, we made certain that our guides waited well out of earshot both when asking for informed consent and 
during the survey itself. We explained to each participant that the survey was optional and unaffiliated with the 
government. We also worked to find somewhat unpredictable counting methods that would make it difficult for our 
guides to influence our household selection. We believe we were largely successful in maintaining a random 




unusable.15 Formal interviews, which were conducted primarily from April 2018 to January 
2019, were semi-structured, with a flexible schedule of questions about local history, Luguru 
culture and traditions, issues of environmental change, religious beliefs, challenges faced by the 
community, and hopes for the future. Most questions were open-ended, and we tried to follow 
the lead of our interviewees on topics to highlight. To select interview subjects, we asked 
existing contacts to identify individuals who were particularly knowledgeable about local history 
and culture. We strove for gender balance, focusing primarily on elders but over time 
incorporating more young interviewees. Later we also engaged in more targeted sampling 
focusing on particular religious groups (Islamic reformists and Pentecostal Christians) and 
traditional healers (waganga). We also carried out several group interviews with elders in 
Ludewa Village (Kinole Ward) and with youth in Mkuyuni and Kibwaya Villages (Mkuyuni 
Ward). Beyond this, I also had interviews or informal conversations with many village and ward 
officials, individuals who had worked as surveyors during villagization in the 1970s, religious 
leaders, and individuals involved in specific NGO-run development projects, both residents of 
Uluguru and current and former project staff in Morogoro town. Most interviews were done in 
single sessions but occasionally, we returned for one or more follow-up sessions and/or informal 
conversations. To compensate for time and labor expended on participation, we paid all 
household survey and interview participants 5,000 TSH (approximately 2.00 USD)16 per survey 
 
15 There are several possible reasons for this. Some respondents suspected, despite our repeated protests to the 
contrary, that we might be screening for eligibility in some sort of development program with direct material 
benefits, and thus they were hesitant to indicate cash income. In other cases, remittance income was too inconsistent 
to be easily reported to us or did not seem to respondents to fall within the parameters of our questions. 
16 I settled on this amount in consultation with Gerald as well as my advisor at SUA, Gabriel Nzalayaimisi. It was 
intended to rest at the upper end of rates for informal labor in the area but not to be so high that poorer individuals 
would feel compelled to participate. I had originally intended to pay more for interviews than surveys, since the 
former took considerably more time (45–120 minutes instead of 20–30 minutes) but we quickly realized that paying 




or interview session, with the exception of government officials, religious leaders, and NGO staff 
who we spoke to in their professional capacities. 
During my time in Mkuyuni, I also visited one of the village’s churches nearly every 
Sunday, rotating between the three small Pentecostal congregations and the larger Catholic 
church. As a non-Muslim, I was not permitted in either the main Friday mosque or the newer 
reformist mosque. However, one smaller satellite mosque permitted me to attend a few sessions 
of madrassa where women and children were instructed in Quran and proper Muslim prayer, and 
numerous Muslim leaders and teachers met with me to explain questions of religious practice 
and belief throughout my research. I also attended girls’ initiation ceremonies in both their 
traditional and Islamic iterations, as well as weddings, public holiday celebrations, and memorial 
and funeral services. After finishing interviews each day, I often spent late afternoons drinking 
soda and eating chipsi mayai17 in one of Mkuyuni’s small restaurants, sipping small cups of 
coffee with old men along the road, or visiting with vendors around the market. I also developed 
lasting relationships with several key interlocutors whom I would visit regularly to talk 
informally about my research questions and other topics of interest. On such visits, I would often 
bring small gifts of sugar or tea. I also received many gifts, most often freshly harvested fruit. 
* * * 
Throughout research, I tried to bracket questions of “truth” or “accuracy” in my 
interviews and conversations (although this is easier said than done, I quickly found). Feminist 
researchers and other scholars have long questioned the notion of an objective truth against 
which accounts can be measured, instead pointing to the ways in which knowledge is always 
shaped by processes of narration and memory, as well as by power relations (Brooks and Hesse-
 




Biber 2007). Moreover, misrememberings, silences, and lies often reveal as much as they 
obscure, although the “truths” they contain may be in a different register (Portelli 1991). In the 
interviews and conversations that constituted the bulk of my research, I approached speech not as 
primarily representational but as a social act bound up in relations of power, an act that carries 
intentions and demands response—not only words but also actions. In this, I follow Bakhtin: 
[The speaker] does not expect passive understanding that, so to speak, only 
duplicates his own idea in someone else’s mind. Rather, he expects response, 
agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth…. The desire to make 
one’s speech understood is only an abstract aspect of the speaker’s concrete and 
total speech plan (Bakhtin 1986: 69). 
Language is not simply used to transfer information but is embedded in complex social relations 
of which it is an integral part. It not only conveys content but seeks response. Following from 
this understanding, I focused not on whether responses I received were “true” (in the sense of 
accuracy or genuineness) but what they aimed to achieve and what they asked of me. Because 
the people I interviewed knew I was writing a book, I typically understood their answers to my 
questions as, in part, requests to share particular pieces of information, opinions, and framings. I 
have tried to treat these requests with care and respect, although I have certainly not met them 
all—indeed, it would be impossible not only for reasons of space but because many requests 
stood in direct contradiction and because I, like others, had my own agendas as well. 
 Some requests were more explicit. One day in June 2018, I went to the village office to 
meet with the Village Executive Officer who was supposed to show me documents related to 
several recent land cases. When I arrived, three SUA professors from the Department of 
Agricultural Extension and Community Development (DAECD) were in the midst of a meeting 
with the village livestock officer and several other village leaders, following up on research done 
by a student the prior year. I was told to have a seat and wait, so I sat awkwardly against the back 




that people in Mkuyuni were tired of SUA students showing up to do research, getting their 
degrees, and departing, leaving those in Mkuyuni to wonder about the results of the research to 
which they had contributed. As a graduate student researcher affiliated to DAECD at SUA, I 
understood the message was also directed at me, whether by design or chance. And indeed, I 
heard similar sentiments many times during my research. Many of those who participated in my 
household survey or interviews asked whether results would be shared. I agreed that they would, 
and that I would ensure that a copy of this study would be deposited at the ward office in 
English, and that Swahili summaries, to be followed eventually by fuller translations, would 
follow as soon as I was able to find the time or funds. 
 One outcome of this research will therefore be the creation of a small archive in 
Mkuyuni. This will contain copies of this text and related articles along with copies of several 
published books about the region, and some accounts by elders I recorded explicitly for 
preservation and sharing. I also hope it will contain copies of additional books, dissertations and 
theses pertaining to the area. During my research, Mkuyuni lacked stable internet beyond a 2G 
level, and few people had access to smartphones. The flow of knowledge from Uluguru, like the 
flow of water and other resources, has been extractive. Taking the small measures I have 
proposed will not reverse these larger flows. For that, structural change is needed (Chitere and 
Mutiso 2015; Edelman 2009; Hale 2007). 
 Finally, it should be noted that most of the names I use in the following chapters are real. 
A few people requested anonymity, but the vast majority wanted to be cited and recognized for 
their knowledge. Even in cases where accounts involved direct criticism of relatives or neighbors 
or otherwise involved controversial opinions, my interlocutors typically insisted that I should 




scholars whose articles and books have also contributed to this study. Together, these two groups 
make up my main interlocutors—that is, those with whom I am in conversation and whose 
knowledge and theorizations I draw on to make sense of the questions addressed in the following 
chapters. 
As this suggests, I engaged my interlocutors in Uluguru as experts and fellow theorists 
(F. Harrison 2016; Nordstrom 2009). Jan Kees van Donge (1993), in his work in Western 
Uluguru, reported that, despite his best efforts, he could not elicit sophisticated interpretations or 
theorizations of social life from those he spoke to in the mountains. In my conversations, I found 
the opposite to be true. Many people I spoke with in Uluguru had rich interpretations of social 
and environmental change. Often, such interpretations came to light through small statements, 
like Mama Kimwe’s exclamation, quoted above, that tradition is work. The analyses embedded 
in such statements emerged over the course of multiple conversations and through the process of 
building social relationships. In our ongoing discussions, elders shared with me complex 
analyses of shifting relationships to land in the socialist period and their links to broader 
philosophical questions about the nation, equality, and labor (Chapter 2), and of the changing 
economic pressures that had contributed deforestation and upended relations to the past (Chapter 
4). Due to the asymmetrical flow of knowledge out of the mountains (and from Swahili into 
English), there are limits to which most of those who live in Uluguru have been able to read and 
engage with the scholarly publications I cite here, but I do not think that their knowledge or 
theories were therefore more parochial or bound to the horizons of the “local.” Rather, all 
knowledge is assembled from diverse sources and all is informed and limited by positionality in 




Spies, Lizards, and the Politics of Knowledge 
In 2016, while at SUA, I met a young Tanzanian anthropologist named Sylvester Haule 
who had conducted extensive research about the sacred forest at Kolero, Uluguru’s most 
important rainmaking shrine. As Haule was wrapping up his research and I was just beginning 
my own, he warned me that I should prepare to be met with obfuscation if I tried to carry out 
ethnographic research in the mountains. In the first nine months of his research, Haule had 
eagerly recorded interview data about the community’s relationship to the sacred forest, but as he 
began to assemble his findings, they began to fall apart. While he had found many people willing 
to speak to him and answer his questions, the accounts he gathered did not hang together. 
Instead, they appeared to be a series of misdirections and partial truths which led him in circles. 
Haule was discouraged but he persevered, returning to Kolero to continue his research. Over the 
time he had stayed in the area, he found, he had gradually built trust, especially through offering 
rides to the hospital in town and in providing other forms of material assistance to members of 
the community. Extending his stay in Kolero to nearly two years, he was able to develop 
relationships and to gain significant information about the Kolero spirit and its forest. 
 Haule’s difficulty gaining information was in part the result of tensions around poaching 
and illegal logging in Kolero. Both the Kolero forest’s potential as a site of illicit logging and its 
proximity to Selous Game Reserve to the south meant that the area had come under scrutiny 
from the state, and several area residents had been arrested and faced charges for poaching just 
before Haule began his fieldwork. Haule was a Tanzanian but not Mluguru and did not have any 
connection to the area beyond his research. In light of this, residents of the area were 
understandably suspicious of their new visitor and his deep curiosity about their use of natural 




 Concerns about anthropologists as agents of the state or foreign interests resonate with 
the long history of colonial anthropology in the area.18 As Chapter 1 shows, colonial 
ethnography was an important tool for the consolidation of administrative power by both the 
British and certain elite men in the mountains. Fears about the role of anthropologists in 
struggles over power were further amplified during the Cold War, when Tanzanian socialism and 
the country’s political and material support of liberation movements around the continent made it 
a target for espionage. Indeed, I heard a rumor of a foreign spy who had posed as a researcher 
interested in traditional Luguru dances and who used this cover to smuggle vital information out 
of the country some decades prior to my research. Although no one was able (or willing?) to tell 
me to what this smuggled information may have pertained, I suspect it was related to the African 
National Congress (ANC) training base located in the Uluguru area during the struggle against 
apartheid in South Africa. 
 To the best of my knowledge, the people I spoke with in Uluguru did not suspect me of 
being a spy for a foreign government19 nor of gathering information for antipoaching policing (a 
subject of considerably less interest in Mkuyuni than in areas closer to forest and game reserves 
like Kolero). I also made little secret of my politics during my fieldwork, although I generally 
abstained from commenting on Tanzanian electoral or party politics, a subject that became 
increasingly fraught during my time in Uluguru. For related reasons, I avoided dealing with 
government bureaucrats and police as much as possible, except for local authorities such as 
village and hamlet chairmen. 
 
18 The use of anthropologists as spies has been widely documented elsewhere (Edelman 2009: 252–253; Gusterson 
2003; Price 2002, 2008). 
19 One possible exception may be the reformist Muslims, who did understandably suspect I was there to gather 




 Despite my general distance from the Tanzanian and American governments, however, I 
was still subject to several suspicions from my interlocutors, chief among them that I was in 
search of the gold and gemstones that are found in small quantities in the mountains. Foreign 
interest in Uluguru, especially during Kikwete’s largely laissez faire administration (2005–
2015), centered on the region’s mineral resources and the area was home to several small mines 
with a mix of domestic and foreign owners and investors.20 Gerald patiently fielded countless 
calls inquiring whether I was interested in buying gemstones. Men would frequently approach 
me, show me a palm full of dusty gems, and ask if I knew their value or if I could connect them 
with potential buyers. Others would describe rock formations or mineral deposits on their land to 
see if I had any insight into their potential value. I heard rumors of other white people appearing 
with maps, digging, and leaving with unknown items. Many wondered if I had come for similar 
purposes. 
Over time, however, I came to understand that gold and gemstones are not the only 
wealth believed to lie below the surface of the mountains. Rumors about deposits of mineral 
wealth blur with rumors of buried wealth, hidden by the Germans when they were driven out by 
the British. I first remember hearing these rumors on the back of a motorcycle down the long 
southward descent out of the mountains on my way to get a letter from the district office at 
Mvuha approving my research. The young motorcycle driver, an acquaintance from years before, 
told me that on a farm belonging to his family, there was a trunk that had been left by the 
Germans. He wanted to know if I knew what it might be and whether it was safe to open. When I 
asked why he had not looked himself, he said he was afraid it might be dangerous. He seemed to 
believe the box had been left by Germans during wartime and I initially understood his fear to be 
 
20 In addition to these mines, the Mkuyuni area sees a steady trickle of artisanal miners from around Tanzania. The 




about the potential for unexploded munitions. About six months later, in June 2018, my research 
assistant and I were interviewing a seventy-two-year-old former village official named Ali 
Ming’walu about local history when the conversation veered in an unexpected direction. Mzee 
Ming’walu began telling us that he knew where the Germans had buried their treasures of gold, 
mercury, and rupees (interview, June 4, 2018).21 Gerald and I looked at each other in 
bewilderment and attempted to redirect the conversation back to the topics we had come to 
discuss. Eventually, however, I was able to place Mzee Ming’walu’s comments in the context of 
a constellation of rumors about subterranean riches in the mountains. 
The boundaries between natural and buried treasure in Uluguru are unclear. Instead, 
whispered rumors paint a picture of an underground laced with stores of wealth that are 
inseparable from questions of history. The underground is often understood in Uluguru to be the 
residence of ancestors and other spirits who live and farm below the earth. From this perspective, 
the location of mineral wealth is never “natural.” It is always entangled with the ghosts of the 
past. Like discourses of rainmaking, this understanding of mineral wealth troubles the distinction 
between humans and nature not through an understanding of non-human agents acting on 
humans but through an understanding of nature as a place where relationships among humans, 
living and dead, are inscribed in the landscape. Underground riches are guarded by spirits of 
ambiguous identity and origin, perhaps conjured by long-gone Germans to protect their ill-gotten 
wealth or maybe simply angry mapepo22 who do not like their subterranean homes disturbed. 
Rumors of harm befalling those who try to access buried wealth abound, and indeed the area’s 
small-scale mining operations are dangerous and sometimes deadly (Ramadhani Bakali, personal 
 
21 Mzee is a term referring to an elder man. I use it as an honorific throughout the text. For women, I use the 
honorifics Bibi (grandmother, elder woman) or Mama (mother). 
22 A category of spirit widely believed to occupy certain places in the landscape including rocks and trees. Mapepo 




communication, December 27, 2018). When people asked me about mineral wealth on their land, 
some did see me as a potential geologist with relevant scientific knowledge, but there was 
another reason some approached me. I was suspected of being a grandchild of German settlers, 
back to claim their treasure. Perhaps, it was thought, I knew how to get past the guarding spirits 
and bring the treasures to the surface. To understand this suspicion and its importance, however, 
we also have to understand something about lizards and medicine. 
* * * 
On a sweltering day in October 2018, Gerald and I took the bumpy motorcycle ride 
northeast from Mkuyuni to interview an elderly man named Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko in 
Luholole Village. We introduced ourselves to the tall, gaunt 75-year-old and settled in for our 
interview, taking shelter from the glaring sun in the narrow strip of shade offered by the eave of 
his daughter’s small house. As we began to discuss the history of the mountains, his daughter 
and son-in-law joined our conversation. Mzee Sipriani’s daughter, Berinada, was sparing in her 
comments, but her husband, Deodat, an energetic man in his late forties, was eager to share his 
thoughts about local history and tradition. Although he was relatively young, Deodat has been 
initiated into the society of elders after inheriting a lineage name (see Chapter 2) and he held 
considerable knowledge of Luguru medicines (dawa). One such medicine was mazimbo, a 
widespread term for lineage medicine. As Deodat explained, each lineage had its own such 
medicine, which was made during matambiko rituals and stored in a pot in the home of the 
lineage head. If someone from another lineage attempted to open the pot and steal the medicine, 





The term dawa in Swahili refers to medicine in a broad sense. Medicines, in this view, 
are assemblages of substances, words, and acts which bring healing, protection, fertility, or good 
fortune to those who use them properly. Medicines received at the hospital are considered dawa, 
as are herbal medicines known as mitishamba, many of which rely on wild plants collected in 
forests or other uncultivated areas. Pesticides to protect crops, whether chemical or organic, are 
dawa, as are the substances made during rainmaking rituals at Kolero and Kinole. Deodat had 
learned how to make certain dawa during his initiation into the society of the elders, a ritual 
which involves a period of isolation and intensive all-night instruction by already-initiated 
elders. 
Dawa bears some similarities to another category in Uluguru, called maadili in Swahili. 
Usually translated as ethics, maadili invokes a sense of correct and upright behavior and like 
dawa, knowledge of its rules are shared during initiations, specifically those of boys and girls 
into the ranks of adulthood. Those I interviewed often considered the forms of dawa and maadili 
taught during these ceremonies to be specifically Luguru, and along with the rituals themselves, 
they were considered one of the cornerstones of Luguru tradition (mila). Both dawa and maadili 
are products of esoteric knowledge and can only be shared with authorized individuals who have 
gone through proper processes. The kinds of dawa taught through the initiations of elders and 
traditional healers are not simply recipes of herbs that could be recorded and replicated. They 
rely on relationships to place, spirits, and the origins of the knowledge itself. Likewise, maadili 
cannot be shared with the uninitiated. These ethics too are relationally bound forms of knowing 
laden with social responsibility. Both dawa and maadili can be dangerous in the wrong hands. 
There are, then, protections in place to prevent unauthorized use of knowledge, including 




As Haule had warned me, I met with a fair amount of what might be described as 
obfuscation during my research. Regardless of my ability to dodge suspicions about being a 
geologist or a spy, my questions often met with answers that led in oblique directions and which 
simply did not make sense. I was very rarely told that the information I was asking for was secret 
or could not be shared. Instead, people would typically answer my questions with small pieces of 
information which together proved inconsistent and confounding. When I tried to point out the 
obvious contradictions, most people gave answers that left me further baffled. I came to see these 
answers as so many lizards, protecting secret knowledge from unauthorized eyes—mine and 
those of the people who would one day read the products of my research. Over time, however, 
my knowledge grew and I found that some of the answers I had initially written off as nonsense 
or misdirection proved meaningful—indeed they might be called, in a rather uncomplicated 
sense of the word, true.  
This transformation, of a lizard back into dawa, however, was not a sign of the triumph 
of my clever sleuthing over attempts at obstruction. Rather, it was part of the way that 
knowledge is protected, shared, and passed down. In the end, the points of misdirection, 
confusion, and frustration I encountered were not merely clues but also lessons in the politics of 
the knowledge that constitutes mila. Traditional knowledge is not generalizable, and much 
cannot be written down. What appears in ethnographies of Uluguru is a shadow of mila, an 
outline or form which corresponds to something unseen. True knowledge of mila, in contrast, 
exists only where it is woven in social relationships. As my relationships in Uluguru deepened 
and became more meaningful, my ability to make sense of the statements I heard also changed. 
How, when, and to whom to communicate esoteric knowledge is part of the knowledge itself, a 




that follow may encounter some lizards. They are neither truth nor lies. Rather, they show the 
ways in which knowledge, power, and relationships are always bound together. 
Requests for knowledge during my research were not unidirectional. My potential 
connection to German settlers and their buried treasure meant I was suspected of knowing the 
dawa needed to get past the spirits who guard the hidden stores of gold and rupees. In this too, 
knowledge was relational, linked to place, history, and power. The rumors shared with me about 
the location of these treasures were often attempts to draw secret information from me. However, 
although I am the granddaughter of German settler colonialists, my ancestors did not settle in 
East Africa but rather East Texas, and if they knew the whereabouts of any buried treasure, the 
information did not find its way to me. I was likewise found to be wholly ignorant of the geology 
of gemstones and gold in the mountains and of the markets on which to sell them, another piece 
of information it was hoped I could provide. I was able to help with certain other kinds of 
information—the prices of various fruits and spices in the United States, the process of applying 
to universities abroad, the answers to English class homework, the causes of global climate 
change, and the reasons that USAID spends so much money on development projects in 
Tanzania. Gerald and I were also frequently asked about improving agricultural practices, 
questions Gerald was often able to answer with concrete and helpful advice. In the complex 
politics of knowledge in which we had become implicated, these were small offerings, but they 
did provide a starting point for the collaborations of which this research is a part. 
Organization of the Text 
The remainder of the text is organized in a loosely chronological order, although each 
chapter moves between the time of my fieldwork and points in the past. Chapter 1, which is the 




century through the end of colonial rule in 1961. It shows how competing regimes of politics, of 
which social healing was one, served as spaces of struggle along gendered, generational, and 
classed lines. It reveals both the process of political consolidation by certain elite men and the 
ways in which that process was continually contested by women, youth, and non-elites. 
Throughout this history, questions of water were deeply linked to questions of power, although 
in different ways at different moments. 
Chapter 2 explores the legacies of Tanzanian socialism and forced villagization in the 
mountains. It analyses changes in land tenure and land inheritance that resulted, often indirectly, 
from socialist policies. Alongside these shifts, it also examines men’s growing reluctance to 
inherit ancestral names and the complaints of many women that men have abandoned their 
obligations to their matrilineal kin, especially obligations related to rainmaking and social 
healing. By viewing these changes together, I show that shifts in control over land sparked by 
villagization upended structures of reproductive labor in the mountains. Ultimately, I argue that 
Tanzanian socialism fell short of its goals in part because it neglected to account for the richness 
of social reproduction and because it continued to subordinate social reproduction to questions of 
production, ultimately removing the material basis of social reproduction from the institution that 
had long managed it—the matrilineal lineages. While this effect may have been desirable for 
many reasons, it also rendered social reproduction precarious and left lasting conflicts along 
gendered and generational lines. 
Chapter 3 focuses on conflicts among Muslims over funeral and memorial rituals for the 
dead. It argues that these conflicts are connected to the politics of social healing and to growing 
concerns about the unpredictability of the environment. Tracing the emergence of these rifts to 




economy, I suggest that a shift in the relationship of labor to land led to a partial ungrounding of 
economic life in general and social reproduction in particular beginning in the 1980s. These 
changes occurred in the wake of the collapse of the socialist project and widespread 
disillusionment with both the socialist government and Sufi leaders. In this context, the Islamic 
reform movement known as Ansar Sunna offered young men an alternative model of authority, 
ethics, and knowledge, one which marked their growing independence from elder generations. 
The reform movement also marked changing relationships to the dead and place, sparking new 
conflicts over the terms of social reproduction.  
Chapter 4 examines the contested connections of knowledge, labor, and the environment 
in the management of forests and waterways in Uluguru. Exploring both changes and 
continuities in the state’s approach to resource governance since independence, it suggests that 
persistent understandings of humans as inherently apart from and harmful to nature, alongside 
regimes of knowledge which reinscribe the roles of “experts” as the bringers of both 
development and sustainability, have rendered invisible and tenuous other ways of caring for the 
environment. I trace the use of development in Tanzania as a site for the extraction of unpaid 
labor, including ecological labor, under coercive conditions. Ultimately, I argue that approaches 
which make ecological visible and render it a source of value can serve as the foundation for 
feminist and decolonial approaches to environmental crisis. To bring this insight to bear, 
however, requires a refiguring of politics and an openness to radical epistemologies that trouble 






RAIN, GENDER, AND TERRACES: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ULUGURU, C. 1800–
1960 
In early 1953, a few British colonial administrators of what was then Tanganyika decided 
to breathe new life into a plan to build terraces and plant trees in the small mountain range of 
Uluguru in east central Tanzania (Brain 1980; Young and Fosbrooke 1960). They believed the 
mountains, which provided a key water catchment for the colony, had been unsustainably farmed 
and that deforestation and soil erosion were threatening livelihoods in the highlands and 
downstream. In particularly, they blamed farmers in the mountains for floods and unreliable 
water supplies in the Ruvu Delta which had affected important commercial rice and cotton farms 
(Pels 1999: 149). They were also eager to develop coffee as a local cash crop. Coffee had 
become a major cash crop in several other regions of the colony and was at the height of a post-
war boom in the early 1950s (Eckert 2003: 301). Several members of the colonial service were 
brought in to implement the project, including James Brain, who would go on to earn his 
doctorate in anthropology and author several important articles on Luguru culture and history, 
including an important paper about the events of this project (Brain 1980). After a two-week 
seminar with local government officials and religious leaders, the project’s staff fanned out 




beginning, these schools were held outdoors and brought together lineage leaders, religious 
authorities, teachers, shopkeepers, the women who owned beer clubs, and any other men or 
women deemed to be influential (Brain 1980: 182). The lessons focused on terraces but also 
encouraged tree planting and coffee cultivation. In Mkuyuni, according to Brain’s account of 
program, the scheme initially met with resistance, but local leaders were eventually convinced of 
the value of terracing. However, over time, the form of the bush schools changed. Instead of 
including only local leaders, elders, and elites, the meetings in Mkuyuni became open to the 
public. Brain, who was not in charge of the Mkuyuni area and did not approve of the public 
meetings, would later compare them to tent revivals, generating an “enormous emotional 
response.” Whatever the accuracy of Brain’s characterization of the meetings, the results of the 
program were astounding: the creation of nearly five million yards of terraces in Mkuyuni 
between September 1953 and February 1955, at least according to official reports (Brain 1980: 
183–185). 
However, the tenor of the project quickly changed. The colonial administration decided 
to implement a mandatory quota system for terracing. Officers of the program also put into effect 
a ban on burning fields and began imposing large fines for violations, especially in eastern 
Uluguru (Brain 1980: 186–187). Corruption blossomed; evidence suggests that some local 
officials were accepting bribes to falsify records showing households’ terracing quotas had been 
met. Several local powerholders who had been shut out of the Native Authority threw their 
weight against the scheme. On July 1, 1955, over 1,500 people attended a meeting about the 
project at Mkuyuni, brandishing sticks and demanding an end to the terracing program (Young 
and Fosbrooke 1960: 153). Several subsequent meetings were similarly met with protest and at 




The District Commissioner said he would come to the mountains to hear their grievances. He 
arrived with armed police and reiterated the importance of continuing the terracing program. The 
crowd was ordered to disperse, but they refused and violence erupted. The police used tear gas, 
but the crowd quickly reassembled and, according to official accounts, began throwing rocks and 
clumps of dirt at the officers. Eventually, one of the officers opened fire, killing one man, John 
Mahenge (Brain 1980: 187–188; Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 151–157). 
Following the incident at Matombo, Roland Young and Henry Fosbrooke described 
“ribbons of smoke” rising from the mountains, where burning was resumed in defiance of the 
ban (1960: 157). After a brief attempt to modify the terracing program in response to the 
protests, the scheme was abandoned altogether. Four men perceived to be leaders of the “riots” 
were arrested several weeks after death of Mahenge.  The incident was still widely remembered 
during my research in Uluguru, where many recounted the intense labor of terracing and the 
resistance against the program. Some, who were youth at the time, recalled being hidden by their 
parents, while others remembered their parents themselves hiding to avoid the grueling labor 
required (H. R. Malekela, interview, August 15, 2018; A. M. Ng’omanga, interview, October 4, 
2018). The Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS), as the program was known, appeared in 
retrospect as an early flicker of the independence movement that would eventually win 
Tanganyika’s freedom from Great Britain in 1961. It also ensured that for several decades, the 
post-colonial state would take a hands-off approach to management of the water supply in 
Uluguru, fearing a repeat of the protests. 
As we will see, the unrest that occurred in 1955 was born of an unlikely political alliance 
between educated elites, traditional authorities, Islamic leaders, and ordinary farmers, both men 




colonial administration requires an exploration of the layered politics of Uluguru that had 
emerged since the eighteenth century. This chapter explores that political history and makes 
several related arguments. The first is that the political paradigm of rainmaking and social 
healing has recurred throughout the mountains’ history, although in vastly different forms over 
time. This form of politics was layered with several others but was distinguished by the way in 
which it placed questions of social reproduction at the center of political legitimacy. The second 
is that politics in Uluguru have always been bound up in struggles to control the mountains’ rain 
and water. The third is that much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was characterized 
by the increasing centralization of political power by certain elite men at the expense of women 
and non-elite men, although the composition of the elite group changed considerably over time. 
The politics of social healing worked on both sides of this process, allowing some men to shore 
up their authority while also providing the grounds for political critique from below, especially 
by women. After exploring political change in the mountains over the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, this chapter returns to ULUS to make sense of the confrontation over 
terracing, showing that the unrest was the culmination of several long and intertwined political 
struggles over a century in the making. 
Early Settlement and the Emergence of Luguru Politics 
Oral histories of Uluguru broadly agree that people today known as “Luguru” were 
descendants of various groups that moved into the mountains over the last several centuries. 
Young and Fosbrooke (1960: 21), drawing on lineage genealogies, place the arrival of the 
ancestors of Waluguru to the mountains around the middle of the seventeenth century while Paul 
(2003: 38–43), using the same information, arrived at a date about a century later. Pels (1996: 




nineteenth century. Debates about when Luguru people arrived in the mountains have held 
particular significance around environmental policy since the colonial period. Young and 
Fosbrooke’s longer estimate was intended in part to counter colonial officials who believed the 
mountains had only been inhabited since the late nineteenth century, and consequently thought 
that massive deforestation had taken place on the slopes in a matter of only decades. Estimates of 
the arrival of settlers in the mountains have also served to legitimate or delegitimate Luguru 
communities’ claims to the land. As we will see, a closer examination of the evidence suggests 
established settlements by at least the mid-eighteenth century, but the area likely saw additional 
in-migration through the mid- to late-nineteenth century, driven by conflict in the surrounding 
lowlands. 
Political and kinship structures in Uluguru, as elsewhere, are relayed in ideals that at once 
belie and make sense of more complex and messy realities. Accounts from Uluguru agree in 
large part on the ideal social structure and its relationship to settlement, although this should be 
understood as ideological rather than a reflection of historical fact. As the Introduction suggests, 
the fundamental unit of this ideal was, and is, the matrilineal lineage. Most recount the history of 
their lineage by beginning with a story of the lineage founder and their relatives arriving from a 
specific location or direction to settle on previously unoccupied land. The lineage founder, often 
said to have had magical abilities, was typically given a special name related to some personal 
characteristic or event in the story itself. After the death of lineage founder, their name and spirit 
(mzimu) passed down along matrilineal lines, and with it, the responsibility for administering the 
land they had settled. Frequently in such accounts, the lineage founder is said to have been a 
woman, but subsequent heirs to the name were inevitably male. In Swahili at the time of my 




of the lineage.1 When an mjomba died, the women of his lineage would convene to pick a 
successor among his brothers and nephews. In theory, all members of a lineage and their children 
were entitled to plots within the lineage territory to farm and build homes, distributed by the 
mjomba. Outsiders could also ask for land in the territory but would be expected to offer a 
payment called ngoto, usually in crops, to the lineage mjomba. Lineages in turn were part of 
larger clans, many of which correspond to clans in groups outside the mountains.2 Often, land 
would be subject to at least two layers of tenure, one of the clan recognized as owners of the 
larger valley, and a second of the lineage who had been given rights to some section (Pels 1996: 
745). Lineages and clans were exogamous, and cross-cousin marriages were considered ideal 
(Pels 1999: 180; Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 39–77). Outsiders were absorbed into areas 
through processes of adoption and marriage, and lineage members could also move to unclaimed 
and unsettled land to begin a new branch, thus producing cascading affiliations and genealogies, 
with newer lineages often returning to their founders’ places of origin to carry out the set of 
rituals known as matambiko. 
As the Introduction outlined, matambiko rituals served to manage relationships with a set 
of spirits which are today elided under the term mizimu. Although most people in Uluguru at the 
time of my research described mizimu as “waliokufa zamani” (“those who died in the past”), they 
also used the word to refer to powerful territorial spirits associated with names such as Kolero, 
which are not necessarily ancestral. The term mizimu, which in older Bantu languages referred to 
certain ancestral spirits, appears to have become the dominant term for territorial spirits in 
 
1 In Kiluguru, this position termed mkolo, and several other titles have applied to these figures over time. Here, I use 
the term mjomba because it was mostly commonly used by my interlocutors. Mjomba can refer to any matrilineal 
uncle but here refers to lineage heads unless otherwise noted. 
2 “Clan” refers to units that claim a common ancestor but are not able to provide an exact genealogy whereas 
lineages are descent groups of known relations, but the boundary between the two is somewhat slippery in Uluguru. 





Uluguru by the 1950s (Mzuanda 1958: 74; Vansina 1990: 95–96, 297). As we will see, the 
slippage in the term mzimu points to historical processes by which clans or lineages sought to 
extend their power by claiming kinship linkages to territorial spirits or by elevating lineage 
spirits to the rank of more powerful territorial ones. Within the category of ancestors, the term 
mizimu can refer to certain named ancestors or to the nameless society of ancestors who are often 
described as living below the earth. The names of particular mizimu of this type are inherited by 
the living, most commonly their matrilineal descendants, and with these names flow the powers 
and identities of the spirits themselves. The names inherited by wajomba, the male lineage heads 
who administer the land, fall into this category, and each mjomba of a particular name has an 
identity that blurs partially with his predecessors and the spirit itself. The names of territorial, 
non-ancestral mizimu were not inherited by the living but these spirits remained connected to 
communities in other ways. For example the territorial spirit Kolero in southern Uluguru 
typically took a human wife who, under the name Bibi, served as the spirit medium and shrine 
guardian at his sacred forest. In all cases, mizimu were thought to be powerful spirits who shaped 
the wellbeing of humans and their environments. Those who inherited mizimu names or were 
bound to them through other linkages like marriage were obligated to perform matambiko rituals 
related to their spirits. 
The term matambiko refers to an array of practices of reconciling with mizimu to ensure 
good health, good rains, fertility and prosperity for the community (Pels 1999: 121).3 Such 
rituals have been practiced across wide areas of East Africa and vary widely in their details. 
While those with special relationships to mizimu have critical roles in matambiko, the rituals are 
typically collective activities led by a group of elders that necessarily includes both men and 
 
3 “Reconciling” is the verb used by Pels (1999: 121). I have adopted it throughout the text as it better captures the 




women. In Uluguru, matambiko practices typically begin with the coming together of 
participants and the brewing of millet beer. When the beer is ready, participants don black kaniki 
cloth, removing all other forms of clothing and shoes, and proceed to a series of sacred locations 
connected to mizimu. At these locations, beer is poured into the earth and sacred words are 
recited, including ancestral names. Elders or healers may also gather and prepare particular 
medicines during this time to be consumed by participants or stored for later use. Today, 
individual healers often carry out matambiko for clients, but historically the practice was most 
commonly carried out collectively at several levels: the lineage, the clan, and the regional. 
Ideally, lineages would gather once a year, as well as in times of hardship—particularly illness, 
infertility, drought, or crop failure—to carry out matambiko. Lineages might also send 
representatives to participate in such practices with the clans from which their founders 
originated, or at the important regional shrines associated with the territorial mizimu of Kolero 
and Kingalu. These regional shrines were of particular importance in bringing rain, the most 
capricious and vital component of ecological and societal wellbeing, and have been visited in 
times of drought not only by residents of Uluguru but by people from wide areas of east-central 
Tanzania beyond. Matambiko rituals also helped to regulate agricultural cycles, as they tended to 
correspond with agricultural seasons and often preceded planting. 
The central practice of matambiko, the procession to sacred sites to make offerings and 
recite sacred words, marked out a complex sacred geography across the landscape. The most 
significant feature of this landscape were the groves or forests described in the Introduction 
where cutting was forbidden. In the colonial and immediate pre-colonial period, lineages 
typically each had at least one such area within their territory, which served as the site of lineage 




features visited during matambiko. In Luguru cosmology, ancestors and other spirits are typically 
described as residing under the earth as well as in wilderness spaces, and many sacred sites are 
areas where the boundaries between the above-ground and the below are blurred: rock features 
and caves, springs and pools, and certain sacred trees. In addition, the graves of important 
ancestors formed a critical part of this sacred geography; lineage matambiko typical involved 
visits to the graves of past lineage heads, while matambiko at Kolero involved visiting the graves 
of the past holders of the title Bibi who served as Kolero’s wife and intermediary (Haule 2018: 
81–82). 
Sacred forests appear to have served immediate ecological functions as reserves of forest 
resources and as buffers around key water sources, but beyond this, this network of sacred sites 
bound communities to the land and the environment. Bridging the gaps between living and dead, 
and inhabited and wild, matambiko rituals linked human health to the wellbeing of forests, water 
sources, and the land in rich and reciprocal ways. The presence of ancestors in the landscape also 
wove kinship through the environment itself. While these systems of sacred places and 
matambiko rituals proved resilient mechanisms for managing ecological and social relations, 
they should not be romanticized as symbols of timeless harmony between indigenous 
communities and their environments. On the contrary, a close look at this sacred geography 
reveals traces of several centuries of political conflicts and social change. The visitation of 
lineage graves, which follows known genealogies, served to reinforce lineage claims to land and 
bolster the power of lineage wajomba. Indeed, sacred groves in Uluguru, as elsewhere, were 
often cultivated and protected by lineage heads in order to maintain claims to land and authority 




different, and probably older, political structures with different relations to kinship. Within each 
of these are additional layers of struggle for control over resources and people. 
The story of Kingalu I, the Bena lineage mjomba whose heirs would come to be 
considered “chief” of Uluguru during the colonial period, provides some clues about early 
settlement and political power in the mountains. Two versions of the story about the founding of 
the Bena lineage and the emergence of Kingalu I were collected in the 1950s (Brain 1971; 
Mzuanda 1958: 8–16). According to the myth, the lineage founders originated in Ubena, to the 
west of Uluguru and upon arrival in the mountains first settled high in the southeastern area of 
Kibungo or Nyingwa. From there, two children of a man known as Msumi, a son called Mleke 
and a daughter variously called Mkirindila or Mwanadindiro, travelled north to Kinole looking 
for a place to settle (Brain, 1971; Young and Fosbrooke 1960:47–48). However, they found the 
area already occupied by the Nyani lineage, whose mjomba was known as Magoma. Magoma 
welcomed Mleke and allowed the newcomers to stay, eventually marrying Mkirindila. 
Mkirindila, however, was loyal to her brother and reported to him all Magoma’s military secrets. 
Mleke then attacked and defeated Magoma, seizing his land and taking the name Kingalu, which 
suggests fickleness or unpredictability. After driving Magoma out, Kingalu continued his 
military campaign to the south. There, he became locked in ongoing battle and was ultimately 
killed after being betrayed by his son. Upon dying, Kinglau’s body disappeared, and soon 
thereafter, his voice was heard at the sacred shrine at Nguru a hundred kilometers north of 
Uluguru. Young and Fosbrooke recorded the same lineage history as Brain, but, significantly, 
were told by Kingalu Mwanamguo that the first Kingalu was not Mleke but his sister Mkirindila, 




This story encapsulates several aspects of early history in the mountains, including the 
origin of clans and linages in locations and groups outside the mountains as well as their 
staggered arrival. It offers hints about the contested process through which previously patrilineal 
groups like the Bena came to conform, at least in part, to the area’s matrilineal norms. It also 
suggests that the ascendance of Kingalu and the Bena lineage were due to military strength, 
rather than any establishment as first-comers, in contrast to accounts of the ideal Luguru social 
system. Importantly, there is also no coherent group considered Luguru in this story, and no 
indication of shared ethnic identity between Magoma and Kingalu. Indeed, in 1859 Richard 
Burton offered a somewhat jumbled account of “tribes” in the mountains suggesting that a group 
known as Waluguru were confined to the highest peaks, with Wasuop’hanga and Wakubaku 
tribes below (Burton 1860: 85). Suopanga and Kubaku are in fact names in Kingalu’s Bena 
lineage, and on his 1870 visit to Kinole, the missionary Antoine Horner described them as 
individuals who served as “ministers” under Kingalu (Ricklin 1880: 237–238). In the early 
colonial period, those residing in northern Uluguru and associated with Kingalu were referred to 
as Wakami rather than Waluguru, but British colonial officials ultimately decided the two 
constituted a single “tribe” due to the similarities in their social structures and traditions 
(Hutchins n.d.). As Kingalu’s story suggests, clans predate the overarching identity of Waluguru 
in the mountains.  
Kingalu’s authority in this foundational myth, though gained militarily, was subsequently 
consecrated by his apparent supernatural abilities, especially his association with the ancient and 
powerful rainmaking shrine at Nguru. There, holders of the name Kingalu would perform annual 
rainmaking matambiko that were said to ensure the health of the land in and around Uluguru. 




associated with the name Kolero4 and possibly the name Mundo (Glassman 1995: 136–137; 
Iliffe 1979: 29; Mananga 1968). Kingalu and the Bena lineage’s ability to appropriate this shrine 
and establish or take over an ancillary shrine at Kinole consolidated their authority and 
positioned Kingalu as a political leader in the tradition of other precolonial rainmakers and social 
healers. As the Introduction described, “social healing” refers to the social understanding of 
health and healing across central and eastern Africa, and to the inseparability of questions of 
health from those of politics. Rainmaking and other forms of social healing emerged as a 
powerful political paradigm in the region in the several centuries prior to European colonization. 
Speaking of the emergence of the Ganda kingdom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
Neil Kodesh wrote: 
During this period, efforts to establish control over the collective conditions of 
health characterized the very nature of political practices. Public healers, in short, 
operated as political leaders, and healers’ shrines emerged as sites of creative 
ambition where aspiring leaders fused ritual and political power and where they 
composed stories to explain the nature of the authority (2007: 531) 
Steven Feierman’s (1990) work on the Shambaa kingdom has shown similarly that political 
leadership was understood through the idiom of social healing, particularly rainmaking. Good 
leaders were those who “healed the land” while those who harmed it lost their legitimacy. Social 
healing as a form of politics placed questions of social reproduction—ecological, agricultural, 
and human health and fecundity—at the center of political discourse. 
In his work on the Ganda kingdom, Kodesh (2007) has shown how legends related to the 
healer’s shrine reveal a layered history, with traces of older political structures discernable 
preceding the centralization of Ganda authority. Hugo Hinfelaar made similar observations in the 
Bemba-speaking regions of what is now Zambia, showing how the Crocodile Clan appropriated 
 
4 Kolero is a territorial mzimu name associated with several important shrines including the one previously 




prior ritual practices and relationships to spirits, subordinating household and nature spirits to 
their own ancestral spirits (1989: 24–33). In northeastern Uluguru, although political power 
never became as centralized as it did in the Ganda or Bemba kingdoms, similar changes can be 
decerned. In the account recorded by Mzuanda, Kingalu captured a spirit belonging to his 
paternal lineage at Kibungo and brought it to Kinole (1958: 247–248). Subsequently, this spirit 
not only merged in identity with Kingalu I but also with the powerful territorial spirit at Nguru. 
At the time of my research, the only spirit names associated with Kingalu’s rainmaking shrines, 
at least among residents of northeastern Uluguru, were the name Kingalu and the place name 
Nguru. The older connections to the territorial mizimu Kolero and Mundo were no longer 
recalled. This replacement of a territorial spirit by an ancestral one illustrates the shifting power 
dynamics of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, in which certain lineage heads consolidated 
power through the appropriation of earlier systems of social healing. This increasing 
concentration of power was also gendered. Evidence suggests that in Uluguru, women had key 
roles to play in mediating relationships to forests and territorial spirits. As ancestral spirits of 
elite men such as Kingalu’s came to dominate the healing landscape, women’s political roles 
were weakened.5 
In contrast, at the Kolero shrine in southern Uluguru, this consolidation of power was less 
pronounced. There, the territorial spirit is not understood as ancestral and the shrine, as of 2018, 
was guarded by elders of the Mlali and Hega clans. As mentioned above, the principal guardian 
at the shrine was previously a woman called Bibi who was chosen from the Mlali clan to be the 
wife of the spirit. The spirit itself today is affiliated with Hega clan (Haule 2018: 100). The most 
important political figure in southern Uluguru in the early colonial period was the mjomba of this 
 





clan, also called Hega, whom colonial administrators listed as an important rainmaker alongside 
Kingalu (Hutchins n.d.). Kolero’s association with Hega’s lineage is likely a result of similar 
political shifts to those we have seen with Kingalu. The ritual role of Bibi has been lost, and the 
male power of Hega as a mediator of the spirit increased. However, in this case, the Mlali have 
nevertheless remained the true “owners” of Kolero’s sacred forest, and Kolero remained a non-
ancestral entity. As we will see, one reason for this difference was the ability of holders of the 
name Kingalu to accumulate power through outside connections, first to coastal trade networks 
and later to European colonizers, due to political changes to the north and east of Uluguru in the 
nineteenth century. 
The Nineteenth Century and the Rise of the Mrima Coast 
In the nineteenth century, several significant events in the region surrounding Uluguru 
shaped life in the mountains. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the region known as the 
the Mrima coast was growing in political significance through an expanding trade in ivory and 
other commodities. Since the seventeenth century, the Mrima had been occupied by two major 
groups: those who claimed local origins, such as the Waluguru’s close linguistic relatives, the 
Wazaramo, and those who claimed origins in the middle east or Persia, often called Shomvi (S. 
Fabian 2019; Iliffe 1979: 44; Owens 2006; Sheriff 1987: 175). The Shomvi were Muslim and 
sources suggest that they gradually became politically dominant over towns along the coast 
during this period. The term Shomvi refers at once to a ruling class and to a (purported) descent 
or ethnic group. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these communities were largely 
focused on farming and fishing, but also engaged in trade, especially trading salt for agricultural 




Slavery was also a part of this coastal economy. Enslaved Africans carried out a variety 
of domestic, agricultural, and commercial tasks as well as a range of skilled trades. There was no 
single mechanism through which individuals became slaves; some had been sold or pawned by 
relatives, others captured or demanded in payment for a relative’s wrongdoing. As Marcia 
Wright has shown, the boundary between pawn and slave has often been one of degree, as 
repeated exchanges gradually erase social connections and move individuals toward the status of 
commodity (1993: 7). Moreover, the definition of “slave” and “free person” were continually 
contested by those subject to enslavement (Glassman 1995). By any definition, however, slave 
holdings on the coast were typically small. Moreover, slavery on the Mrima coast, especially 
before the nineteenth century, was a far cry from the chattel system of the Atlantic. Rather, 
enslaved men, women, and children were seen as dependents who would be absorbed to a greater 
or lesser degree into their owners’ kinship systems over time. Enslaved men and women also 
often had a significant amount of autonomy, although the exact degree depended on their status. 
Conditions varied widely between skilled tradespeople agricultural laborers, domestic servants, 
and concubines. Nevertheless, the oppressiveness and inequality of the slave economy was 
evidenced by frequent rebellions, large and small, by enslaved men and women (S. Fabian 2013: 
100; Fabian 2019: 114–117; Glassman 1995: 79–114). 
In the nineteenth century, several political changes occurred. First, new caravan trade 
routes appeared, predominantly transporting ivory to feed the growing market in South Asia and 
China (S. Fabian 2013; S. Fabian 2019: 80; Iliffe 1979: 43; Sheriff 1987: 175–179). One of these 
routes passed directly north of Uluguru. At the terminus of these routes, the town of Bagamoyo 
grew rapidly into a commercial center. In the early decades of the century, the Omani-Zanzibari 




control of coastal towns and caravan routes along the Mrima and its hinterland. In the mid-
nineteenth century, the Sultanate in Zanzibar became independent of Oman and intensified its 
political grasp along the mainland. Meanwhile, British forces were also expanding their political 
control along the East African coast, in part through attempts to abolish the slave trade. 
Ironically, however, attempts to curtail the transoceanic slave trade helped fuel the intensification 
of plantation slavery on Zanzibar and along the coast. Booms in demand for particular export 
crops, increasing demand for food for traders along the coast, and declining prices of slaves due 
to the collapse of the export market all fueled the growth plantation agriculture, and existing 
slave labor systems were increasingly retooled to serve this economy. The move toward the 
planation economy led not only to an increased use of slave labor but also the rapid deterioration 
of conditions for enslaved men and women. A growing credit-based economy further fueled 
these shifts, as enslaved people were either exchanged to pay off debts or subject to increasingly 
demanding labor conditions to keep up with the demands of their masters’ creditors (Glassman 
1995: 74–107). By the late nineteenth century, guns had also flooded into the region, traded from 
the coast for ivory and other commodities, and several groups, including the Zigua and the 
Zaramo, gained military dominance in the lowlands north and east of Uluguru (Glassman 1995: 
48; Iliffe 1979: 50–52). The presence of guns and the expansion of the plantation sector at the 
coast led to a volatile situation in which slave raiding and the gun trade formed a positive 
feedback loop. Those seeking political dominance in the hinterland could obtain guns by trading 
slaves to the booming plantations at the coast, with the guns allowing for further slave raiding. 
Overall, throughout the nineteenth century, the increasing trade in ivory and other 
commodities, as well as the gradual intensification of the slave-based plantation economy in later 




at the coast and inland (Becker 2008: 25–52; Glassman 1995: 48–49).6 It also saw increasing 
flurries of instability through the intensification of warfare, both through the influx of guns from 
the coast and the arrival of another group in the middle of the century from the opposite 
direction. This group, known as the Mbunga, brought novel military techniques from southern 
Africa. Through the middle of the nineteenth century, the Mbunga carried out wide-ranging raids 
around the Kilombero area, including in Uluguru (Larson 1977; Gallagher 1974; Young and 
Fosbrooke 1960: 22). Although Young and Fosbrooke (1960) place the Mbunga era prior to the 
rise of coastal politics in the mountains in their periodization of Luguru history, accounts show 
that the Mbunga remained active in the area until at least 1880, by which time Waluguru in the 
north had already been drawn into significant relationships with the coast and had already faced 
significant military incursions from Zaramo and Zigua forces as well. 
In addition to these political and economic shifts, the nineteenth century was also marked 
by the spread of Islam beyond the coast. On the Mrima coast, Islam had become heavily 
associated with the Shomvi elite and conveyed both high social status and connection to broad 
social networks reaching across the Indian Ocean. It also often indexed literacy and could 
facilitate access not only trade but also to credit. As trade with the hinterland increased, Islam 
also spread inland. Tabora was established as a Muslim trading post by the 1850s and two 
decades later, much of the immediate area beyond the Mrima coast had seen largescale 
conversions to Islam (Becker 2008: 25–52; Glassman 1995: 34, 58–78, 137). In Uluguru, Islam 
appears to have arrived as a religion of the elite, especially “big men” who sought to capitalize 
on the caravan trade and the new politics it engendered. Although it is difficult to assess the 
 
6 As we will see, the rise of “big men” was overwhelmingly male-dominated. However, some “big women” also 
played significant roles in these new power structures (e.g. Biersteker 2007: 71; S. Fabian 2019: 150–151; Farler 




exact spread of Islam in the interior, many elites in the eastern mountains likely identified as 
Muslim as early as 1870 (Alpers 2005; Ricklin 1880). What “becoming Muslim” entailed varied 
and might be marked by abstention from pork or alcohol, participation in Muslim rituals, and the 
adoption of Muslim names, among other practices. Conversion to Islam also overlapped with 
adoption of elements of Swahili culture, including language, clothing, and architecture, but the 
latter could and did also occur without conversion (Becker 2008: 25–26). In addition to its role in 
indexing social status and solidifying links with the coast and beyond, Islam could also provide 
an alternative charter for governance, kinship, and relations to place and community. In this 
sense, it was bound up with other social changes of the nineteenth century in complex and 
sometimes contradictory ways. 
Once again, a turn to the history of Kingalu is informative. From Kingalu Mwanamsumi, 
the name Kingalu was passed down to Kingalu Mwanamkova, Kingalu Mwanamkasi, Kingalu 
Fimbo Mbili and Kingalu Mwanadundaga before it was inherited by a man known as Kingalu 
Mwanashaa. This early lineage hints at close linkages between Kingalu’s family and the coast. 
The name Fimbo Mbili is Swahili, not Luguru, and although we know little about Fimbo Mbili, 
Young and Fosbrooke were told that he died at the coast (1960: 48). These coastal linkages are 
even clearer in the time of Kingalu Mwanashaa, about whom considerably more information is 
available, in large part through the writings of Father Antoine Horner and his fellow 
missionaries, who visited Kingalu at Kinole in 1870 (Ricklin 1880). Kingalu Mwanashaa was 
born at the coast near Bagamoyo. Edward Alpers estimated Mwanashaa’s birth at 1788, based on 
Kingalu’s stated age at the time of Horner’s visit (2005: 34). While it is possible that Kingalu 
exaggerated his own age by some years, he was certainly born before or near the turn of the 




lineage in the Uluguru Mountains, to which his mother was born, and an influential Shomvi 
family to which his father belonged (Alpers 2005). Such inland-coastal unions between powerful 
families were not uncommon at the time and served to bolster both families’ statuses as well as 
their control over trade (S. Fabian 2019: 40; Owens 2006: 740). Because Shomvi followed 
patrilineal descent and the Bena lineage was matrilineal, Kingalu Mwanashaa was an heir to both 
families. The title he bestowed upon himself, Shenekambi, indicated his patrilineal status, while 
the name of Kingalu, which he had inherited from his brother by the mid-nineteenth century, 
indicated his matriline. Early sources agreed that Kingalu Mwanashaa was the first Muslim to 
hold the title Kingalu and Horner’s accounts of Kingalu’s sons indicate that at least some had 
Muslim names (Ricklin 1880: 156, 199). 
Further information about Kingalu Mwanashaa is evident from a dispute that arose over 
half a century later, when in 1931, the British administration received a petition from a man 
bearing the name Machupa bin Shenekambi suggesting that he, not Kingalu, was the rightful 
chief of the Uluguru Mountains. On investigation, the administration determined that Machupa 
was the patrilineal grandson of Kingalu Mwanashaa, and that the title of Shenekambi has been 
passed from Kingalu Mwanashaa to his sons and grandsons in succession after his death. The 
Morogoro District Book offers family trees for both Kingalu and Shenekambi, labelling the latter 
“Ukoo Punguji” (“Punguji lineage”).  Below the family tree, there is a note, presumably written 
by District Officer E. E. Hutchins, which says: “The Ukoo Punguji is apparently the only clan to 
adopt the Mohamedan line of succession and the heirs descend from father to son” (Hutchins 
1931a). The accompanying note stated that while Kingalu Mwanakonza had inherited the name 
Kingalu, he was concerned primarily with ritual roles (“rain-making and witchcraft”), while 




“Punguji” is derived from the name of the Shomvi settlement near Bagamoyo on the coast, 
where Kingalu Mwanashaa’s father and grandfather held sway. 
If Kingalu Mwanashaa’s birth is a testament to the longstanding linkages between the 
hinterland and coastal elites, his reign as described by Horner in 1870 illustrates the political 
trajectory of such linkages with the intensification of trade and slavery after 1850. Horner’s visit 
occurred after repeated invitations from Kingalu’s sons, sent as emissaries to the coast to 
welcome the missionaries (Ricklin 1880: 150–156). The missionary’s visit was an opportunity 
for both men to affirm their political significance, especially in light of the growing dominance 
of the Zanzibari Sultanate. Kingalu had recently suffered military defeats in the north of Uluguru 
from a Zigua leader named Kisabengo. Despite this, Horner’s account detailed Kingalu’s 
apparent power, describing him as a “king” with an elaborate array of ministers and significant 
wealth and firepower. Horner also described Kingalu as a “turbulent neighbor” who had made 
“continual wars” in his youth, and as a “despot” and “tyrant” disliked by his subjects (Ricklin 
1880: 212). The missionaries were told by Kingalu’s niece that he had violently overthrown his 
brother, her father, to ascend to his current position. While Horner’s account bears the marks of 
the missionaries’ own motivations to present themselves as needed civilizers, it also stands in 
stark contrast to the image of Luguru lineages as first settlers collectively governing land, as well 
as the common colonial-era assertion that prominent individuals came to power through 
rainmaking abilities. Instead, struggle over important rainmaking shrines and important trade 
routes, sometimes through direct military force, shaped the overarching political dynamics of the 
time.  
From Horner’s account, we can see several ways in which Kingalu was working to 




critics used tensions in his authority against him. For instance, one of Kingalu’s daughters had 
married a Muslim from Muscat who was reported to have been living in Uluguru for 40 years at 
the time of Horner’s 1870 visit and who assisted Kingalu in his administration. Horner also 
described goods in Kinole originating at the coast or overseas, including a Persian blanket and 
numerous guns, which appear ubiquitous in the missionaries’ account (Ricklin 1880: 192–215). 
As Glassman has shown, such prestige goods helped elite men consolidate their status and 
cultivate networks of clients (1995: 25–52). However, these markers of power in the coastal 
networks of “big men” sit alongside references to other forms of authority based in social healing 
and rainmaking. Horner wrote: 
The King…ordered his slaves to bring a stool replete with mysterious properties. 
But they did not dare obey this injunction. “Ah! they cried,—Lord of the 
country!—We will die if we touch this sacred object! Ah, we are afraid. We don’t 
dare!” Kingalu repeated his order, and as his slaves7 refused to expose 
themselves, one of the nephews of the king went to look for it, and presented it to 
us, trembling with his whole body. It was nothing but an old worm-eaten seat, 
covered with a monkey skin half eaten away by insects. “Look! said Kingalu, I 
only have to touch this precious talisman and instantly clouds amass and the rain 
falls in torrents.” (It is the Minister Makoussi—storm cloud—who gives to the 
King, on his accession to the throne, the turban which renders him invincible and 
the magical seat.) (Ricklin 1880: 242). 
Later, per this account, Horner condemned Kingalu for allowing witch-burning in his kingdom, 
appealing to Kingalu as a “civilized man” who was “born at the coast.” Kingalu, according to the 
missionary’s account, exited the conversation, feigning spirit position. “Yes,” Horner allegedly 
called after him, “you are possessed by the Spirit, but the spirit of evil, who opposes you hearing 
the truth. You imagine that a white man ever believes in these extravagances? It is God, Kingalu, 
and not you, who makes the rain fall!” (Ricklin 1880: 243–244). 
 
7 It is probable that Kingalu, as a “big man,” did hold slaves, but there are little details from Horner or other 




 The next day, Kingalu came under a different verbal attack, also related to his role as a 
rainmaker and social healer. Horner and Kingalu had put the previous day’s conflict behind 
them, and the missionary offered to have a portrait of Kingalu made and sent to Europe. Kingalu 
agreed, but the portrait session was briefly interrupted by an old woman who Horner understood 
to be one of Kingalu’s wives. Horner recounted her shouting, “What, Kingalu, here you are 
obeying the whites? Are you going to have another figure done? Is the one you have no longer 
good? You will bring all the calamities to the country: all the people will fall ill, all the goats will 
perish, you yourself will die!” The audience cried out, apparently in support of the woman’s 
case, but Horner persisted and Kingalu acquiesced to the missionary, his picture appearing in the 
Catholic mission bulletin a few years later (Ricklin 1880: 244–245). 
 The attacks on Kingalu from the Catholic missionary and the unnamed woman each took 
up the language of social healing to place demands on Kingalu, and together illustrate the 
tensions in his authority. In his criticism of Kingalu, Horner astutely played on the prestige 
politics of the coast, in which status was linked to “civilization” (and its corollary, Islam) in 
opposition to washenzi (a term variously translated as barbarian, heathen or bumpkin), explicitly 
counterposing civilization to rainmaking. Horner had previously touched Kingalu’s sacred 
regalia, despite warnings that he would die, and ridiculed Kingalu for suggesting that a white 
man would believe in such superstitions. This deliberate attempt to delegitimize Kingalu’s 
leadership, however, was counterposed with an appeal to his power as a leader, and especially as 
a Muslim with coastal linkages. The unnamed woman who confronted Kingalu the next day also 
counterposed Kingalu’s connection to the coast with his obligations as a social healer, but sought 
to delegitimize the former, suggesting that participation in having his portrait taken would 




Her critique appears targeted at the concentration of power in the individual person of Kingalu 
Mwanashaa, epitomized through portraiture, as well as at Kingalu’s connection to coastal politics 
achieved through political networks with Europeans, Arabs and coastal elites, control over trade, 
and the accumulation of private wealth. Rainmaking authority across East Africa typically came 
with strict prohibitions, especially around particular technologies and certain foreign goods. 
Indeed, while Horner expressed shock at Kingalu’s humble living arrangement, his simple home 
in Kinole was doubtless a compromise between Kingalu’s desire for “big man” style authority 
oriented toward the coast and the strict prohibitions demanded of a rainmaker. To the woman 
who confronted him, and likely to others in Kinole at the time, Kingalu’s entanglements with 
other forms of authority posed ecological threats to social reproduction, namely drought and 
disease. Put otherwise, rainmaking as a political form placed questions of social reproduction at 
the center of political struggle, while for coastal “big men,” ecological control and social well-
being were secondary to the accumulation of wealth and military strength. 
It is also no coincidence that this complaint was brought by a woman. The rise of “big 
men” in connection to the coastal economy meant the increasing concentration of power in the 
hands of individual men and the increasing marginalization of women. We also see echoes of 
women’s historical loss of power in the many lineage histories, including Kingalu’s, which 
depict lineage founders as women but subsequent lineage heads as exclusively men. While these 
stories should not be taken as literal records of events, the persistence of the cliché, together with 
other evidence, does match the trend by which certain wajomba consolidated their power over 
others in their lineage. While matambiko were always a collective action carried out by elders, 
both men and women, it appears that the roles of individual rainmakers to affect the outcome 




While Kingalu’s lineage provides a stark example of the consolidation of authority by a 
single individual, similar processes took place on a smaller scale in other lineages and other 
areas. This can be seen in another widespread cliché, that of uncles selling their nephews and 
nieces into slavery.8 I heard these accounts not only in response to questions about the slave 
trade and the nineteenth century, but also in reply to general questions about the matrilineal 
system. For example: 
In Luguru tradition and custom (mila na desturi), one’s child is the child of one’s 
mjomba.…The livestock (mifugo) of the elders at that time, their livestock were 
their nephews and nieces, their sisters’ children. If one had a problem, he would 
take two or three of them to Bagamoyo to sell them (Mwishehe Juma, interview, 
April 11, 2018). 
Back then, [for example] my uncle (mjomba) would take me—or my brother 
would take my child, he would go and sell them there at Bagamoyo or wherever. 
They were sold there. They were given salt (Muhando, interview, August 14, 
2018). 
In lineages then, we were with the mother [matrilineal]. The mjomba, who was 
the mother’s brother, would come and chose [from] his sister’s children. He 
would go to sell them…. For example, he would take them and go to sell them at 
Bagamoyo, where there was a big a market of slaves (Abdallah Ali Kawambwa, 
interview, October 9, 2018). 
Many in Uluguru today believe that those taken to Bagamoyo were subsequently sent to the 
Middle East or Europe, citing as evidence the fact that their relatives never came home. In fact, 
there little evidence of a significant transoceanic slave trade at Bagamoyo (S. Fabian 2013). 
While it is difficult to ascertain how many people from Uluguru were sold into slavery at the 
coast, there is likely some truth to these accounts. If it is true that those enslaved never returned, 
this is likely because they were absorbed into the social and kinship networks of the coast, either 
because they were forcibly severed from prior kinship relations through the act of enslavement or 
because conversion to Islam and claims to coastal citizenship marked the best path out of 
 




oppressive conditions (S. Fabian 2019; Glassman 1995). Megan Vaughan has noted that slavery 
served as a form of social death in Central Africa, because it meant an existence outside of 
kinship (Kalusa and Vaughan 2013: 20). The permanent loss of kin relations seems to similarly 
define slavery in Luguru memory. The repetition of these accounts in conjunction with a 
discussion of the matrilineal system offers a critique of the concentration of power in the hands 
of wajomba that is coherent regardless of the actual extent of the slave trade out of Uluguru. In 
this discourse, wajomba acted not as rainmakers and healers of their lineages, but as those who 
most immediately threatened the reproduction of the lineage and community through the 
consumption of its youth and the breakdown of family relations. In such accounts, fertility was 
traded—quite literally—for wealth in the form of salt. 
However, despite the implication of wajomba in the slave trade, coastal power networks 
based on trade also stood somewhat at odds with the matrilineal system. This was evident in the 
struggle between Kingalu Mwanashaa’s matrilineal descendants, heirs to the name Kingalu, and 
his patrilineal descendants, heirs to the name Shenekambi, mentioned above. Matrilineal kinship 
provided an expansive set of kin relations which powerful wajomba could call upon as 
dependents in the framework of social healing. In the hands of powerful individuals like Kingalu, 
this system allowed for the extension of power over space and population. Patrilineal kinship, in 
contrast, provided fewer heirs and dependents in each generation, allowing for the greater 
concentration of power and wealth, and limiting networks of kin-based obligation. Power based 
on rainmaking and other forms of healing required social links to elders and healers with the 
diverse forms of knowledge needed to bring rain and heal the land. Power gained through control 
over trade, conversely, rested on linkages to coastal elites and authority over caravan routes. 




and effective rainmaking as grounds for territorial expansion. However, despite the changing 
politics of the nineteenth century, matrilineal links ultimately proved more critical and enduring 
in Uluguru. Only in the case of Kingalu Mwanashaa was this seriously threatened, but the 
attempt of Kingalu and his heirs to bifurcate power through two lines of inheritance—that of 
Kingalu and that of Shenekambi—floundered and ended when Shenekambi III ran afoul of the 
German administration and was hung at Kisaki, marginalizing the patriline’s linkages to 
European power just as colonialism made such linkages critical to continued authority (Hutchins 
1931a). 
 Islam had a significant but not causative role in these politics as well. Flowing along 
trade routes and through political networks from the coast inland, Islam provided an alternative 
charter to the ideal matrilineal lineage system in places like Uluguru. In his note on the conflict 
between Kingalu and Shenekambi, Hutchins (1931a) described Shenekambi’s patrilineal kinship 
explicitly as Muslim. On the coast, Islam had become a religion of the political elite. Inland, 
Islam served as an index of connection to long-distance trade. “Big men” like Kingalu rarely 
engaged in proselytization, preferring to maintain the exclusive nature of Islam (Becker 2008: 
25–52). Islam would also prove useful in the early period of European expansion in East Africa, 
as Horner’s appeal to Kingalu’s religion makes clear. Islam, especially when accompanied by 
literacy, offered particular forms of legitimacy in the eyes of early Europeans in East Africa. 
 Luguru identity, more recent than clan identity and even than many of older lineages in 
the mountains, emerged from these nineteenth century struggles. Most scholars writing of 
Uluguru explain that the word “Luguru” to mean “people of the mountains” (Mzuanda 1958; 
Young and Fosbrooke 1960). However, many elders I spoke with in Uluguru gave a different 




mountains. Mzee Sipriani,, introduced in the Introduction, gave a particularly interesting version 
of this story: There was once a man named Msawanga who had no children of his own. When 
the parents in the area went to work, they left their children in his care. However, when the 
parents were away, Msawanga took one of the children and sold him to the Arabs.9 When the 
parents returned, they were enraged to find their child missing. When they discovered that 
Msawanga had sold the child, they shot him in the leg with a shotgun. He ran away into the 
forest, but his leg was permanently disfigured. After this, he became known as “Luguru” 
(Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko, interview, October 22, 2018). Whether or not such an individual 
existed, this story is significant because it explicitly traces the origin of “Luguru” as a category 
to the form of politics associated with the slave trade and to the presence of guns, distinctive 
features of the late nineteenth century. Indeed, Mzee Sipriani added to his story that the guns 
such as the one used to shoot Msawanga were common at that time, explaining that the Arabs 
gave them as gifts to “watu wakubwa” (lit. big people). 
Taken together, these accounts—of Kingalu and Shenekambi, of rainmaking matambiko 
and sacred geography, of slave-selling uncles and guns—offer a layered history of the mountains 
from the eighteenth century. It is clear from the dates associated with Kingalu Mwanashaa that 
Bena lineage, despite being late arrivals to Uluguru, had already ascended to power and had 
forged coastal connections by the turn of the nineteenth century. It is difficult to make sense of 
these dates if the mountains were not already populated by the mid-eighteen century, although it 
is highly likely that additional groups entered the mountains a century later, pushed by increasing 
raiding from Mbunga, Zigua, and Zaramo groups as well as Zanzibari and Shomvi political 
expansion. Whatever the exact date of settlement, traces in the sacred geography and in 
 




rainmaking practices suggest a general trend to the increasing concentration of power by certain 
wajomba and growing anxieties about social healing (and its corollary, social reproduction) with 
the rising influence of coastal trade networks. Social healing provided the basis for the 
consolidation of power on the part of rainmakers like Hega and Kingalu, but also provided a 
framework by which ordinary people could make demands upon and critiques of those in power. 
In either case, this form of politics wove kinship into the landscape and placed questions of 
social reproduction at the center of political legitimacy. 
Early European Encounters and German Rule 
When Europeans began extending their reach in inland East Africa in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, their understanding of these political dynamics was limited. However, 
they immediately recognized the mountains’ importance as a source of water. One of the first 
European accounts of Uluguru is from Richard Burton, who passed near the mountains on his 
1857 expedition. Burton wrote: 
Dut’humi, one of the most fertile districts in K’hutu, is a plain of black earth and 
sand, choked with vegetation where not corrected by the axe. It is watered by the 
perennial stream of the same name, which, rising in the islands, adds its quotum 
to the waters of the Mgazi, and eventually to the Mgeta and the Kingani [Ruvu] 
Rivers….The mountains of Dut’humi [Uluguru] form the northern boundary of 
the plain….This chain is said to send forth the Kingani River, which, gushing 
from a cave or fissure in the east, is swollen to a large perennial stream by feeders 
from the southern slopes, whilst the Mgeta flows from the western face of the 
water-parting, and circles the southern base (Burton 1860: 86–87). 
Burton’s emphasis on water and its sources is perhaps not surprising since he passed Uluguru on 
his ostensible search for the source of the Nile. Nevertheless, his concern with the mountains 
primarily as a source of water and the tales of the Kingani (today known as the Ruvu) “gushing 
from a cave or fissure” are typical of early European accounts of the mountains. In the same 




by a pepo (spirit) named “Kurero” (Kolero) or “Bokero.” This place, Burton wrote, was visited 
by pilgrims from as far away as the coast seeking “fruitful seasons” as well as help with matters 
of war and fertility. 
Horner’s account of his 1870 visit to Uluguru also frequently focused on the mountains’ 
ecology and their seeming abundance of water. He wrote: 
The air there is very crisp, the vegetation splendid…. These mountains contain 
abundant sources of water which give rise to numerous streams…. Here stand 
ancient trees seven meters in circumference and which reach 30 meters height 
before the base of their branches. There torrents of roaring water fall in cascades; 
farther away flow creeks shaded by a luxurious vegetation; even on the highest 
summits of the mountains spreads a brilliant parure of forests. A magnificent 
country where God has poured out in plenty all the splendors of nature (Ricklin 
1880: 202). 
However, Horner, who ventured into the mountains themselves, added to these images of natural 
abundance remarks on population density, noting that the mountains in the north were 
“cultivated to their peaks” (Ricklin 1880: 192). As we will see, these two conflicting images—
the untouched wilderness from which poured abundant water and the baren land of deforestation, 
erosion, and overpopulation—would become the major motifs in European descriptions of the 
mountains, occurring again and again over the decades. 
 While both Britain and Germany initially eyed the area as a potential space for empire, 
the mainland of what is now Tanzania was officially colonized by Germany in 1885, when the 
German East Africa Company (DOAG) was granted imperial charter. One year before, the 
founder of DOAG, Carl Peters, had travelled through the eastern interior, returning with a dozen 
“treaties” with various “chiefs” that he believed gave him legal rights to a significant part of 
what would become German East Africa (Iliffe 1979: 89–91). In 1891, after further territorial 
expansions, DOAG ceded control of the territory to the German government, which began to 




northern part of the colony, which was favored among early settlers. In the southern half of the 
territory, German presence was weak until the early twentieth century. In Uluguru, as elsewhere, 
the German administration relied on a mixture of local authorities (designated jumbes) and 
outside akidas to enforce rules, collect taxes and otherwise administer the colony. A few German 
settlers also eventually entered the mountains, establishing small plantations of rubber and 
kapok, including in the area of Mfumbwe, Luholole and Madamu. Oral accounts in Mkuyuni 
emphasize that these settlers also acted as de facto administrators who enforced stringent rules 
and inflicted punishments—especially viboko (whipping)—on Africans living near them. 
Prior to the arrival of these settlers, the first “scientific” accounts of Uluguru were written 
by the German zoologist and naturalist Franz Stuhlmann, who first described the mountains after 
passing near the base of them in 1894. A year later, he published a more extensive account of the 
geology, vegetation, climate, and inhabitants of Uluguru. In his first letter, he described the 
extent of water flowing from the mountains and argued that more intensive cultivation would be 
possible with irrigation. As his route passed along the north and west of the mountains, however, 
he also described foothills as denuded of trees, writing that “the treelessness…can surely be 
traced back to the destruction of forest by culture” (1894: 288). The area, he continued, was said 
to be very populated, though he does not say who told him this. In his second account, which 
took him through the mountains themselves, he again remarked extensively on the mountains’ 
abundant water, describing “magnificently picturesque, incomparably fertile and water-rich” 
valleys (1895: 215). However, he also emphasized rapid ecological decay through deforestation 
and erosion, writing of what he described as “the clearing zone” in the central mountains: 
Very few trees are present here, yet all circumstances suggest that the entire zone 
was previously occupied by mountain jungle. In the lower regions, it seems to 
have been cleared a long time ago, but further up one can still see tree stumps 




trees…. Here and there, especially along stream courses and valley trenches, 
small stands or groups of trees remain standing (1895: 218). 
He noted that the lower edges of forests were always sharp, stating that “from this, one can 
already deduce the activity of the people who pushed the forest back.” Stuhlmann attributed this 
apparent deforestation to “the Negro’s peculiar economic system” of clearing new fields “almost 
every year” in search of fresh topsoil rather than using fertilizers, a practice he believed was 
shared across the continent (1895: 220). 
 Stuhlmann blamed both cutting and burning for what he believed to be the permanent 
loss of primeval forest. Removing the trees, he believed, resulted in a loss of the topsoil through 
erosion and thus prevented new forests from growing once cultivation was abandoned. In 
particular, he remarked that the water supply was being adversely affected and that the 
missionaries at Tununguo had reported a decrease in water in the Kingani (Ruvu) River over the 
prior eight years. He argued that the only solution would be the creation of forest reserves and 
the imposition of rules on the local population: 
In order to prevent or at least check the defacement of this magnificent mountain 
forest, something must happen as soon as possible, which of course is only 
possible through the supervision of the natives; because admonitions are 
unquestionably ineffective (1895: 222). 
Instead, he argued that burning should be banned and punished, forest boundaries delineated, and 
a forest assessor and staff appointed. Moreover, he wrote, the administration should push for the 
cultivation of exportable crops like coffee, tea, and cocoa, which he believed would be well 
suited to the climate. 
That year, the Crown Land Declaration declared all “ownerless land” property of the 
colonial administration (Gissibl 2016: 120). This declaration rested on the division between 
occupied and empty lands that left no room for patterns of shifting cultivation and periodic 




rather than a space of coexistence. Convinced that rapid deforestation was taking place, the 
declaration banned swidden cultivation and burning, and placed a tax on all tree cutting for 
purposes other than the construction of homes. Also in 1895, the Usambara Forest Ordinance 
took aim at a part of the Eastern Arc Mountains northeast of Uluguru, banning burning, cutting, 
and grazing in protected areas and requiring forest preservation along ridge tops, valleys, and 
water courses. While the limitations imposed by the Crown Land Declaration were difficult to 
enforce in areas with limited German presence such as Uluguru, the Usambara Forest Ordinance 
was enforced with harsh penalties including heavy fines, jail, whipping, and chains. In 1899, the 
Forest Conservation Ordinance extended similar provisions to Uluguru out of concern for the 
water supply (Schabel 1990: 133, 140). 
In 1904, the Forest Protection Ordinance aimed to shift land from crown lands to formal 
forest reserves and initiated a significant increase in forest reserve land across German East 
Africa, with a priority placed on creating reserves in mountain and watershed regions (Schabel 
1990: 133; Sunseri 2009: 54). The next year, the Maji Maji War swept across the southern half 
of the colony, passing near eastern Uluguru on all sides. This armed uprising against the 
Germans, which traversed linguistic and political divisions, was in part sparked by a crisis in 
social reproduction. Taxation in currency, along with compulsory labor on cotton-growing 
schemes and infrastructure projects in some regions, drew male labor away from food production 
while increasing restrictions on forests blocked access to critical resources including foodstuffs, 
wood, and medicines (Sunseri 1997, 2003). Following the failure of the agricultural season in 
1904, new medicines began to circulate, including both war medicines and agricultural 
medicines, and new sets of social healers emerged as regional contenders for power. Followers 




missionaries and Muslims in their attacks and sometimes sparing them. The German 
administration responded with a scorched earth campaign that lasted two years and led to 
significant displacement and hunger. In Uluguru, the main participation in the war came from the 
western side of the mountains, under the leadership of Mbago (also called Mwanambago), a “big 
man” and rainmaker who had influence in Mgeta, along with his son. Medicines associated with 
Kolero were among those circulating during the war, but residents of Eastern Uluguru do not 
appear to have joined the fighting and the Germans did not attack the area as they did the 
surrounding lowlands (Giblin and Monson 2010; Gwassa 1972; Iliffe 1967, 1979; Pels 1999; 
Wright 1995). 
In the aftermath of the war, the German administration’s grip on Uluguru tightened. A 
forest administration was created at Morogoro and several small reserves were established at 
Bunduki and Kasanga in 1908 (“Bekanntmachung No. 8” 1908; Fuchs 1907: 91). In 1909, these 
holdings grew by several orders of magnitude with the establishment of a 27,800 hectare reserve 
along the highest reaches of the mountains, as well as the addition of smaller reserves at 
Kimboza and Mvuha. While this land had previously been protected by the Crown Land 
Declaration and the 1899 Forest Conservation Ordinance, with the creation of the Uluguru Forest 
Reserve, forty-four forest police officers were brought in from neighboring regions to prevent 
cultivation in the reserve (“Sonderberichte der Forstverwaltung” 1909). In the years that 
followed, men, women and even children were fined and sentenced to labor in chains for 
farming, burning, and grazing in the forest (Sunseri 2009: 73). Restrictions on forest use not only 
limited access to material forest resources and land, but also threatened access to sacred sites and 
thus threatened the ritual work of social reproduction, rainmaking, and healing. When I asked 




discussed punishment by whipping, which they described as capriciously applied for even minor 
infractions. 
The closest forest reserve to Mkuyuni was the small reserve at Kimboza, along the Ruvu 
River. Like others, this reserve limited access to key forest resources as well as important sacred 
sites. I interviewed Asha Ramadhani Msisimizi, an elderly woman in Changa village, in August 
2018. Early in our interview, she noted that relationships to forests had changed with the creation 
of forest reserves. Before, she said, people had farmed in the forest, but during the colonial 
period, people were expelled from the forest and farming was banned (interview, August 22, 
2018). At Kimboza, in particularly, she recalled, people were forbidden to enter to forest, 
because it was “shamba la bibi” (“grandmother’s farm”) (interview, August 29, 2018). The term 
“grandmother’s farm,” interestingly, evokes a local rather than colonial form of forest 
reservation, denoting a forest in which restrictions must be followed out of respect for the 
ancestors. As described above, such sacred forests were used for the collection of medicines and 
other resources, as well as for matambiko. In many cases, they were deliberately cultivated and 
maintained by lineages, part of the consolidation of power by lineage elders and lineage heads. 
In Bibi Asha’s account, such forests were not asocial spaces in need of protection from extractive 
human beings, but rather were places in which human relations were continually remade through 
intergenerational practices of care. In other areas, as Bibi Asha’s account also shows, other forms 
of forest existed as spaces of farming and food production, a patchwork of agroforestry and 
clearing through shifting cultivation. German forestry, which viewed human activity as alien to 
“natural” forests, not only rendered the agroforestry practices and forest management practices 
of forest-dwellers invisible but froze boundaries and limited the uses of forests for matambiko 




on both agroforestry practices and healing practices had material consequences for residents of 
the mountains, they were not totalizing, and indeed, referring to the Kimboza forest reserve as 
“shamba la bibi” serves to reinscribe the colonial forest in the terms of kinship and social 
healing. 
The Arrival of the British and Indirect Rule 
German control in East Africa ended with World War I. The war itself passed through 
Eastern Uluguru, as German forces retreated from Morogoro and Mikesse to Kisaki, passing 
through Mkuyuni and Matambo, the British close on their heels. As Germans retreated, they 
destroyed many of their records. Writings by British troops and officials, arriving in the chaos of 
war, reflect a profound unfamiliarity with the area. One of the first and most detailed written 
accounts of the period in Uluguru came from British Lieutenant E. William Bovill, who was part 
of the contingent that pursued the Germans through Uluguru from Mikesse to Kisaki. Bovill’s 
account of the war offers useful details not only about the war but about the demographic and 
ecological history of the area. Like many of the Europeans who passed through the mountains 
before him, Bovill wrote effusively of the landscape: 
These highlands are of extraordinary beauty, and have been compared to those of 
Kashmir…Great rocks crop out on the floors of the valleys as well as on the 
hillsides; but nowhere does this ruggedness meet the eye, for the whole landscape 
is clothed in dense tropical vegetation through which only an occasional gaunt 
peak rises above the general conformation of the hills. The rising sun turns the 
brilliant green of the virgin forest to a wonderful medley of soft shades of pink 
and mauve and violet; but during the heat of the day the heights are enveloped in 
a veil of the softest blue (1918: 16). 
He also offered descriptions of the rivers flowing from the mountains and added, “Of wild fruit 
the banana, mango, and paw-paw are plentiful” (1918: 17).  
 When Bovill shifted from descriptions of the landscape to a discussion of the inhabitants 




The Uluguru Mountains were formerly thickly populated, as shown by the 
extensive clearing of the lesser hilltops, marking the sites of former farms on 
which much millet was grown. Sugar-cane and bananas may have been cultivated 
near villages…. Occasionally a few naked children come to the road and sell 
mangoes to the passing troops (1918: 20).10 
While Bovill’s comments make clear that he was aware of the cultivation and sale of bananas 
and mangos by residents of the mountains, the fruit trees he described seeing along the way were 
marked as “wild” in his account, presumably because they were interspersed with the other 
species that composed the forest. Where Bovill saw “virgin forest” with an abundance of “wild” 
fruit, however, we might just as easily see signs of agroforestry, intentional patches of fallow, 
forest, and cultivation tended and maintained by the mountains’ inhabitants. Like other European 
commentators of the time, Bovill saw agriculture and the mark of human activity only in spaces 
of deforestation and not in the growth of trees (save the several German rubber and kapok 
plantations they passed on their way, from which other growth had also been cleared). 
Upon assuming formal control of the former German East Africa via League of Nations 
Mandate, the British began collecting both scientific and ethnographic information about their 
new colony, now called Tanganyika. At the district level, this information was compiled in 
district books, large binders that served as the basis for local administration. Bovill’s account, 
which was excerpted in the Morogoro District Book, was quickly supplemented by further 
research concerning the environment and people of Uluguru, driven in particular by the 
administration’s transition to indirect rule. After the war, the British government initially 
retained the German administration’s mixture of direct and indirect rule through akidas and 
 
10 Bovill’s belief that the mountains had been depopulated through war, conscription, and potentially genocidal 
policies such as those recently uncovered in German Southwest Africa proved unfounded. Oral accounts of WWI 
from those in Uluguru recall that many people hid in caves as the armies passed, as they had during prior periods of 
raiding (T. I. Digonile, interview, December 3, 2018; J. R. Lipeluke, personal communication, December 24, 2018; 




jumbes, but with the arrival of Donald Cameron as Governor in 1925, a model of indirect rule 
was officially implemented across the territory. Indirect rule required ethnography both in order 
to identify proper authorities for appointment in the Native Authority and to create a standard 
account of “customary law,” which would serve as the basis for the administration of the African 
population. At least in the early years of his administration, Cameron believed that African 
societies were composed of bounded tribes, each under the authority of a chief, and upon his 
arrival to Tanganyika, he ordered district officers to gather notes on “the original constitution” of 
the tribes in their districts (Pels 1996: 741–743). 
Morogoro District Officer E. E. Hutchins compiled the main set of notes upon which 
indirect rule in Uluguru would be based. In the second half of the 1920s, he wrote broad outlines 
of Luguru history, politics, and culture, beginning with a discussion of the lineage system. From 
his writings, it is clear that Hutchins subscribed to a theory of political evolution, in which 
individual “family heads” became “village heads.” Although political organization did not 
“originally” go beyond these figures, Hutchins noted that some further consolidation of authority 
had occurred:  
Later on, as the successful rain-maker become more powerful, he gradually took 
over the control of the Wandewa [lineage heads] in his particular sphere of work 
and this appears to have been the way that the families of Kingalo, Hega, and 
MwanaMbago, gradually became chiefs in their respective areas (Hutchins n.d.). 
This evolutionary view of African politics was hardly unique to Hutchins. It was shared by many 
British administrators, including Cameron, who saw indirect rule not only as a mechanism to 
expand British power through the absorption of local authorities, but as a system that would 
encourage the gradual development of political authority in each “tribe” toward what were seen 




However, Hutchins and Cameron diverged on the question of chiefs and their role in 
precolonial politics. At the beginning of his tenure, Cameron believed that all African societies 
would appear as distinct tribes under chiefly authority and argued that absence of chiefs in some 
areas was due to the destruction of indigenous political systems by German direct rule (Pels 
1996: 742). In contrast, Hutchins failed to find evidence of a clear chiefdom in Uluguru prior to 
German control (Hutchins n.d.). A few months before Cameron’s directive to implement indirect 
rule, Hutchins had agreed to the installation of two “chiefs” to replace the German-installed 
akida: Chief Muhina Goso Kingo (heir to the Zigua conqueror Kisabengo) in the north and Chief 
Kingalu Mwanamfuko in the south. Only a few months later, however, Hutchins suggested an 
alternate arrangement granting Hega and Mbago powers equal to those of Kingalu. Cameron was 
unconvinced of this more decentralized administration and took advantage of Hutchins’s leave in 
1926 to reaffirm the selection of Kingo and Kingalu as sole chiefs (Hutchins 1930). 
Under Cameron’s directives, the traditional authorities had both executive and judicial 
functions and thus the chiefs identified through colonial anthropology were to serve as the judges 
in the native courts, enforcing “customary law.” This law, in turn, was assumed to already exist 
as a general, but unwritten, consensus among tribal members, waiting only for the government 
anthropologist to discover its precise content. While this form of colonial anthropology tended to 
take social structures at face value, Pels reminds us that in fact, “descent categories were a 
discourse through which political and economic relations were organized and discussed” (1996: 
744, emphasis original). Once inscribed in the District Book, forms of social organization that 
had been flexible and shifting became increasingly ossified. Of course, the written form of 
Luguru custom did not immediately efface the complex practices unfolding off the page. Rather, 




the written system and the one in practice was never achieved, but the pieces of political 
discourse and practice that were missing from colonial accounts became increasingly sidelined in 
daily life. If what appeared on the pages of the District Book was initially a mere shadow of 
politics in practice, over time, the shadow gradually began to appear as the figure to which 
practice should conform. 
British administrators based colonial ethnography and thus indirect rule on information 
gathered in meetings (known as barazas) with select informants, predominantly elite men. Pels 
(1996) has described indirect rule as process of “pidginization.” Like a pidgin language, which 
emerges from the interaction of a substrate and superstrate language, indirect rule emerged 
through an unequal but creative process of negotiation between these two groups. Although the 
colonial administration always held the upper hand, the process of implementing indirect rule 
created complex political opportunities that exceeded not only their control but quite often their 
knowledge. Such political negotiations between British and Luguru men happened almost 
universally at the expense of Luguru women. The British authorities overseeing Uluguru were 
universally men, and almost never spoke to women when recording the colonial ethnography that 
served as the basis for indirect rule (Pels 1996: 751; Pels 1999: 162–166). As a result, the only 
significant political role granted to Luguru women in official ethnographies was their selection 
of the succession of wajomba, and even this role is absent from the District Book itself (Pels 
1999: 162; Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 53). Women’s other economic and political roles 
became increasingly invisible to official eyes during the British period. This process by which 
women were marginalized from the sphere of official state politics was not simply the result of 
oversight; rather, it should be understood as the result of active efforts by elite men, both Luguru 




rainmaking power by individual men over the course of several centuries and the increasing 
influence of coastal trade networks in the rise of nineteenth century “big men” had already led to 
losses of power by women. Indirect rule pushed this process to even further extremes. 
Kingalu Mwanamguo, who inherited the position of Kingalu from his uncle in 1927, was 
one of the men who succeeded, at least at first, in using indirect rule to his advantage. In the 
early years of his reign, Kingalu proved to be particularly skilled at navigating the complex 
political landscape and using British presence to consolidate his authority. Upon assuming the 
title of Kingalu, he moved from Kinole, high in the mountains, to Mkuyuni, which had recently 
surpassed Madamu and other villages as a commercial center. As the appointed chief of Uluguru, 
he presided over the Native Court there. While in office, he quietly reduced the power of Mbago 
and Hega, who had each been appointed as subchief (mtawala) under him, subordinating them to 
his assistant. He also ousted Hega’s son from the Native Authority and took action to limit the 
power of several relatives of Hega and Bambarawe, another “big man” and rainmaker who had 
previously held sway in the mountains (Pels 1996: 751). Kingalu also appointed Shenekambi, his 
uncle’s patrilineal heir, to the position of mtawala, the same rank held by Hega and Mbago, thus 
temporarily neutralizing the threat of an alternative claim to chiefship while widening his 
family’s political clout. His political maneuvering can also be seen in a 1931 letter from 
Hutchins requesting the deposition of an mtawala, in which Hutchins wrote that “both Kingalo 
(sic) and I feel that a more sophisticated native should be in charge here.” Hutchins accused the 
incumbent of corruption and nominated a relative of Kingalu in his place (Hutchins 1931b). 
Kingalu Mwanamguo also moved to shore up his power in 1929 when F. J. Bagshawe, 
then the Land Development Commissioner for the colony, conducted a land development survey 




research in the area. He began his tour with a baraza at which Kingalu and other members of the 
Native Authority affirmed the information Hutchins had compiled in the District Book. 
However, the next day, Kingalu apparently realized that Bagshawe was looking for something 
different, and changed his approach, using the opportunity to claim a wider territory and to 
sideline his political rivals (Pels 1996: 750). As Pels (1996) has shown, Kingalu rarely left 
Bagshawe’s side during the remainder of his tour, and his presence at nearly every meeting with 
Bagshawe made it difficult for his rivals to contradict his accounts. Bagshawe, who had been a 
strong adherent of Cameron’s vision of distinct tribes led by power chiefs, was happy to entertain 
Kingalu’s claims, although even he was not convinced that past Kingalus had held lasting and 
meaningful authority over the southern and western mountains (Bagshawe 1930; Pels 1996).  
Administering Nature in the Colony 
While colonial researchers were concerned with ethnography for the purposes of indirect 
rule, they were equally eager to gather environmental data that would help them turn the colony 
into a source of agricultural profit. In Uluguru, the British administration quickly focused on 
questions of soil erosion and its potential impact on the water supply downstream. They 
reaffirmed the boundaries of the German forest reserves, to which Hutchins credited the survival 
of any forest at the mountains’ peak: 
There is little doubt that originally the whole of the Uluguru Mountains were 
covered with primeval forest and that they have gradually become denuded from 
the foot-hills upwards by the encroachment of the Waluguru. As these people 
have increased so they have pushed further up, and it is only the timely 
intervention of the European that has prevented this encroachment from reaching 
the actual summits (Hutchins n.d.). 
British accounts such this consistently describe settlement on the mountains as having spread 
from lower elevations to the tops of the mountains, thus viewing the boundaries of the forest 




accounts, however, indicate an opposite movement, whereby the earliest settlements were high in 
the mountains at Mgeta, Kibungo and Nyingwa. Lineage genealogies bear out Luguru versions, 
with the oldest lineages found at high elevations near the forest boundaries. This suggests that 
population spread was in fact downward, with lower areas like Mkuyuni settled later. This 
version of the population of the mountains offers a rather different image of the relationships of 
farms to forests, suggesting that the preservation of forests on the mountains’ peaks was 
maintained prior to the colonial period and that populations had indeed moved from denser areas 
to less dense areas over time. 
Had British authorities taken more seriously Luguru histories of their own settlement, 
they might have taken a different approach to forest management in the mountains. However, 
convinced that the few remaining forests had been saved just before their inevitable destruction, 
colonial administrators focused on convincing Luguru people not to cut down trees. The monthly 
report for Morogoro District in September 1922 already expressed grave concern that “the rapid 
denudation of the hills to the S. west of Morogoro, coupled with the resulting erosion of the soil, 
will, within the next 20 years, render this area uninhabitable.” The report said that the after a 
baraza regarding the perceived problem, “the local inhabitants…have agreed to plant a minimum 
of 20 [wattle] trees per man on the hill tops” as long as they would have a right to use the trees 
when they fell down, usually after four or five years. A note on this agreement in the colonial 
archive says that two trees should be planted for every one cut down (“Morogoro District 
Monthly Report” 1922). 
Bagshawe’s 1929 tour of the mountains, during which Kingalu Mwanamguo sought to 
solidify his claims to authority, was also predominantly concerned with these issues, as 




It must be noted that Waluguru have destroyed all the unreserved forest to get 
land for cultivation, trees of any description remaining only where the ground is 
unsuitable for planting. The desire for fresh land is overcoming the objection to 
cold which formerly kept the tribesmen below certain limits. They are already 
beginning to encroach on the edges of the main reserves (1930: 6). 
Although Bagshawe saw the rate of erosion as relatively slow, he wrote that “it is vitally 
necessary for the tribe to take steps to preserve their soil,” and suggested that teachings about 
preventing erosion could be included with lessons in coffee growing, anticipating the attempts 
during ULUS to combine coffee-growing with soil preservation (8). In the report, Bagshawe also 
remarked that “it is obvious that Southern Uluguru proper will soon be very crowded” and 
warned that “if and when their own country can no longer support them, the Waluguru will have 
nowhere to go.” Nevertheless, the report noted that the soil was “good and fertile” and produced 
surplus crops (4, 7–8). In the agricultural report that was included with Bagshawe’s land survey, 
W. J. Hill (1930) wrote that landslides were uncommon in the mountains and that soil wash was 
also not a major issue on the eastern side of the mountains because the moisture led to almost 
immediate plant growth. Nevertheless, he suggested terraces, citing an article extolling the 
virtues of new contour terracing projects in slowing erosion in cash crop producing areas of 
Ceylon, also a British colony.  
 In 1930, the colonial administration attempted to create additional forest reserves, 
arguing that designating such reserves was the only way to prevent complete deforestation in the 
mountains. Ironically, while the primary evidence of this was purportedly the lack of forests in 
non-reserved areas, the safari undertaken by the Assistant District Officer and the Forester to 
identify forest reserves found a significant number of viable forested areas, including 900 acres 
of forest just south of Mkuyuni and identified as belonging to the lineages of Msume and 
Rufesuwa. Nothing in the administration’s report suggests they had knowledge of a ritual 




matambiko and indeed, many are consistent with oral accounts I gathered in 2018 from elders of 
these lineages. 
The process of designating sacred lineage forests as government forest reserves had 
mixed political consequences for authorities in the mountains. Designating forests may have 
helped some lower level officials stake claims to power, by combining their ritual authority with 
new bureaucratic forms of power, but for more powerful individuals, the government’s apparent 
intent to manage and impose limitations on these forests appeared to pose a threat to their 
autonomy. Kingalu, for example, seems to have avoided designating the ritual forest at Kinole as 
a forest reserve. As he was residing near the court in Mkuyuni at the time the survey was done, 
he designated a small forest near the Mkuyuni market instead (Fletcher 1931). Msume and 
Rufezuwa, in contrast, volunteered their lineage forests as official reserves. 
Following the survey, Hutchins summarily placed these forests under the administration 
of the Native Authority and banned all cutting and cultivation (Fletcher 1931). Sacred forces 
were thus incorporated into the administration’s regime of scientific forestry. Because lineage 
heads filled many of the positions in the Native Authority responsible for such forests and 
because prohibitions did not appear to include ritual practice in these areas, the shift was initially 
subtle. Nevertheless, the change was significant, as access to the forests and their resources now 
depended on the colonial government and its official agents. Moreover, while Hutchins and his 
staff seemed largely oblivious to the ritual significance of forests, commenting only on water 
sources and valuable timber in their reports, they inadvertently joined a long tradition whereby 
those seeking political authority attempted to appropriate sacred places. While the British did not 




necessary to ensure the continued healthy rains as well as preserving water sources that fed the 
major rivers of the central coast. 
Social Healing and Indirect Rule 
To existing forms of politics based on social healing and on commercial connections, 
British rule added yet another layer, this one founded on bureaucratic administration. The 
relationship between indirect rule and social healing was complex. As we have seen, Hutchins, 
like many other Europeans, believed that political authority in Uluguru had been derived from 
rainmaking abilities, which were seen as a natural step in the process of political evolution and 
contrasted with the unnatural power of those who had gained control through conquest. 
Hereditary rainmaking was the basis through which Kingalu’s claim to chiefship was 
legitimated, while Kingo, as an outside conqueror, was considered at best an exception who must 
be tolerated in lieu of a local alternative. Indeed, when Kingo III died in 1942, his heir was not 
installed in his place. At the time, Acting District Officer D. S. O’Callaghan noted, “He had 
become Chief of the whole Uluguru not because of any hereditary right but because of the failure 
of the Chief and subchiefs of Southern Uluguru which left his as the only Chief of any standing 
in the Uluguru” (O’Callaghan 1944).11 However, while rainmaking was the basis for legitimate 
authority prior to colonization in the eyes of the British, the practice was largely relegated to the 
realm of magic and superstition in the colonial imaginary and was to be replaced, over time, with 
rational forms of governance. Colonial documents have few notes on ongoing rainmaking 
activities by Kingalu or others. In the eyes of the British, the main role of the Native Authority 
was to oversee tax collection, implement agricultural programs like ULUS, enforce rules such as 
those protecting forests, and resolve disputes through the Native Courts. However, communities 
 




still expected Kingalu to provide rain and social healing. Oral accounts in Mkuyuni suggested 
that Kingalu continued to carry out rainmaking matambiko throughout the colonial period, and 
written documents indicated that he continued to use the shrine at Nguru through the 1950s 
(Brain 1971: 832; Mzuanda 1958: 74).12 
However, the contradictory demands of bureaucratic administration and social healing 
were difficult to navigate, in part, because of the colonial government’s definition of corruption. 
Rainmaking involved payments of gifts and tributes, and as rainmaking powers had become 
consolidated by men like Kingalu and Hega, they served as sources of enrichment, as well as 
providing famine reserves and bases for limited redistribution. As Pels has argued, such practices 
met British definitions of corruption and were sources of concern for the colonial administration 
(1996: 754). Certainly, many members of the Native Authority did use their combined roles as 
“traditional” and bureaucratic authorities to enrich themselves at the expense of others, using 
their status in the British administration as a shield against local criticism. At the same time, 
charges of corruption could easily be leveled at almost any authority to whom British 
administrators objected; in order to carry out the roles of leaders expected by the community, 
authorities were bound to violate British rules and indeed, nearly all figures initially appointed in 
the top levels of the Native Authority in Uluguru were ousted by the end of the 1930s. The heir 
to the title Shenekambi was removed in 1929, prompting his plea for the chiefdom mentioned 
above. In 1930, Mbago was removed for ineffective rule and Hega was deposed for embezzling 
taxes the same year. In 1936, Kingalu himself was deposed for “grave abuses of authority and 
 
12 At the time of my research, Kingalu continued to use the shrine at Nguru and there is no evidence of significant 
interruption of this practice since the nineteenth century, although ceremonial processions to Nguru declined after 




corrupt practices” and the entire territory was placed under the jurisdiction of Chief Kingo until 
his death in 1942 (“Native Administration” 1940: 15). 
Even after these individuals were removed from power, concerns about their misuse of 
“traditional” authority continued, as exemplified by the conflicts over payments known as ngoto. 
In the discourses of Luguru kinship and land tenure recorded by colonial administrators and 
other ethnographers, outsiders were permitted to settle on lineage lands where there was land to 
spare but were required to make a payment called ngoto in return. Historically, this was often 
given as a portion of crops, but as currency became increasingly important in the area, cash 
payments became the norm. Over time, colonial authorities became increasingly concerned that 
ngoto was becoming a source of corruption and in 1942, it was banned. H. D. Curry, who wrote 
the proclamation banning ngoto, noted that ngoto served as payment “for the performance of 
sacrifices” (a reference to matambiko), as well as the basis for famine reserves and as a safeguard 
against the permanent alienation of land. Curry complained, however, that individuals were 
collecting ngoto for personal enrichment rather than as wealth for the lineage as a collective 
entity. He also worried that such practices were leading to overcultivation and soil erosion in 
some areas (Curry 1942). This proclamation did little to stop ngoto payment, but it drove such 
payments underground, where they faced less scrutiny not only by the colonial administration 
but by lineage and community members as well. In this sense, the act posed a double threat to 
social healing in the mountains. On the one hand, the British threatened the material basis of 
matambiko both through the loss of payments of ngoto themselves and through the 
destabilization of ngoto as a critical marker of land tenure. Without stable control over land, 




matambiko. On the other hand, pushing ngoto underground reduced landholders’ accountability 
to their lineages and the residents on their land. 
The struggle over ngoto was part of a larger pattern of efforts on the part of the British to 
contain forms of economic and political power exercised by Africans. Concerns over ngoto were 
inherently connected to wider worries about the development of a land market among Africans. 
Indirect rule linked ethnicity to territory and thus tied people to land and to “traditional” political 
and economic institutions. African mobility, accumulation of wealth, and participation in a larger 
economy threatened British power and administrators sought to curtail it by barring land sales 
and other forms of land commodification among Africans. The banning of ngoto also reflected 
the increasing tensions within indirect rule between the forms of authority which indirect rule 
attempted to capture—forms related to kinship and social healing—and the kinds of political 
authority it deemed legitimate in the actual administration of the colony. As this contradiction 
became increasingly fraught, indirect rule was jarred loose from the precolonial forms of 
authority it once claimed to encapsulate. While this destabilized some authorities’ control over 
land, including the sacred forests to which the administration had earlier laid claim, it also 
generated the expansion of the political sphere operating outside and alongside the Native 
Authority, through mechanisms largely invisible in official bureaucratic accounts. 
Cash Crops, Sufi Orders, and Changing Patterns of Authority 
Several other important changes took place in the mountains during this time. One was 
the rise of Islam as a popular religion. Although Islam had arrived through trade networks as a 
religion of elites by the mid-nineteenth century, a new wave of Islam appeared in the mountains 
from the 1920s to the 1950s: Sufism. Brought by teachers from outside Uluguru, three Sufi 




decades of the colonial period. These orders, Qadariyya, Askariyya, and Shadhiliyya, brought 
new ritual practices including zikiri, the rhythmic recitation of devotional phrases, performed at 
major ceremonies including funerals and girls’ initiations (see Chapter 3). Based on esoteric 
knowledge passed from teacher to student, the tariqa offered access to Islam for those unable to 
read and write, and notably, all three orders that took root in Uluguru permitted women as well 
as men to join and to take part in key rituals.13 These tariqa, which had first spread on the coast 
among former slaves and other low status groups during the German colonial period, were of 
constant to concern to authorities, who saw them as potentially subversive organizations (Becker 
2008: 179–208; S. Fabian 2019: 143–146; Glassman 1995: 139–142; Nimtz 1980). Indeed, a 
1933 circular from the administration fretted over the possibility of “communistic or other 
subversive influences” spreading through the tariqa and zikiri was banned in some parts of the 
colony around this time, although Uluguru was not among them (“Confidential Circular” 1933; 
Nimtz 1980: 81–83).  
Prior to the arrival of these orders, Mkuyuni and Kinole were already understood as 
Muslim-dominated areas, as evidenced by the Catholic mission’s lack of presence in the 
immediate area (Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko, interview, October 22, 2018; Pels 1999: 115). 
However, the introduction of tariqa brought both additional conversions and a changing 
engagement with Islam. For many, this is remembered as the birth of a deeper and more 
meaningful involvement with religion. When I asked Ali Tondolla, one of my key interlocutors 
in Mkuyuni, about this, he explained to me that Islam was already present in the mountains prior 
to the tariqa, but that people had very limited religious knowledge. When the Qadariyya teacher 
 
13 As discussed in Chapter 3, some orders did not permit women to join (Nimtz 1980: 79). Those in Uluguru did, but 
this should not be mistaken for full equality. No orders allowed women to become leaders or teachers except in 




Senei bin Juma arrived in Uluguru, he brought “real understanding” of Islam (A. T. Tondolla, 
personal communication, August 11, 2018). Of course, this assessment of tariqa and the forms of 
religiosity that preceded it reflect the claims of the tariqa leaders themselves and thus overstate 
the lack of religious practice and understanding prior to their arrival. Nevertheless, the popularity 
of the orders and the discourses surrounding their history suggest that the forms of religious 
knowledge, practice, and community they brought were indeed powerful and compelling to 
many in the mountains. 
The spread of Sufism had significant political implications at the local level. The new 
religious teachers opened rural madrassa (Koranic schools) which challenged the authority of 
both prior Muslim elites and the mission-run school system. Whereas Islam had previously been 
entangled with social class and the politics of “big men,” the tariqa tended to flatten prior 
distinctions and espoused equality in the religious community, except along gendered lines and 
between teachers and students. Likewise, the orders offered an alternative to lineage-based 
structures. While the direct passage of secret knowledge and other Sufi practices such as 
visitations to graves resonated with Luguru mila, the orders and their leaders stood outside the 
matrilineal lineage system. Like other Islamic institutions, their teachings promoted patrilineal 
descent and inheritance patterns. Likewise, their ritual practices, including care for the dead, 
were based not on matrilineal kinship but on affiliation with the tariqa. 
 Around the same time that the tariqa were spreading, some areas of the eastern 
mountains, including Mkuyuni, also saw a marked shift from uxorilocal to virilocal residence 
patterns, as well as a general shift away from residence on lineage land and toward new 
settlement (Fosbrooke 1954). While these changes corresponded closely with the growth of 




Rather, it appears that the shifting residence patterns were primarily an outcome of growing 
economic importance of cash crops. Cash crops first emerged via an internal food market, with 
millet sold locally by the late 1920s.  Farmers began to grow cotton and coffee in small amounts 
a few years later. Kapok had served as a cash crop since the German period and peas and beans 
were also grown for the emerging urban markets in Morogoro and Dar es Salaam. Beginning in 
1928, the Agricultural Officer also began working with the Native Authority to encourage the 
production of cash crops. Based on this sequence, Pels convincingly argues that the increase in 
cash cropping after 1926 was first driven by the growth of the local cash economy, and only 
subsequently in response to external markets and colonial policy (Pels 1999: 138–141, 180–182). 
In Mkuyuni, relatively more recent settlement and shallower lineage control over land 
coincided with lower population densities. As cash crops made land increasingly appealing, 
significant numbers of families moved from lineage lands higher in the mountains to Mkuyuni 
and requested land from lineage heads there. Colonial data show that it was almost exclusively 
men who secured these “outsider” land rights. It is not clear why this was so, but it may have 
been a result of men establishing farms prior to marriage, or of the relegation of matters 
involving cash transactions to men. Whatever the case, this change meant that children of such 
families lived away from their own lineage and relied heavily on their fathers for access to land. 
This evidence also suggests men had primary control of cash crop revenues. The increasing 
reliance of the household on the male household head along with distance from the lineage itself 
added pressure to the matrilineal system (Fosbrooke 1954; Pels 1999: 137–145, 180–182). At the 
same time, increasing independence from the matrilineal system combined neatly with Islam, 
which espoused patrilineal kinship norms and offered alternative forms of authority outside of 




It was in these parts of the mountains that the tariqa had their largest growth, and their 
popularity must be understood in this context. Just as the patrilineal framework of Islam had 
proven attractive to certain “big men” of the nineteenth century, it similarly appealed to a new 
generation of young men living away from their lineage and dealing increasingly with a cash 
economy. Moreover, the community offered by the tariqa, including ritual practice, drew in both 
men and women who had settled far from their extended families and who sought new 
connections in areas like Mkuyuni. The forms of authority promoted by the orders, based on the 
mastery of novel kinds of esoteric knowledge, also offered an alternative to the entangled 
structures of colonial administration, lineage elders, and the remnants of the “big men” and other 
prior elites. As the colonial administration shifted from its original principles of indirect rule 
toward a vision of development and modernization throughout the 1930s, 40s and 50s, the tariqa 
and the alternative structures of community they embodied would continue to grow. 
Erosion and the Malthusian Threat 
As Samantha Jones pointed out in her overview of the discourses around land 
degradation in Uluguru, Bagshawe’s 1930 land development survey followed a Malthusian 
ideology, viewing the carrying capacity of land as a fixed variable that could not be increased 
through any amount of labor increase or innovation (Jones 1996: 188). However, despite his 
concerns about population growth, Bagshawe had ultimately praised Luguru farmers for their 
hard work and productivity. The 1938 annual report dispensed with this respect altogether, 
marking deepening fears about the catchment and the environment of the mountains. The report, 
written by Agricultural Officer H. P. Smart, accused local communities of “rapidly denuding 
these essential watersheds of trees, vegetation and soil” (Smart 1938, quoted in Jones 1996: 190). 




the sake of downstream water supplies, populations should be relocated to the plains (Jones 
1996: 190). Indeed, concern about soil erosion was growing among British administrators across 
Africa at this time (Beinart 1984; Carswell 2003; Moore and Vaughan 1994; Showers 2005). As 
alarm about erosion grew, plans to mitigate its effects proliferated, especially in key catchments 
like Uluguru. Notes were shared across empire on best practices around tree planting, terracing 
and other measures, often with relatively little concern for the particularities of place. 
The main instigator of ULUS was A. H. Savile, the Regional Assistant Director of 
Agriculture. In the 1940s, Savile issued severe reports on the conditions of soils in the 
mountains, writing that “the African cultivator in the greater part of the Uluguru and Ngurus still 
remains completely apathetic to the ravages caused by erosion” (Savile 1945, quoted in Jones 
1996: 190).  He emphasized that what he perceived as poor practices on the part of those living 
in the highlands not only affected those communities but harmed those downstream. In 1947, he 
wrote: “There can be no doubt that a proportion of the population, varying in different areas, will 
have to be resettled on the plains,” although he admitted that a total depopulation of the 
mountains would be unwise given the mountains’ tendency to act as a famine reserve in years of 
lowland drought (Savile 1947). When arguing for the need to intervene in Luguru agricultural 
processes, he claimed that cultivators downstream had been adversely affected by floods during 
the rainy season followed by a lack of water during the dry season, a problem he dated to 1929 
(Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 143). Importantly, he believed that the Luguru had only arrived in 
the mountains in the 1880s, a timeline that gave force to his view of farmers ignorant of their 





While Savile’s estimation of the beginning of inhabitation in Uluguru was clearly 
incorrect, his concerns about soil erosion were more ambiguous. There was evidence of erosion, 
but it was difficult to judge whether the erosion was increasing at a significant rate and if so, 
whether it was due to farming. Henry Fosbrooke recorded evidence of significant flooding and 
concomitant erosion in the area well before the mountains would have reached the population 
densities that concerned Savile (Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 144). Even Henry Morton Stanley, 
on his pass to the north of the mountains on his expedition to find Livingstone in 1871, noted a 
massive flood that wiped out entire villages and changed the course of the Ngerengere River 
which flowed from the northwestern side of the mountains (Stanley 1872: 517). A note from 
1956 in the “Soil Conservation” file of Morogoro District remarked that German documents 
from 1911 described the river as erratic and prone to annual periods of desiccation (“Ngerengere 
River Flow” 1956). While this river has its source on the opposite side of the mountains from 
Mkuyuni, these observations raise greater questions about the assumptions made by 
administrators that uneven flow in the rivers was a recent problem resulting from increasing 
population density. However, most of this information was ignored by the colonial authorities of 
the 1930s and 1940s. 
The Uluguru Land Usage Scheme 
ULUS officially began in 1947, largely under the direction of Savile and in accordance 
with the concerns about soil erosion that animated his work. However, there was disagreement 
about the proper course of action. The forestry department advocated for tree planting on 
overworked land and for the creation of special reserves around water sources, while an 
agricultural officer pushed for a program centered around the construction of terraces. Experts 




experiment on the northern side of the mountains in 1949 was a remarkable failure; crops did not 
grow. However, despite sustained objections from critics of the bench-terrace plan, terracing 
carried the day and remained the primary focus of ULUS until the 1955 unrest forced the 
administration to abandon the project (Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 143–146). 
 While terracing was the centerpiece of ULUS, it involved several additional components. 
There was an effort to alleviate population pressure by attempting, through a variety of measures, 
to relocate people from the mountains to the plains below. This was met with resistance, but 
eventually some people did move to the newly opened and irrigated lands made available at 
Mlali (Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 146–147). Tree planting and encouragements to plant coffee 
were also included in ULUS. The scheme also forbade cultivating near streams or on slopes 
deemed too steep. The project moved forward in lurches but only showed success in Mgeta. 
There, terracing was already common, and the scheme focused instead on small amounts of tree 
planting and improvements in crops, especially vegetables grown for the urban market. 
Elsewhere where terracing was introduced, little was accomplished and after the officer at 
Tangeni began to focus on coercive legal measures, his house was burned down, along with 
those of two of the project’s African instructors (Brain 1980: 179–181). 
In 1953, Savile returned to Uluguru after an extended absence and, seeing an opportunity 
in the appointment of a new District Commissioner, R.H. Gower, set about reinvigorating ULUS. 
Gower had experienced the land usage schemes of Usambara to the northeast prior to his 
appointment in Morogoro and was better positioned than his predecessor to win the cooperation 
of a diverse group of local powerbrokers. Gower astutely invited a broad selection of leaders to a 
two-week seminar to launch the renewed scheme, including representatives from various 




members of the Native Authority. However, the meeting did not include Kingalu, who had been 
deposed almost two decades before, and when the program reached Mkuyuni, Kingalu declared 
that terraces were “taboo.” Gower dispatched Brain to run a two-day seminar on the benefits of 
terracing at Kingalu’s residence at Kinole, after which Kingalu agreed to the plan (Brain 1980: 
181–183). The category of “taboo” was almost certainly what is called in Swahili miiko, which 
are implicated in Luguru ideas of social healing. Items and activities considered miiko threaten 
the social reproduction of society by angering ancestor spirits, leading to infertility, drought, and 
death. It was also likely miiko that the woman evoked when she confronted Kingalu Mwanashaa 
in the same spot nearly a century earlier, as Horner attempted to have his portrait made. The 
invocation of miiko against terracing suggested that the program threatened social health. While 
Kingalu ultimately changed his stance and permitted terracing to go forward, the exchange 
directly implicated terracing in the politics of social healing and rainmaking. Late in the year, 
Kingalu Mwanamguo died, and rumors circulated that this death was caused by his violation of 
miiko by allowing terracing (Brain 1980: 185–186). 
At the time, the beginnings of what would become the independence movement were 
emerging in Tanzania. The Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU), the party that would 
ultimately lead to Tanzanian independence in 1961, was officially founded in 1954. TANU itself 
was a manifestation of a broader growth of a new kind of politics, led predominantly by educated 
and upwardly mobile young men, which was beginning to coalesce in opposition to colonial rule 
(Iliffe 1979: 485–486). In many instances, this new politics was at odds with traditional 
authorities who had their power bolstered through the Native Authority. However, in Uluguru, 
Kingalu’s family had been shut out of the Native Authority since 1936 and had little interest in 




his nephew, Kingalu Mwanakinoge. Kingalu Mwanamguo’s sons, not in the line of succession, 
joined TANU early after its inception and began encouraging their cousin to push back against 
the colonial administration (Brain 1980: 186). 
Meanwhile, public opinion against ULUS was shifting. The major theme in stories of 
terracing I gathered in 2018 was the amount of labor involved, which drew labor away from 
agriculture as well as other tasks. From the perspective of the British administrators, the labor 
used to build terraces resulted directly in capital development in the mountains. Terraces were 
understood as a form of capital that would permit the increased extraction of profit from the soil 
while protecting the prospects for economic development downstream. Paired with coffee 
planting initiatives, the scheme was intended to increase incomes and promote economic growth. 
However, increasing the value of land through labor in Uluguru was complex and politically 
fraught. The matrilineages which, in theory, controlled the land itself were not typically 
understood to have ownership over improvements to the land; those belonged to individuals and 
were passed from parent to child. Thus, adding terraces and trees to the land threatened lineage 
land tenure. The future of matrilineal tenure, which had already been weakened by the ban on 
ngoto payments, the cooptation of lineage forests, and the rise of cash crops, seemed increasingly 
uncertain. However, the matrilineal lineage was not only an entity concerned with land tenure. It 
was also the foundation of social reproduction through practices of social healing. While not all 
in the mountains were happy with matrilineal authority—as evidenced by the increasing draw of 
Islam and shifting residence patterns away from the lineage—it nevertheless maintained a 
monopoly on rainmaking, the core of social health. 
The promotion of cash crops, while never the central focus of ULUS in the eastern 




emerged since at least the 1920s, the pushing of coffee, a semi-permanent crop, also raised 
difficult questions over the control of land and the wealth it produced. Cash crops had been a 
particularly losing enterprise for women, as we have seen, since men captured most of the 
profits. The slow move away from uxorilocal residence that cashing cropping accelerated was 
particularly threatening to women. Removed from their own kinship networks and sidelined 
from the major cash earning activities of the household, many women found themselves 
increasingly dependent on their husbands. This growing vulnerability was especially noticeable 
in areas like Mkuyuni, where most households lived away from their lineages and relied upon 
land rights secured by men. This gendered tension was exacerbated by the work required for 
terracing, which was demanded of both men and women. Maack (1996) reported that ULUS 
received complaints that the program made men and women work together. One interpretation of 
such complaints is that they voiced a gendered conflict over land; farms in Uluguru typically 
belonged to individuals, not households, so mixed gender working parties raised a critical 
question—who would own the terraces and the land attached to them after the work was 
complete?  
In addition to these changes in land tenure, ULUS became increasingly coercive and 
stringent in its imposition of rules, including the ban on burning, which farmers had previously 
practiced not only to clear fallowing fields but to control for cutworms and other pests (Brain 
1980: 186). The demand for labor also became compulsory as the quota for terraces was made 
mandatory. Threatened with jail or fines and fearing an increasing loss over the ecosystem and 
institutions of social reproduction, farmers’ skepticism of the program began to grow. In their 
original enthusiasm for the project, many hoped that terracing would improve crop yields, and in 




places, terracing caused a loss of topsoil, which was either turned under or washed away before it 
could be planted. The varied results were a result of the highly variegated mountain landscape 
and caused increasing dissatisfaction with the scheme. A critical turning point appears to have 
been irregular and low rainfall in late 1954 and early 1955. The interruption of rains, which 
followed the sudden death of Kingalu Mwanamguo, appeared to confirm that terraces were 
miiko. Terracing had angered the mizimu and damaged the fertility of the land they protected. 
When public energy began to shift against ULUS, Kingalu and his cousins were quick to 
channel the energy toward their own causes, casting blame on the colonial administration for 
interfering with rainmaking. The unlikely alliance between Kingalu’s chiefly family and TANU 
was also joined by new religious authorities. One of the main instigators of the unrest was the 
son of Senei bin Juma, the founder of the Qadariyya order in Mkuyuni. The Sufi orders sat in 
tension with both the matrilineal system, due to their patrilineal structure and nominal rejection 
of “pagan” rituals, and with TANU, the nationalist focus of which contradicted Islam’s more 
global orientation (Becker 2008: 209–240). However, Kingalu Mwanamguo himself had joined 
Qadariyya (likely after his 1936 deposition) and many lineage elders in the area were active in 
the spreading of this new form of Islam (Asman Kingalu Said Setembu, personal 
communication, December 30, 2018; Pels 1999: 212). For them as for others, participation in the 
tariqa marked access to powerful forms of knowledge and connections to Muslim communities 
beyond the mountains. It also offered a challenge to colonial authority among those increasingly 
shut out of the Native Authority. Muslim communities in general were also resentful of their 
long marginalization in the British administration, which tended to favor mission-educated 
Christians. These vastly different authorities—TANU, Kingalu, and the tariqa—thus shared a 




discontent of the farmers, offering an alternative vision of political authority. In so doing, they 
harnessed anxieties around social reproduction and social healing, laying the blame for the lack 
of rain at the feet of the British administration. 
By June 1955, after two seasons of poor rain, people began showing up at meetings about 
ULUS armed with machetes, demanding an end to the program. In Mkuyuni, several agricultural 
instructors were attacked. On July 13, 1955, District Commissioner Gower scheduled two 
barazas in eastern Uluguru to address complaints about the program. He was accompanied by 
Sultan Sabu bin Sabu, who had taken over the top position in the Native Authority after Kingo’s 
death 1942. Sultan Sabu did not have a hereditary claim to his title but was chosen by the British 
for what they deemed his administrative competence and because his appointment appeared to 
draw the least complaint of any candidate (Pels 1996). At both meetings, Gower demanded an 
end to the threats and unrest, while offering to hear individual grievances. He also explained that 
the lack of rains was not caused by terraces, arguing that they had also affected unterraced land. 
The first stop at Mkuyuni was attended by around 2,500 and ended peacefully. Gower then 
traveled to Matombo, where an even larger crowd waited. He repeated his earlier speech, but this 
time, the crowd did not disperse, instead continuing to hurl accusations at Sultan Sabu. A scuffle 
broke out and Gower read the riot act, threatening the crowd with force. Unrest continued to 
spread, and the riot police who accompanied Gower took matters into their own hands, shooting 
and killing John Mahenge, whom they accused of inciting the crowd and throwing rocks (Young 
and Fosbrooke 1960: 151–157). 
Gower’s insistence that terracing had not caused the year’s irregular and inadequate 
rainfall attempted to answer a political and moral complaint with a scientific explanation. There 




for the lack of rain. Indeed, none of the ethnographers involved in reporting on ULUS and its 
aftermath—James Brain, Henry Fosbrooke, and Roland Young—recognized the importance of 
rain as a way of invoking the broader politics of social healing. Kingalu’s family, in contrast, 
seized the moment, promising “more rain and better crops” if Kingalu was reinstalled as chief of 
Uluguru (Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 152). This promise appealed to the politics of social 
reproduction, speaking to several centuries of rainmaking and alluding to the power of mizimu to 
heal the land. The appeal was powerful among women, who were threatened by the decline in 
the lineage system, and among the young TANU members and Islamic leaders who resented 
British rule. The administration was caught off guard by the demands for the reinstatement of 
Kingalu as chief and by the apparent coalescence of power behind Kingalu’s family, but they had 
largely ignored politics outside of the Native Administration, except to charge individuals with 
corruption. They failed to notice the continuing importance of rainmaking matambiko and the 
rise of Sufi orders as alternative forms of social organization. The British politics of development 
ignored questions of social reproduction and rain, thus providing their opponents an opportunity 
to harness the power of political critique emerging from crop failures, rain shortages, and other 
signs of social illness. 
Conclusion 
The history of Uluguru from the turn of the nineteenth century until independence was 
marked by the proliferation of political paradigms, which formed a complex and layered social 
landscape. Forms of authority linked to spirits, rain, and the sacred landscape intersected with 
new networks of power branching across caravan routes and arcing toward the Indian Ocean. 
Guns and the slave trade offered leaders new opportunities for the consolidation of power, but 




the arrival of Islam added additional strata to this shifting configuration, especially as indirect 
rule attempted to conform to and reshape local political formations. While indirect rule did lead 
to the reification of many traditions, it also became increasingly disjointed from the structures on 
which it claimed to be based, creating new opportunities for political action outside official 
bureaucratic channels. Throughout these changes, water remained a critical point of conflict, and 
control over the mountains’ water supply—whether through rainmaking matambiko or forced 
terracing—stood at the heart of political struggle. The appropriation of forests and other sacred 
places provided leaders with increased power, but also placed upon them complex sets of 
obligation to the people and the environment. 
While these changes led to the increasing marginalization of women from the political 
sphere, the politics of social healing remained a powerful framework by which demands could be 
placed upon those in power. This politics of healing, expressed through the core image of rain, 
placed questions of social reproduction—human, agricultural, and ecological health—at the 
center of politics. As such, it became a potent paradigm by which the disenfranchised, especially 
women, could resist, critique, and contest poor leadership. When crowds gathered to confront 
District Commissioner Gower over the failures of ULUS, they invoked social healing and the 
obligations it entailed. The British administration showed little understanding of these 
obligations, offering instead scientific explanations of climate and a promise of economic 
development through cash cropping. While the colonial government refused to take 
responsibility for rain, new members of TANU in the mountains astutely drew upon ideas of 
social healing to provide an alternative image of leadership, one that would come with 
agricultural and ecological flourishing. Although this vision was ultimately contradictory—




whole—it nevertheless proved successful in channeling criticism of ULUS toward the 
establishment of a new form of politics, that of the nationalist independence movement. 
After ULUS was abandoned, the colonial administration repealed their ban on ngoto and 
took a lighter hand to the administration of the mountains. Much of the energy that had brought 
an end to terracing was redirected toward the growing independence movement, and TANU 
Youth membership rose quickly in the mountains. At the time of my research, elders still 
recalled the songs they sang calling for independence from colonial rule, and proudly 
remembered confronting the District Commissioner with the demands of the party. Women in 
particular joined in large numbers across the eastern mountains. After half a decade of internal 
and external struggle, TANU won its appeal for independence, and on December 9, 1961, a new 
flag was raised over Uluguru. Celebrations in the mountains lasted well into the night. The 
promise of TANU and independence generated a wave of optimism and ushered in a set of 
radical experiments in development, this time lead by TANU under an explicitly socialist 
framework. These experiments and their lasting impacts on the communities of Uluguru are the 






REFUSING NAMES: SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AND SOCIALISM1 
When I first spoke with Mama Kisangile, in early June 2018, Gerald was with me. We 
had asked a young village official to help us find elders who were knowledgeable about local 
history and he brought us to her house, introduced us, and left to attend to other matters. The 
house was built of unbaked earth bricks, with a bowing wall and a weathered door. Through the 
trees, you could see the main road as it curved toward the south. When we arrived, Mama 
Kisangile cleared the cups from the small wooden table in her kitchen and called to her young 
granddaughters to bring us chairs. Her kitchen, an open area behind her house with a wood stove 
under a low thatch roof, was crowded with furniture and cookware. Her granddaughters lingered 
nearby, listening curiously, as we began working through our tattered schedule of questions. 
Mama Kisangile opened the conversation by informing us that she’d spoken to other researchers 
in the past, and indeed, she seemed to find our questions routine. Her answers were at once 
incisive and circuitous, compressing complex information in seemingly offhand statements while 
skillfully redirecting the conversation away from more secret matters. I would later learn she was 
the most senior person in the local Mlali lineage, but I failed to notice the few oblique hints she 
 
1 Portions of this chapter were previously published: Fredlund, Jessie, 2020. “Naming Matters: Inheritance, Land, 




dropped about her status during our first conversation (A. A. Kungugu, interview, June 12, 
2018). 
Not long into our conversation, Mama Kisangile repeated a refrain that was already 
familiar to us—young people today disrespect tradition (mila), she said. They don’t understand 
its benefits. When I asked her what those benefits were, she immediately began telling us about 
past rainmaking practices, in which people would travel to the sacred forest at Kolero and return 
with rain. Those responsible for making the trip were holders of a specific set of names that were 
passed down through the matrilineal lineage from uncle to nephew. The name in Mama 
Kisangile’s lineage was Sugusugu.2 However, she informed us, the holders of these names had 
died. I asked why the names hadn’t been inherited as they had in prior generations. She said she 
didn’t know. Hoping to get her to explain a little about the structure of the matrilineal system, I 
asked who would normally inherit a name like Sugusugu. She laughed heartily and said, “the one 
you came with.” 
I later learned that the young village official who had brought us to interview Mama 
Kisangile was one of two men that lineage members speculated might inherit the name 
Sugusugu. When I asked them about this, both men told me that the prior Sugusugu, on his 
deathbed, warned them that no one should inherit the name until an unspecified period had 
passed. If someone tried to take it prematurely, he would die within a few years. However, the 
men said, the name (and the ancestral spirit it represents) would eventually choose someone, 
causing that person to fall ill until they assumed the name. If the name selected them, they could 
not refuse without risking sickness and ultimately death. Mama Kisangile, however, gave a 
different story. She said that after the death of Sugusugu, the heir was supposed to be caught and 
 
2 Elsewhere in the mountains, there were also inherited women’s names, but my interlocutors in Mkuyuni agreed 




put inside like a girl undergoing initiation but the young men of today were afraid and ran away. 
When I asked her why, she chuckled. “I don’t know, even me. They are my children but I don’t 
know.” 
During my research, many in Mkuyuni, like Mama Kisangile, reported that mila was no 
longer being followed. When I asked people why not, they often shrugged and said, “everything 
has its time.” Many said religion was the driving force in the abandonment of older practices—
whether religion (dini) opposed mila was a subject of debate in Mkuyuni when I was there (see 
Chapter 3). It is likely that religion did play a role in the decline of mila, but when I asked when 
mila was abandoned, the majority of those I spoke to pointed to the decades following 
independence, the 1960s and 1970s. This was not an era in which religion—either Islam or 
Christianity—saw significant changes or growth. The large waves of conversion to Sufism and 
Catholicism occurred in the 1930s and 1940s, while Ansar Sunna and Pentecostalism did not 
arrive until the 1980s. However, the period when mila is most often understood to have waned 
was one of significant social change: it was the time of a radical social experiment on the 
national level, the socialist project engineered by Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nyerere and 
his party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). 
This chapter consists of two parts analyzing this pivotal period in Tanzanian history and 
its lasting legacy on the communities of Uluguru. The first lays out the history of Tanzanian 
socialism and villagization. I argue that while Tanzanian socialism in general and villagization in 
particular are often framed as failures, they succeeded in bringing about two related and deeply 
significant changes in the management of land. First, Tanzanian socialism upended prior 
institutions of land tenure. In Mkuyuni, this led to the fracturing of the matrilineal lineage. 




capital. By centering land’s “productive” uses, the post-independence state rendered the role of 
land in social reproduction increasingly invisible in both policy and law. The first section 
explores why the government brought about these changes, asking why so many in Mkuyuni 
assess villagization as a good thing, despite the violence and suffering it entailed. 
The second section turns to the lasting effects of this period in Mkuyuni, arguing that the 
changes in land tenure sparked conflicts over social reproduction that remain sites of struggle 
today. To illustrate this, I examine interlinked changes in the inheritance of land and of ancestral 
names. Inheritance encapsulates relationships between the living, their ancestors, and future 
generations. As such, it is a key site of struggles over social reproduction. As the Introduction 
outlined, feminist scholars have argued that the separation of social reproduction (and 
reproductive labor) from production has been integral to the establishment of capitalism 
(Federici 2004; Katz 2001; Picchio 1992; Vogel 2013). However, in Mkuyuni, conflicts over 
reproductive labor emerged most acutely because of socialist land policies. I argue that this was 
because the form of social reproduction assumed by the socialist Tanzanian state was still 
“unhinged” from and subordinate to production and that the government failed to account for the 
richness of social reproduction in practice (Katz 2001: 710). As such, the socialist government 
was unable to replace the older social forms it had dismantled, leaving gaps which women and 
men in Mkuyuni are still laboring to fill. 
Ujamaa and Villagization 
After independence in 1961, the government of the country then known as Tanganyika3 
embarked on an ambitious plan to build an authentically African socialism, called Ujamaa, a 
word meaning familyhood in Swahili. Nyerere first laid out the principles of Ujamaa in 1962, 
 




and the government took initial steps toward this vision of socialism under its First Five Year 
Plan (1964–1969), including the nationalization and expansion of “settlement schemes,” 
originally colonial era projects intended to promote capital intensive cultivation of certain 
commercial crops. Under these schemes, voluntary settlers from land-poor regions would be 
allocated land in settlement areas and paid to produce particular cash crops. After independence, 
these schemes were nationalized, and the government announced ambitious plans to expand the 
model to new areas. The schemes were intended to modernize agricultural production and 
increase productivity through capital-intensive development. However, the plan was abandoned 
in 1966 due to high cost, low output, and poor morale in the new settlements (Cliffe and 
Cunningham 1973; Resnick 1981: 50–53; Schneider 2004: 348). 
A period of more radical change began a few years later with the Arusha Declaration of 
1967, in which Nyerere announced a broad, explicitly socialist program for the country. 
Following the declaration, the government nationalized banks and large import/export houses 
and began acquiring majority shares in the Tanzanian subsidiaries of many multinational 
corporations (Coulson 2013: 22). The Arusha Declaration emphasized agriculture as “the basis 
of development,” and later that year, Nyerere further elaborated his policies for rural 
development in the policy booklet Ujamaa Vijijini4 (Nyerere 1968: 29, 106). Following the 
Arusha Declaration, the ruling party, TANU, began to encourage rural communities to 
voluntarily form cooperative villages that would conform to the party’s vision of collective rural 
development. By 1973, however, TANU’s vision for the voluntary formation of Ujamaa 
collectives and villages had failed to come to fruition and the government, under Nyerere’s 
leadership, decided to take more drastic action, implementing a policy of compulsory 
 
4 The official translation in English is titled “Socialism and Rural Development.” The title translates literally as 




villagization. In the ensuing three years, about five million Tanzanians were relocated into 
planned villages, their old homes often razed or burnt to the ground (Coulson 2013: 280–309; 
Scott 1998: 224–254). 
Today, Tanzania’s program of compulsory villagization is widely regarded as a failure. 
James Scott (1998) critiqued Tanzanian villagization as a “high modernist” project by an 
aesthetically-motivated state, calling it “among the greatest human tragedies of the twentieth 
century” (3). While other scholars of Ujamaa have been less hyperbolic in their analyses of 
villagization’s shortcomings, the depiction of villagization as a failure is widespread (Ibhawoh 
and Dibua 2003). In some ways, villagization, and Ujamaa more broadly, clearly failed. Faced 
with an angry public and a deteriorating economy, the government revoked its policies requiring 
Tanzanians to live in planned villages only a few years after their forcible relocation, and many 
returned to their previous homes (Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977; Schneider 2004). Plans to 
further collectivize agricultural production were scaled back or abandoned due to lack of both 
resources and popular support. Less than a decade later, after significant pressure and 
interference from the United States and Europe, Tanzania began to formally liberalize its 
economy and agreed to the terms of structural adjustment. By 1985, the dream of socialism was 
over before many of the original plans for Ujamaa had even been attempted (Lugalla 1995; 
Mbilinyi 1990). 
The narratives often told of this period, those of an overreaching government and of 
massive failure, contrast with the stories I heard about villagization in Mkuyuni. While most of 
those I spoke with in Mkuyuni recalled anger at being moved and widely acknowledged the 
central government’s unilateral power in the process, they also often laughed at their anger and 




village. When I asked whether they thought the policy was ultimately good or bad, the 
overwhelming majority said it was good and most saw the program as a success. They gave 
several reasons for this assessment, including greatly increased access to schools, hospitals, and 
clean water, but the most common benefit they cited was the proximity of neighbors. Many 
people told me that if someone needed help, there were neighbors nearby you could call on. 
Many told me they simply liked living close together. Moreover, the depictions of villagization 
as simply imposed from above, while not incorrect, obscured the many ways in which people in 
Mkuyuni claimed degrees of authorship over the process. Attending to these tensions is 
necessary to understand the complex legacies of Ujamaa. 
Although I have described this period of Tanzanian history as “socialist,” some critics of 
Nyerere and TANU would contest the accuracy of this characterization. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
many industrial, agricultural, financial, and commercial enterprises in Tanzania were 
nationalized, but control was largely through parastatals which functioned similarly to private 
corporations, operating for profit with little public oversight (Coulson 2013: 319–346; Loxley 
and Saul 1975). Moreover, Nyerere argued that African socialism need not be based upon class 
struggle, a position which put him at odds with many Marxists. In an early and influential 
critique of Nyerere’s government from the Tanzanian left, Issa Shivji (1973, 1976), argued 
forcefully that far from being free of class struggle, Ujamaa was the product of a “bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie,” petit-bourgeois officials who made up the bulk of the administration and whose 
interests were largely aligned with international capital. In this view, the policies of Ujamaa 
marked an expansion of the bureaucratic class’s ownership over the means of production and 
control of labor rather than a deeper shift away from capitalist structures. Other observers were 




efforts to build socialism in Tanzania were repeatedly undercut and distorted by lower tiers of 
the bureaucratic class and their allies, especially an emerging class of “kulak” farmers (Boesen, 
Madsen and Moody 1977; Raikes 1975; Resnick 1981; van Velzen 1973; von Freyhold 1979). In 
addition to these internal limitations to socialism, some also pointed out that Tanzania’s 
continued integration into the global capitalist system meant the country’s economy was still 
ultimately market-driven rather than truly socialist (Cliffe 1973; Loxley 1979). 
Even though socialism never came fully into being in Tanzania, I use the term “socialist” 
to describe the post-independence period because I wish to take seriously the project of those 
who attempted to build an alternative to capitalist structures. Many among the “bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie” did act according to their class interests, ones which cannot be understood as 
meaningfully aligned with socialism. Others, however, acted against those own interests, drawn 
by the political forces of anticolonial struggle and the utopian vision so powerfully articulated by 
Nyerere (Coulson 2013: 24; Nursey-Bray 1980; Resnick 1981). They were joined by ordinary 
people, including many smallholder farmers in Uluguru who actively participated in efforts to 
build Ujamaa. Together, they sought to limit exploitation by capitalists and landlords and to 
redistribute wealth generated by the economy to the Tanzanian public. They also worked to 
construct the village not only as a physical space but as an institution through which people 
could work together for their collective wellbeing. They built schools and water pumps, 
improved roads, and taught literacy skills to adults and children alike. I do not think these efforts 
can be reduced to processes of capitalism. Considering possible futures for the Global South, 
Samir Amin wrote of the transition to socialism: “it is not linear; […] its still distant point of 
arrival is largely unknown. After all, socialism has still to be built” (1990: 55). In one sense, 




found in fragmented and winding efforts toward a hoped-for future. The term “socialist” allows 
us to trace one trajectory among many that existed in Tanzania from 1961 to 1985. It must be 
understood as always contested, contradictory, and incomplete. Nevertheless, Tanzanian 
socialism brough real change to the lives of those in Uluguru and its legacies, good and bad, 
continue to reverberate. Viewed from this perspective, Ujamaa’s ruptures appear not as endings 
but as waypoints on an unfinished map. 
Socialism and Nationalism in the Post-Independence Era 
Tanzania’s post-independence land policies must be understood in light of both the 
socialist principles of TANU’s vision of Ujamaa, under the leadership of Nyerere, and the 
challenges of nation-building and nationalism in the post-colonial context. While in the years 
leading up to decolonization, debates had raged among Nyerere’s pan-Africanist peers across the 
continent regarding the form independence should and could take, an Africa composed of 
independent nations carried the day (Wilder 2015). Frantz Fanon, who argued that the nation was 
the necessary site of anticolonial struggle, presciently identified many of the challenges that 
would be faced by the leaders of these new independent nations. He warned of “how easy it is 
for young independent countries to switch back from nation to ethnic group and from state to 
tribe—a regression which is so terribly detrimental to the development of the nation and national 
unity” (2004: 97). This, he wrote, was due to both “the colonial subject’s mutilation by the 
colonial regime” and the “apathy…mediocrity, and…deeply cosmopolitan mentality” of the 
national bourgeoisie (98). Fanon argued forcefully that the solution was a national consciousness 
that gave way to a humanist political and social one, and a government with a substantive 




Nyerere’s vision for nation building and socialism in Tanzania differed in fundamental 
ways from Fanon’s analysis of decolonization. Most notably, Nyerere rejected the applicability 
of Marxist-Leninist models of socialism for Africa. He claimed that Tanzania was effectively 
lacking in entrenched class divisions and that its socialism could not be based in class struggle. 
As we have seen, Nyerere’s Marxist critics, in contrast, identified the post-independence 
government as one of petit-bourgeois bureaucrats, an assessment that echoes Fanon’s predictions 
for post-colonial Africa (Shivji 1976). Tanganyika had also gained independence without the 
kind of violent struggle Fanon felt was necessary to truly liberate colonized peoples. Instead, 
TANU had leveraged the colony’s status as a United Nations trust territory to pressure for a 
peaceful withdrawal of the colonial administration (Coulson 2013: 144–158). However, despite 
the clear contrast in thought between Nyerere and Fanon, Nyerere’s government did face the 
challenges Fanon had predicted in building postcolonial national consciousness. Like other 
independence leaders, Nyerere shared Fanon’s concern about the dangers of tribal and ethnic 
division. In response, the TANU government embarked on a broad nation-building program 
rooted in the country’s lingua franca, Swahili. In line with Fanon’s prescriptions, TANU’s 
national consciousness was tied to a robust program aimed at improving economic and social 
conditions, focused on the nation’s interior and driven by humanist values of equality across 
gender, race, and ethnicity. 
In laying out his program for African socialism, Nyerere claimed to draw inspiration 
from pre-colonial African institutions which colonialism had interrupted, but not fully 
extinguished. These institutions, he suggested, were inherently egalitarian and classless. 
However, these traditional institutions, Nyerere explained, were not be maintained in their 




We, in Africa, have no more need of being ‘converted’ to socialism than we have 
of being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in our own past—in the traditional 
society which produced us. Modern African socialism can draw from its 
traditional heritage the recognition of ‘society’ as an extension of the basic family 
unit. But it can no longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of 
the tribe, nor, indeed, of the nation. For no true African socialist can look at a line 
drawn on a map and say, ‘The people on this side of that line are my brothers, but 
those who happen to live on the other side of it can have no claim on me’; every 
individual on this continent is his brother (1968: 12). 
Here, Nyerere is explicit that his understanding of socialism is incompatible with the indigenous 
institutions from which he claims his inspiration. While Nyerere promoted ahistorical, 
romanticized and generalized images of these “traditional” institutions, he also recognized in 
them the potential for conflict and even fascism (Nyerere 1968: 38–43). Decades of British 
indirect rule had reified and racialized these institutions as “tribes” and tied them to new legal 
regimes of authority over populations and land in ways that magnified this danger. In addition, 
Nyerere himself emphasized that the indigenous kinship-based institutions he gestured toward 
did in fact contain structures of inequality, especially along gendered lines (1968: 108–109). 
What Nyerere proposed, then, was a new institution, modeled on the extended family (or 
lineage), but free of patriarchy, racialization, and ethnonationalism—the village. This new social 
formation was envisioned as a deeply linked, cooperative community with internal equality. It 
would not tie people to the land on the basis of descent or tribe. It would also undo the structures 
of gerontocracy and patriarchy that Nyerere identified as an impediment to national 
development. Instead, youth and elders, women and men, would work together on equal terms to 
build the nation. But this utopian vision was not the only goal of villagization. As the next 
section discusses in more detail, it would also mitigate the danger of two potential threats to 
TANU’s power by undermining the tribal landlord class associated with indirect rule and the 





Land Under Ujamaa 
Majeshi Juma Setembo, a farmer in Mfumbwe Village, was twenty when Tanzania 
gained independence from Great Britain. He remembered TANU’s inroads into the area in the 
years between the terracing scheme of 1953–55 and independence in 1961 and recalled the 
policies the party implemented after it gained control of the government. When I asked him what 
TANU had achieved, he answered that it had made all Tanzanians equal and had forbidden 
discrimination on the basis of religion or tribe. Beyond that, it had ended what he referred to as 
land discrimination. Previously, he explained, Tanzanian land had been controlled by tribes, but 
TANU placed land under control of the government. Indeed, the post-independence government 
abolished the Native Authority in 1963 and vested all land in the new central government. This 
meant that land was no longer controlled by “customary” authorities appointed by the British 
under indirect rule and that land cases and other matters were no longer adjudicated by these 
same authorities (interview, June 2, 2018). 
Mzee Setembo was not the only one in Mkuyuni to tell me about the importance of the 
changes in land law following independence, but these comments contrast with the writing of 
Tanzanian legal scholars who have often emphasized continuity between colonialist and post-
independence land policy (Ramadhani Jenera, interview, April 17, 2018). For instance, R.W. 
Tenga (1987) argued forcefully that the post-independence government failed to effect a 
significant change in land tenure and could largely be characterized as continuing colonial 
patterns, especially in its suppression of the land market and in the government’s reluctance to 
grant freehold titles. For most of its rule, the British colonial administration sought to limit the 
sale of land by Africans. Africans, subject to customary law under the Native Authority, were 
said to have usufruct rather than property rights to land and thus, officially, could neither sell 




of a capitalist class of African farmers, but also sought more generally to act as a brake on 
African mobility by binding smallholders to the land. Of course, land sales did occur, much to 
the consternation of some British authorities, who worked to avoid making records of such 
transactions that could be used as evidence of ownership (“Native Authority Ordinance” 1932). 
Only in 1955 did the administration change its stance and begin permitting Africans (in certain 
cases) to claim freehold tenure. TANU, assuming leadership in 1961, promptly reversed this 
change and again barred freehold titles (Tenga 1987). While on the surface, the reasons the new 
administration gave for limiting the development of a private land market differed from those 
invoked by the colonial government, the policies shared fundamental concerns and assumptions. 
In his first major statement on Ujamaa, in 1962, Nyerere argued that land privatization was 
antithetical to authentic African socialism (1968: 7). When he later laid out his socialist policies 
in detail, he described land as part of the means of production and the necessary foundation for 
development in Tanzania, a point I return to below. He went on to argue that it must be 
“controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their Government and their 
cooperatives” (16, 118). While drawing on the language of Ujamaa, this approach to land rights 
bore much in common with pre-1955 colonial policy, beginning with the argument that 
“traditional” African societies had usufruct rather than property rights and that they were 
properly understood as collective rather than individual. Both administrations feared that 
allowing land sales would result in the growth of a class of landless poor (Tenga 1987: 41). 
However, such policies were never straightforward in practice, and government prohibitions on 





While these policies can be broadly understood in terms of socialist principles, they 
should also be understood in terms of the class interests of the new government itself. As Marxist 
critics like Shivji have pointed out, Nyerere’s administration was composed predominately of 
petit-bourgeois bureaucrats who were competing for power with both traditional and capitalist 
landholders (1998: 9). The administration’s relationship to the latter group, was complex, 
because in practice, the lower tiers of TANU were deeply linked to and allied with the “kulak” 
class, and these farmers were often able to use post-independence land policies to their 
advantage (von Freyhold 1979). This was possible because Nyerere adhered to modernization 
theory with regards to agriculture and prioritized the development of more capital-intensive 
agricultural methods (Coulson 2013: 283). The “kulak” class, although seen as exploitative, was 
also understood as the vanguard of modern agricultural techniques favored by the 
administration.5 However, at the higher levels of TANU, the emergence of such a class not only 
contradicted the principles of Ujamaa, but also posed a political threat, as did its presumed 
corollary, the creation of a class of landless peasants. Capitalist farmers were described as a 
central problem in Nyerere’s statement on rural development (Nyerere 1968: 112–118). The 
state’s attempts to limit the development of a land market and individual freehold tenure were 
aimed at preventing the emergence and growth of both a capitalist agrarian class and a landless 
one. In this, the British administration (at least until the final decade of the colonial period) and 
the post-independence petit-bourgeois government were aligned. 
However, as the comments from Mzee Setembu make clear, the new government’s 
relationship to customary law and customary authority marked a more significant shift from 
 
5 As von Freyhold (1979) showed, this class was in fact often not “progressive” or interested in investing in 
increased production. Nevertheless, the administration generally believed they were and this belief, in combination 




colonial era policies.6 As mentioned above, the post-independence government abolished the 
Native Authority in 1963. This was the final step in the process that began with the creation of 
district councils in some areas after 1953 (Fimbo 2004: 34). The final dismantling of the Native 
Authority after independence had a significant impact on the administration of land law in 
Uluguru. Although customary land rights continued to be the basis for rural tenure, their 
enforcement in contested cases depended on the interpretation of those rights by the courts. The 
Native Authority, even after the deposition of Kingalu, consisted of Luguru men who were 
versed in local systems of tenure. The new courts relied on judges from elsewhere in the country 
who were often less familiar with Uluguru’s matrilineal institutions. In Mkuyuni in particular, 
where the lineage was already relatively weak and coexisted with patrilineal patterns of 
inheritance and virilocal residence, those rights based on the matrilineage were rendered 
particularly tenuous. As we will see below, this did not only impact those cases that went to the 
courts but also shaped the flow of land more broadly. 
The continuation of customary law posed another problem for the new government. 
Although the Native Authority had been abolished and land had been formally unbound from 
ethnicity, customary law recognized complex and overlapping claims to land. In Uluguru, who 
had the right to a given a plot: the lineage mjomba who at least nominally administered the land 
in the valley, or their nephew or niece who had worked that plot over a period of years? 
Although arrangements like these varied widely across Tanzania, the post-independence 
administration tended to frame such relationships as landlord-tenant, and to equate them with 
feudal structures. It was in this context that the government introduced a new principle of land 
 
6 I use the term “customary” throughout this chapter in the legal sense of “customary law.” As prior chapters have 
shown, “customary” law and “customary” authorities were not remnants of timeless tradition but often the products 




law, known as “land to the tiller.” According to this principle, tenure was directly linked to labor, 
and “tenant” rights were prioritized over those of the “landlord.” The rule of “land to the tiller” 
was brought to bear on customary landholders with the passage of the 1968 Customary 
Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act, which provided a legal mechanism for the breakup of the 
holdings of customary landlords such as chiefs or lineage heads. Although this law was only 
applied to areas with commercial agricultural production and not to places like Uluguru, it also 
marked the beginning a more general recognition of the principle of “land to the tiller” by the 
courts (Tenga 1987; Tenga and Mramba 2014: 59; URT 1968). This change served to weaken 
the threat posed by the “traditional” land holding class, but it ran counter to other principles of 
the administration because it promoted individual rather than collective tenure. 
Post-independence land law was also shaped by the administration’s view of the 
economic role of land and nature in development. As noted above, Nyerere described land and 
other natural resources such as forests, minerals, water, and oil, as part of the “means of 
production” (1968: 16). This understanding of land as a form of capital informed the new 
government’s policies, which largely focused on increasing the value of outputs, especially cash 
crops for export, in order to grow the economy (Nyerere 1968: 106–144; Coulson 2013: 283). 
This trend had begun during the late colonial period, when projects like ULUS pushed for 
increased cash cropping and encouraged the development of the class of “progressive” farmers 
discussed above. However, even at the height of such policies, the colonial administration 
betrayed a marked ambivalence about the development of the rural African economy and the 
potential political threat emerging capitalist farmer and landless classes might bring (cf. Moore 
and Vaughan 1994: 116). As we have seen, Nyerere’s government was also fearful of the 




ambivalence about the need to develop the rural sector. Economic growth was the goal and rural 
lands were to be its basis. Instead, the threat of individualism and the emergence of capitalist 
rural classes needed to be managed through the creation of collective forms of production which 
would allow farmers to rationalize production, increase their use of inputs, and extract more 
value from the land. 
 In this context, the policy of villagization proved useful in managing two conflicting 
trends in land tenure. On the one hand, in areas where “land to the tiller” principles had been 
applied, individual tenure was taking root. Following the Arusha Declaration, the government 
attempted to encourage voluntary collectivization, but these efforts failed to spark change at the 
speed and scale the authorities envisioned. On the other hand, in areas where “land to the tiller” 
laws had not come into force, customary landholders continued to pose a political threat to the 
ruling party. Because customary law served as the basis for both the power of this class and the 
land rights of vast majority of the peasantry, it could not simply be eliminated as a legal 
framework. At the same time, the principle of “land to the tiller” was difficult to apply to areas 
like Uluguru where relationships were difficult to collapse into the landlord-tenant framework 
and they did nothing to promote the collectivization the government sought. 
 On its surface, villagization addressed the problem of collectivization by establishing the 
village as an institution that would serve as the foundation for collective, rather than 
individualist, rural development. At the same time, although less explicitly, it served to interrupt 
customary landholdings, to weaken the power of “traditional” authorities and institutions, and to 
begin a process of indirect land reform by encouraging the dissolution of older forms of 
collective land tenure. Shivji has argued that villagization amounted to a major land reform, but 




this indirect land reform was one of the key factors in shaping the policies of villagization, even 
if it was not explicitly stated as such. As numerous Tanzanian legal scholars have pointed out, 
villagization proceeded largely outside the law, but was rarely challenged in court, and when it 
was, courts tended to side with the government for political reasons (Shivji 1998; Fimbo 1992). 
Land for villages was often appropriated from customary holders like lineages. Although the 
land used for villages was typically only a fraction of larger customary landholdings, its 
appropriation by the state served to undermine such forms of land tenure more broadly. In short, 
it made clear the precarity of such claims to land without directly abolishing them, while 
simultaneously introducing forms of tenure which sat in tension with customary law. The village 
itself, as an institution formed to offer a collective basis for land administration and rural 
development, also undermined the authority of preexisting structures like the lineage. This 
process not only shifted control over land away from longstanding local elites toward a broader 
base of the peasantry, but also from elders to the younger generations that made up much of 
TANU. However, it did so in an uneven and legally ambiguous way. As we will see, the 
resulting uncertainty, in combination with the shift toward principles of “land to the tiller,” 
effected a much larger shift away from “customary” forms of collective tenure in places like 
Uluguru. The result was, in essence, a generational and class-based processs of land reform, 
albeit by another name. 
Villagization in Mkuyuni 
In 1974, the government forcibly relocated the residents of Mkuyuni Ward into planned 
villages, where any household could claim a residential plot and build a home. Those who 
refused to leave faced arrest and their homes were destroyed. Most of those who already lived in 




some only a matter of meters, others several kilometers or more, to new plots. The land taken for 
residential plots, most often either personal or lineage farmland, was appropriated without 
compensation. As elsewhere in the country, this was extralegal, but the courts upheld the 
government’s right, leaving those losing farms without recourse.  
Zaina Athmani Zengwe, in her 70s when I met her in 2018, spoke to us in the shade of 
her small house along the main road in Madamu Village. She and her co-wife were both 
pregnant at the time of villagization. Although they were already settled near the main road in 
Madamu, they were told they had to move to Mkuyuni to make room for people being moved 
down from the hills. She recalls that the day she gave birth, men came with a truck, threw her 
possessions in the back, and offered her, her new baby, and her pregnant co-wife a ride down the 
rough dirt road to their new plot in Mkuyuni. They were dropped off on an undeveloped piece of 
land, where they cooked dinner and went to sleep. In the night, her co-wife woke up in severe 
pain. She was rushed to the hospital, but she died, along with her baby, a few hours later. Her 
family blamed the death on the stress of the forced relocation, and in particular, the bumpy ride 
from Madamu to Mkuyuni. Less than a week later, Zaina Athmani was told her family had been 
moved in error and she was brought back to Madamu. Her old home had been destroyed and the 
plot had been occupied, so she was left to rebuild further down the road (Z. A. Zengwe, 
interview, June 29, 2018). While Zaina Athmani’s experience with villagization was the most 
traumatic I heard during my research, it was not the only tale of loss and pain. Many told second-
hand stories of deaths as people were left on undeveloped plots, where they fell sick or were 
attacked by lions. Others remembered the anguish of seeing their homes demolished and of being 




Zaina Athmani, they kept the anger “in their stomach,” knowing it was fruitless to resist the 
government. 
The actual planning of the villages, however, was not entirely an outside imposition. 
Implementation involved numerous local actors as well as outside bureaucrats. Many local 
people were TANU members and active participants in villagization, in official capacities or 
otherwise. The texture of villagization and its impact on individuals was shaped in small but 
meaningful ways through ad hoc advocacy, as when residents in one area successfully resisted 
attempts to move them to the nearby road and had been allowed to stay in their homes 
(Ramadhani Jenera, personal communication, December 11, 2018; Zena Ramadhani Sadala, 
personal communication, December 20, 2018). The implementation also depended on local men 
who were hired to measure new plots, demolish old homes, and forcibly relocate those who 
resisted. Omari Ahmedi Budi, more commonly known as Maandishi, who helped measure plots 
in Mkuyuni Village, recalled that he and other surveyors had a large amount of discretion as to 
where to begin measuring. Maandishi was not a bureaucrat; he had simply been selected for the 
task along with a group of other young men. He still remembered his work with pride, recounting 
how they would make decisions about where to measure, and how they would always leave 
space for football pitches, churches, and mosques. The optimism with which he recalled these 
days provides an image of villagization often missing from the scholarly discourse—a moment 
of progress, promise, and collective pride (O. A. Budi, interview, December 20, 2018). 
I spoke to several other men who been involved in the process of villagization, and they 
also took pride in their contributions to the process. Mwangila Mbwali, who worked to measure 
the plots in Kivuma, told me that despite his own participation in the process, he was initially 




Even despite his personal anger, he seemed to recall the moment with a sense of excitement 
(personal communication, December 11, 2018). Mohamed Salum Dogero, in Kibwaya Village, 
was involved in more than just measuring plots. Already serving as a low-level village official at 
the time of villagization, he also helped in enforcement, patrolling old homesteads and arresting 
those who failed to relocate. He and other village leaders designated an area for the Christians, 
mostly recent transplants from further south in the mountains, making space for them to build a 
church.7 The work, as he described it, was important, shaping the geographic contours of the 
community that still exist today (interview, December 12, 2018). While the experiences of these 
men differed, they all shared in taking pride in their work and remembered the time as one of 
excitement and promise. 
This is not to say that the villages were democratically planned; they were not. Indeed, 
many of my interlocutors, like Zaina Athmani, stressed the indomitable power of the 
government. The official who had final say in the placement of the villages was a TANU 
bureaucrat not native to the mountains, although most I spoke to remembered him fondly. 
However, crediting such bureaucrats with full authorship for the process of villagization 
obscures the important ways in which local people helped shape the form villagization took, 
including many local members of TANU youth who were enthusiastic about TANU’s plans for 
development as well as those who resisted forced resettlement. 
My purpose in offering these accounts is not simply to provide an antidote to more 
caricatured depictions of an undifferentiated, conservative peasantry resisting a modernizing 
state (Scott 1998). Local participation in villagization is significant because it indicates that the 
 
7 Although discrimination by religion was illegal in Tanzania, villages in the Mkuyuni area were often somewhat 
segregated by religion. Many of the area’s Christians were settlers from further south in the mountains who had 
moved looking for land or to work in the kapok or sugar processing for the Indian or German farmers in the area. 




temporality of the socialist project and the radical future it imagined were meaningful to many in 
Mkuyuni, and many, especially the youth who had been mobilized through TANU, not only 
believed in the vision of progress Ujamaa offered but helped shape that vision. It is also 
significant in a more specific way; as the rest of this chapter shows, generational conflicts today 
originate in part with the moment of villagization. These conflicts cannot be understood without 
a consideration of the unique historical experience of those who were elders at the time of my 
research. This generation was the very generation that called for and participated in projects of 
radical change in the post-independence period. The ambivalence of many elders toward mila 
cannot be understood without attending to this history.  
Recalling this moment of collective idealism, many in Mkuyuni are nostalgic. During my 
research, the remnants of socialism were tangible. It left behind not only schools, hospitals, and 
the bureaucratic institutions of village governance, but also a vision of progress premised on 
collective effort and government provision of certain forms of social welfare. Villagization 
shaped not only the village geography and village governance but the sense of the village as a 
meaningful social unit through which collective action might be taken. In this way, it seems to 
me that Ujamaa’s legacy is perhaps best understood not as ruins but as embers, a sense of 
futurity and community that continues to burn even as other structures displaced the socialist 
program itself (Sanjinés 2013; Coronil 2019: 262–263). However, this legacy is also deeply 
ambiguous. Starting from an examination in changes in social reproduction brought about by 
Ujamaa and villagization, the second part of this chapter explores this ambiguity through the 





Inheritance, Land, and Reproductive Labor 
While the future that the socialist project imagined never came to be, it did succeed in 
upending systems of land tenure and in destabilizing the forms of authority upon which 
customary tenure depended. The socialist government also succeeded in erecting primary schools 
and hospitals in many rural areas and improving infrastructure, including water supplies. The 
second part of this chapter analyzes the ways in which these changes unsettled structures of 
social reproduction and reproductive labor in Mkuyuni. I do so by examining shifts in two kinds 
of inheritance: the inheritance of land, and the inheritance of ancestral names. As I suggested at 
the beginning of this chapter, inheritance, spanning past, present, and future generations, is an 
important site of struggle over questions of social reproduction. In Mkuyuni, the indirect land 
reform carried out through villagization aimed to undermine customary institutions like the 
lineage and delink those institutions from control of land. However, as the remainder of this 
chapter shows, the lineage was not only an institution for managing land tenure over time. It was 
also a key institution of social reproduction. By uncoupling land from lineage and by framing 
land as capital, the post-independence government undermined the material and social basis for 
key forms of social reproduction. The remainder of this chapter explores the consequences of 
this shift, which has opened gendered and generational conflicts that are still sites of struggle 
today. 
Land Inheritance in Mkuyuni 
As outlined in prior chapters, land tenure at the time of colonization was generally 
organized through matrilineal lineages, with a male lineage head in charge of administering land. 
When he died, the women of the lineage would typically convene to select his successor from 




this system, and any person could request land from the lineage of either parent, as a member of 
their mother’s lineage or a “child” of their father’s. Importantly, although land rights ideally 
flowed along matrilineal lines, permanent crops and other improvements to land like terraces and 
buildings were understood to flow from parent to child. As Chapter 1 showed, the matrilineal 
system was ossified through the process of colonial ethnography and indirect rule, which sought 
to regularize and codify it. Some in Uluguru were able to use this process to consolidate their 
power, while others found their positions undermined. Women were particularly disadvantaged, 
as colonial ethnography often rendered their authority invisible. 
Today, land inheritance in Mkuyuni has changed. While old lineage boundaries are 
remembered, the lands themselves have been fragmented into small farms held by individuals. 
Under the matrilineal system, what had been inherited was a right to use land within the lineage 
area. Today, what is inherited is a piece of land itself, which flows from parent to child.8 Thus, 
when someone dies, their farms are most often divided evenly among their children. While 
women and men still have equal formal rights to land under this system, the weakening of the 
lineage has given fathers more control over their children, increased women’s dependence on 
their husbands and, in combination with virilocal residence patterns established during the 
colonial period (see Chapter 1), made it more difficult for women to claim the land holdings to 
which they have a legal right. Many of those I spoke with in Mkuyuni told me that this change, 
though gradual, was cemented in the post-independence period. The shift was driven by the 
changes in land policy at the national level described above. First, as we have seen, the 
nationalist government vested all land in the government, removing it from tribal control and 
 
8 All land in Tanzania is vested in the government (Tenga and Mramba 2014). However, land rights today, unlike 





placing it largely under the control of the village as an administrative unit (Fimbo 2004: 11; 
Tenga and Mramba 2014: 55–63). However, change on the ground was slow, as existing tenures 
were rarely interrupted. It was villagization, beginning in 1974 in Mkuyuni, that sparked a more 
radical, tangible change. 
Villagization impacted land tenure and inheritance in several ways. When villagization 
was implemented in Mkuyuni, the land used for the planned villages typically belonged to 
particular lineages and was taken without compensation. While the plots given out were only big 
enough for a house, not agriculture, they did help delink control of land from lineage. Young 
men could now get a plot of land without asking their lineage elders. Moreover, since land 
parceled out during villagization was decoupled from the lineage, it could not be passed down 
through matrilineal lines, and patrilineal inheritance became the norm. Patrilineal inheritance had 
already become more common in the villages around Mkuyuni over the preceding decades due 
especially to the rise of cash cropping (see Chapter 1). Villagization further cemented this trend 
by dramatically increasing the number of plots that were independent of lineage control. Some 
villages also gained control over agricultural land that had previously been held by Indian and 
German farmers and either redistributed this land or made it available to village residents by 
lease. As younger generations depended less on their lineage elders for access to land, the 
lineage system began to lose its authority. Speaking of Tanzania generally, Shivji writes:  
Villagization in effect meant the expropriation of customary rights and the 
compulsory acquisition of land under customary regimes. No recognizable legal 
procedures were followed in carrying out the process…. Customary occupiers 
occupied [their] lands not so much as a matter of legal right but at the discretion 
of the president (1998: 13).  
Villages, which I have argued were designed to wrest control from prior authorities and to take 
on the role previously filled by extended family in rural life, competed directly with lineages in 




villagization did succeed in one of its principal, if unspoken, goals—disrupting existing systems 
of land tenure and weakening the control of the older men over youth. 
 Beyond this, there was a more subtle shift in the understanding of land by the government 
and by those committed to TANU’s vision. In the colonial and precolonial period, land in 
Uluguru generally belonged to the lineage, but improvements on the land and permanent crops 
such as trees belonged to individuals and could pass from parent to child. As Chapter 1 
discussed, the colonial terracing and tree planting programs of the 1950s undermined collective 
land tenure and the matrilineal lineage because the introduction of permanent improvements to 
land like terraces and trees effectively shifted the category to which land belonged (Young and 
Fosbrooke 1960). Post-independence land policies had a similar effect, although not through the 
development of improvements like terraces. Indeed, the socialist government did not succeed in 
creating significant improvements to the variegated mountain land in Mkuyuni. Rather, these 
policies shifted the understanding of land because they were designed around land’s productive 
capacity. In other words, they framed land itself as a form of capital, a part of the “means of 
production” to which Nyerere referred (1968: 16). In Uluguru, such policies and the discourse 
around them helped swing the logic of land inheritance toward the patrilineal, to which capital 
was understood to rightly belong. The role of land as an ecosystem, a sacred landscape, and 
locus of social relations became increasingly obscured in public discourse. Patterns of 
inheritance shifted accordingly. 
Villagization had an uneven impact on men and women, weakening women’s access to 
land in several ways. Although in theory, post-independence land policies formalized women’s 
equal rights to own land, in practice, specific conditions in Mkuyuni shaped the outcomes of 




not have land rights under customary law, Uluguru was a notable exception. Women in the 
mountains had historically held significant rights to and control over land. They not only had a 
right to plots of land from their lineage and that of their fathers, but also had roles in appointing 
and potentially deposing the lineage heads who administered the land. However, as we have 
seen, in Mkuyuni, unlike other parts of the mountains, a pattern of virilocality had emerged. A 
1952 survey found that over four-fifths of households in Mkuyuni were virilocal, a result of 
increased cash cropping and the spread of Islam (Pels 1999: 181; Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 
57–58). During villagization, women had rights to claim plots equal to those of men, but most of 
those I spoke with in Mkuyuni said that few women did so. There are at least two reasons for 
this. First, the land was for residential plots. The pattern of virilocality in Mkuyuni meant that 
prior to villagization, most women in Mkuyuni lived in houses belonging to their husbands. It 
was these houses, then, that were to be destroyed and replaced during villagization. Older 
patterns of virilocality continued in the new villages, but now the land on which houses were 
built belonged to the husband and not his lineage. 
In this context, villagization was not simply a continuation of older structures of gendered 
inequality. In certain ways, the process increased women’s precarity, especially in the areas 
around Mkuyuni. Although women in Uluguru had historically strong land rights under 
customary law, these rights depended on the lineage as an institution. Even under virilocal 
conditions, divorced or widowed women could return to their own lineage and be guaranteed 
access to space to live and farm. As lineages lost control of land following villagization, this 
option disappeared. Of course, a shift away from customary matrilineal inheritance was widely 
replaced by patterns conforming to statute law, under which women continued to have equal 




virilocality, however, also put women at a disadvantage in asserting these rights. While siblings 
should have inherited land equally on the death of their parents, brothers living near their 
families were in a better position to establish a history of continuous cultivation on inherited 
plots than their sisters, who were living with their husbands. Under the principle of “land to the 
tiller” and in the eyes of courts that consistently valued continuous cultivation as evidence of 
ownership, women’s rights have been harder to claim. Moreover, women’s absence from their 
family, whether their matrilineal lineage or their nuclear or patrilineal family, has also weakened 
women’s roles in overseeing the management of jointly held lands. Returning home after 
widowhood or divorce, women may find that their uncles or brothers have sold family land and 
left them with little recourse. 
Villagization lasted only a few years before the policy was repealed. Liberalization will 
be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, but it is important to note here that while 
liberalization created more space for the recognition of customary law and opened up renewed 
debates over land tenure (Odgaard 2002; Tsikata 2003), the impact of villagization on land 
tenure and lineage authority was not reversed. Rather, the trend toward patrilineal inheritance 
and the breakup of lineage lands continued. Increased access to the cash economy and 
commodification of land itself meant that younger people, especially men, whose access to cash 
was usually higher (see Chapter 3), could purchase farms rather than depending on lineage land 
or inheritance. The growing land market also facilitated the permanent sale of lineage lands to 
outsiders. The socialist-era principle of land to the tiller had helped lay the groundwork for a 
legal system that focused on individual land tenure and obscured the possibility of a lineage 
holding land in trust for their descendants (Tenga 1987). In addition, with economic 




opportunities outside of Mkuyuni. The absence of lineage leadership facilitated the breakdown of 
lineage land as more transfers took place without the supervision of lineage leaders. In part, the 
change also happened because many wanted it to happen. Many farmers I interviewed suggested 
that with increasing population density, transfers from parents to children led to less 
fragmentation and stronger access to land overall. Their stated reasoning was that a man had 
fewer children, on average, than nephews or nieces. This understanding of fragmentation 
assumes individual tenure as the only possibility, indicating the extent to which collective 
landholding has been eliminated as a possibility in the mind of many in Mkuyuni, regardless of 
its actual legal status. In addition to these views, movements within Islam toward a stricter 
adherence to Islamic law were influential in the move toward patrilineal inheritance patterns (see 
Chapter 3). According to Islamic inheritance law, wealth should flow from parents to children, 
with sons receiving a larger portion than daughters. 
The ways in which lineages lost control over their land varied, in part due to the plural 
and often contradictory regimes and processes of Tanzanian land law. There are three legal 
registers formally recognized in land cases, all dating back to the colonial period: statutory laws 
that favor equal inheritance among natal children; Islamic law, in which inheritance passes to 
children, but unevenly by gender; and customary law, under which the matrilineal lineage system 
could be invoked. All three were officially recognized in the post-independence period and 
remain recognized today. However, as we have seen, following the abolition of the Native 
Authority, the court system was decoupled from tribe, with judges drawn from around the 
country. While these judges were still expected to recognize customary tenure systems, 
patrilineal inheritance was the norm in most areas of Tanzania, as well as being normative in 




patrilineal principals to be more legible. Moreover, because under Luguru customary law, 
children had rights to their father’s lineage land as well as the land of their own lineage, 
matrilineal inheritance patterns could be difficult to discern over the short-term, as land only 
reverted back to the matriline on the second generation. 
In one illustrative case, in 1979, Shabani Ally Hazeru sued for access to a farm that had 
been passed to Alimasi Mhumba from Mhumba’s mother. On appeal, Hazeru claimed that the 
farm belonged to his lineage. In dismissing the appeal, the District Magistrate M. A. Upaga 
wrote:  
This appeal is senseless. It has been established beyond dispute that the disputed 
shamba [farm] descended up the respondent from his deceased mother…In 
[Hazeru’s] petition of appeal he is now claiming that the disputed shamba belongs 
to his clan, the respondent’s mother being a member of that clan. He does not 
appear to dispute that it was always being cultivated by the respondent’s mother 
(Hazeru v. Mhumba, 1979).   
This case was not a conflict between members of different lineages; both parties belonged to the 
lineage of Mhumba’s mother. However, the judge made two notable assumptions in this 
dismissal. First, he recognized continuous cultivation as evidence of ownership. This is 
consonant with Tanzanian land law’s emphasis on use. The principle of “land to the tiller” 
discussed above served to challenge the power of customary landlords, but once implemented, it 
fueled other kinds of inequality. For example, women who resided with their husbands, if their 
families did not live close to one another, would have difficulty maintaining continuous 
cultivation on their own farms, whether granted from lineage land or inherited from a parent. If 
they wished to claim the land years later, they would not have evidence of continuous cultivation 
in their favor. Second, the judge in this case appears to see the claims of a natal child as 
automatically more valid than the claims of any other relative in lineage, in contrast to the 




rather than an individual is not explicitly excluded here, but neither is the possibility seriously 
considered. Again, the principle of “land to the tiller” reinforced the idea of individual ownership 
and the law proved ill-equipped to grapple with land held jointly. This was typical of many of the 
cases I read at the Mkuyuni primary court. Courts rarely considered the possibility that land 
belonged to a lineage rather than an individual and claims of inheritance from parents were 
always more legible to the courts than other types of transmission. 
While looking at the courts can be informative in understanding changes in land tenure, 
most disputes never reach the primary or district courts. They are usually handled by relatives 
without state involvement. Today, when conflict does arise, the courts are one of several 
institutions that can be called into service. Within the family, lineage heads and elders can be 
called upon to mediate conflict. Religious authorities can also adjudicate matters of inheritance, 
whether through informal counseling on the part of Islamic and Christian leaders or through a 
formal hearing at the local Islamic Council. Hamlet, village, and ward officials also help mediate 
disputes. For more formal action, land cases in Mkuyuni are referred to the local land councils, 
while inheritance cases proceed through the court, leaving the venue for proceedings ambiguous 
in cases that straddle these categories. Within this array of institutions, which have multiplied 
since liberalization in the 1980s, the plurality of legal norms—customary, statute and Islamic—
remain in place.9 
 In this context of legal pluralism and uncertainty, the loss of lineage land was gradual and 
emerged through a variety of processes. In some cases, the land was sold. Near the top of the 
 
9 In some ways, they have become even more pronounced. Liberalization is associated with both the return to 
customary law and the promotion of statute law as a liberal norm (under the guise of equal rights), while the 
loosening of controls on religious organization has gone hand-in-hand with the rise of Ansar Sunna, the Islamic 
reform movement that has pushed for stricter adherence to Islamic law, even among Muslims who remain affiliated 




mountains, far above Mkuyuni Ward, I spoke to Magoma XVIII, the heir to one of the oldest 
lineages in Uluguru. When I asked about lineage lands, he said one of his predecessors had sold 
much of the land for cash. Similarly, members of a once-powerful lineage in Changa Village told 
me that their lineage head had sold the land and departed for opportunities in another district. 
Such sales tended to come after liberalization, but villagization paved the way by eroding the 
lineage institutions that could challenge sales and by shifting the logic of land rights toward 
individual tenure. Even more common than the sale of lineage lands, however, was a more 
straightforward shift to patrilineal inheritance. Many of the largest landholders in Mkuyuni were 
the sons of former lineage heads. 
On one of the final days of my research, I spoke with an mganga (traditional healer) 
named Hamisi Mustafa Magana, in a lush valley in Kibwaya Village. A charismatic man who 
seemed younger than his sixty years, Hamisi told me in detail about how he came to work as a 
healer and showed me some tools of the trade. After discussing his profession, I moved to more 
general questions about changes in the community: 
JF: I heard that long ago, a lot of land was owned by clans [sic], but now many 
farms belong to individual people? 
HMM: Let me tell you something. See where we are? Up to that mountain? […] 
Everything on this side was once ruled by my father, Sewanda. 
[…] 
JF: This used to be lineage land? 
HMM: Yes 
JF: But now it is private farms? 
HMM: Yes. 
JF: How did this change? Did he [Sewanda] sell the farms? 
HMM: No.… Before, the head of the lineage owned the land. But with Ujamaa, 




old man was clever, and because…he had many children and had his wapwa 
[nephews and nieces], so he [distributed the land among them]. 
[…] 
JF: Was there conflict between the children and the nephews? 
HMM: No, because the wapwa used the land of their mothers, his sisters. He gave 
his sisters their areas. His sisters and their children took this part, and his children 
took this [other] part. 
After he dies, Hamisi told me, his children will inherit his land. It no longer belongs to the 
lineage. When I asked whether conflict might ensue, he dismissed the idea, saying that everyone 
now inherits from their parents, including the cousins who might otherwise lay claim to the area. 
Hamisi’s story highlights the ways in which post-independence land policies in general 
and villagization in particular shifted land tenure in the mountains. It also points to another 
pattern, that lineage heads often acted before their deaths to steer how their lands would be 
inherited, increasingly favoring their children but often including their wapwa as well. Land 
systems had previously recognized children of the lineage as holding land rights, so the change 
away from matrilineality was not always a radical rupture. Sometimes, it entailed a more subtle 
shift of weight within the existing system away from matrilineal descendants and toward natal 
children.10 The plurality of formal and informal institutions for adjudicating inheritance and land 
disputes, the multiple and contradictory sets of laws in use, and the mutability of the lineage 
system meant that the process of change was gradual, partial, and far from linear. Nevertheless, 
considering the changes in retrospect, many of those I spoke with pointed to the moment of 
villagization as the turning point in the inheritance of land. 
 
10 Of course, for women, these categories are one and the same. However, as we have seen, from the colonial period 
onward, women were increasingly marginalized in politics and the administration of lands. Women’s experiences of 




The Inheritance of Names and the Work of Social Reproduction 
This change in land inheritance from matrilineal to patrilineal patterns coincided with a 
significant change in another kind of inheritance in Mkuyuni, that of ancestral names. However, 
in contrast to land, which is frequently subject to multiple competing claims, heirs of ancestral 
names are increasingly refusing their inheritance, as Mama Kisangile’s account of the name 
Sugusugu at the beginning of this chapter clearly illustrates. To understand why this is so, we 
must first examine the institution of name inheritance in more detail. People I spoke to in 
Mkuyuni generally recognized two main kinds of names, lineage (or ranked) names and 
“regular” names. In either case, a person is given the name, and to some degree, the identity of 
an ancestor. Previously, lineage names and their associated ranks could be bestowed upon men 
or women, and in fact, were typically received by husbands and wives together. Those without a 
husband or wife were not qualified (Pels 1999: 163–164). In Mkuyuni today, however, following 
the invisibility of women’s leadership in colonial ethnography and the weakening of the lineage 
system after independence, women’s lineage names are rarely invoked and have been 
increasingly forgotten. Indeed, since many lineages in Mkuyuni were founded more recently than 
those higher in the mountains, women’s names may never have been established the way they 
were elsewhere. Nevertheless, certain men’s names, like Sugusugu, are still remembered, 
discussed, and sometimes inherited. These are the names of the wajomba who previously 
administered the land.  
There are two main ways to inherit a name in Mkuyuni. The first, which applies only to 
lineage names, is through the system already described; when the holder of a lineage name died, 
the women of the lineage would select a successor from among the deceased’s brothers and 
nephews. The second, which can apply to any name, occurs when a name has not been inherited 




(almost always of the same gender) may become ill. Often, the patient is brought to the hospital 
where diagnostic tests show nothing or where the medicines dispensed fail to work. The patient 
is then brought to an mganga who conducts a divination and discovers that the patient is being 
afflicted by a name—that is, the spirit of the deceased wants the patient to take their name. After 
procedures that confirm the diagnosis, a tambiko ritual is carried out to reconcile with the dead, 
and the holder is thereafter known by their inherited name. If the mganga’s diagnosis was 
correct, the illness disappears.  
Ranked names, which are said to be “ruled” (kutawala), generally stay within lineages 
and are inherited along matrilineal lines. “Regular” names, which are inherited (kurithi) but not 
“ruled,” can pass along either matrilineal or patrilineal lines. Ranked names typically come with 
a set of regalia: a three-legged stool, a wrist bangle, a ceremonial axe, and a carved spear or 
walking stick.11 Those inheriting these names go through an initiation process during which they 
receive the special knowledge associated with their rank. They are typically put inside for a 
week, and during this time are often compared to girls undergoing initiation. Those holding 
names of the same rank come to the house and teach them secret knowledge, including 
knowledge of certain medicines. 
In addition to the name, regalia, secret knowledge, and authority over land, lineage names 
also come with a set of obligations related to matambiko. As discussed in prior chapters, in 
Mkuyuni, matambiko are generally understood as a set of practices of reconciling with the 
ancestral or territorial spirits called mizimu. Mizimu are typically described as “waliokufa 
zamani” (“those who died long ago”) although during my research, the term was also used to the 
territorial spirits associated with Kingalu and Kolero. They are connected to sacred places in the 
 
11 Some holders of “regular” names also wear wrist bangles and may inherit particular items from their predecessor 




landscape: trees, pools, caves and graves—openings between the spirit world below the earth and 
the human world above it. Those who inherit clan lineage inherit several obligations related to 
matambiko. First, they are responsible for organizing annual lineage matambiko, wherein lineage 
members gather, brew millet beer, visit sacred groves and graves of past lineage heads, and recite 
ancestral names and sacred words that will ensure the health of the lineage and the fertility of 
their fields. Second, they are expected to travel to the shrines associated with Kingalu or Kolero 
to take part in rainmaking matambiko there. Third, they are expected to assist when a member of 
the lineage falls ill, which may mean calling in an mganga and gathering people together for a 
lineage tambiko. Finally, they are in charge of a medicine that is distributed to all members of the 
clan or lineage to ensure their health each year. These medicines remain important, even being 
transported to lineage members living hundreds of miles away.  
The overlapping practices of healing, rainmaking, and matambiko should be understood 
as forms of reproductive labor. In Uluguru as elsewhere, caring for ancestors is a central 
obligation of kinship (Kalusa and Vaughan 2013: 28), and as the women quoted in the 
Introduction would remind us, mila, healing, and even remembering are forms of work (kazi). 
The work of remembering is part of the work entailed in matambiko, when names and lineage 
histories are recited and remembered, and in initiations, when knowledge is recalled and passed 
across generations. These forms of reproductive labor are essential for the health and 
reproduction of the social body, by remembering and reconciling with the dead and ensuring the 
flourishing of the lineage in the future. Names themselves link the past and present, binding 
generations in recursive iterations that ensure their own reproduction—that of the names and that 
of the lineage. When men refuse to inherit these names, they fail carry out their roles in this 




Making Rain in the Era of Villagization 
 On several visits to Kingalu’s residence in Kinole, I spoke with the son of Kingalu XII, 
Asman Kingalu Sadi Setembu, who was at the time of my research one of the most senior 
members of Kingalu’s family and regarded as the most knowledgeable on matters of family 
history.12 More than once in the course of these conversations, Mzee Asman recounted that that 
villagization had resulted in a severe nationwide drought, for which he blamed relocation of 
Kingalu from his residence near the sacred grove in Kinole. Nyerere, the story went, recognized 
the situation after drought struck the entire country and allowed Kingalu to move back to his old 
residence, thus ensuring the return of the rains. This story succinctly highlighted how 
villagization worked to undermine the power of local chiefs and other authorities who served in 
the Native Administration. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, Kingalu’s relationship to TANU 
was unusual; the 1936 deposition of Kingalu XI positioned his successors as opponents to 
colonial rule and potential allies to TANU. This alliance was cemented during the protests 
against terracing and Kingalu’s family had a close relationship with TANU (and its successor, 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi [CCM]) from the 1950s onward. Nevertheless, after independence, 
Kingalu became caught up in TANU’s attempts to dislodge “traditional” leaders through 
villagization.  
The truth of this story, which I only heard from Kingalu’s family members, is beside the 
point. Families with histories of rainmaking often told stories emphasizing their fame and power 
in ending droughts. What is important here is the underlying logic which makes this story legible 
to people in Uluguru—the relationship between authority, rainmaking, and sacred places. One of 
the goals of villagization was to disrupt the authority of customary leaders like Kingalu. 
 




However, in doing so, TANU also disrupted systems of social reproduction in the form of social 
healing. The village, posited as an alternative to traditional institutions, was not capable of 
bringing rain and ensuring social reproduction in the way older institutions had been, even while 
it did attempt to provide other supports for social reproduction in the form of hospitals and 
schools. 
Feierman’s (1990) account of Shambaa rainmaking after independence is instructive. In 
Shambaai, power had long been more centralized than it had been in Uluguru, and political 
authority and rainmaking flowed together through patrilineal lines in a complex set of political 
structures. Unlike Kingalu, the chief in Shambaai had retained his official position in the Native 
Authority throughout British colonial rule and only lost his official status in 1963, when TANU 
abolished the chiefship in all parts of the country. In 1966, a drought occurred that many 
residents understood to have been caused by the old chief in protest of his removal from power 
by the new government. In response to the drought, TANU arrested the sons of the chief “to 
show that TANU had covered the land, and that the old chief was not powerful enough to 
challenge its authorities” (1990: 257). In 1979, a local official of CCM also told Feierman that 
during a drought several years earlier, when he was village chairman, he had paid tribute money 
to the rainmaker from the village treasury without the knowledge of more senior party members. 
 Feierman also reported that people felt rain had changed after the death of the chief, years 
after independence: 
Through the sixties, people paid tribute to the chief, he made the rain. This did not 
cut off his subjects from the politics of TANU, which many of them joined. Local 
people took part in the new politics in other ways too. After the Arusha 
Declaration, one village asked to be made an ujamaa village. Women in several 
villages started cooperative farms under party leadership.  But the women also 
farmed together in the banana groves of the retired chief. For as he was alive, they 
could act together, working on his farms and knowing when the rain drenched 




However, after the death of the chief, a crisis of succession ensued: 
In the nineteenth century the heirs might have fought it out with spears and 
arrows, or the chiefdom might have been sent a new man, son of the Simba 
Mwene at Vugha. In the 1920s it was the British who would have had the final 
say. Under the new conditions the process of selection was driven underground, 
and was therefore aborted, cut off before a clear successor emerged (1990: 248). 
In Uluguru, the consequences of TANU’s policies were also often felt later. Lineage heads often 
maintained their land holdings under the new system and many continued to carry out 
matambiko. However, upon their death, their lands fragmented and the heirs to their names fled. 
Kingalu remains the most powerful traditional authority in Uluguru, his status emerging 
from the rise of nineteenth century “big men,” the institution of rainmaking, and the history of 
British indirect rule. He was the closest figure in Uluguru to the powerful rainmaking chiefs 
discussed in Feierman’s work. It was at this level in particular that TANU wished to disrupt 
existing forms of authority. However, for most people in the mountains, the questions of social 
reproduction raised by villagization did not play out at the lofty levels of “chief” nor in the 
nationwide drought, but in more local concerns with lineage and extended family. In this realm, 
feelings about existing structures of authority were often ambivalent. The history of the slave 
trade, indirect rule, and the introduction of cash crops had all contributed to deepening 
inequalities and many had reason to oppose the continued power of the lineage heads. However, 
the upheaval caused by villagization raised more questions than it answered and generated new 
conflicts along gendered and generational lines. 
Ancestors, Healing, and Climate Change 
In the Introduction, I recounted a visit to an elderly man named Sipriani Kasiani 
Changadiko in Luholole Village whose son-in-law Deodat told me about medicines that appear 




law, Deodat was enthusiastic when I arrived to discuss mila, which he felt has been neglected by 
younger generations. When I asked about ancestral names such as theirs, Deodat and Mzee 
Sipriani explained that before, when a lineage head would die, the women would meet to select a 
new one, looking for someone responsible, with a proven history of helping the family. The 
initiate would then be placed inside for seven days, undergoing various tests and receiving secret 
teachings. Today, these practices still happen, they said, but more rarely. Deodat explained that 
these days, people are afraid to take on the names, which he described as “difficult.” Likewise, 
when I asked the men about matambiko, they answered that the rituals still exist in some form 
but that they have diminished. Previously, if rain didn’t fall, Deodat recounted, the elders would 
don kaniki, simple garments of black cloth, go to a special place of wilderness (pori), and pray 
for rain. Each lineage had its own such area to carry out matambiko. There, they would also 
make medicines, including one to protect the lineage from illness and another to assuage 
conflicts within the lineage. There was even a medicine, Deodat said, that allowed a husband to 
temporarily take his wife’s pregnancy so she could carry out other work such as pounding grain. 
When she was done, he would pass the pregnancy back to her. But now, medicines like these are 
no longer available, the men told me, because the elders who followed these traditions have all 
died. “They didn’t teach you?” I asked. “They didn’t give a ‘seminar,’” Mzee Sipriani replied, 
laughing at his use of the English word. When I asked again later why the tradition of lineage 
medicines and matambiko had not been passed down, however, he gave a different answer: the 
youth of today disrespect mila (Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko and Deodat Gaspar Kunambi, 
interview, October 3, 2018). 
While several important themes emerge from this conversation, including the close 




particularly key. As Chapter 1 described, lineages once managed groves where cultivation was 
forbidden and where they would carry out matambiko. These sacred groves typically contained a 
water source—a well, spring, or pool—and strong taboos (miiko) forbid cutting the trees or 
disturbing the landscape. Those who violated these rules could expect punishment from angry 
spirits, who might cause injury, illness, or even death. During a later conversation, Deodat 
pointed out that the sacred forests used for matambiko had often protected water sources and 
suggested that the ancestors may have understood their importance for the environment 
(interview, October 22, 2018). It is true that both the smaller lineage forests and those protecting 
major sacred sites like the ones associated with Kolero and Kingalu often contained critical 
sources of water. While a functionalist framing might depict sacred groves as an ecological 
adaptation masked by cultural beliefs about spirits, such an interpretation would at once hollow 
out the category of mzimu and flatten the political ecology of Uluguru by obscuring the ways in 
which these forests served as sites of political power for certain lineage elders. Rather, these 
forests should be understood, as Deodat and others in Uluguru described them, as manifestations 
of the temporal and political links between ancestors, lineages, and the conditions of social 
reproduction. 
Similar to Deodat’s assessment, Sylvester’s Haule’s (2018) recent research around the 
sacred forest at Kolero found community monitoring of the forest by the elders of several 
lineages, coupled with strong social and spiritual sanctions against cutting around the mzimu 
area, have proven effective in protecting water sources and other forest resources. At the time of 
my research, the large forest there remained largely intact from prior generations, despite 
occasional incursions by illegal loggers. Kolero, higher in the mountains and farther from major 




the largescale settlement of non-lineage cash croppers that Mkuyuni saw during the colonial 
period. As a result, lineages in Kolero were better able to withstand the changes sparked by 
villagization and most land remains under lineage control. 
In Mkuyuni, the lineage has atrophied. As lineages lost both control over land and 
political authority, the forests they once cultivated and maintained began to disappear. A few 
spirit areas remain around Mkuyuni and gravesites are still remembered and preserved, but 
remaining groves are smaller than they once were and many are no longer visible at all. Indeed, 
ariel and satellite images show the lineage forests of Msume and Rufezuwa, which were 
designated as official forest reserves in 1930, were still standing late in the colonial period but 
had dwindled to nearly nothing by 1984.13 Following liberalization, some of these areas even fell 
into private hands outside the lineage. The loss of the institutions responsible for rainmaking was 
thus directly linked to the loss of forest areas and according to many in Mkuyuni, resulted in 
damage to natural water sources. Without lineage oversight, boundaries of farms have come 
closer to protected pools and springs. Moreover, many believe the loss of forests has reduced 
rainfall.14 There are still taboos on cutting trees and logging injuries are often attributed to 
spiritual forces; several logging deaths during my fieldwork in Mkuyuni sparked rumors about 
angry spirits. However, the resources and authority that once came with the protection of sacred 
forests were based on the system of land tenure that socialist land policies dismantled. 
The post-independence state was not oblivious to the need for forests. However, the 
convergence of political and economic forces significantly shaped and limited the form of forest 
 
13 Aerial photographs taken in 1955 as part of a government land survey project show forest boundaries that match 
those on hand drawn maps in the Morogoro District Book (Fletcher 1933). Satellite imagery from 1984 shows a near 
total loss of forest cover aside from scattered trees (Landsat/Copernicus, retrieved from Google Earth). 
14 As Chapter 1 explained, data showing exact changes in rainfall in the eastern mountains and their correlation to 




preservation after 1961. On the one hand, the legacy of the colonial forest system posed 
significant problems for the new administration. In general, the government maintained the large 
forest reserves that had previously been under direct British control. However, as we have seen, 
the colonial administration had also designated lineage forests in Uluguru as reserves under the 
Native Authority. The authorities that protected these forests disappeared after independence, 
first with the abolition of the Native Authority in 1963 and then through the weakening of 
lineage control over land resulting from villagization and other socialist land policies. Moreover, 
although colonial limitations on Africans’ rights to cut trees may have served to maintain forest 
cover in select areas, they were also rightly resented by inhabitants of Uluguru as political 
measures meant to appropriate resources from Africans and to weaken their opportunities for 
economic gain. The placement of lineage groves under the control of the Native Authority 
rendered these forests sites of political struggle where male lineage elders and the British had 
fortified their alliances at the expense of other residents of the area. After independence, control 
over these forests and their resources were implicated in attempts of youth and non-elites to 
overturn colonial power structures. At the same time that these political shifts occurred, 
economic change put further pressure on forest resources. In the eyes of the new government, 
forests were seen as a form of capital and were considered in terms of their value for a vision of 
development geared toward commodity production and industrialization (Nyerere 1968: 16, see 
also Chapter 4). As efforts to bring development and industrialization accelerated after 
independence, demand for timber grew rapidly. Political and economic pressure converged on 
those forests outside of direct government control and rapid forest loss in some parts of Uluguru 
ensued (Fr. Philipe Neri Mkude, personal communication, December 10, 2018). While many in 




view became less and less legible in the economic and political order of the post-independence 
state. 
When I returned to speak to Mzee Sipriani and Deodat a few weeks after our first 
conversation, Mzee Sipriani told me that when he moved to the area at the time of villagization, 
there had been more forest, but the trees had all been cut down. As a result, he said, the climate 
had changed. “We moved the rain. And now the rivers are drying up because the trees were cut. 
There is just great damage [hasara]. There is great damage from cutting the trees.” Deodat 
agreed. The only solution, they said, was to replant trees, but people were not doing so. They 
hoped the government would provide seedlings for planting. Then, the forest could return and 
with it, the rains (Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko and Deodat Gaspar Kunambi, interview, October 
22, 2018). As Chapter 4 discusses in more detail, people in Mkuyuni often depict declining 
rainfall as the result of local deforestation. The government, from colonial times to the present, 
has repeated this message to local farmers, hoping to motivate populations to plant and preserve 
trees. However, workshops, meetings, and fliers aimed at spreading this message have proven 
less effective than the lineage institutions that once guarded critical groves. The loss of rain is 
attributed both to the loss of moisture-producing tree cover and the simultaneous demise of 
rainmaking practices. Nevertheless, the discourses of social healing have not disappeared. 
One reason Mzee Sipriani and Deodat gave for the decline of matambiko is the lack of 
lineage leadership as many youth today refuse to inherit names. However, they agreed that if the 
spirit of the name selects someone, that person cannot refuse to inherit it. This apparent 
contradiction marks out the terms of the gendered and generational debates over names. When a 
name goes uninherited, the lineage members often say they are waiting for a potential heir to fall 




treatments, will indicate the name’s choice. On the other hand, if the wrong heir is selected, they 
will fall ill. It is the ancestors, not any living member of the lineage, who have ultimate agency. 
Mzee Sipriani told me that sometimes an heir has to wait until they develop problems to inherit 
their name. The fact that names can be passed following illness if the transfer does not take place 
following the previous holder’s death has given the institution of names some resilience in the 
face of social change; although the names have not been passed down, the question of succession 
is not closed but only deferred. Indeed, this deferral is often understood as coming at the behest 
of spirits who, for reasons unclear to the living, are waiting for the right time to return. 
Unclaimed Names and Struggles of Reproduction 
The situation of Sugusugu’s uninherited name discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
is not unique in Mkuyuni. One of my closest interlocutors in Mkuyuni was a sharp woman in her 
fifties named Mama Kimwe, who originally helped us during our household survey in Kivuma 
Village. It was Mama Kimwe who had told me, “tradition is work” (see the Introduction). During 
our conversations, Mama Kimwe often complained to me that when she falls ill, she has nowhere 
to turn because the man who she believes should be the lineage head has refused to take on their 
late uncle’s name. The lack of lineage support was frequently a source of distress and anger for 
women. When I asked women in lineages with vacant names like Mama Kisangile and Mama 
Kimwe why they hadn’t appointed a successor, they often told me they tried, but the potential 
heirs had fled. When I asked these men, they rarely denied the accusation outright. Instead, many 
told me that the last generation had held their names for an exceptionally long time and that the 
next person to hold the name would die shortly after taking it. Some, like Sugusugu’s potential 
heirs, said the previous holder of the name told them the name should sit unoccupied for a time 




names, which are said to be “heavy.” Older men, like Mama Kimwe’s uncle, said they were too 
old. Many were waiting for someone to fall ill. The name would claim someone eventually and 
when it did, the man who refused would grow sicker and ultimately die. The fact that they had 
not was proof they had not, or at least not yet, been chosen.  
When I began to ask about uninherited names, a few people mentioned to me that the 
unclaimed names were being “stored” by the senior woman of the lineage, usually in a pot in her 
house. The senior woman of the lineage was ideally responsible for safeguarding the name until 
it could be passed on. This also meant housing the regalia, which are believed to be imbued with 
power. While storing the name is not the same work as “ruling” it, the names and regalia are 
“heavy,” even in storage. I asked one of the potential heirs of Sugusugu who was keeping the 
name until an heir was chosen, and he told me Mama Kisangile had it in a pot. I returned to her 
house and she confirmed she had the name in her house, but, she said, it was not in a pot, only in 
a bag. Mama Kimwe, on the other hand, told me no one in her lineage was caring for the name. 
“We are only youth (vijana),” she said. “We can’t carry it.” Descriptions of names as heavy were 
common. For many women, then, men’s refusal to carry out their roles had shifted the burden of 
certain kinds of reproductive labor onto them. However, women are not alone in shouldering this 
burden. Certain elder men, including both those unqualified to inherit names and those who have 
refused, have nevertheless taken on the role of acting lineage head. Indeed, Mama Kimwe’s 
uncle, Rufezuwa, another one of my key interlocutors, was one such man. He used the lineage 
name informally and took on a role of leadership in the family, although he declined to formally 
inherit the name, claiming he was too old. However, without the name and its attendant spirit, 
both the powers and the obligations of such men are limited. The situation is thus not one of total 




Why are men refusing to inherit lineage names? With the loss of lineage land, and 
therefore of the resources received through land rent and lineage labor, there is not only a lack of 
economic motivation to take on the role of lineage leader but indeed, an absence of the very 
resources needed to carry out the role’s functions. In addition to the material aid lineage 
members expect during times of hardship, the carrying out of matambiko requires significant 
amounts of food and grains for beer. Name-holders are also expected to provide some form of 
payment to clan heads and to Kingalu or Kolero for matambiko. Previously, lineage members 
provided labor on a lineage farm where such resources were produced but with the shift toward 
individual land tenure, such farms are now rare. 
Beyond this, changing relationships to space have also made it difficult for men to accept 
lineage names. This topic arose one particularly hot day in December 2018, when I stopped at a 
small stand on the main road above the market. There, in late afternoons, older men gather to sip 
small, steaming cups of hot coffee and to exchange news. As we chatted that day, I brought up 
the topic of ancestral names, which had come up in several recent interviews. One man, Juma 
Jikwaya, said he himself held such a name. Originally from a nearby hamlet, he was then living 
and working in Kilosa, about a three-hour trip to the west. He said when he had first been 
selected to inherit his name, he resisted because he knew it would be “work.” He fled to Kilosa, 
but once there, he became very sick and realized he would not recover until he returned home 
and accepted the name. Although he still lives and works in Kilosa, where larger farms are 
available, he must make frequent trips home to attend to the work of his name—helping heal sick 
lineage members, resolving disputes in the family, carrying out lineage matambiko rituals, and 




the work he must do in Uluguru is necessary for his health and the flourishing of his family (J. 
Jikwaya, personal communication, December 12, 2018). 
Limitations on mobility were one of the main reasons men avoided inheriting names. 
Pels, conducting research in Matombo in the late 1980s, observed the same and was told that 
lineage heads could not be absent from their lands for periods long than one week (Pels 1999: 
163n7). During my time in Mkuyuni, the rules were considerably less rigid but the requirement 
to be present in the lineage area still stood in direct tension with the need to spend periods of 
time living away from the area to earn cash. Even the last succession of the name Kingalu was 
contentious because the heir was residing in Morogoro town at the time he assumed the name. 
He reached a compromise of part-time residence in his ancestral village of Kinole, but some in 
Mkuyuni doubt his efficacy as a rainmaker in part because of his absence from the area (see 
Chapter 4). 
As we have seen, not all lineages have been able to strike a compromise such as that 
navigated by Juma Jikwaya or Kingalu, who move between the mountains and other areas as 
they balance conflicting demands on their time. In some cases, the problem is manifested in the 
refusal of qualified heirs to take lineage names. For those lineages, resolution has been deferred 
as lineage members wait for the name to afflict its chosen heir. In other cases, however, a more 
difficult problem has arisen—some lineage names have been conferred upon heirs only to have 
the name-holder move away taking their name and regalia with them. In theory, illness caused by 
the angry mzimu should drive them back to their homes, but in practice, this does not always 
seem to be the case. Lineage members are left to wait, uncertain whether the name is still being 




One of the most powerful lineages in Changa found themselves in this position when, as 
mentioned briefly above, their uncle sold their lineage lands to outsiders and absconded to 
another part of the country with the money. However, land was not all he sold. He also sold the 
sacred lineage regalia, including the three-legged stool that symbolizes lineage power. As one 
relative remarked, “he sold mila” (S. M. Ngalawa, personal communication, December 24, 
2018). Lineage regalia, imbued with spiritual energy and bound to the lineage name, is essential 
for practices of matambiko and the making of lineage medicines. However, a global market for 
such artifacts also rendered them commodities. Today, Luguru stools appear on auction websites 
for European and American art collectors.15 The sale of these items and the disappearance of the 
nameholder from the area made it difficult for the lineage in Changa to continue matambiko, 
even though the new owner of their former lineage lands has agreed to permit them to visit their 
ancestral shrines for ritual purposes. Lineage leaders at the time of my research were in the 
process of selecting a new heir for the lineage name, but without the regalia and direct control of 
the land, his abilities to bring rain and health remained uncertain. 
Although some men, like this lineage head, chose to leave behind their lineage 
obligations in favor of new economic opportunities, many more expressed ambivalence and 
feelings of loss as they struggled to balance demands placed on them by family. Deodat’s 
nostalgic description of the medicine that allowed a man to take his wife’s pregnancy illustrates 
eloquently not only the shifting of reproductive labor onto women within the household but also 
many men’s feelings of powerlessness and loss at this change. Carrying the next generation into 
existence is the most literal and visceral manifestation of reproductive labor and the sense that 
men could previously share this burden, at least temporarily, is significant. For men like Deodat, 
 




the inability to help women in their families in the work of social reproduction is seen not as a 
refusal nor as a natural division of labor but as a loss with a recent history, rooted in the demise 
of medicinal knowledge, the lack of lineage land, and the destruction of sacred places. As a 
result, women must now bear the burden of carrying children alone. While this medicine is the 
most literal example of the relationship between the loss of knowledge and lineage institutions 
and the reconfiguration of household labor, it resonates with many other stories I heard in 
Mkuyuni. Without the knowledge, land, and resources of their ancestors, men today find 
themselves unable to provide the kinds of support their wives, daughters, sisters, and nieces 
expect. Even Deodat, who did inherit a name, is not able to do what his uncles and grandfathers 
once did for their families, a fact he regrets but cannot control. 
When asked why men no longer inherited ancestral names, many responded like Mzee 
Sipriani and Deodat in pointing to a generational rupture. Older people would complain that 
youth, especially young men, were disrespecting and abandoning tradition, to the detriment of 
their communities. In turn, young men would state that they liked tradition and wanted to follow 
it but complained that their elders failed to pass on the knowledge they needed to take part. 
Indeed, while girls’ initiation ceremonies continue in various forms, boys’ initiations have 
largely disappeared from Mkuyuni. These initiation ceremonies were the venue for instruction in 
Luguru ethics (maadili), part of the esoteric knowledge that underpin ideas of Luguru tradition 
(see the Introduction). Changes in land tenure and the growth of the cash economy following 
liberalization have given young men unprecedented independence from their fathers and uncles 
alike. For women, who have fewer routes to economic independence and greater access to 
traditional knowledge, generational conflicts are less pronounced. However, among men, the 




traditions like matambiko—particular kinds of reproductive labor—is a site of conflict between 
elders and youth. 
Importantly, within this generational tension, there is also an ambiguity: who is an elder 
and who is a youth often unclear. Even Deodat and Mzee Sipriani, when describing why mila 
was no longer being carried out, alternated between blaming youth’s disrespect of tradition and 
their own elders’ failure to pass on their knowledge. There are two related reasons for this 
ambiguity. One is that the definition of elders was once linked closely to the inheritance of 
ranked names and initiation into the society of elders that came with it. Many in Mkuyuni at the 
time of my research believed life expectancies in the past were higher, and people well into their 
sixties frequently referred to themselves as “vijana,” a word usually translated as “youth.” Many 
did not see themselves as elders because they lacked the knowledge that comes with being an 
elder. This reasoning is, on the surface, tautological, but it is grounded in a real loss of 
knowledge which has changed the significance of aging in the mountains. This ambiguous nature 
of the boundary between youth and elders is also rooted in the specific history of today’s older 
generations; they were youth at the time of villagization, and many were deeply invested in the 
socialist project, including its rejection of many things associated with mila. Many, like Mzee 
Sipriani, vacillate between attributing the end of practices like matambiko to the prior generation 
of elders for failing to teach them the necessary knowledge to carry out mila and their own 
children for failing to respect mila. This ambivalence, expressed through indeterminate 
narratives of cultural loss, reflects the ambiguity of the aborted socialist project, at once a 




Social Reproduction in the Village 
Villagization upended institutions of social reproduction and opened gendered and 
generational rifts over reproductive labor. However, most of those I spoke to in Mkuyuni about 
villagization told me that despite their initial resistance, resettlement had been good. For 
example, when I asked Juma Mange, who was a child in 1974, how people felt about 
villagization, he recalled that most were very angry. The government was demolishing homes (J. 
Mange, interview, December 13, 2018). He paused in his explanation, then added, “but it was a 
very good thing.” People could get services, he said, and schools and clinics were built in the 
villages. Most of those I asked gave similar answers. As I mentioned above, the residents of 
Mkuyuni who praised villagization named two major advantages of life in the new villages. The 
first was the social services the village provided. Villagization was accompanied by the building 
of schools, hospitals, wells, and water taps. Indeed, the construction of schools and hospitals was 
a key component of, and justification for, villagization. Schools and hospitals were the main 
contributions of the socialist state to social reproduction, providing particular forms of healthcare 
and education, and they remain highly significant resources for Tanzanians today. 
The second advantage to living in the village I heard many times was a general 
enjoyment of living close to one’s neighbors. I was frequently told that if someone fell sick in the 
middle of the night, help was now available, and that in general, people were happy to live near 
one another. These new forms of social life, which traverse lineage, are valued, especially by 
women who socialize with neighbors while they carry out domestic work. Although villagization 
failed to transform agricultural labor into a collective endeavor, at least in the long term, it seems 
to have succeeded in transforming certain kinds of reproductive labor, including housework and 
particular types of care. Hospital medicines may not have fully filled the void left by the decline 




in times of sudden illness or other emergencies, when neighbors could be summoned for help. 
Silvia Federici (2019) has written about the importance of collectivized domestic work as a site 
of solidarity that resists the forces of neoliberal capitalism. While the village did not fully replace 
the extended family as the architects of Ujamaa once hoped it would, it did provide new forms of 
sociality and reconfigured the reproductive labor of mutual care in meaningful ways.  
However, as the gendered and generational conflicts described here show, the new 
schools, hospitals, and informal communities of neighbors that emerged in the villages still left 
many holes in fabric of social reproduction. Formal education and access to biomedical treatment 
did not fully replace the forms of education and healing that were disturbed by the erosion of the 
lineage system, nor have the new water pipes and wells replaced the natural springs and streams 
that feed crops and make life possible in the mountains and downstream. Concerns about the loss 
of traditional knowledge suggest that formal schooling has not adequately replaced all that was 
disrupted when lineage institutions were dismantled. Likewise, women’s complaints about the 
lack of lineage support during illness reveal gaps in healing that the local hospital cannot fill. 
Hospitals, many acknowledge, are excellent for treating particular diseases, but they are helpless 
in the face of afflictions related to spirits, witchcraft, and family relations. Village institutions 
also do not address ecological practices like rainmaking and the maintenance of sacred groves.16 
In dismantling the land tenure system that served as the basis for social reproduction in the past, 
villagization interrupted more than it replaced. As the subsequent chapters show in more detail, 
 
16 A few villages in Uluguru do manage traditional forests, but this was not the case in Mkuyuni Ward. Changa 
village has been involved in the management of the adjacent Kimboza Forest Reserve through a Joint Forest 
Management (JFM) program, but ownership and ultimate control of the forest lies with the central state (see Chapter 
4). The number of government-recognized traditional forests in Uluguru is negligible in comparison to the number 




liberalization added increasing pressures on households, stretching the holes in the fabric still 
wider. 
Nyerere described the village as replacing the extended family, a new institution for 
collective governance that would draw on longstanding traditions of collectivity and democracy 
while rooting out entrenched forms of patriarchy and dispelling the threat of ethnic violence. 
However, the description of the village as a family obscured a fundamental difference; as 
Nyerere’s own writings make clear, Tanzanian socialism was oriented toward increased 
productivity, measured in terms set by the global economy (Coulson 2013, 283; Nyerere 1968, 
106–144). Although the socialist state was committed to improvements in education, healthcare, 
and the standards of living of rural people, it saw village management of land predominantly as a 
mechanism to facilitate the development of capital-intensive agriculture. In this way, the socialist 
project replicated rather than overcame the contradictions between accumulation and 
reproduction that characterize capitalism. The forms of social reproduction prioritized under 
socialism—Western-style schooling and medicine—were narrowly conceived and largely 
delinked from the land. Villages were set up to manage land for development, not to maintain the 
ancestral graves and sacred groves that had long been central to matambiko practices of healing 
lineages and their lands. This was left to lineage institutions, but without control of the land, 
these institutions began to disappear. 
It is likely that villagization would not have been as successful in disrupting existing 
lineage-based institutions if at least some residents had not wanted it to. This was especially the 
case for the generation of youth at the time of independence, who joined TANU, fought for 
independence, and worked to build a different future for the Uluguru. Schools and hospitals 




The modern education provided by government schools was geared not only toward producing 
workers but to cultivating and participating in new, worldly subjectivities, while the hospitals 
gave patients access to the kind of powerful, allopathic medicines used in wealthy countries. 
Moreover, as subsequent chapters show, while some in Mkuyuni have called for a return to the 
lineage, others resent the past tyranny of their uncles, and others still believe the matrilineal 
system is counter to development or God or both. Nevertheless, anxiety at the decline of 
initiation rituals and worries about the loss of herbal and lineage medicines, as well as the need 
for waganga to address afflictions the hospital cannot treat, suggest that existing state-sponsored 
forms of social service failed to adequately provide for social reproduction in all its prior 
richness. 
Conclusion 
While the processes by which capitalism cleaves social reproduction from production are 
widely discussed in feminist literature, there is significantly less work on the way socialist 
policies impact this process (Croll 1981). However, in Uluguru, continuing tensions over 
reproductive labor can be traced back to the moment of villagization. As we have seen, the 
socialist state was not blind to the need for social reproduction in its new villages. Indeed, the 
construction of schools and hospitals was a key component of villagization and one of the main 
justifications given for the resettlement program. However, as the gendered and generational 
conflicts described here show, these services have left many holes in the fabric of social 
reproduction, from the more immediate questions of housework to matters of tradition and 
remembering and ecological practices like rainmaking matambiko and the maintenance of sacred 
groves and forests. The authorities who implemented villagization largely failed to grasp the 




primarily seen in terms of its capacity to produce commodities for the market. Social 
reproduction was envisioned as the process of producing modern workers and citizens for the 
new nation and its productive economy, the growth of which, in turn, would raise standards of 
living. This thin understanding of social reproduction has proven inadequate to meet the complex 
and interconnected needs of those in Uluguru, as ongoing gendered and generational tensions 
attest. 
Many scholars who have written of villagization and its shortcomings have focused on 
the government’s lack of understanding of local conditions and its dismissal of local knowledge 
(Coulson 1975, 1977; Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003; Scott 1998). This is certainly true of the 
administration’s understanding of social reproduction, which failed to account for the thick web 
of connections between kinship, health, and the environment. Scott’s (1998) famous chapter on 
villagization has drawn attention to the phenomenological differences between the perspective of 
“the state” and peasants and its role in the project’s failures. However, in contrast to Scott, my 
conversations in Mkuyuni pointed not so much to attempts by the state to render rural 
populations legible but rather to the efforts by several groups to build a radical and “modern” 
future for Tanzania. One such group was the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie,” who vacillated between 
their own class interests and commitments to the ideology of Ujamaa. Another was the youth of 
TANU who wished to break the power of their elders and the social and economic stagnation 
imposed by decades of colonial rule through the construction of something radically new. Pels 
found that the era of independence marked a generational rupture, “a period in which youngsters 
could no longer be sufficiently controlled by elders in Luguru society” (1999: 150). Generational 
and class divisions both inflected the project of villagization and shaped the struggles over social 




It is important to note that the policies that undermined collective land holding enacted by 
the socialist government in the 1960s and 1970s were aimed at decolonization and the rooting 
out of undemocratic, ethnonationalist, and patriarchal forms of land control. Colonial policies, 
which sought to limit individual land ownership and the sale of land by Africans, were rooted in 
the logics of racism and imperialism and served to create racialized structures of inequality by 
trapping “tribal” people on their lands and denying them economic access while their labor and 
resources were exploited and extracted by colonial powers. Nor, as Nyerere (1968) pointed out, 
were precolonial systems of land tenure egalitarian utopias or the unchanging, harmonious, 
functional structures imagined in much of colonial ethnography. Rather, as Chapter 1 shows, 
they were also sites of inequality, struggle, and violence. Both colonial land policies and the 
invocation of precolonial systems have been powerful tools for denying coevalness of Africans, 
especially rural Africans, and perpetuating their economic, political, and cultural marginalization 
(J. Fabian 1983). 
Tanzanian socialism sought to bring about radical change by uncoupling land from 
lineage and dismantling the latter. As the case of Mkuyuni shows, this led to crises of social 
reproduction. However, it would be a mistake to read this merely as a cautionary tale about the 
dangers of making large scale change. To do so would be to condemn rural African communities 
to conservatism and to deny the possibility for radical futures (Coronil 2001; Scott 1998). Many 
residents of Mkuyuni fought for radical change following independence, and the future promised 
by the socialist project, though never realized, remains a powerful source of meaning for many. 
Rather, where TANU policies fell short was in adopting an understanding of social reproduction 
as a mere means to an end. Schools and hospitals were welcomed but their lacunae can be felt in 




the work of waganga who step in when hospital cures fail, and in anxieties of women like Mama 
Kinsangile about the dissolution of rainmaking institutions. Had the newly villagized country of 
Tanzania not been prized open by the forces of neoliberal capitalism so quickly, it is possible 
that richer forms of social reproduction would have grown up in the cracks of the new villages, 
filling in the holes left by bureaucratic shortsightedness. It is also possible that had villagization 
been designed and led by rural people, especially women, the result might have been a more 
robust and resilient form of community from the beginning, one that could have made room for 
forms of social reproduction oriented not toward the calculus of the global market but to the 
thick linkages between spirits, nature, and human flourishing. 
In any case, the socialist project undertaken by Nyerere and TANU was cut short. Only a 
few years after villagization, the requirement to live in villages was lifted. In the 1980s, Tanzania 
was forced to liberalize its economy in accordance with structural adjustment (Mbilinyi 1990; 
Lugalla 1995). The dream of collectivized land ownership and communal agricultural labor 
faded as the market extended its grasp. These changes were coupled with others, like the rise of 
new religious movements in both Islam and Christianity. Chapter 3, tracing conflicts over 
funerals and memorials in contemporary Uluguru, begins to explore these shifts, which occupy 
the remainder of the text. Where villagization was implemented almost overnight, neoliberalism 
and its attendant ruptures happened slowly in Tanzania, spreading piecemeal and transforming 
the political and economic landscape in fragmented but significant ways. However, as the 
subsequent chapters also show, the embers of socialism and of the lineage system that preceded 
it, continue to burn, providing alternative modes of politics that, again and again, serve to 






ISLAM, FUNERALS, AND THE UNGROUNDING OF SACRED SPACE 
 Storms in Uluguru tend to strike at night. During the fitful short rains, I would sometimes 
be awakened by a clap of thunder that seemed to shake my entire house. Through the cacophony, 
my ears would often catch the faint pop of my circuit breaker and I would watch helplessly as 
my small fan whined to a halt. Even with ceilings, the corrugated metal roof amplified the 
downpour to a deafening roar. In both 2017 and 2018, the short rains came early and even more 
intensely that usual, miring northeastern Uluguru in a thick layer of mud and rendering even the 
main road nearly impassable. 
 On the morning of October 25, 2018, I awoke after such a night to a text from Gerald 
informing me that he would be late. The vehicle he was in was stuck in the mud, a regular 
occurrence in rainy months. We had arranged that day to meet with a group of older women in 
Ludewa Village, high up the mountain behind Mkuyuni. When Gerald finally arrived, we were 
almost two hours behind schedule. I asked our regular motorcycle drivers to take us to Ludewa, 
but they refused. The roads were too muddy, they said, and it wouldn’t be possible to get there. 
Thinking of the women who had already given up the chance to work their farms that day 
waiting for us, I persisted and eventually found two young, foolhardy drivers who agreed to try 




As we struggled eastward through the muck, I noticed an unusual number of people 
walking in the same direction, and quickly learned they were headed to a funeral. During the 
early part of my research, I had hesitated to attend funerals of those I did not know personally, 
fearing that my presence would appear disrespectful and distracting. I was never explicitly 
invited. However, I gradually came to understand that my presence would be welcome. Funerals 
in Uluguru are extremely well-attended; I never saw a funeral with fewer than a hundred in 
attendance and sometimes saw crowds exceeding five hundred mourners. Even so, I often failed 
to learn about funerals until after they were over, since they tended to occur on very short notice 
after a death. On this day, the funeral-goers appeared particularly numerous, wading through the 
muck in flipflops as we lurched past them. 
 Perhaps the tenth time I had to jump off the motorcycle so the driver could maneuver 
through a particularly waterlogged patch of road, I realized we would not make it up the 
mountain. The road so far was relatively flat in most areas, but after the turnoff to Ludewa, I 
knew, it climbed so steeply that motorcycles making the trip seemed to defy physics even in the 
best of weather. Even if we maintained our current pace and didn’t get into an accident on the 
harrowing slopes, we wouldn’t arrive until well into the afternoon. I reluctantly called the village 
officer who had helped us coordinate the meeting to send our apologies. I gave Gerald cash for 
the drivers and sent them and him back to the bus stand so he could at least get an early start on 
what would likely be an arduous return trip to town. Deciding to make the most of what was 
beginning to feel like a wasted day, I set out for the funeral, following the small groups of men 




arrived. I quickly donned a kanga1 over my muddy jeans and wrapped my hair clumsily under a 
scarf before approaching.2 
 The funeral was carried out in the open space between several small brick buildings 
clustered on the hill above the road, houses belonging to the deceased and his relatives. Several 
hundred people were already there, talking in small groups and waiting for the ceremony to 
begin. Women sat crouched along the higher buildings and sprawled up the slope, teetering on 
rocks because the ground was still far too wet for sitting. The men sat or milled around the space 
below. Various community and religious leaders could be seen moving through the crowd to 
attend to logistical matters. A few women busily toted water and food to the corner where others 
stirred giant pots of ugali3 over wood fires. Close family members could be heard in one of the 
houses, the women wailing loudly. More distant relatives and neighbors darted in and out of the 
buildings, tending to the needs of family and guests. I spotted an older woman I had come to 
know well during my research, Mama Kesse, among the women sitting on the rocks further up 
the slope and happily joined her. She informed me that the man who had died had been 
prominent in the community and had left behind two wives. 
After a time, a group of women began to gather in one corner, slowly forming a circle. 
Quietly at first, but quickly growing, the sound of zikiri began to fill the yard. The Arabic term 
dhikr, from which zikiri emerged, refers to the repetition of devotional phrases, often the names 
of God. In Uluguru, zikiri refers to a collective vocal practice done at funerals and memorial 
services as well as at Sufi gatherings called ziara and at the Islamicized versions of girls’ 
 
1 A wrap-around skirt worn by most rural Tanzanian women. 
2 Muslim women in Mkuyuni vary widely in the extent to which they cover their hair. As a non-Muslim, I was not 
expected to cover my hair in daily life, but it was required when participating in any Islamic events, including 
Muslim funerals. 





initiations (maulidi). The three Sufi orders (tariqa) of Mkuyuni each have their own style of 
zikiri, but in each, participants form a circle or a series of concentric circles, which rotate slowly 
or expand and contract around the center in time with the chant. Some participants create a 
rhythm through breathy vocalizations, over which others recite melodic strands of religious text. 
The performance can be done by men alone, by women alone, or by a mixed group, in which 
case men typically make up the inner circles and women surround on the outside. Sometimes the 
flag associated with the Sufi order is placed in the middle, although there was none this time. 
 I moved to the edge of the circle to observe the performance; I had heard zikiri many 
times, but rarely seen it performed by only women. The women near me smiled and welcomed 
me into the circle, indicating that I should join in. “Why are you out here? Get closer!” one 
encouraged me, nudging me toward the center. As a non-Muslim and as someone with limited 
skills as a vocalist, I was always hesitant to join zikiri, but I had learned at other events and from 
Sufi teachers in the area that my participation was not only permitted but enthusiastically 
welcomed. So, to the smiles of the women around me, I did my best, training my lungs to the 
rhythm. 
 After around half an hour, the zikiri ended without ceremony and I returned to my seat. A 
group of men were huddled near one of the buildings. Mama Kesse informed me that they were 
discussing the costs of the funeral and the immediate financial needs of the family, for which 
money was being collected. Eventually, a group of men entered the house where the close female 
relatives sat wailing, and emerged with the narrow wooden casket, draped in fabric. A quiet fell 
over the funeral. Everyone stood. Around fifteen men assembled behind the coffin, including the 
imam from the main Friday mosque in Mkuyuni and the village chairman. One of the men led 




the men lifted the casket and carried it away to be buried, while the women remained standing in 
silence. After the men disappeared around the corner, we returned to small talk. Large metal 
plates heaped with ugali and beans were distributed among the women, and then the men as they 
returned. 
 After eating, the crowd dispersed to make the muddy walk home. As I began to leave, 
Mama Kesse pressed a 200 shilling coin4 into my hand, saying it was my payment. 
“Payment for what?” I asked, taken aback. 
“For zikiri,” she replied. 
 When I first learned about zikiri, it was from followers of one of the local branches of the 
Qadariyya tariqa. I had a terrible cough and was met with a laugh by my interviewee, who told 
me this too was a form of zikiri, the sound of the cough replicating the name of God (Idi Amri 
Waziri, interview, September 1, 2018). I learned from him and other Sufi leaders that zikiri, like 
other Sufi practices, was a path—a shortcut—to God (Sheikh Magoso bin Ahmedi, interview, 
September 2, 2018). However, it was only after receiving this small token from Mama Kesse that 
I grasped zikiri as a form of work, a form of reproductive labor like the work of healing, 
remembering, and carrying out tradition discussed in Chapter 2. As I would come to understand, 
those organizing funerals and hitima (memorials) would often hire a group of men to perform 
zikiri for the deceased. In this case, for reasons I could not discover, these arrangements had not 
been made, so the women present decided to perform zikiri themselves. If zikiri was a shortcut to 
God, performing it at a funeral was like making a bridge over which the deceased could pass to 
draw closer to God. Zikiri eased their journey in the afterlife and helped ensure their ultimate 
arrival in paradise. Even for those in Mkuyuni, however, 200 shillings was more of a token than 
 




a meaningful sum. It was out of care for the dead, not for this small coin, that most women 
joined together in zikiri that day. This was the meaning of my participation, formally 
acknowledged by the coin Mama Kesse handed me. I doubt I would have received payment had 
she not claimed it for me when she collected her own share. But still, I felt moved. I had helped 
the newly deceased man find his way. 
* * * 
When I finally made the trip to meet the women of Ludewa the following week, the roads 
had dried and we made the steep trek with little trouble. When we arrived, we found seven 
women waiting for us in a small room of the half-built government dispensary. Chairs were 
gathered from all corners of the building, and we apologized again for the cancelation of the 
prior week. The women were understanding and still eager to talk to us about local history.5 We 
started, as usual, by gathering some demographic data. None of the women knew what year they 
were born, but we estimated based on their ages at key events, finding the oldest among them 
born in the 1930s, and the youngest in the 1950s. Then we launched into a discussion of local 
history. They eagerly told us about the failed terracing scheme and the rise of TANU as well as 
the events of villagization, and we recorded a song they recalled from their time in TANU 
Youth. Toward the end of our conversation, I asked whether there had been any change in 
religion in their lifetimes. No, they agreed. What about Ansar Sunna, I asked, referring to the 
Islamic reform movement that had spread in Tanzania since the 1980s. Had that brought any 
changes? 
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 Suddenly, the echoey room sprang to life. Apparently, in the days leading up to our visit, 
there had been heated controversy in the village. It had started some time back, when the local 
shehe6 passed away. His son had returned to the village and assumed leadership of the mosque as 
an Islamic teacher. Recently, however, he had conducted a funeral for a child who had died, a 
close relative of one of the women in our interview. At the funeral, the child was bathed and the 
teacher was called to pray, but he refused, saying they should proceed straight to the burial. At 
the grave, he was once again asked to lead prayers, but again refused and simply buried the body 
and left. These actions shocked and outraged many in the community. Moreover, the woman told 
us, relatives of this teacher had recently wanted to visit the grave of their mother to clean the 
grave site and offer prayer, a practice known by the verb -zulu. They asked the teacher to lead 
this visit, a common practice among Sufi Muslims in Uluguru, but he had refused. Beyond these 
complaints, the women told us, he had refused to participate in girls’ initiations and although he 
did attend memorials (hitima), he refused to take part in the shared meal. What’s more, he had 
misled the community about the day of Eid, following a date that diverged by one day from the 
official announcement by Bakwata, Tanzania’s main Muslim organization. Although the man 
had never stated that he had joined Ansar Sunna or any other religious movement that would 
represent a break with his father’s Sufi traditions, these differing practices caused the women to 
speculate that he had become a “muhabia” and members of the mosque had held a meeting 
earlier that week to express their concerns. 
The term muhabia is a Swahilization of Wahhabi, a term that has become widespread in 
Tanzania, as elsewhere, and which serves as a slightly pejorative exonym for followers of the 
Islamic reform movement. This movement, which in Tanzania most often calls itself Ansar 
 




Sunna, has been spreading in rural regions, especially in predominantly Muslim areas, since the 
1980s and 1990s (Becker 2008: 241–275). In some parts of Tanzania, the term Ansar Sunna 
refers to a specific movement or organization within a larger field of Islamic reform, but in 
Uluguru, these boundaries were often blurred by reformists and non-reformists alike and I follow 
my interlocutors in using it as a general term (cf. Gilsaa 2015). The term “reformist,” in turn, has 
been used by Becker (2008) and others to highlight the religious goals upon which this 
movement is based and which it shares with a global set of movements and organizations across 
the Muslim world. In Tanzania, as elsewhere, reformist Muslims have sought to spread a 
conservative and largely literalist reading of Islamic law and to eliminate practices and beliefs 
they deem un-Islamic. Initially dominated by young men, the movement posed a radical 
challenge to established forms of religious authority. As a result, Ansar Sunna’s arrival in rural 
Muslim communities has often been accompanied by controversy and clashes over several key 
issues: control of mosques, the practice of Sufi rituals, and the date of Eid. When I asked about 
tensions around this movement in Mkuyuni, the topic that most consistently arose and that 
sparked the greatest emotion was the reformists’ rejection of funeral and memorial prayers and 
other practices of care for the dead, including zikiri (cf. Becker 2009). 
These two incidents, linked in my experience through a chance rainstorm, help highlight 
the stakes of struggles over funerals and memorials in Mkuyuni. While religious relationships 
were largely amicable, at least in public, heated clashes over relationships to and care for the 
dead were an exception. The subject came up frequently in my interviews and conversations. As 
Chapter 2 argued, relationships with the dead lie at the heart of social reproduction. Zikiri, 
performed at funerals and memorials, is a matter of kinship, relationships between generations, 




catchment since the eighteenth century. Today, new political and economic configurations 
wrought by liberalization have led to new struggles over the terms of social healing. In this 
chapter, I argue that these changes have been marked by a partial ungrounding of social 
reproduction as cash has come to outweigh land as the material basis of life. New forms of Islam 
must be understood in this context, where they serve as sites for the renegotiation of 
relationships—to authority, to elders, and between men and women. 
Changing trends in Islam have coincided with economic liberalization across the Muslim 
world. Samir Amin (1990) considered “Islamic fundamentalism” as an attempt to grapple with 
the continued economic and political marginalization of the Global South, although one he 
suggested would ultimately fail to bring meaningful change to the structures of neocolonialism. 
More recently, scholars such as Daromir Rudnyckyj (2009) and Filippo and Caroline Osella 
(2009) have discussed how Islamic reform movements have been deployed by emerging 
managerial classes in Indonesia and India (see also Adas 2006; Hassan 2009; Sloane 1998). 
Feminist anthropologists have also considered the ways in which Islam has served to mediate 
changing gender roles under neoliberalism (Bernal 1994; Masquelier 2008; Ong 1987). As these 
works show, the content of Islamic reform and its connection to economic change have varied 
significantly across disparate contexts. Nevertheless, it is clear that the history of contemporary 
Islamic reform since the 1970s cannot be understood apart from the emergence of a neoliberal 
world order. In this context, religion has served as a key site for theorizing and navigating 
changing relationships to work, land, and money—relationships always bound up with questions 
of social reproduction. 
As past chapters have shown, the framework social reproduction brings together 




graves cannot be understood apart from the long history of rainmaking and matambiko which 
link the dead with ecological and agricultural fertility and human flourishing. In this way, they 
are also bound up with gendered and generational conflicts over reproductive labor. However, as 
social reproduction has become increasingly delinked from land and as the weather in the 
mountains appears increasingly unpredictable, relationships to place and the environment are in 
flux. Conflicts over funerals are also sites in which these changes are theorized and debated. In 
short, challenges to practices like zikiri are calls to reorganize relationships to kin and to the land. 
They mark shifting ideas about which authorities are legitimate and what obligations come with 
political power, and they have significant implications for relationships between genders and 
generations. They are also inseparable from questions of rain. 
Space and Politics in the Tariqa 
Contemporary conflicts over ritual practice and care for the dead must be understood in 
relation to Tanzanian Sufism’s complex relationships to space and to the nation. As Chapter 1 
discussed, the tariqa arrived in Uluguru in the late 1920s and grew rapidly over the subsequent 
decades, prompting both large numbers of conversions to Islam and an increased religiosity 
among Muslims in the region. While Islam was already present in northeastern Uluguru since the 
time of Kingalu Mwanashaa in the mid-nineteenth century, it was originally associated with elite 
families and individuals as an index of coastal ties and participation in larger networks of trade. 
Because Islam served as a status marker, most early Muslims in the region had little interest in 
proselytization, preferring to keep their affiliation exclusive. Some non-elites also sought to 
affiliate themselves with Islam, but they had relatively little access to religious education (Becker 
2008: 25–52). The arrival of the Sufi order (tariqa) radically changed Islam in Uluguru from a 




Moreover, as we have seen, its growth was heavily correlated with the rise of cash cropping and 
changes in land tenure, especially as more families migrated from higher elevations to relatively 
sparsely populated valleys like Mkuyuni. The tariqa provided an alternative space of community 
for those living far from their matrilineages and extended families. 
 Sufism has often been important to the geographical expansion of Islam, in part because 
it offers space to negotiate between non-Islamic and Islamic forms of ritual practice (Ho 2006; 
Werbner 2003). In Uluguru, Sufism arrived to the rich social fabric of ritual and tradition known 
in Swahili as mila. As we have seen, there were several central components of mila. First, 
matambiko rituals allowed the living to seek healing for their families and for the land through 
reconciliation with their ancestors. Matambiko rituals involved brewing traditional beer, visiting 
and tending to graves and other sacred sites, and reciting the names of ancestors. The most 
significant forms of matambiko were the rainmaking rituals performed annually and during times 
of drought. Alongside matambiko, initiation ceremonies for girls and boys and initiations into the 
society of elders served as spaces where secret knowledge and ethics were maintained and 
shared. However, as Chapter 1 showed, the landscape of mila was not a static or timeless entity 
but contained striations which reveal histories of migration, conquest, and political struggle. 
When the tariqa emerged in the mountains, they brought additional layers to this complex and 
contested formation, adding to and shifting the topography of ritual, religion, and spirits. 
Aspects of Sufi practice resonated with existing forms of mila but there were also 
important points of divergence. Sufi rituals around the world often focus on visiting, tending to, 
and praying at graves—those of the Sufi teachers (walimu) and saints (wali) who have died. 
These figures form a genealogy which followers can recite, linking present followers of the 




genealogies also trace the path of secret knowledge, which is relayed directly from teacher to 
student. However, unlike lineage names recited during matambiko, tariqa genealogies are 
patrilineal, not matrilineal, flowing directly from (male) teacher to student. The position of shehe 
itself passes down along these lines, based on knowledge and leadership in the tariqa. In 
practice, this has often meant the title remaining within families, moving from father to son, 
although direct kinship is not required for succession. Knowledge in this system is also more 
centralized, personified in the figure of the shehe. In mila, while male lineage heads had come to 
exercise important ritual roles, knowledge was more diffuse, spread among elders of both 
genders. 
These spaces of convergence and difference became spaces of creative tension in the 
lives of the residents of Mkuyuni, offering possibilities to renegotiate ritual practice, authority, 
knowledge, and relationships to the dead. They also marked another step in the marginalization 
of women. Although women were and are included in the tariqa of Uluguru, and perform zikiri, 
they cannot become a shehe. Women can only serve as Islamic teachers to other women and girls 
and are excluded from the higher leadership structures of the tariqa. In Uluguru, where women 
had long held positions of power, this change was perhaps the most significant one brought by 
the tariqa. At the same time, as we have already seen, structures in which women did have 
power, most notably the matrilineage, continued to exist alongside the Sufi orders, although in 
forms weakened by long political struggle since the mid-nineteenth century. Also, importantly, 
as Chapter 1 discussed, while some tariqa in East Africa did not allow women to become full 
followers and to participate in zikiri, the orders which took hold in Uluguru all permitted 
women’s participation (Nimtz 1980: 79). Women, it appears, continued to assert a significant 




The tariqa also shifted and expanded ideas of sacred geography. Sacred geography is a 
part of what Henri Lefebvre (1991) has described as the social construction of space. Pnina 
Werbner, tracing the history of a global Sufi order, has argued the process of “sacralising” space 
is fundamental to Sufism, and that practices of pilgrimage and of dhikr inscribe the sacred into 
the landscape, expanding and reaffirming the boundaries of the Islamic world against an outside 
associated with wilderness and with unbelievers (2003: 43). Yogesh Snehi (2019), in his 
consideration of Sufi shrines in Punjab, also argues that tombs and their visitation are critical in 
the production of social space in everyday life, one that is often enmeshed with political struggle 
and conflict. Engseng Ho (2006) has written of the ways in which Hadrami genealogies and 
graves mark pathways of migration and movement across the Indian Ocean. Through tombs and 
genealogies, Hadrami Sufis mark a wide geography of connectivity shaped by centuries of 
transoceanic trade. In Sufism, space and genealogy, geography, and history, are co-constitutive, 
marking out paths of connection and circulation. 
In Uluguru before the arrival of Islam, graves and other sacred sites associated with 
ancestors wove kinship through the landscape, linking family to forests, water, and the 
mountains themselves. At the same time, this grounded kinship was not only centripetal. It also 
linked communities to networks of movement and connection. Uluguru’s sacred sites were 
always understood to be part of a broad web of shrines, one that sent Luguru people to far-off 
places and drew outsiders into the mountains in crossing and shifting paths of pilgrimage. This 
landscape included shrines to other territorial mizimu like those at Kilombero, Rufiji, Nguru, and 
Ukaguru, as well as the Kolero shrine that drew pilgrims from the lowlands of Uzaramo and 
beyond to Uluguru. As we saw in Chapter 1, boundaries between lineage graves and territorial 




map of Sufi tombs overlay this geography as practices of zikiri and zulu incorporated existing 
family graves into Islamic geographies. At the same time, tariqa also expanded this web of 
graves and connections in new directions oriented toward and across the Indian Ocean. Sufi 
genealogies linked the teachers who arrived in Uluguru to lines of learning and knowledge that 
stretched across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.  
In Changa Village, the tomb of Senei bin Jumaa is remarkable for its contrast to usual 
Luguru graves. Senei bin Jumaa, introduced in Chapter 1 as the teacher who established one of 
the major branches of Qadariyya in Uluguru, was not himself Mluguru and did not belong to a 
clan or lineage in the mountain. Following his death in Changa in 1955, his followers 
constructed a large building with concrete floors and walls and a metal roof, in the center of 
which sits his raised, concrete tomb (Maulidi Tamim Tondolla, personal communication, August 
30, 2018; Idi Amri Waziri, interview, September 1, 2018). This burial stands in stark contrast to 
Luguru lineage graves in scared groves, areas associated with nature (pori) in which cutting and 
settlement were prohibited. Considering the shehe’s tomb, it would be easy to suggest that 
Sufism broke the link between ancestors and nature long maintained by mila, but the reality is 
more complex. Islam, both within and beyond the tariqa, introduced new practices of burial and 
the tending of graves which allowed for an increasing separation of graves from nature. 
However, most Muslims in Uluguru are buried in places that continue to blur the lines between 
settlement and wilderness. Sufi practices of visiting graves have also served to reinscribe and add 
to the significance of these places even as lineages lost control of the land and as the large 
lineage forests that once surrounded graves began to disappear. Links to the land were not 
broken but reconfigured. Moreover, although Sufi teachers generally say that ancestors do not 




related to rain, creating space for reinterpretations of old connections between climate and the 
ancestors; as graves found new signification, new conversations opened about who could bring 
healing and who could bring rain. 
As Chapter 1 showed, the tariqa grew rapidly in areas like Mkuyuni, both because of the 
prior prominence of Islam, brought by influential figures like Kingalu, and because many in the 
area were living away from their lineages and were drawn to the tariqa as alternative spaces of 
community and learning. In the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS), the tariqa aligned with 
the nascent nationalist movement and with the family of Kingalu to oppose colonial intervention. 
Although it is unclear what, if anything, tariqa leaders said about rainmaking during the 
struggles over ULUS, the fact that critiques of ULUS invoked rainmaking suggest at least some 
tolerance on the part of some tariqa leaders for Kingalu’s claims to rainmaking abilities. After 
independence, however, the relationships among “customary” rulers like Kingalu, TANU, and 
the tariqa became strained. The last chapter showed the fissures between Kingalu and TANU 
wrought by the party’s attempts to weaken “customary” authorities and to prevent their control 
of land. While Kingalu’s family remained aligned with TANU and its successor, CCM, until at 
least 2013, active collaboration reached its zenith at the time of ULUS. 
While the alliance between the customary “chief” and TANU was unusual, the 
collaboration of the tariqa with the new nationalist movement was part of a larger pattern 
throughout much of southern and eastern Tanganyika (Becker 2008: 209–240; Nimtz 1980). 
Although much of TANU’s central leadership, including Nyerere, was Christian, the 
independence movement was popular among Muslims, many of whom were particularly 
resentful of British policies that disadvantaged Muslims in the Native Authority. Although there 




skills such as literacy in the Latin alphabet, which were taught in mission schools (Becker 2008: 
210–211). Most schools during the British colonial period were mission-run and Muslim parents 
were often reluctant to send their children. As several men who remembered the colonial period 
told me, these parents feared—not without reason—that the missions would baptize or convert 
their children or feed them pork.7 There were also fewer mission schools in general in Muslim 
areas, with the nearest to Mkuyuni over ten kilometers away. In Mkuyuni, a government school 
was eventually constructed, but only after several generations of Catholic students had been 
educated at the mission in Matombo. As a result of such discrepancies, Christians tended to 
advance more quickly through the Native Administration and to be granted higher positions of 
authority. Muslim opposition to colonial rule was also fomented in the tariqa more specifically 
by the administration’s suspicious and negative attitudes towards Sufism, including a 1933 
circular hostile to zikiri that led the practice to be banned in some jurisdictions (though not in 
Uluguru) (“Confidential Circular” 1933; Nimtz 1980: 81–83; see also Chapter 1). This circular 
was also the result of the administration’s tendency to trust orthodox Sunni leadership, especially 
Arab and Zanzibari authorities, over African mashehe (e.g. ibni Hajar, n.d.). As a result of these 
tensions, African Muslims in general and followers of the tariqa in particular joined TANU in 
large numbers in the 1950s. 
After independence, the government prioritized harmonious relationships between 
Muslims and Christians, but the educational and political marginalization of Muslims did not 
come to an end. Indeed, Christians continued to be privileged in the post-independence 
government, in part because the bureaucracy retained the basic shape of British governance and 
continued to require skills for which mission education had already given Christians an upper 
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hand. Moreover, a lag between the nationalization of schools and the building of new schools in 
underserved areas meant that communities with a history of missionary presence continued to 
have greater opportunities for educational advancement. At the same time, the push toward 
formal, secular education that occurred after independence marginalized not only traditional 
forms of knowledge but also Quranic education, which—unlike the teachings of mission 
schools—was not seen by the state as part of “modern” knowledge (Becker 2008: 235). As 
Muslim disillusionment with TANU grew, older tensions also became more pronounced. In 
particular, Muslim leaders’ transnational alliances through global Islam had always sat somewhat 
uneasily alongside the nationalist vision of TANU, generating mutual distrust. After 
independence, this tension began to boil over. 
This came to a head in 1967, the year of the Arusha Declaration, with the formation of 
the Baraza Kuu ya Waislamu Tanzania (the Central Muslim Council of Tanzania, commonly 
known as Bakwata). The foundation of this new Islamic organization appears to have occurred at 
the wishes of the government, although the exact circumstances of its inception remain 
somewhat obscure (Becker 2008: 237–238; Nimtz 1980: 90). Bakwata took the place of the older 
East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), but reframed this organization in national, 
rather than regional terms. With the formation of Bakwata, EAMWS was banned and many of its 
leaders were arrested or exiled. This abrupt change was the result of a growing view on the part 
of the government that the internationally-oriented EAMWS was fundamentally incompatible 
with the nationalist plan for development. In short, the banning of EAMWS and the formation of 
Bakwata was an attempt by the government to formalize and co-opt Islamic leadership and 
contain it within a national paradigm. However, while Bakwata did replace EAMWS, it never 




the Muslim community across the mainland. While many mashehe joined Bakwata and enjoyed 
leadership positions in the organization, other Muslims were more reluctant to accept the change 
(Gilsaa 2015; Westerlund 1997). Especially in light of the continuing marginalization of 
Muslims, the state’s attempt to manage Muslim civil society through Bakwata became a growing 
source of resentment. 
The socialist period of Tanzania officially ended in 1985, but the decline of the socialist 
state had been in evidence by the late 1970s, when the requirement to live in planned villages 
was revoked and ambitious development plans were scaled back due to economic and logistical 
difficulties (Boesen et al. 1986; Lugalla 1995; Mbilinyi 1990). Over the 1980s and early 1990s, 
many of the regulations of the socialist state were rolled back and many plans for development 
were abandoned. After 1985, structural adjustment reduced social services and opened markets. 
It was at this moment of liberalization that the movement known as Ansar Sunna first emerged in 
Tanzania, growing in particular among young men who had migrated to urban areas in search of 
economic opportunity (Becker 2008: 241–274). Ansar Sunna’s emergence was further bolstered 
by the lifting of the de facto ban on Islamic civil organizations outside of Bakwata at this time; 
beginning in the early 1980s, new Muslim organizations were able to officially register, creating 
institutional space for those critical of Bakwata’s stances (Westerlund 1997: 319). However, 
more than this institutional change, it was the larger set of social changes wrought by 
liberalization that drove the movement’s growing popularity and influence. 
Liberalization, Commercialization, Deagrarianization 
 Abdallah Ramadhani Kambi was raised by followers of the Qadariyya tariqa in Kinole 
and Kibwaya, but as a young man, he left the mountains for Dar es Salaam, where he lived and 




began to pay attention to debates happening in the Muslim communities in the city. He was 
intrigued. Was it proper to follow dates announced by Muslim leadership in Saudi Arabia, the 
center of the Muslim world, or were Tanzanian Muslims to follow the dates announced by 
national leadership in Bakwata? As he began studying Islam more deeply to find the answers, he 
discovered much of what he had been taught as religious practice was absent from the Quran, 
including memorials for the dead and visitations to graves. Sometime around 1992, he aligned 
himself with a group of Muslims who were calling for a return to Islam as they understood it to 
be described in the Quran and the Sunna and who were oriented toward likeminded Islamic 
leaders and teachers in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and around the world. Abdallah changed his 
behavior, no longer going out dancing or pursuing women. He and the other Muslims like him 
were called Ansar Sunna, although he preferred—and still prefers—to eschew the label, arguing 
that Islam does not have denominations or divisions. 
 Eventually, Abdallah returned to the mountains, bringing these ideas of Islam with him. 
He was not alone. Around 1980, a man known as Mwalimu Kudula had already moved back to 
his home in Mkuyuni after studying Islam in Dar es Salaam and had begun spreading the 
teachings of Islamic reform in the village. Over time, he was joined by other returnees from the 
cities, including Abdallah and men like Abdul Hussein Matemelela, who had joined Ansar Sunna 
in the mid-1980s in Singida, where he had a small business (interview, December 3, 2018). In 
1994, a group of reformist Muslims, under the leadership of Mwalimu Kadula and with funding 
from a benefactor in Oman, constructed a new mosque just off the main market in Mkuyuni 
(Masawanga Ally, interview, August 23, 2018; Fazili Amiri, interview, January 3, 2019). Since 
then, reformist Muslims have built mosques in several neighboring villages including Changa, 




 The arrival of Ansar Sunna in Uluguru corresponded with a period of rapid economic 
change in Tanzania. As the last chapter showed, the socialist period had its biggest impact on 
Uluguru through its reorganization of land tenure, especially in the program of forced 
villagization, which ultimately served to weaken control over land by matrilineal lineages, 
especially in areas with high numbers of people living away from their lineages, such as 
Mkuyuni. Yet, almost as soon as these changes started, the socialist program began to unravel on 
the national level. The requirement to live in villages was repealed only a few years after the 
resettlements in Uluguru. The national economy was shattered by several concurrent crises; a 
series of nationwide droughts, the collapse of the East African Community, war with Uganda, 
and the global oil shocks all did serious damage to the socialist vision by the end of the 1970s. 
On top of this, protectionism from industrialized countries and hostile treatment from institutions 
of global finance combined with internal problems including poor rural-urban linkages and 
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption to push the country into a downward economic spiral 
(Boesen et al. 1986: 21; Coulson 2013: 3; Edwards 2016: 360; Ponte 2003: 47). In 1979, the 
International Monetary Fund began to demand policy changes including decreased state 
spending and currency devaluation. The government of Tanzania refused and was met with 
punitive measures including decreasing foreign aid, which coincided with rising global interest 
rates. It became increasingly difficult for the government to resist outside pressures and to 
continue to follow Nyerere’s socialist path. By 1984, imports had been liberalized, and in 1985, 
Nyerere declined to run for reelection. His successor, Ali Hussein Mwinyi, soon agreed to 
submit to a structural adjustment program and rapidly liberalized sectors of the economy amid 




 This process of liberalization had several major impacts on farmers in Uluguru but 
perhaps most important was what Ponte (2003) has described as the “commercialisation of rural 
life.” This commercialization was accompanied by “deagrarianization” as agricultural incomes 
declined and need for cash increased (Bryceson 1996). During the socialist period, Tanzanian 
farmers were subject to minimum acreage laws and other regulations, and sold their prices 
through regional cooperatives, which in turn sold to national marketing boards (Ponte 2003: 41–
42). In Uluguru, however, the main cash crops had long been fruits and vegetables, which were 
unregulated and sold through domestic markets. Likewise, minimum acreage laws had gone 
largely unenforced in the area. Thus, some of the major changes brought to other regions by 
liberalization were relatively unimportant in the mountains. However, farmers in Uluguru were 
significantly impacted by the loss of input subsidies and rising input prices as well as crop price 
volatility and overall declines in prices for food (Ponte 2003: 102–105). In addition, shortages of 
consumer goods in the 1980s were quickly reversed, something many of my interlocutors 
remembered well. With the availability of new items from abroad, the need for cash increased. 
The introduction of cost sharing mechanisms in healthcare and education also increased needs 
for currency (Lugalla 1995). One outcome in Uluguru was a shift from “slow” crops with only a 
few harvests per year to “fast” crops with year-round yields. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
rice and maize production declined in Morogoro rural district, where Uluguru is located, while 
tomato and coconut production rose (Ponte 2003: 113–131).8 These shifts meant quicker access 
to cash for farmers in the mountains, but significantly, they did not lead to an increase in farm 
incomes, which fell significantly during the period. 
 
8 The schema of “slow” and “fast” crops, proposed by Ponte (2003), indicates the period of time between harvests, 




 Instead, to compensate for falling farm revenues, households depended increasingly on 
non-farm activities, sparking a trend of “deagrarianizaiton” (Bryceson 1996). This was 
particularly true for young men, who increasingly sought off-farm employment, including 
opportunities for paid labor or starting small businesses in urban areas. Ponte’s household survey 
in Morogoro rural district found that over half of children who left home between 1986 and 1995 
were residing in urban areas, most of them young men. He also recorded that around a third of 
households in 1995 were receiving regular remittances from relatives working elsewhere, up 
from only 12.5% in 1986/87. At a time when farm incomes were declining relative to non-farm 
incomes, young men’s ability to migrate to cities as well as their tendency to adapt more easily to 
changing crop patterns when they did remain in farming gave them an unprecedented level of 
economic independence from their elders (Ponte 2003: 156). As we have seen, prior generations 
had also seen increasing levels of independence from their elders. In the 1960s and 1970s, young 
members of TANU participated in dismantling the power of authority of lineage elders, in large 
part by transferring control over land from elders to new villages (see Chapter 2). However, as 
village institutions themselves lost power, control of land passed largely to individuals. The 
matrilineal system did not return, and the former youth of the independence period now were 
themselves parents of adult children over whom they had little control through kinship, finances, 
or state bureaucracy. 
 It was the sons of these former TANU Youth and their agemates who traveled to Dar es 
Salaam and other urban centers and among whom Islamic reform took hold in the wake of 
liberalization. This was the first generation of young men for whom initiation ceremonies had 
been rare and who had thus received little instruction in Luguru ethics (maadili, see the 




of age during an economic crisis, lasting from the beginning of the 1980s through the mid-1990s, 
in which farming was increasingly inadequate to meet basic needs and in which social services 
were rapidly being withdrawn, these youth were left to piece together a living from small 
businesses and wage labor. While these non-farm pursuits ultimately placed them at an economic 
advantage relative to their parents and elders, as well as to young women whose mobility and 
access to off-farm work was more limited, it did not raise standards of living or allow for a 
significant accumulation of capital for most (Ponte 2003: 155–158). Considering these cascading 
failures, it is clear why young men like Abdallah and Abdul were drawn to a movement that 
promised something different—from mila, from the tariqa, and from TANU. 
 The question of ethics in particular was key for many who joined Ansar Sunna. The last 
chapter described many men’s sadness at having lost the traditional knowledge imparted during 
the initiations of the past. Those who joined the reform movement, of course, were not likely to 
express nostalgia for the ways of mila, which is seen as a violation of religious law. 
Nevertheless, many men described a sense of ethical unmooring prior to their conversion. When 
I asked Abdul Rahman Thabit about his religious affiliation before he joined Ansar Sunna, he 
responded that he had no religion (interview, November 5, 2018). “As for religion, you could say 
I had none, because I was just a regular person. I was getting drunk. There was no religion in 
that,” he said. Abdul, I later learned, was the son of an important shehe, and his description of a 
lack of religion in his life prior to joining reform indexed a dissatisfaction with the authority and 
ethics of tariqa. Abdallah Ramadhani Kambi, the man who joined Ansar Sunna in Dar es Salaam 
in the 1990s, said when he joined, he stopped going dancing and pursing women, labelling these 
activities and disrespectful and immature (interview, November 5, 2018). Religious study with 




from home. Importantly, for these young men, it was text that provided moral authority and 
offered guidelines for ethical living. 
 Ansar Sunna itself arose from a mixture of internal and external factors. It can be 
identified as part of a global movement known as Islamism or Salafism, although neither term is 
in wide circulation on the Tanzanian mainland (Becker 2008: 276n9; Gilsaa 2015). Each of these 
terms encompasses a slightly different set of actors and indexes different dimensions and 
genealogies. For instance, “Islamism” is most often used to highlight movements focused on 
capturing the state for the purpose of implementing a particular form of Islamic law. 
“Reformism,” in contrast, is more commonly used to refer to groups focused on changing 
religious practice outside of state power. The term “Salafism,” in turn, points origins in particular 
modernization movements within Islam that formed in opposition to European imperialism in 
Egypt and other parts of the Middle East in the nineteenth century (Becker 2008: 242–244; 
Haykel 2014). As we will see, these origins are only one part of Ansar Sunna’s genealogy. What 
the groups referred to by these terms have in common is that they emphasize the textual authority 
of the Quran and Sunna and advocate for a close adherence to a conservative interpretation of 
Islamic law (sharia) and a return to the practices of the first generations of Muslims (Becker 
2008: 241–276; Haykel 2014; Rosander 1997). Central to this broad movement is a rejection of 
what followers call “innovations” (bida), practices added to Islam after the time of the Prophet. 
The term bida has two main referents in reformist discourse: influences of Western/Christian 
cultures, and practices associated with Sufism. The latter are often suspected of allowing for the 
preservation of pre-Islamic rituals, traditions, and beliefs. Islamic reform has been particularly 




Definitions of this movement—what it consists of and who belongs to it—can be difficult 
to pin down. There is no official organization or centralized leadership, and no settled doctrine. 
In general, followers of the Islamic reform have advocated against Western (Christian) 
colonialism and for a return to authentic Islamic practice as described in the Quran and the 
Sunna. Importantly, these movements emphasize the Quran and Sunna as texts that can be read 
and interpreted by all Muslims, rather than relying on teachers with esoteric knowledge or 
interpretive precedent from Islamic courts. While this ostensibly open approach to Islamic text 
and law is associated with modernization and a rejection of tradition, it has also been dominated 
by conservative, literalist interpretations of sharia, and many reformists do adhere to the 
interpretations of certain Muslim scholars and particular schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, 
the change in practice is not so much an opening of interpretation, but a move away from certain 
stances toward knowledge and authority. For Sufi Muslims, sacred knowledge is secret and 
passes through long, known genealogies of teachers. For reformists, knowledge is no longer 
esoteric but is rooted in texts accessible to all Muslims, while authority is (ostensibly) unbound 
from established genealogical lines (Becker 2008; Gilsaa 2015; Haykel 2014). 
The term Wahhabia, used by the women in Ludewa to express their disapproval of the 
shehe’s refusal to participate in funerals, points to one genealogy of the reform movement, 
tracing it to the eighteenth-century Islamic leader Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in what is 
now Saudi Arabia. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab opposed the visitation of tombs and veneration of saints, 
central practices of Sufi tariqa, considering these to be innovations that amounted to idolatry 
(Crawford 2014). Followers of Islamic reform typically reject the term Wahhabi, arguing that 
their beliefs come not from a specific teacher but from the Quran itself. However, Saudi 




the rise of Ansar Sunna. In the first decades following Tanzanian independence, an oil boom 
enriched many Saudi Islamic institutions. Many of them used these funds to establish madrassa 
(Quranic schools) and other Islamic organizations abroad, including in Tanzania, and to finance 
scholarships which permitted Muslim students to receive Islamic education in Saudi Arabia. 
Cheaper commercial flights also meant more Tanzanians could visit Saudi Arabia, whether on 
hajj to Mecca or to study (Becker 2008: 241–275; Gilsaa 2015). There, they were exposed to 
teachings influenced by ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. With liberalization and the loosening of Bakwata’s 
monopoly on Islam in the public sphere, both the role and number of other Islamic institutions 
expanded. Saudi influences have never been singular in Tanzania, though; Islamic organizations 
from other gulf states, as well as Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, among others, have also had financial, 
intellectual, and political impacts on Muslim institutions across Tanzania. For instance, Egypt’s 
Islamic reform movement, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and particularly anticolonial 
in nature, was influential long before Tanzanian independence through the circulation of 
publications like al-Manar along the coast and became more significant after the opening of the 
Islamic Educational Centre in Dar es Salaam in 1968 (Glisaa 2015: 35, 41). 
Despite these international connections, however, it would be a mistake to suggest that 
the Islamic reform movement in Tanzania is an import from abroad, in contrast to “local” forms 
of Sufi Islam. First, Islam in all its forms and from the first centuries of its existence involved the 
circulation of ideas and practices across continents. Second, while Islamic reform has been 
influenced by discourses from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere, it also draws on very long 
traditions of Islamic reform and theological debates within “African Islam” and Sufi traditions 
(Becker 2006, 2008; Kresse 2007; Loimeier 2003). Already in the 1930s, discussions about bida 




such as Sheikh al-Amin bin ‘Ali ‘Abdallah bin Hafi al-Mazrui of Mombasa and later Sheikh 
Abdallah Saleh al-Farsy, originally of Zanzibar. As we will see, al-Farsy had a particularly 
significant role in shaping the direction of Islamic reform in Tanzania. While these thinkers 
never opposed the tariqa as a whole, their publications critiquing certain Sufi practices as bida 
circulated widely in the middle and later decades of the twentieth century (Gilsaa 2015: 37–38; 
Mraja 2010, 2011). Rather than understanding Islamic reform as an export of Saudi Arabia or 
Egypt, the movement is better understood as a “multipolar” event, arising in multiple places from 
similar but not identical local conditions, as well as from global discourses that traversed local 
and national boundaries (Ma 2016). Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf 
States were important nodes in these global circuits of Muslim discourse, but they did not simply 
export Saudi forms of Islam outward. Rather, Islamic reform in Tanzania was shaped through 
both local and global discourses around theology as well as economic and political shifts at 
multiple scales. 
Translating Islam and Generational Rupture 
 One of my first formal interviews in Uluguru was with a man in his early 80s, Amaji 
Rajabu, a farmer and a follower of the Qadariyya tariqa (interview, April 12, 2018). As we sat 
under a tree watching young men ferry bricks to a new construction site nearby, I asked him how 
religion had changed in his lifetime. He answered that before, people used to come together, but 
now, they didn’t, especially at funerals. He worried about his own funeral; while he knew other 
followers of Qadariyya would do everything necessary, he also knew others would refuse to join 
them. Everyone goes their own way, he said sadly. I asked why this change had occurred. He 
didn’t know, he said, but he thought it might have something to do with the translation of the 




 The day before, I had spoken Hosain Shomari Kiyega, also in his 80s (interview, April 
11, 2018). Mzee Kiyega had joined the reformist mosque ten years earlier. When I asked him 
why he had joined, he replied that when Ansar Sunna arrived, “they came with strength.” Like 
many others who joined, he hoped the religion would bring something new, a deeper 
understanding and engagement with religion. However, he said that he and others who joined 
discovered it was not what they expected. “Now we see that there is really no difference,” he 
said with a sigh. He was disappointed that the movement had not proven more radical. 
“What did you expect when you joined,” I asked. 
“That they would tafsiri Islam,” he replied. 
The verb tafsiri in Swahili is most often translated as “to translate” but in Arabic, its 
meaning is closer to “to interpret,” in the sense of exegesis. Mzee Kiyega’s meaning, in this 
context, is closer to the latter but it also not a coincidence that the word has both connotations. 
Because the Quran consists of direct revelation as it was spoken to Muhammad, only the version 
of the text in the original Arabic is the true Quran. Any version in another language is seen as a 
form of exegesis, rather than a copy of the text itself. While translation theorists might point out 
that all translations are interpretations, this is especially and explicitly so for Muslims. Learning 
to recite the Quran in Arabic is the centerpiece of Islamic education and does not necessarily 
require an understanding of the meaning of the Arabic words. However, many Muslims—
including those associated with Islamic reform—feel that Muslims should ideally understand the 
meaning of the text so they can interpret it and apply it to their lives. 
Translation of the Quran into Swahili was long a source of controversy. The first Swahili 
translation of the Quran was published in 1923 by UMCA missionary Canon Godfrey Dale, and 




Ahmadiyya movement. Ahmadiyya, a heterodox Islamic sect, has a few followers in Uluguru 
(see Chapter 4), but because of the movement’s belief in continuing revelation and other radical 
views, it is widely regarded as un-Islamic by mainstream Muslims around the world. Both 
translations were suspect because of the religious affiliations of the translators, as well as doubts 
about the translators’ fluency in Swahili and Arabic. A third translation was published in 1969 by 
Shaykh Abdallah Saleh al-Farsy, an influential Muslim scholar of impeccable qualification, 
mentioned above as one the principal influences on the budding Islamic reform movement in 
East Africa. Although al-Farsy is cited by reformists as a major influence and his works on bida 
remain foundational for the movement, he was not himself associated with any distinct 
movement and his translation, along with his other works of Islamic scholarship and writing, 
were popular among mainstream Muslims across East Africa (Gilsaa 2015: 37; Lacunza-Balda 
1997). 
Al-Farsy’s translation arrived at an opportune moment. In the decade and a half after its 
first publication, literacy rates skyrocketed in Tanzania, from close to 60% in 1975, the first year 
the government officially surveyed literacy rates, to around 90% by the mid-1980s (Ponte 2003: 
149). The 1975 figure itself likely represented a rapid improvement since independence, 
resulting from the government’s investment in literacy programs, but the building of universal 
primary schools after villagization marked a particular turning point toward widespread literacy 
across the country (Unsicker 1987). After the mid-1980s, literacy, along with school enrollment, 
began to decline as structural adjustment forced the state to cut back its support for education 
(Lugalla 1995). The generation of young men who traveled to Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, and 
other cities during the early period of liberalization were the most literate generation Tanzania 




Tanzanian Muslims’ growing ability to read and interpret the Quran for themselves 
undercut the authority of Sufi mashehe and teachers. In Sufism, knowledge passes from teacher 
to pupil in a patrilineal genealogy that dedicated followers of tariqa can recite. This knowledge 
is esoteric and can only be accessed through the personal process of teaching. In rural Tanzania, 
Sufi leaders had long depended on their semi-monopoly on Arabic education to maintain their 
positions of authority (Lacunza-Balda 1997: 114). When Amaji Rajabu remarked that translation 
had fractured Islamic unity, he hit at the heart of the matter. The post-independence state had lost 
much of its early legitimacy, the result of hardships under socialism and growing contentions and 
crises after liberalization. The Sufi mashehe, who had become closely associated with the state 
both in the independence struggle and through Bakwata, were also viewed with increasing 
skepticism. Literacy gave young Muslims, especially men, an alternative route to knowledge. 
They could read books and periodicals by Islamic scholars and could read the Swahili translation 
of the Quran itself, undermining the monopoly of the mashehe.  
Textual authority was significant for many followers of the reform I interviewed. When 
asking what drew them to the movement or what set it apart from others, they repeatedly 
mentioned the role of text: 
I liked their honesty…. someone says this, someone says that, but [when Ansari 
say something], if you look in the book, you’ll find it’s true what they said (Abdul 
Rahman Thabit, interview, November 5, 2018). 
I joined Ansar Sunna after reading the book [Quran]…. Ansar Sunna follow the 
complete analysis of the book of Almighty God, that is, the Quran (Abdul 
Hussein Matemelela, interview, December 3, 2018). 
Ansar Sunna, they look closely at the book and they interpret [tafsiri] it (Mfalme 
Fundi Mfalme, interview, December 5, 2018). 
In Islam, there is book called the Quran, yes? And then there is the Sunna, which 
is the teachings of the Prophet. Muslims should look, that is, in the Quran and in 




Quran and the Sunna. Others listen to the shehe (Abdallah Shomari, interview, 
December 5, 2018). 
Popular literacy changed the contours of authority in Tanzania. Just as literacy rates rose, the 
first authoritative and widely trusted Swahili translation of the Quran became available, 
shattering the mashehe’s monopoly on Islamic knowledge. This new generation of Muslims 
could eschew the mashehe and seek out other forms of religious knowledge, including numerous 
books and periodicals from Muslim scholars alongside the Quran itself. 
If You Name a Dog “Thief” 
It took me some time to meet the leader of the Ansar Sunna mosque in Mkuyuni. The 
movement’s mosque is quite visible, located just off the market in a large, well-constructed 
building. For this reason, many men who work in and around the market pray there regularly 
while considering their primary affiliation to be with the mainstream mosque further back across 
the stream. Upon learning that this was the mosque associated with Ansar Sunna, I spoke to 
many people I saw coming and going, asking them if they knew who the leaders of the mosque 
were, so that I could approach them for an interview. One of those I inquired with was 
Msawanga Ally, who I often saw selling vegetables in the market with his wife and whom I had 
met in his capacity as the chair of the Village Land Council. When I stopped by his vegetable 
stand to inquire about the mosque and its leadership, his answers were vague. Later, though, 
several people informed me that he himself was in fact the leader of the mosque. I returned to his 
vegetable stand and asked him directly. He said he was. 
A sixty-year-old man with a large beard and a wide smile, Msawanga Ally had joined 
Ansar Sunna in the early days, before the mosque was built. He had only recently been selected 
as the mosque’s leader and hastened to tell me that this was an administrative position and that 




the history of the mosque and he agreed, but I found it difficult to set a date, and it took several 
months before we were able to sit down and have a formal conversation. When we finally 
succeeded, I met him at his stand in the market and he outlined the history of the movement and 
its general principles. He explained that the name “Ansar Sunna” meant followers of the Quran 
and the hadith. When I asked about their differences from other Muslims in the area, he 
explained that Ansar Sunna followed only what was in the text, while others mixed “mila na 
desturi” (tradition and customs) with religion (Msawanga Ally, interview, August 23, 2018). 
When I asked about arranging interviews with other Ansar Sunna, he told me that there is 
a history (desturi, lit. custom) of being afraid of wazungu (white people) so it would be difficult 
for me to find anyone to speak to. If he showed up with me, people might be afraid. I suggested 
that if we scheduled the interviews in advance, we could make sure people understood the 
purpose of the interview and would not be startled. He agreed this was possible and said we 
should communicate about the date later. When I started to gather my things to leave, he stopped 
me. He told me that there was a rumor that Ansar Sunna were wagomvi (quarrelsome). They 
were accused of this because they violated mila, he said, and people were conspiring to fight a 
“war” against them. If you name a dog “Thief,” he told me, everyone will join up and kill the 
dog. 
When I followed up about arranging interviews with other members of the mosque, 
Msawanga continued to push back the date. Eventually, he told me that he had asked around, but 
no one was willing to speak to me. Discouraged, I tried my contacts in other villages, and 
quickly found myself with numerous interviews, especially in Kibwaya and Changa. I also asked 
non-Ansar contacts in Mkuyuni to connect me to reformists there as well and they soon turned 




to me, as Msawanga had told me. In reality, I came to learn that Msawanga had actively 
discouraged people from talking to me about religion. In fact, the only interview subject I spoke 
with who refused to let me record our conversation was a reformist belonging to this mosque 
who did not want to provoke the ire of mosque leadership by speaking with me on the record. 
I do not think Msawanga’s attempt to control and limit my access to Ansar in Mkuyuni 
was born of malice but rather out of a desire to protect his community. Followers of the 
movement in Tanzania had felt the impacts of September 11, 2001 as well as the bombings of the 
U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya a few years before. The group had been heavily 
surveilled and numerous leaders were violently arrested between 1998 and 2006. They were also 
subject to widespread condemnation by mainstream Islamic leaders and by the state (Gilsaa 
2015: 31). In some areas, I heard them jokingly referred to as al-Qaeda, a clear reference to their 
widespread association with terrorism in the public imaginary (cf. Becker 2006). In Mkuyuni, the 
group’s initial appearance was met with hostility by many. According to the interviewee who 
asked not to be named, they had difficulty securing a plot for their mosque. Many of those who 
joined the movement stated that they were met with anger from family members. Many Ansar, 
including Msawanga, told me the group had been persecuted and conspired against. Moreover, 
they were acutely aware of American Islamophobia and of attempts to lump Muslims like them 
with terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and al-Shaabab. Some Ansar did refuse to speak 
with me—a white American non-Muslim and usually unveiled woman—and many of those who 
did agree to an interview were at pains to distance themselves from more radical organizations 
and to emphasize the value they place on peace. I saw nothing to make me question their 
commitment to peace during my time in Mkuyuni.9 Indeed, while Ansar Sunna has generated 
 
9 Followers of related movements in East Africa have carried out violent attacks, including armed conflict in 




conflicts, these have taken the form not of violence but of thoughtful debates about community, 
education, and ethics (Becker 2009). However, these debates have caused deep wounds in the 
community that have yet to fully heal. 
Caring for the Ancestors 
Although the initial spread of Islamic reform in Uluguru was met with tensions, things 
have since cooled. As one Sufi elder put it, “we have gotten used to them” (Ali Setembo Kiloko, 
interview, August 14, 2018). The nature of the conflicts has also shifted. While generational 
struggle was key to the rise of Ansar Sunna, its members have aged. The young men who joined 
Ansar Sunna in the 1980s and 1990s, described by Becker (2008: 262) as jeans-wearing, 
swaggering youth, are today well into middle age, and some are elders. Many have returned to 
agriculture. Most of the mashehe of the 1990s have died and have been replaced by men the 
same age as many Ansar. The conflict that was once generational has taken a new form. At the 
center lie clashes over care for the dead. 
As anthropologists have long recognized, funerals, memorials and gravesites play 
important social and political roles. Graves bind kinship to place and mark out ideas of belonging 
and history. They can be used to stake claims over land by individuals or by nations (Bernstein 
2013; Verdery 1999). As cases from Kenya and South Africa show, the location of graves has 
become a critical dimension of contests over rural property rights (James 2009; Shipton 2009). 
Graves make space, mark connections, and bind communities to the land (Ho 2006; Shipton 
2009; Snehi 2019). The dead and their graves can also be deeply linked to a sense of social 
health (Verdery 1999: 48). In colonial Zambia, changes in funerals and burial brought by 
 
groups not only in their explicit rejection of violence as a tactic but also in that their energies were primarily directed 
toward shifting Islamic practice among Muslim communities rather than challenging the authority of the state. The 
significance of this difference can be seen in the case of Mozambique, where the group known as Ansar al-Sunna or 




conversion to Catholicism sparked deep fears over changing relationships between the living and 
the dead (Kalusa and Vaughan 2013: 1–46).  The dead sometimes need care and sometimes 
bestow it, but their social entanglements rarely end at the moment of death. They can also do 
harm, especially if not properly attended to, as with the “ghosts of war” that have haunted 
postwar Vietnam (Kwon 2008). In this way, burials and memorials also (re)establish kinship and 
ideas of belonging and can reintegrate the dead and the living alike (Kwon 2008; Mueggler 
2001). Funerals are also important social gatherings among the living, where food, gossip, gifts, 
and payments are exchanged (Verdery 1999: 108). As the last two chapters illustrated, questions 
of remembering and caring for the dead are also questions of social reproduction. The stakes of 
debates about funerals in Mkuyuni must be understood in all these terms. 
As Chapter 1 showed, graves and interactions with the dead were important in Uluguru 
before the arrival of Islam. While this importance is generally ascribed to mila (tradition), we 
have seen that the specific importance of names and graves in the mountains likely emerged 
primarily in the last two centuries as certain lineages, and particularly their male heads, 
consolidated power through control of land and participation in the Indian Ocean trade. In what 
is now understood as Luguru mila, we can see the traces of other geographies, still marked out 
through the recognition of sacred trees, springs, caves and pools. Today, these sites are combined 
with graves and the groves that surround them to form a sacred landscape visited during 
matambiko. As prior chapters described, lineage matambiko practices involve visiting multiple 
sacred sites, saying words in Kiluguru, reciting a list of ancestral names, offering beer and food 
at sacred trees or graves, and creating medicines for the purposes of healing the lineage, ensuring 
fertility, and bringing rain. The living and future generations thus depend on the ancestors for 




remember their names. If these relationships break down, followers of mila say, the living will 
experience illness, infertility, and drought. The inheritance of names, described in Chapter 2, 
marks the process of social reproduction, linking each generation with those before and after and 
winding kinship into a dense spiral of shared identities and responsibilities. 
Under Sufi practices, matambiko were partially replaced with memorials known as hitima 
as well as visits to graves (zulu) for purposes of cleaning the grave site and praying. Hitima are 
gatherings at regular intervals after a death, generally forty days after the death, and then 
annually. Family members and neighbors gather and perform zikiri, typically all night. In the 
morning, the ceremony concludes with a prayer and a shared meal. Funerals themselves, like the 
one described at the beginning of this chapter, also involve zikiri and certain prayers. In addition, 
at the gravesite, the dead are given specific instructions about how to answer the questions they 
will face in the afterlife. As we have seen, matambiko are still carried out, although mashehe 
disapprove of them in their traditional form, which involves the brewing of beer. Mashehe and 
some of their followers often contrast matambiko and Sufi practices around the dead by arguing 
that under mila, people prayed to the ancestors, whereas Muslims carrying out hitima, zulu, 
zikiri, and funeral prayers are praying for the deceased, helping them find their way to God. In 
some ways, the presence or absence of beer, and, conversely, of zikiri, marks a clear line 
between traditional and Islamic practices. However, in practice, prayers for the dead and visits to 
graves blur the bounds between mila and dini (religion). Questions of how prayers and 
responsibilities for care flow between the living and the dead are ambiguous and remain open to 
play, as they do elsewhere in the Sufi world (Ho 2006: 11). Moreover, despite official 
disapproval of matambiko by Sufi leaders, the result is rarely punitive; most mashehe simply 




Ansar Sunna eliminate hitima and do not participate in zikiri. They also say only shorter 
prayers at funerals and do not instruct the dead about the questions they will face in the afterlife. 
Many told me they continue to visit graves to pray for the dead but added that these practices are 
only for the comfort of the living. The fate of the deceased cannot be influenced by those they 
left behind; each individual will be judged by the life they lived and nothing after death can 
change this record. As one member of Ansar put it: 
Other Muslims, when they go from the grave, they bring a book [Quran] and 
read…. What they say is that they are teaching him [the deceased]. They say that 
after being buried, he will come to be asked certain questions, right? So they say 
they are teaching him, they are reminding him [of the answers]. We say that 
human beings, when they die, it means their acts stop then and there (Abdallah 
Shomari, interview, December 5, 2018). 
Another described it this way: 
A person of Bakwata, if he goes to a funeral, if someone has died, they gather 
together. After they have buried, they…cook food, they sit together, and they 
pray…. But Ansar Sunna, by their teachings, if someone dies—even me myself 
personally, I sit and pray [for the deceased] by myself (Mfalme Fundi Mfalme, 
interview, December 5, 2018). 
Significantly, when reformists visit graves and pray for the dead, they do so alone. 
Followers of the Islamic reform typically reject funeral practices such as praying at 
graves and zikiri because they see these as innovations (bida) without scriptural support. Usually, 
they cite the origin of these bida as older, non-Islamic rituals. The resonances between the tariqa 
and mila, reformists contend, are a result of the incorporation of the latter into the former. As 
Msawanga put it, Sufi practices have “mila na desturi” mixed in. Reformists strongly oppose 
matambiko in particular, describing it as tree worship. When I asked Mfalme Fundi Mfalme, 
quoted above, whether Ansar Sunna oppose any traditional practices, he answered: 
Yes, for example, a traditional person will go to a tree, a special tree, to pray. This 
is forbidden…because there, there is no God. The one they are praying to is 




go to pray for [the dead] to be forgiven, not to pray to [the dead] for help 
(interview, December 5, 2018). 
As another reformist put it succinctly, “you can’t worship two Gods.” Sufi funeral and memorial 
traditions, which do not involve sacred trees, are nevertheless critiqued for maintaining the idea 
that the dead are not fully dead and that the living can impact their fate in the afterlife. Both sets 
of practices are suspected to be forms of ancestor worship. In this way, reformists explicitly link 
Sufi practices to the visiting of graves and sacred sites in mila—in other words, to traditions of 
matambiko, and rainmaking. While Sufism and mila also differ in important ways, Ansar Sunna 
represents a more radical break with prior relationships of connectivity between generations. 
Relationships of obligation between generations end at the moment of death. 
Importantly, because Sufi practices and matambiko require collective effort, the anxiety 
about reformists’ refusal to participate are acute. While individuals may place their hands 
differently during prayer or wear slightly different clothing, these actions do not affect other 
Muslims. But a refusal to participate in practices like zikiri threaten the community’s ability to 
extend care to the dead. This is why the Qadariyya follower Amaji Rajabu, who I quoted early in 
this chapter, expressed concern about his own funeral. If his relatives fail to attend and perform 
zikiri, will his path to God be clear? This is also why the women in Ludewa Village expressed 
alarm at the behavior of the shehe’s son; the child who died was not given instructors or prayers 
to guide him on his way. Like the men described in Chapter 2 who were no longer helping 
women in their family with matters of mila and social healing, Ansar Sunna—in the eyes of their 
critics—endanger the relations that form the basis of social reproduction, kinship, and collective 
well-being. In Uluguru, care for the dead is inseparable from ideas about social health. The 
sustained relationships between the living and their ancestors, which operate in cyclical iterations 




are always shared—neither matambiko nor zikiri can be carried out alone and ideas of social 
healing implicate lineages, other relatives, and even neighbors in illness and healing alike. 
Social Reproduction on New Terms 
 At forty-seven, Mama Muhando was younger than many of our interviewees when we 
met her in the village of Mfumbwe, in the northwest corner of Mkuyuni Ward. Mfumbwe, higher 
in elevation than much of the ward, is particularly tree-covered and I relished the shade as we 
settled onto chairs outside her house. During our preliminary questions, Muhando identified her 
religious affiliation within Islam as “uwahhabia” (Wahhabism), the only time I heard a reformist 
use that term for themselves. She told us that a reformist mosque had been built nearby around 
2006 and that she had joined it six years later, together with her husband and children. When we 
asked her why, she replied, “because you don’t have to carry out matambiko or throw ngoma 
[‘dances,’ here a reference to girls’ initiations], so you can save money.” I asked whether there 
were tensions between reformists and other Muslims. She said they were, especially around 
hitima. She said that people accused reformists like her of pretending hitima is haram (forbidden 
in Islamic law) to cover up the fact that they simply cannot afford to hold the events. Overall, 
however, she felt that the new movement had not changed the broader community, only the lives 
of those who joined, who, like her, have ceased to participate in rituals like hitima and girls’ 
initiations, and thus were better able to save money for their families’ futures (interview, August 
14, 2018). 
 Nasma Nasoro, another reformist, was the only person we interviewed who was born into 
Ansar Sunna rather than joining as an adult. She was born in 1980, in Kinole Village, higher in 
the mountains, to a reformist father and a Sufi mother. She recalled tensions between her parents 




her father and as an adult, was fully committed to Islamic reform. We met with her under a tree 
near a small quarrying site off the main road, our conversation punctuated by passersby en route 
to a nearby funeral. When we asked Nasma about praying for the dead, she gave a similar answer 
to what we had heard from Muhando. She said that while prayers for the dead didn’t ultimately 
help them, members of Ansar Sunna prayed anyway, out of love for their late relatives. 
However, they did not participate in hitima. Wouldn’t that money be better spent on taking the 
person to the hospital while they are still alive, she asked us (interview, December 22, 2018). 
 While Muhando’s own explanation for the reasons of her conversion seem almost 
Weberian, suggesting that Ansar Sunna allowed her to save money, it is telling that both she and 
Nasma referred to saving money not for investment or to start a business, but to care for 
relatives, paying for things like house repairs and hospital visits. Chapter 2 argued that 
Tanzanian socialism, by delinking lineage from land, undermined the material basis of social 
reproduction, and only partially replaced it with the institutions of the village. Followers of 
Ansar Sunna, in contrast, seem to highlight cash, not land, as the necessary factor for social 
reproduction. As we have seen, liberalization was marked by both the commercialization and the 
deagrarianizaiton of rural life in Tanzania. Although money has long been a necessity in 
Uluguru, rising costs of clothing, homeware, education, and healthcare coincided with declining 
agricultural incomes at this time. Under these conditions, access to cash became more important 
than access to land for many households. Followers of Islamic reform reflect the gradual 
delinking of social reproduction from land and the shift toward money as its material basis. 
Rather than participating in making space through grave visitations and ziara, reformists like 
Muhando and Nasma worked to provide for their families through the accumulation of currency. 




following Ansar Sunna permitted them to save money (Juma Mange, interview, December 13, 
2018). 
The actual economic impacts of joining Ansar Sunna vary. Although both women framed 
their discussions of money in terms of concerns over questions of caring for family, Nasma was, 
in fact, a successful businesswoman and had purchased several properties in town as 
investments. Concern about matters of social reproduction—paying for a hospital bill—framed 
her discussion of her withdrawal from the rituals of the tariqa, but the commercialization of life 
has also widened inequalities in Uluguru, and Nasma was among those who had come out ahead. 
Although not wealthy by international standards, she owned two cows and a television as well as 
a home with cement floors, all rarities in Mkuyuni. Muhando, in contrast, was closer to the 
average in socioeconomic standing, owning a few small farm plots, a house with brick walls but 
no floor, and a few chickens. Although my data are not expansive enough to be conclusive, I did 
not see evidence that followers of Ansar were more likely to be wealthy than their Sufi 
counterparts, nor to conclude whether religion had played a significant role in their economic 
fate. As the cases of Nasma and Muhando illustrate, withdrawing from the obligations of mila 
and tariqa did not necessarily lead to the accumulation of wealth. Rather, it allowed both women 
to reallocate limited household resources in response to the commercialization of life. 
In doing so, followers of Ansar Sunna also withdrew both money and labor from 
particular collective systems of social reproduction. One woman critical of Ansar Sunna, Halima 
Musa, complained to us that not only did Ansar Sunna followers refuse to participate in aspects 
of funerals, they also refused even to pay grave diggers (interview, August 29, 2018). They also 
do not pay those who perform zikiri (like me). Moreover, they no longer contribute their labor to 




the health of the lineage and the land. For their relatives, this denial of labor removes critical 
links from the chain of social healing, which requires the entire lineage to participate. It also 
breaks the chain of knowledge, as Ansar Sunna refuse to inherit names or participate in 
initiations. For followers of the reform movement, however, this can also be a response to the 
failure of prior systems to provide healing. Rain has become unpredictable and Kingalu’s ability 
to summon it is increasingly in question. Lineages have lost their land, and with it, the ability to 
provide for their nieces and nephews. The villages of the socialist period also fell short. Schools 
still operate but  educational expenses have risen, and formal education has failed to replace 
ethics once taught at boys’ initiations.10 Hospitals, clinics, and the medicines they offer have also 
become more expensive. Ansar Sunna provides an alternative, rejecting the broken leadership of 
past generations and accepting the processes of commercialization and deagrarianization.  
These debates also have gendered dimensions. The first to join Ansar Sunna were 
overwhelmingly young men. For these men, as we have seen, the movement provided a new 
community and a space for ethical self-fashioning in the absence of boys’ initiations and the 
failure of the socialist project. They authorized forms of knowledge founded on literacy rather 
than personal teachings from elders or mashehe. Ansar Sunna’s teachings, by ungrounding 
ethics, reinforced young men’s mobility at a time of increased labor migration. For women, 
however, the movement has had a different impact. Ansar Sunna followers typically explain that 
 
10 As Green (2014) points out, government spending on healthcare and education has risen since the turn of the 
millennium, and many of the trends in the crisis period of the 1980s and 1990s have been reversed. There were no 
school fees for primary schools or the first four years of second school in Tanzania at the time of my research. 
Nevertheless, associated costs of books, supplies, uniforms, and transportation to and/or housing at the secondary 
school for those who lived far away, as well as fees for private schooling, public schooling after Form 4, tutoring, 
and other educational costs were significant for average income and poor households. Likewise, cost sharing for 
healthcare posed a burden for many. While it is not clear from my data whether such expenses have risen or fallen 
relative to household incomes since 2000, the expansion of some services and reduction of certain direct costs have 
been at least partially offset by rising subsidiary expenses and an increase in culturally and historically constituted 




under Islamic law, women are subject to the authority of their husbands or fathers. Although all 
the reformists I spoke to agreed that women could work outside the home, including in 
agriculture and in business, they also indicated that women should seek permission from their 
husband (or father, if unmarried) and that these men had a right to restrict a woman’s movement 
outside the home. Reformist discourses, thus, have become a mechanism for men to assert 
increasing control over women’s mobility and activities. 
Nevertheless, some reformist women spoke positively of changes brought by Ansar 
Sunna. One point they raised, discussed above, is that it allows women to escape demands on 
household resources made through extended kin networks and ritual practices like hitima and 
girls’ initiations. Just as importantly, Islamic law provides women with mechanisms to place 
certain demands on male relatives. For instance, Nasma explained that although Ansar Sunna can 
divorce like other Muslims, the process requires more steps including a meeting with the 
spouses, their families, and religious leaders to resolve issues (interview, December 22, 2018). 
Likewise, many reformists pointed out that although under Islamic law, women’s rights to 
inheritance were limited, the law also guaranteed women rights to material support from their 
fathers, husbands, brothers, and male children. As we have seen, since independence, lineages 
have lost control of land, and this, in combination with high rates of virilocal residence in 
Mkuyuni, has rendered women vulnerable to landlessness in cases of widowhood or divorce. 
Although Islamic law gives unequal rights to men and women, it also offers women recourse not 
available through either mila or state law, for instance by demanding support from a brother 
following a divorce. 
The gendered dimensions of Ansar Sunna are bound up with questions of social 




and Islamist movements are frequently accused of violating women’s rights, insisted that the 
movement protected women through the legal mechanisms described above. However, they also 
highlighted the ways in which Islamic law (as they interpreted it) gave men and women different 
rights and responsibilities. As Chapter 2 showed, the gendered division of reproductive labor in 
Uluguru has hardened since independence. Victoria Bernal (1994), in a study on the role of 
Islamic revival in a Sudanese village, argued that the village’s changing place in the national and 
global economy had led to a shift in gender relations and the division of labor between men and 
women. According to Bernal, the new form of Islam that took hold at this time, part of the same 
global wave as Ansar Sunna, served to institutionalize these changes. While this account is 
perhaps overly deterministic, it also resonates with changes in Uluguru, where Islamic reform 
reinforces the increasingly gendered nature of reproductive labor and its increasing 
marginalization in larger economic structures. One reformist man told me that “men should not 
help around the house” (Fazili Amiri, interview, January 3, 2019). Another explained: “There are 
rights of women and rights of men…. For example, the rights of the woman are to care for the 
house…and to welcome her husband. The rights of the man are to provide for the woman…and 
to be the protector” (Abdul Hussein Matemelela, interview, December 3, 2018). Unlike Deodat, 
who in Chapter 2 lamented that he could no longer use mila to help his wife by carrying her 
pregnancy, these men argued that a stricter division of labor was demanded by God. 
The rise of Ansar Sunna must be understood as emerging in the context of both the 
ungrounding of social reproduction and the renegotiation of gendered divisions of labor. As cash 
as taken precedence over land, both mobility and household divisions of labor have become sites 
of gendered conflict. Overall, the terms have favored men but have also imposed on them 




interpretations of religious law to limit women’s mobility and to justify their absence from forms 
of domestic labor and ritual practice, women have also used the ideas of Islamic reform to 
reallocate resources to the nuclear household from extended family obligations and to shore up 
rights to material support from male family members. For both, the loss of lineage authority and 
the increasing turn away from land and toward cash has led to a renegotiation of the terms of 
social reproduction. However, these processes are far from complete, as the persistence of other 
forms of collective care indicate. Social reproduction is not fully delinked from land but remains 
in flux. 
Despite the partial ungrounding of social reproduction, most of the residents in Uluguru 
still work primarily as farmers who rely on rains for their crops and social reproduction cannot 
be divorced from questions of rain and ecology. In Uluguru, the seasons have grown increasingly 
unpredictable. Nearly everyone recalls the days when visitors to Kingalu or Kolero would return 
from matambiko, silently and without looking over their shoulder. The rain would follow from 
the shrines to their homes, falling abundantly on their fields and bringing forth a new harvest. 
There are many theories as to why the rain has failed, although most people—including most 
members of Islamic reform—attribute it to local deforestation since the 1970s, which occurred in 
the wake of the breakdown of both colonial and kin-based structures of forest conservation. 
However, when asked why past rainmakers like Kingalu are no longer able to guarantee rain 
today, many also blame moral failings. As the last chapter showed, many in Uluguru attribute the 
collapse of rainmaking institutions and of ecological control more broadly to the fact that people 
have abandoned mila. These accusations apply to many people, but followers of the Islamic 




rainmaking and lineage matambiko has destabilized the ability of their families and communities 
to bring rain. 
Tausi Hamisi, a follower of Islamic reform, had a different understanding of the reason 
rains had failed (interview, November 6, 2018). When I asked her about changes in the climate 
in her lifetime, she said: 
TH: Before, it would rain in October, September, but now it has changed. [It 
doesn’t rain] until November…. The rain has decreased 
JF: Why has the rain decreased? 
TH: [….] People have become disobedient. They have stopped worshipping God, 
and God has withdrawn his blessings. 
For those who seek a return to mila, blame for the lack of rain falls on those like the reformists 
who reject tradition and neglect the ancestors. For Tausi, blame lies with the neglect of God. For 
both, then, the lack of rain is a result of the abandonment of collective ethics (maadili) in which 
the poor behavior of some bring ruin to the harvests of everyone in the community. After her 
explanation above, Tausi added, “it’s not only rain, it’s also in the economy…. God has reduced 
his blessings.” By bringing rain and economic prosperity into the same frame, Tausi marked the 
changing basis of wellbeing in the mountains that has resulted from partial deagrarianization and 
commercialization. Both rain and money matter. However, wellbeing is still collective in Tausi’s 
account, and it still depends on ethics. For traditionalists, the ethics that ensure rain were those 
once taught at initiation ceremonies. For reformists, these ethics are authorized not by tradition, 
passed through thick genealogies of elders or mashehe, but by the pure text of the Quran, 
unmarked by place or time. 
Rain remains a critical concern for Muslims in Uluguru, and the question of who can 
bring rain remains as contested as it was in the nineteenth century, when “big men” struggled 




central questions: Who has the power to bring rain? And who has the responsibility to bring it? 
In cases of drought, Muslim leaders across divisions agree that collective prayer is needed to 
bring rain, and during one recent drought, leaders and Muslims of all affiliations gathered in a 
circle to pray for rain. Many people described this ceremony to me, which occurred before my 
fieldwork, but unlike the stories of past rainmakers, this one ended in ambiguity. The ceremony 
was not understood as a failure, and rain eventually resumed, but no one described the gathering 
of clouds at the moment of prayer nor torrential downpour afterward. These features of past 
rainmaking stories do not repeat in the present tense, either in stories of Kingalu’s continued 
rainmaking nor in accounts of Muslim prayers for rain. As discourses of social healing place 
ecological wellbeing and good rains at the heart of political legitimacy, the ambiguity of 
contemporary accounts of rainmaking rituals—traditional and Muslim—points to a larger crisis 
in authority. Under the conditions brought by liberalization, no leader appears able to ensure 
social reproduction through healing the land. 
Temporalities, Kinship, and the Unruly Dead 
Conflicts over funerals lie at the heart of larger debates over kinship, temporality, and 
relationships to place. At the center of mila is the matrilineal lineage. Ancestors regularly 
interrupt the lives of the living to make demands, and the living in turn, must care for generations 
past to ensure the wellbeing of those yet to come. Fertility, health, and good rains link lineage 
members to each other and to the land. This relationship to place is tied to the mountains, which 
is why when Luguru people living away from Uluguru fall ill, they must return to their lineage 
lands to seek healing. The Sufi tariqa, in contrast, are dominated by a patrilineal paradigm, 
flowing from father to child and (male) teacher to student. Like the lineage, the tariqa cares for 




with personal links that bind past and present, from Muhammad to the major Sufi teachers who 
arrived in Mkuyuni in the mid-twentieth century and to their adherents today. Sufi relationships 
to space posit a sacred geography of graves, points in space which draw together not only 
geographically distant adherents but also past and present. 
Most of those in Mkuyuni live between ukoo (lineage) and tariqa, moving deftly through 
the communities and geographies of each in ways that are creative, practical, and deeply 
meaningful. To these possibilities, Ansar Sunna has added more ways of relating to space and to 
others, but it also brings with it a critique of both mila and Sufism that threatens to undermine 
both. This is because reformist discourses often prioritize a certain form of purification based on 
a foreshortening of time. As Bernard Haykel notes, for followers of the Islamic reform, 
“temporal proximity to the Prophet Muhammad is associated with the truest form of Islam” 
(2014: 34). Texts, especially the Quran, make proximity possible; unaffected by the centuries, 
the Quran bypasses generations of teachers to link current Muslims directly to moment of 
revelation. In this way, kinship also appears truncated. Reformists reject genealogies, such as 
those linking the movement to thinkers like Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. While Sufi time is 
thick with the history of knowledge, reformists see this thickness as pollution, bida, which 
obscures the true nature of religion. 
Although history among reformists is a source of moral danger, the reformist vision does 
not include removing all aspects of change; “science and technology” are widely embraced, as is 
secular education and advances in secular knowledge more generally (Becker 2008: 267–269). 
Rather than attempting to freeze time at the first generations of Islam, this point in the past 
provides an anchor; linear progress in fields such as science remains grounded in an ethical 




which practices (from mila or tariqa) are bida, but for most Muslims in Mkuyuni, the effect of 
these discourses has not been to draw clear lines but to reignite debates over what changes are 
ethical. In so doing, it opens up new ways of navigating questions of kinship, community, and 
authority in the wake of changes brought by deagrarianization and commercialization, which 
have partially shifted the material basis of life from land to money, and which have loosened—
but not severed—ties to the sacred geographies of matambiko and tariqa. Of course, Ansar 
Sunna has a sacred geography as well, but it is one that seeks to shorten and purify time and 
space by removing the moral traces of history that have come between the Prophet and the first 
generations of his followers and present Muslims. This geography removes graves—whether 
ancestral or saintly—from sacred space and reorients the Islamic community, the umma, toward 
Mecca alone. 
 Critically, the shifting temporalities and geographies of Islam are deeply connected to 
conceptions of knowledge. Jane Guyer and Samuel Eno Belinga (1995) have argued that 
knowledge, differentiated and embodied in individual persons, was a source of wealth and 
political power in precolonial central Africa. In Uluguru, esoteric knowledge of medicines was 
passed through societies of elders, while ethical knowledge was transmitted to youth in secret 
initiations. This knowledge was personal and bound to the landscape in particular ways; 
medicines, for example, required not only ingredients but visits to sacred sites for their 
preparation. In short, knowledge was diffuse, differentiated, and grounded. Under tariqa, 
knowledge became centralized and personified in the figure of the shehe. This knowledge was 
also tied to place through genealogies that spanned the Indian Ocean. Such genealogies and the 




traversing backward the paths through which sacred knowledge spread, and toward expansion, 
carrying the boundaries of the Islamic world outward. 
Under Islamic reform, true knowledge emerges from the Quran and the Sunna, radiating 
out from Mecca and Medina as universal truth. It does so through the vessel of the text, on which 
neither history nor geography leave a mark. However, beyond the unipolar orientation toward 
Mecca, Ansar Sunna also produces an international space through which knowledge flows. This 
global geography follows the circulation of ideas among like-minded Muslim leaders and 
institutions, but in a way that remains ungrounded. Authority is thus also deterritorialized, 
breaking ties to ancestral homes and to the nation. Reformists’ rejection of the nation in Tanzania 
is particularly pronounced. As we have seen, the movement arose in the wake of a loss of faith in 
both secular authorities associated with the socialist period and with Muslim leaders who had 
become associated with them through the institution of Bakwata. The struggle between national 
and international authority manifests in the fierce debates over the dates of Ramadan and Eid. 
Most Muslims in Tanzania follow the dates set by the Mufti of Bakwata, declared through the 
local appearance of the moon, but Ansar Sunna observe the dates set in Saudi Arabia. This global 
orientation stands as a rebuke to the failed national project. By ungrounding ideas of knowledge 
and authority and by eschewing genealogy, followers of Ansar Sunna reject the authority of 
elders, ancestors, and mashehe alike, erasing them from the sacred map of Islam. 
Yet Ansar Sunna cannot unilaterally banish the ancestors. Ancestors have agency as well. 
Consider Nasma Nasoro, the businesswoman born into Ansar Sunna who argued that it was 
better to spend money on a hospital visit than a hitima. Nasma was fully committed to Ansar 
Sunna, and espoused a particularly conservative vision of Islam, especially related to women’s 




a funeral. She described the teachings of girls’ initiations as backward and said she did not 
participate in most mila. She opposed practices of zikiri and hitima as well as matambiko, which 
she described as something of the past (interview, December 22, 2018). However, when I asked 
about inheriting ancestral names, our conversation shifted unexpectedly: 
JF: And the issue of inheriting or ruling (kutawala) old names, do you [followers 
of Ansar Sunna] do this, or do you oppose it? 
NN: You know, in Ansar Sunna they oppose it, but it’s real. 
JF: Why do they oppose it? 
NN: They oppose it…they say it’s not real, but it’s real. It comes, truly, and if you 
refuse it, it’s possible you will get very sick. […] 
JF: Ah, ok, you—you haven’t inherited a name? 
NN: Not yet. 
JF: But if you start to feel sick, if you feel like maybe it’s a name, you’ll take the 
name? 
NN: Yes, I’ll take it. 
Although it is easy to see ancestors as constructs and symbols, accounts from Uluguru emphasize 
that they are in fact agents in the social world. Even Ansar Sunna cannot banish them entirely. 
The resurgent past and the unruly dead intrude on the present in unexpected and sometimes 
dangerous ways, demanding they be remembered. 
 What can we make of a past that has the power to return and to compel the present? 
Derrida (1993) famously discussed the ways in which the dead can impose ethical imperatives 
upon the living and indeed cites death as the very condition for generative return. David Gordon 
(2012), writing about the political history of central Africa, has likewise shown the ways in 
which “capricious spirits” have continually reemerged as historical agents which exceed and 
contest relationships of power. In Uluguru, ancestors draw the living into ethical relationships 




cycles of obligation between generations—to feed, to heal, to remember, to bring rain. This 
ethical time is also linked to place, as spirits link kinship to the landscape through graves and 
other sacred places. Islamic reformists attempt to remake the world and to unground knowledge 
and authority. They interpret history and the earthly surfaces over which it passes as sources of 
corruption from which the Quran alone can pass unscathed. At the same time, Nasma’s account 
makes clear that even for strict adherents to Ansar Sunna, this ideal of purified time and space is 
only one of many ways of understanding that shape life. Indeed, the production of time and space 
are social and—like rainmaking—exceed the grasp of individuals. Ancestors themselves are part 
of this social world, and they too have a hand in shaping the temporal and geographic world they 
share with the living. 
Conclusion 
Islamic reform in Tanzania arose at a moment of deagrarianization, commercialization, 
and widespread economic crisis. It originated among young men disillusioned by the failures of 
the socialist state and the tariqa. It also occurred after kinship-based systems like the lineage had 
lost much of their power to provide social healing and social reproduction. The earlier followers 
of Ansar Sunna, overwhelmingly young men, had not been educated in Luguru ethics through 
initiation ceremonies in the forest as their fathers and grandfathers had been. Instead, they 
studied reading, writing, and other standard subjects at newly built village primary schools. After 
finishing school, these young men, many of them living and working in cities far from their 
families, had unprecedented levels of literacy. They also had access to money that exceeded that 
of their elders and of women of all ages, at a moment when needs for cash were rising. At the 
same time, the economic opportunities available to them did not significantly raise standards of 




rising costs of consumer goods, education, and healthcare. This combination of precarity and 
independence led many to seek new sources of authority, ethics, knowledge, and community. 
Ansar Sunna arose from these circumstances along generational and gendered lines. 
 The new reform movement marked out different relationships to space and time, and to 
knowledge and authority. David Harvey (1990) has argued that capitalist conditions and 
technological innovations have produced a space-time compression around the world. As Doreen 
Massey has pointed out, this should be understood not simply as a “speeding up” of global flows 
but as “the spatial reorganization of social relations, where those relations are full of power and 
meaning, and where social groups are differently placed in relation to this reorganization” (1994: 
121). As such, it is not simply a battle between global and local. Rather, ideas of global and 
local, foreign and native, unnatural and authentic, are selectively employed to stake claims to 
place and to authority. Ansar Sunna is no more or less “local” than mila or the tariqa, but it 
employs ideas of the global in opposition to forms of authority associated with the lineage, the 
tariqa, and the nation state. The authorities invoked and listened to by Tanzanian followers of 
Islamic reform are, of course, geographically and historically situated. However, the movement’s 
discourse seeks to unground authority and knowledge, to clean the world from the pollutions of 
thick geographies and thick histories, and to draw closer to the pure past. Genealogy and 
relationships to place have been replaced by text as the legitimate basis of knowledge. 
 However, the movement that was once generational has changed its shape. Adherents 
have grown old, and nationalist and Sufi leaders have died. Many women have also joined the 
reform, finding both reprieve from burdensome expenses associated with certain rituals and a 
legal framework to make demands on their husbands, fathers, and brothers. Today, the 




conditions of social reproduction. It also reflects a crisis in authority generated by the collapse of 
socialism and can be seen as a creative attempt to rethink relationships between people and the 
environment through a compressed and purified space-time oriented not toward sacred forests or 
saintly graves but toward the Prophet and Mecca. At the same time, it also highlights another 
refusal by men to participate in the work of social reproduction through a withdrawal from 
rainmaking, healing, and care for the dead. As Engseng Ho wrote of the desecration of Sufi 
graves by Islamic fundamentalists in Yemen, “Grave visits are to be opposed because they do 
work. They create powerful dynamics of signification with the potential to create communities 
based not on revelation but on something autochthonous and incipient in the grave complex” 
(2006: 25).11 In Uluguru, graves and grave visits do work, inscribing certain authorities and 
creating relationships that link humans to place and past to present. They also are work, the sort 
of work that ensures generations are carried safely from birth to the afterlife. For Sufi Muslims, 
zikiri lies at the heart of this work, binding generations in the opening of a path to God. 
 The delinking of social reproduction from land and the partial deagrarianization of a 
generation of young men made the work of zikiri, like that of matambiko, more difficult and 
more uncertain. New global connections brought by liberalization, disillusionment with 
nationalism as a basis for anticolonialism, and displacement through labor migration to cities all 
changed young men’s relationship to place and family in dramatic ways. The loss of control of 
land by lineages followed by over a decade of declining farm incomes partially ungrounded 
economic life. The climate has also grown unpredictable and no one in power seems to be able to 
restore the rains and the ecological and agricultural health they once ensured. Ansar Sunna offers 
 
11 Broadly speaking, the fundamentalists in Yemen described by Ho can be understood as part of the same 
movement within Islam as Ansar Sunna in Tanzania although the former were more militant and more directly 
involved in contesting state power. Ho uses the term “fundamentalist” to highlight their literalist interpretations of 




its followers a way through processes of liberalization, the disappearance of the matrilineal 
lineage, environmental uncertainty, and the resulting crises of authority. However, it was far 
from the only way in which communities in Uluguru grappled with economic, political and 
ecological change. 
The next chapter turns more directly to questions of the environment and the role of the 
state. Tracing both ruptures and continuities in the governance of forests and water since 
independence, it shows that the ungrounding of social relations brought by liberalization was 
only partial. Even though many young men today still move to cities and other areas in search of 
income and patterns of deagrarianization continue among Uluguru’s youth, relationships to place 
and to nature continue to shape life in the mountains. The resulting struggles over water, trees, 
and the climate reveal both the deepening of longstanding inequalities and the possibility of other 






‘THE FORESTS CALLED THE RAINCLOUDS’: DEVELOPMENT, 
DEFORESTATION, AND THE ANCESTORS 
 In July 2017, The Citizen, one of Tanzania’s leading newspapers, announced that the 
government had called for “people living around the Wami/Ruvu Basin to stop carrying out 
human activities in order to protect the water source” (Kisembo 2017). The Wami-Ruvu basin 
extends from Uluguru and surrounding lowlands to the coast at Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo, 
along with additional tributaries to the northwest (van Koppen et al. 2016: 595). If this statement 
were taken at face value, it would suggest the relocation of over five million people across a 
broad swath of the country including several major cities (Water Action Hub 2020). However, 
the article, which was fewer than 300 words long, did not garner significant attention. Even in 
Uluguru, home to the headwaters of all the major tributaries of the Ruvu River and thus the area 
most likely to be subject to evictions or severe limitations, the news passed quietly. The human 
activities of washing laundry and motorcycles, growing corn, rice, and fruit, building homes, 
raising children, and burying the dead, continued along the rivers as they had before. 
The article itself was the result of efforts on an ongoing collaboration between 
governmental and international organizations on a project titled “Securing Watershed Services 




the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
in collaboration with the Wami-Ruvu River Basin Office and in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Water. After its proclamation that human activities would not be permitted, the brief article 
offered the following elaboration: 
Grace Chitanda, a hydrologist from the Wami-Ruvu Basin, said recently that if 
human activities continued unabated, the basin will soon dry up. Ms. Chitanda 
added that they were striving to educate the public on the importance of keeping 
the area free from human activities. 
She exuded confidence that the public would heed their advice for the sake of 
sustaining water production, which also caters for the country’s biggest 
commercial city—Dar es Salaam. 
Concerns about the fresh water supply to Dar es Salaam and the central coast have motivated 
interventions in Uluguru since the German colonial period, as Chapter 2 showed. Today, Dar es 
Salaam is one of the fastest growing cities on earth. In 2005, the population stood at around 2.5 
million, but at the time of writing, it has more than doubled, and the city is projected to become a 
“megacity” of over ten million inhabitants by 2030 (UN DESA 2018). The government 
hydrologist quoted in the article gestures towards the government’s deep concern with securing a 
supply of fresh water for the ballooning city, while suggesting that the solution lies largely in the 
education of an ignorant and harmful rural public. 
A midterm report from this project offered a more significant detailing of the “human 
activities” it views as threats to the watershed: 
The Uluguru and the Usambara Mountains, like other Eastern Arc Mountains 
ecosystems have been degraded significantly, with serious loss of ecosystems 
services, especially watershed services. Threats to land and water resources 
include: deforestation; uncontrolled use of fire in ecologically sensitive habitats; 
inadequate soil and water conservation measures and other inappropriate farming 
techniques; over-stocking and overgrazing; population pressure and encroachment 
in riparian zones and unregulated and illegal water abstractions (and lack of 
compliance with water basin regulations); unsustainable harvesting for firewood, 
charcoal production and building, illegal gold mining; and encroachment into 




erosion and sedimentation; pollution and eutrophication; decreased water flows 
(and increased water demand). Deforestation is particularly severe with estimates 
that as much as 80% of the original extent of forest in the Eastern Arc Mountains 
as a whole has been lost (Muthui and Mariki 2018: 23–24). 
This lengthy list of dangers is ultimately rooted in a Malthusian understanding of the relationship 
of humans to nature, one characterized by threat, disruption, and destruction. In this depiction, 
human communities “encroach,” destroying the natural system of forests and rivers that is 
imagined to have once delivered a steady supply of fresh water to the coast. “Uncontrolled,” 
“inappropriate,” and “inadequate” practices have destroyed a natural but delicate balance, while 
a growing and thirsty population consumes the finite supply of water at ever increasing rates. 
 As Chapter 1 shows, such descriptions of Uluguru are not new. Now, as then, they serve 
as justifications for the extension of various forms of control over resources and people in the 
mountains. While in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were part of an overt 
project of colonial rule, today they serve a cluster of forces that includes the state alongside its 
international development partners—foreign donors and nongovernmental organizations. This 
assemblage of institutions represents a range of sometimes contradictory interests and goals, but 
it can often appear monolithic to those impacted by its projects and interventions. The stream of 
reports it generates together form a powerful narrative that continually reinscribes Uluguru as a 
site of intervention and its residents as threats to a naturally stable hydrological system. The 
solutions proposed by the state and other development agencies, as this chapter shows, have 
varied over time. However, nearly all place responsibility for the watershed’s health (understood 
largely in terms of quantitative flows) onto rural people, and as a result, focus on changing 




* * * 
 Zaina Ally Rufezuwa offered a different assessment of the problems of deforestation and 
shortages of water in Uluguru. An animated and witty woman in her sixties, Bibi Zaina lived 
next to her brother, Mzee Rufezuwa, in the shady back corner of Kivuma Village. Mzee 
Rufezuwa, introduced in Chapter 2 and whom I return to below, was one of my key 
interlocutors, known for his encyclopedia-like knowledge of local history. Unlike her brother, 
whose way of speaking about local history was systematic, structured by the recitation of years, 
changes in administrative divisions, and shifting political names and titles, Bibi Zaina’s accounts 
were livelier, but more difficult to follow. A gifted storyteller, she would let her voice drop to a 
whisper at moments of suspense, then rise for a joke or a twist. While her brother was regarded 
by the public in Mkuyuni as the most important expert in local history, Bibi Zaina also had an 
expansive knowledge of events in the mountains and a sharp analysis of many of the changes she 
had witnessed. 
One afternoon in October 2018, I went with Rama, a young motorcycle driver with a 
keen interest in local history, to Kivuma look for Mzee Rufezuwa. Rufezuwa was away and we 
were greeted by Bibi Zaina instead. We began to talk, and I asked her a question I had been 
posing to many interlocutors lately: had women gained more of a voice in their families and 
communities in her lifetime, or had women’s voices been stronger before. She said they had 
more of a voice now. I asked how this change had come about. “Who knows?!” she shrugged. 
“It’s like how the weather changed.” She went on, explaining that these days, there was no rain, 
just sun and heat. When I asked why the weather had changed, she answered without hesitation: 
“Because they cut the forest.” She began to explain the problems of cutting down trees, 
emphasizing the loss of sacred lineage forests that had once been home to matambiko rituals and 




sold for timber, and despite the uncanny accidents that maimed or killed many loggers, the spirits 
who lived in the trees were unable to stop the onslaught of chainsaws and the drive for cash. The 
spirits, she said, have been left homeless. Today, these spirits are wandering Uluguru, angry and 
causing widespread sickness. The illnesses cannot be cured because there is no forest in which to 
carry out matambiko. Moreover, the rains are have begun to fail. “Before, we had big trees. The 
rains didn’t go far,” she said. “The forests called the rain clouds.” But today, the clouds have 
scattered, leaving drought and dangerous winds. Rainmaking matambiko have also become 
difficult and ineffective due to the loss of sacred forests and the disdain of younger generations 
for mila. The only solution, she said, was to begin to follow tradition, respect elders, and replant 
trees in the places where they had been cut. 
During my research in Uluguru, most people agreed that the rains had changed. A 
majority said rainfall had decreased, but others noted that both floods and droughts seemed more 
common than in the past. In any case, the seasons have become more difficult to predict. Most 
people also agreed that the mountains used to have more forests and that they had been cut, 
although there is no consensus about the timeline of deforestation. In Mkuyuni, as Chapter 2 
noted, aerial photos reveal the primary loss of forest cover since 1955 came from the 
disappearance of the lineage forests designated in 1930 under the authority of Rufezuwa,1 
Msume, and other lineage wajomba. Explanations for ecological and climate change in Uluguru, 
however, vary widely among residents of the mountains and among those shaping environmental 
policies and undertaking development projects in the region, including government hydrologists 
and international aid workers. Each of these explanations stakes political claims about 
 
1 The maternal uncle of Mzee Rufezuwa and Bibi Zaina. Chapter 2 discusses Mzee Rufezuwa’s informal inheritance 




responsibility for the care of the environment, as well as claims to authority, labor, land, and 
resources. 
This chapter examines the contested connections between knowledge, labor, and the 
environment in the catchment. Drawing on Maia Green’s (2014) analysis of the development 
state and the actors who compose it, I trace the changing approaches of the state and its 
development partners to the management of forests and water in Uluguru. While paradigms of 
resource governance have changed significantly since the colonial period, several important 
threads emerge across this history. First, official efforts to manage water and forests have 
consistently been shaped by privileging of “expert” knowledge and have made the dissemination 
of this knowledge from development professionals to rural people the foundation of intervention. 
Second, I argue that development projects have long served to appropriate unpaid ecological 
labor from ordinary people, often under coercive conditions. At the same time, this labor has 
been rendered largely invisible in part through persistent depictions of nature as a space devoid 
of human work. Finally, and for the same reason, development projects continue to perpetuate 
and act on Malthusian assumptions which see humans as inherently threatening to nature. 
Alongside these trajectories, however, this chapter traces other ways of thinking about and caring 
for the environment, including practices of social healing as well as techniques of agroecology 
and agroforestry. Building on the claims staked by these practices, I argue that the framework of 
delinking, as elaborated by Amin (1990) and Ajl (2018, 2020) offers a possible way forward, one 
which would allow for both the environment as such and environmental labor to serve as a basis 
for value apart from and alongside exchange values set by the global market. As Amin and Ajl 
suggest, this would entail not only a change in the organization of economic relations but a 




subordination of social reproduction to production and thus create space for new relationships 
between humans and ecosystems to emerge. 
Beyond Human Activities 
On the last day of 2018, I met with two staff members at the Wami-Ruvi River Basin 
Office (WRRBO) in a shared office in Morogoro town. A poster on the wall promoted the 
Equitable Payment for Watershed Services program, while vehicles parked outside were marked 
with the logos of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and USAID. One staff member, then 
the WRRBO Community Development Officer, described her role as “sensitization,” working to 
explain the law and the principles of water resource management to local communities. I asked if 
that teaching included a discussion of global climate change and was met with a hesitant yes. Her 
colleague explained that these discussions had to occur in very general terms that rural people 
could understand. When I asked whether they had investigated questions of tradition (mila) as it 
related to rivers and forests, they said they had carried out a baseline survey. In Uluguru, they 
identified several major challenges in their work, including the small-scale mining for gemstones 
and gold along the riverbanks, the practice of farming up to riverbanks, the presence of markets 
along rivers as sources of pollution, a lack of proper toilets, and population growth. They 
explained that all human activities were forbidden near riverbanks. I pointed out that in Uluguru, 
some people’s entire farms fell within the 60 meter no-cultivation zone along the rivers and 
asked what they would advise such a person (URT 2009: 377). They said they should grow fruit 
trees and keep bees. Perhaps a bit too cheekily, I asked if planting fruit trees was not considered 
a human activity. The interview soured slightly, as they explained that planted fruit trees were 




harvesting and replanting like crops such as corn and that the trees could in fact be left without 
human maintenance. 
I shifted gears and asked about their cooperation with the UNDP on the “Securing 
Watershed Services Through Sustainable Land Use Management” project which had prompted 
the article in the Citizen described above. The project, the officers explained, was currently 
supporting initiatives for beekeeping, raising chickens, and other livelihood activities in villages 
where people were being asked not to farm close to the river. They were also engaged in a 
significant afforestation project along the Mvuha River in southern Uluguru. In Mkuyuni 
division and the upper Mbezi River, activities were more limited but the WRRBO was working 
with village authorities to come up with land use plans and supporting the formation of the Water 
Users Association (WUA) there. This WUA included Mkuyuni and ten other villages along the 
upper Ruvu/Mbezi River, and had been launched earlier that year. 
This interview highlighted several key themes of water management in Uluguru. The first 
is the inseparability of water policy, agricultural development, and forestry in the mountains. As 
Chapter 1 illustrated, these issues were deeply connected in colonial policy and remain so today, 
although in changing configurations. Second, the officers showed a particular understanding of 
knowledge as something to be disseminated outward from technical experts to rural people. The 
baseline survey about local customs was intended primarily to identify existing problems in 
water management and potential problems in the implementation of programs. It was not 
understood as an opportunity to gain useful knowledge about water, forests, soil, or agriculture 
from rural communities. Third, the interview highlighted the persistent framing of trees and 
human activities as fundamentally different domains, even in the case of deliberately cultivated 




evident not only from the role of UNDP in WRRBO activities in the watershed but also in the 
presence of logos on vehicles, posters, and reports in and around the building. The role of 
international and foreign aid organizations in steering programs related to water, forests, and 
rural development has been a constant feature since the end of the colonial period, although the 
details of these alliances have shifted significantly. Finally, the conversation points to an 
understanding of water as a finite resource to which rural people posed a constant threat, and to 
an approach to water management that centered market-driven solutions through the support for 
new income generating activities. 
The Development State 
Maia Green has described Tanzania as a “development state,” which she defines as a 
state “materially and ideologically sustained through development relations” (2014: 15; see also 
Jennings 2007: 71–73). This status is manifest in the blurry boundaries between international and 
nongovernmental organizations and the state visible in the jumble of signs and logos I witnessed 
at the WRRBO. The WRRBO, which is answerable to the Ministry of Water, was created in 
large part through funding from an international aid organization, the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA, see below), while the project we discussed was funded by 
international organizations through the GEF and the UNDP. The Equitable Payment for 
Watershed Services program whose posters adorned the walls of the office, another watershed 
initiative, was funded through the global NGO CARE International and the Tanzania branch of 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). This tangle of state agencies, international and foreign aid 
organizations, and domestic and global NGOs characterizes much of the state’s functions related 
to poverty alleviation, resource management, public health, and similar domains. While these 




become blurred as the state is both constituted through and materially supported by engagements 
with international development institutions (Green 2014: 15–16; G. Harrison 2001).2 
As Green’s work shows, Tanzania has played a unique role in the history of international 
development discourse, often serving as an early testing ground for ideas around development. 
This role began with Tanganyika’s designation as a League of Nations Mandate following World 
War I. The Mandate explicitly laid out an agenda that placed improvements in the lives of local 
populations above extractivist priorities. In addition to explicitly calling for the elimination of the 
slave trade, the Mandate stated: 
The Mandatory shall be responsible for the peace, order and good government of 
the territory and shall undertake to promote to the utmost the material and moral 
well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants (League of Nations 1923: 
155). 
While the British administration scarcely abstained from extracting resources, it nevertheless had 
to justify its actions through the framework laid out in the Mandate, thus generating an ongoing 
discourse that served as one of the foundations for later ideas of development at a global scale 
(Green 2014: 24). After World War II, colonial governments began to more clearly articulate 
broad principles of development and their relationship to colonial rule, although implementation 
 
2 During the Magufuli administration, relationships between the nongovernmental sector including donor-funded 
civil society organizations (CSOs) and the state became more strained, as the government has limited 
nongovernmental organizations’ ability to independently publish information and increased already high 
bureaucratic, legal, and financial constraints on their operations. Clashes over the rights of women, girls and 
LGBTQ Tanzanians became points of tension, as did issues around press and CSO repression (Amnesty 
International 2019; Anna 2020; Bamwenda 2018; “Denmark Withholds Aid to Tanzania” 2018; Dahir 2020; Fallon 
2017; Mumbere 2018a, 2018b; Ratcliffe 2017, 2018). Since my fieldwork ended in 2019, the emergence of COVID-
19 and Magufuli’s assertion that the virus had been defeated through prayer again strained relations between the 
government, foreign donors, and the nongovernmental sector (Bariyo 2021; Odula 2020). These clashes provided 
fuel to Magufuli’s use of nationalist and anticolonial rhetoric to shore up a broadly conservative agenda, while 
allowing neoliberal, pro-business interests in Tanzania to cement their public image as protectors of “human rights.” 
In this new configuration, development remained at the core of the state agenda, brought in line with socially 
conservative measures and an increased role of the state in the economy through what Paget (2020) has termed 
“restorationist developmental nationalism.” Specifically, Magufuli’s administration claimed it would return to a 
process of development begun by Nyerere but interrupted by foreign interests. Since Magufuli’s unexpected death in 
March 2021, his successor President Samia Suluhu has sent mixed signals about whether she will continue these 




of social welfare policies was piecemeal and faced resistance from European administrators in 
Africa (Cooper 1997, 2005; Eckert 2004; Green 2014: 24; Jennings 2007: 74). In British 
Tanganyika, this process also corresponded with new forms of compulsory labor. While 
distancing themselves from forms of forced labor used by German authorities, the British 
administration found in the concept of community development a mechanism to compel 
uncompensated labor, framed not as taxation but as self-help (Green 2014: 17; Jennings 2007: 
75). As Chapter 1 showed, this program reached its peak with projects like ULUS, in which 
residents of the mountains were forced to expend tremendous labor without compensation to 
construct anti-erosion terraces. However, in the case of ULUS, beneficiaries were always 
understood to be downstream water users at least as much as residents of the mountains 
themselves, a point I return to below. 
 Following independence, the reliance on the appropriation of labor remained 
foundational to development in Tanzania. The World Bank recommended that the new 
government take a “a community development approach,” justified as appeals to “self-help” and 
counterposed to charity. Under this plan, local communities would contribute labor, materials, 
and/or cash to assist with development projects such as infrastructure construction (Green 2014: 
26–27; IBRD 1961). This program was in large part driven by necessity, as the state lacked the 
funds needed to lift its rural population out of poverty, a fact Nyerere explicitly acknowledged in 
the Arusha Declaration six years later (Nyerere 1968). The policy of “self-help” was officially 
implemented in 1962 and was critical to development efforts in the first decades of 
independence. However, in theory, participation through labor was now to be accompanied by 
participation in planning, primarily through the institution of the Village Development 




officials, cooperative leaders, and progressive farmers, and could submit proposals for self-help 
projects to the district level for approval. However, VDCs did not play a significant role in the 
setting of broader policies and priorities of the new state and even in their more limited planning 
capacities, were effectively under the control of District Development Councils, who had to 
approve all VDC proposals. Beginning in 1972, a program of decentralization which purported 
to alleviate these issues by shifting power from the district and central government levels to an 
intermediate level, the region, ultimately served to move decision making further from the local 
level, since regions, unlike districts, did not have elected councils and offered little opportunity 
for community input. This change coincided with the move to compulsory villagization, a 
process in which relocated communities had minimal say. Despite falling short of these ideals, 
however, the ideal of participation in development planning remained official policy from the 
time of independence until liberalization (Jennings 2007; Samoff 1979). 
 After liberalization, as the following sections show, the state’s primary focus on 
questions of development and the development program’s reliance on unpaid labor through 
“community development” program continued in new forms. The ideal of participation also 
survived. Indeed, ideas about participation which had been developed early in Tanzania’s 
socialist period influenced global trends around the potential liberatory force of participatory 
planning, research, and resource management (B. Hall 1992, 2005; Swantz 2016; Swantz and 
Green 2009). Although the socialist government ultimately fell short of these early ideals, the 
ideals themselves continued to circulate within and beyond Tanzania. During liberalization, 
Tanzania became an early adopter of participatory forest management, a move seen as a part of a 
broader democratizing process (Blomley and Ramadhani 2004; Blomley et al. 2008; Vyamana 




and have become commonplace in development projects such as the GEF/UNDP watershed 
services project described above (Chaligha 2008; Green 2000, 2003, 2014; Igoe 2003; Marsland 
2006; Muthui and Mariki 2018; Pallotti 2008). As the following sections show, these 
applications of participatory principles in development by NGOs and the state have produced 
mixed and limited results and have generated significant debate among scholars, development 
workers, activists, politicians, and Tanzanian people themselves. 
 Anthropologists of development have broadly argued that neoliberal development 
programs serve to depoliticize poverty and reinforce relations of inequality and dependence 
(Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995). But development has also produced specific class politics within 
Tanzania. Within and beyond the state, development serves as a key source of middle-class jobs 
for a select group of educated professionals, whose modest salaries are supplemented by a 
variety of individual investments and by other trappings of status and cosmopolitan identity. 
Such benefits depend on the continued separation of professional classes (those who develop) 
and the rural poor (those who need development), a distinction which often hinges on ideas of 
expertise. In addition to these domestic professionals, neoliberal development institutions also 
support a class of foreign development professionals whose earnings far outstrip those of local 
professional staff. At the same time, they contribute to the cultivation of local elites who act as 
community representatives and points of connection between “local” people and “non-local” 
institutions (Green 2014; Swidler and Watkins 2009). Development is at once the producer and 
the product of these multifaceted and shifting relations. 
Forests and Water in Tanzania 
In Uluguru, policies and interventions related to water, forests, and agriculture are 




national government and international organizations, is its status as a key water catchment area 
that provides fresh water to Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, and the largescale industrial and 
agricultural enterprises of the central coast. Chapter 1 described the history of colonial policy, 
beginning with the early introduction of scientific forestry and the reservation of forests by the 
German administration. Prioritizing catchments like Uluguru, the Germans enforced reserve 
boundaries with strict and violent punishment, curtailing communities’ access to firewood, 
medicines, and sacred sites as well as land (Sunseri 2009). The British inherited much of the 
German approach, including the forest reserves and a focus on scientific forestry, timber 
production, and watershed protection. Sharing the Germans’ sense that Uluguru was becoming 
overpopulated and deforested, they also demarked lineage-based forest reserves to be 
administered through the Native Authority. However, some of the restrictions on forest usage 
were lifted and corporal punishments were abandoned in favor of fines and imprisonment. Later 
in the British period, concern over erosion became paramount, leading to the forced terracing 
program carried out under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS) in the mid-1950s. As we 
have seen, this project was met with intense protests led by an unlikely coalition of nationalist 
youth, customary leaders, and Sufi brotherhoods. After protests that culminated in the murder of 
John Mahenge by police, the scheme was cancelled. Because of the protests’ role in sparking the 
anticolonial movement in the mountains, neither the British nor the post-Independence 
government found heavy-handed intervention in the mountains politically viable for several 
decades. 
When Tanzania gained independence in 1961, control over the ministries related to water, 
agriculture, and forestry were passed on to the new government. Colonial officials oversaw the 




irrigation engineering, and other relevant fields at institutions abroad. Many had been taught by 
predominantly British professors at institutions like Makerere University in Uganda. 
Unsurprisingly, this new generation of experts largely followed the orthodoxies of their colonial 
predecessors and tended to implement a top-down approach centering technical knowledge and 
rarely consulting local communities (Hurst 2004: 104–107; Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020: 
359; van Koppen et al. 2016: 592–593). Foresters found themselves in tension with the new 
government, which sought to loosen colonial restrictions, including those restricting the use of 
forests (Hurst 2004: 104–107). Like the British experts who trained them, these foresters paid 
little attention to local uses of forest environments, focusing instead on measurable quantities of 
timber. 
At independence, the government also inherited colonial water policies which had vested 
all water in the office of the Governor and required “rights” (now called “permits”) for water use 
in agriculture and industry. Initially, this system applied only to European settlers, but prior to 
independence, it had been expanded to include all residents of the territory. After independence, 
control over water shifted from the office of the Governor to the United Republic of Tanzania, 
but the new government maintained a centralized system of control for which any water usage 
required a formal permit (van Koppen et al. 2016: 595–596). However, the management of this 
system began to change with the Water Utilisation (Control and Regulation) Act of 1974, which 
paved the way for a process of partial decentralization over the next several decades (URT 
1974). Heavily influenced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
which had advocated for a water basin approach since the 1950s, the government solidified 




adjustment, the government began forming water basin offices to administer permits and 
development projects in nine basins, including the Wami-Ruvu basin (van Koppen et al. 2016). 
According to van Koppen et al. (2016: 596), these water basin offices approached water 
as a zero-sum game, in which “informal water users became the target.” In other words, small-
scale farmers using irrigation were identified as a major problem and site of intervention by the 
government. During this time, the framework of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) came to dominate the water policy landscape in Tanzania. In theory, IWRM 
emphasized three principles: equity, environmental sustainability, and economic efficiency. In 
practice, it tended to prioritize the last of these, emphasizing water as an economic good (van 
Koppen et al. 2016: 588–589). Influenced by donors and the tenets of the Washington consensus 
and structural adjustment, proponents of IWRM argued that subjecting water to pricing and 
payment would resolve inefficiencies and conflicts over the use of what was understood as a 
finite resource. Collecting fees for water use permits would also fund the administration of the 
watershed, effectively turning water usage into a site of taxation (Mdee 2017: 101; van Koppen 
et al. 2016: 597). Priority for permits was based on a calculation of economic value, which was 
fixed rather than based on potentials for growth. Under this scheme, hydropower was given 
priority over agriculture. However, as van Koppen et al. noted: “The emphasis on economic 
value was later somewhat balanced by considering the environment, narrowly interpreted as 
quantitative environmental flows. The environment also gained a higher priority than 
agriculture” (2016: 597). 
The most influential organization in the development of the Wami-Ruvu Basin was the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which worked on development programs in the 




other watersheds in the 1990s, JICA maintained a stronger interest in infrastructure development 
and sought to meet the needs of all users, although it too prioritized industrial and urban users in 
Dar es Salaam. The Wami-Ruvu River Basin Office officially opened in 2002 with eight 
government officials and two corporate representatives. Their work, guided by Japanese 
consultants funded through JICA, focused on resource monitoring, awareness raising, and 
pollution prevention along with the administration of permits (van Eeden, Mehta and van 
Koppen 2016: 615–616; van Koppen et al. 2016: 599). 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, international organizations including the World Bank 
became friendly to agricultural uses of water in Tanzania, even supporting irrigation 
development projects. However, this shift was primarily focused on large agricultural operations 
and came in the wake of a rush of largescale land investments by private and largely foreign 
capital. This shift thus offered the opportunity for “water grabs” alongside “land grabs” by 
investors, coming largely at the expense of smallholders (van Eeden, Mehta and van Koppen 
2016: 608–609; van Koppen et al. 2016: 600). In 2009, the Water Resources Management Act 
was passed, influenced by international organizations and corporate interests. There was little 
public debate over the law, which was posited as driven by technical knowledge rather than 
political concerns (van Koppen et al. 2016: 598). By putting in place a tiered structure for water 
administration, the act largely certified trends that began with the introduction of IWRM in the 
early 1990s, including the emphasis on the permit system and move toward ostensibly 
participatory governance through the formation of Water User Associations and Basin Boards. 
Political ecologists have critiqued the use of IWRM in Tanzania for facilitating water-
grabbing and privileging elite water users. This privileging is the result of several factors. One is 




not include representatives from local communities. Local participation by smallholder farmers 
is instead concentrated in the lower tiers of governance, most importantly the Water User 
Associations, which wield less power. In addition, the importance of permits has led to the 
privileging of both those purchasing larger permits at higher costs and those who have 
experience with bureaucratic processes (Lankford and Hepworth 2007; Mdee 2017; van Eeden, 
Mehta and van Koppen 2016; van Koppen et al. 2016). Despite these critiques, WUAs and other 
IWRM structures continue to expand in Tanzania, a result of the gradual implementation of the 
Water Resources Management Act of 2009 and the work of international donors. 
Meanwhile, trends in forest policy followed a different timeline. Also heavily influenced 
by the FAO, the post-independence government first focused on plantations and forest industries. 
However, following the Arusha Declaration and the implementation of a more explicitly socialist 
program, afforestation programs gained traction to meet local needs for wood. This shift 
reflected both the socialist program’s emphasis on rural development and a more global turn 
toward the consideration of basic needs and poverty alleviation alongside industrial 
development. The afforestation effort, however, showed little success, in part because 
administrators failed to consult with local communities about their needs for wood and their 
concerns about pests, nutrient leaching, and other drawbacks. Non-native species favored for 
timber production, such as Grevillea and Eucalyptus species, were prioritized, and technical 
knowledge remained dominant and local knowledge marginalized (Hurst 2004: 104–119; 
Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020: 359–360). 
In the late 1970s, global forestry increasingly turned toward the social dynamics of 
forests and community forestry ideals became dominant (Mnzava 1983). In Morogoro District, 




of village nurseries of select species, mostly fast-growing exotics. The government typically 
provided seedlings and some extension support, while village residents themselves were 
expected to provide labor (“Community Forestry Training Programme” 1983; Mnzava 1983; 
Shirima and Chambo 1984). However, some prominent voices including Tanzania’s Director of 
Forestry, Elifadhili M. Mnzava, began to argue that greater consideration should be given to 
indigenous species. Critically, Mnzava also argued in several reports that despite the emphasis 
international and state agencies placed on educating rural people on the need for tree planting, 
that most small farmers already recognized the need for trees and were hampered not by lack of 
will but lack of resources. He also argued that rural people, especially women, had a robust 
knowledge of which tree species would meet their needs and thrive in their environments 
(Mnzava n.d., 1983). 
At the same time, several influential forestry professors began to promote agroforestry as 
a new paradigm for forest management. This was seen to meet the ideals of Tanzanian socialism, 
which envisioned itself as bringing together modern scientific forms of knowledge with local and 
distinctly African ones. As devised by faculty at what would later become Sokoine University of 
Agriculture, agroforestry was envisioned primarily as the intercropping of trees for fuel, fodder, 
and pole production along with non-tree food crops. Relatively little attention was given to fruit 
trees and once again, fast-growing non-native species such as Leucaena leucoephala and 
Eucalyptus spp. were prioritized.3 The idea of agroforestry met with some resistance from both 
foresters and agricultural officials, who typically viewed their domains as discrete. However, the 
project’s potential to resolve multiple issues, alleviate pressure on forest reserves, and present a 
more decolonial vision of rural development ultimately gained it traction, bolstered by scientific 
 




findings on its validity. Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, agroforestry extended the 
reach of the forestry department into the peasant economy (Hurst 2004: 119–125; Lulandala 
1978; Redhead and Maghembe 1982; Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020: 360). 
With liberalization, however, the ideal of agroforestry lost prominence to new models of 
participatory forest management (PFM), which extended the work begun under the community 
forestry projects of the 1970s and 1980s but focused less on tree-planting and more on the 
management of existing forest areas.4 As with the shift of water management to basin offices, 
participatory forest management offered promises of decentralization alongside civil society and 
“stakeholder” participation in resource administration.5 PFM in Tanzania quickly gained 
international attention and drew donor funds from a variety of sources, including Denmark, 
Sweden, and the World Bank. Two forms of PFM were implemented, Community-Based Forest 
Management (CBFM) and Joint Forest Management (JFM), the former involving local or village 
forests and the latter “reserved” forests in areas considered of supralocal importance due to 
biodiversity or water sources (Blomley and Iddi 2009; Blomley and Ramadhani 2004; Blomley 
et al. 2008; Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020: 355–356; Vyamana 2009: 240; Wily 2002). Data 
from early programs in Tanzania suggests that both CBFM and JFM are more effective at 
promoting tree growth and curbing cutting than either state-run or open access forest areas 
(Blomley et al. 2008; Treue et al. 2014). 
 
4 Village tree-planting has reemerged as a priority in parts of Tanzania since 2010 (Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020: 
359–360). 
5 The term stakeholder is ubiquitous in development discourse in and beyond Tanzania. Stakeholders are generally 
institutions and individuals who are understood to have a stake in a project and/or who may affect its outcome. This 
can include corporate and state entities, local and international NGOs, and of course, local communities. 
Representatives from each identified group attend stakeholder meetings or workshops, with local communities most 
often represented by elites selected by project staff (Green 2014: 64–68; see also Argenti 1997; Bächtold, Bastide 




Despite these successes, however, PFM has been critiqued on several grounds. First, it 
has been noted for its vulnerability to elite capture. Elites are most likely to be selected as 
representatives of the community in interactions with the government and donor agencies due to 
access, education, and common interests and are often able to control revenues generated from 
forest management. Others have suggested that PFM serves primarily as an excuse for the state 
to withdraw resources from rural areas and have suggested that tangible returns for participating 
communities are scant, especially their poorest members (Blomley et al. 2008; Iddi 2003; Lund 
and Treue 2008; Meshack et al. 2006; Ngaga et al. 2013; Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020; 
Vyamana 2009). In addition to these concerns, the construction of expert knowledge as an 
exclusive and necessary component of forest management within PFM has served to undermine 
the democratizing effects of PFM (Green and Lund 2015; Scheba and Mustalahti 2015).6 
Flows of Knowledge 
Participatory approaches such as PFM typically involve forms of participatory research 
or appraisal in which, in theory, community members and development professionals work 
together to generate critical knowledge about the community and to identify project priorities. 
The origins of this process lie in the thought of Paulo Freire and radical social movements of the 
1960s and 1970s.7 Early forms of participatory research aimed to decolonize knowledge creation 
and to empower ordinary people to take charge of their community and its development. As we 
have seen, socialist Tanzania served as an important early site for the development of these ideas 
(B. Hall 1992, 2005; Swantz 2016; Swantz and Green 2009). By the 1990s, however, 
 
6 Critiques from Tanzania resemble those from elsewhere in the Global South, which have shown that PFM can 
perpetuate inequality and extend centralized and colonial forms of control under the guise of decentralization and 
democratization (Mathews 2011; Nightingale and Ojha 2013; Poteete and Ribot 2011; Ribot, Agrawal and Larson 
2006; Rutt et al. 2015). 





participatory approaches had become standard in rural development projects and criticism began 
to emerge around bureaucratization, routinization, and the curtailing of the concept’s radical 
potential. Instead, critics argued, these processes, often conducted in short time frames, 
encouraged a homogenizing and thin view of rural life, and only made space for only limited 
forms of knowledge rather than permitting meaningful input on larger questions such as policy 
priorities. Participation often did more to authorize and facilitate outside intervention than to 
challenge the assumptions and priorities of states and development agencies (Cooke and Kathari 
2001; Green 2014; Hildyard et al. 2001; Kapoor 2002; Richards 1995). Government and NGO 
staff I spoke to about participatory processes, with few exceptions, framed them as opportunities 
to identify possible impediments to pre-defined project and to find the best ways to incentivize 
rural people to conform to a set of ultimately unquestioned project objectives like tree planting. 
The construction of knowledge plays a particular role in these dynamics. While 
participatory knowledge-making practices were originally intended to decolonize the production 
of knowledge, in practice they often reinforce the differentiation and stratification of kinds of 
knowledge: expert or scientific knowledge, which is understood as universal, and local 
knowledge, which is place-bound and which “lack[s]… relations to other kinds of knowledge” 
(Green 2014: 97). “Local” knowledge is at once reified and circumscribed, ascribed to 
epistemology that is experiential and non-generalizable. Meanwhile, expert knowledge is reified 
through trainings and seminars which may incorporate “local” people in (supposedly) scientific 
knowledge regimes, but which ultimately maintain the distinction and asymmetrical relations 
between forms of knowledge. This reinforcement of difference serves as a brake on the 
democratizing effects of participatory structures and reaffirms the status of experts (Agrawal 




and Larson 2006; Scheba and Mustalahti 2015). In short, civil servants, development 
professionals, and extension agents in Tanzania tend to see local knowledge as useful to 
eliminating barriers to their agenda and to building consensus both “downward” (with 
communities) and “upward” (with donors). They portray scientific expertise, in contrast, as 
useful for determining how to understand manage resources like forests and watersheds. 
The content of the “expert” knowledge produced through these relationships, however, 
has a more complex relationship to science. In a recent paper, Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga (2020) 
have shown that forestry education in Tanzania remains rooted in outdated, colonial-era ideas of 
scientific forestry that prioritize quantifiable aspects of forest health such as timber production 
and, more recently, carbon sequestration. Scientific forestry understands forests to be governed 
by plant succession which culminates in a stable equilibrium (see also Larson and Ribot 2007; 
Ribot, Agrawal and Larson 2006; Scoones 1999). Surveying the curriculum at the only 
institution in Tanzania granting degrees in forestry, Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in 
Morogoro, the study authors show that these ideas persist at the expense of both newer scientific 
approaches and alternative epistemologies including those of forest-dwelling Tanzanians. They 
found that forestry education at SUA focused on rote memorization and exam preparation, rather 
than critical thinking or the production of new knowledge, that it excluded non-equilibrium 
approaches to ecosystem and forest management, and that it repeated longstanding depictions of 
humans as inherently external and threatening to forests. Although their study did not extend to 
other departments at SUA, the findings of this study were consistent with my own interactions 
with SUA faculty, students, and graduates across the disciplines of forestry, agriculture, 




SUA sits on the northern edge of Uluguru in Morogoro town and serves as the 
preeminent agricultural university in the country. During my research in Tanzania, I was a 
Research Associate at SUA and I have spent several months living at the campus and have 
worked closely with professors and graduate students there. While SUA does support innovative 
research in many fields, it tends to emphasize quantitative work, having only added an 
anthropologist (Sylvester Haule) to their social science staff in 2018. Overall, the role of social 
sciences and humanities at the university is small. Forestry students, for example, had no 
requirements related to social sciences or political ecology at the time of my research (Sungusia, 
Lund and Ngaga 2020: 362–363). The same is true for similar disciplines. Nearly all technical 
experts working on issues related to agriculture, water, and forests I met in Uluguru were trained 
at SUA and their attitudes reflect a singular emphasis on technical knowledge and its attendant 
epistemology.  
For example, when I asked one SUA-trained WRRBO employee about his 
understandings of mila, he said that they would always carry out research on mila to know 
whether they need to talk to men and women separately or to know what days of the week or 
month might be best to set meetings. When I asked about mila related to water management, he 
responded with disinterest. I also asked whether he’d heard about the history of forced terracing 
in the mountains. He smiled and said yes, a farmer in Kinole had told him they’d killed a 
European for trying to force them to build terraces. I corrected the record, letting him know it 
was actually an African protester who was killed in the conflict, although I now wonder if I 
should not have softened the farmer’s threat. 
The attitudes described by Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga (2020) that posit knowledge as 




students are replicated beyond the classroom in many of the state and NGO-led extension and 
outreach programs in Uluguru, which emphasize beyond any other aspect the need to “educate” 
rural people about proper care for forests, water, and soils. Training and outreach programs are 
always unidirectional, with knowledge flowing from technical experts to farmers. Grace 
Chitanda, the government hydrologist quoted in the Citizen article from which we began, 
underscored the need to educate rural people about how to protect the watershed. Yet, in my 
interviews with over 150 residents of the mountains, mostly smallholder farmers, nearly 
everyone could recite the official scientific facts: trees protect water sources, generate rain, and 
stop erosion. Lack of rain is due to local deforestation. This “knowledge” was repeated to me 
nearly identically in most interviews across the three wards and at least eleven villages, by men 
and women of all ages and educational levels: 
There was more rain before…the major reason is human activities. Before, that 
area up there was covered completely by forest, a very big [forest]…but because 
of human activities, the forest [disappeared] (Hosain Shomari Kiyega, interview, 
April 11, 2018). 
The weather has changed…because [before], people were not numerous, so there 
were even forests here, it was the opposite of what you see today. Now we have 
very intense heat, and there are many people.…the reason [there is less rain now] 
is deforestation. We get rain, but not as much [as before] (Mwishehe Juma, April 
11, 2018). 
We cut a lot of trees. We moved the rain. We cut a lot of trees (Ali Mohamedi 
Ng'omanga, interview, October 4, 2018). 
Before, people didn’t burn the forests. Before there was a lot of rain…. But now 
people are burning the forests…. Rain is scarce…. [Before] we were protecting 
the forests, we were caring for the forests…. People were caring for the sources of 
water (Frank Lukas Majikupwe, interview, October 29, 2018). 
Forests have declined and people have increased. People are cutting the trees. [For 
this reason] there is less rain (Furaha Athani, October 29, 2018). 
The rain has diminished, it’s not like before…because people cut the trees 




When I asked people how they knew about the relationship between forest loss and changes in 
rain, most said they had been taught in school or that it had been explained by the government, 
but many also cited their own experiential knowledge and that of parents and grandparents who 
told them about changes to the landscape. Whether people believed in these connections or were 
simply offering what they thought was the “correct” answer in the context of our conversation 
does not matter (although I think most did genuinely believe in the connection, even if they felt 
there may be other reasons, such as loss of mila). What is important here is that even though 
development projects often emphasize the need to educate villagers, the information they hope to 
convey about the dangers of tree cutting and burning is already common knowledge in Uluguru. 
 As Green points out, development paradigms have typically posited a link between 
knowledge, agency, and behavior-change (2014: 40). Because rural people in Uluguru do not 
behave in ways that the government and development personnel understand as correct to protect 
the watershed, the latter infer a lack of adequate knowledge among rural communities. 
Education, then, becomes a perpetual solution, even though almost all village residents are 
familiar with mainstream scientific ideas about deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, 
watershed protection, and related topics. As development scholars have long noted, development 
tends toward “technical solutions” rather than structural ones (Li 2007: 2). Education is not only 
one of the cheapest technical solutions, but also serves to reinscribe the role of experts and expert 
knowledge in development practices not only in planning but in implementation. However, this 
does not suggest that civil servants and development professionals are ignorant of the broader 
structural pressures that compel households to cut down trees, burn brush, or farm along 
riverbanks. When I spoke to the agricultural officer in Mkuyuni about challenges facing the 




term income for short-term cash flow. But, he said, people made these decisions because of 
“economic pressure.” Most people simply could not wait for slow returns and had few 
alternatives to meet immediate cash needs (personal communication, October 24, 2018). Like 
him, many civil servants and NGO staff do understand the structural factors that impede their 
attempts to change local behavior, but bringing structural change is more difficult than offering a 
seminar—and agitating for structural change is, generally, not part of their job description. 
 Educating rural people has been a major point of intervention since the colonial period. 
However, this education does not cover all knowledge, only that deemed useful in pushing 
farmers to alter the behaviors identified as threats to the watershed or the environment or as 
hindrances to “development.” While nearly everyone I interviewed explained local causes for 
changes in rainfall patterns, only two smallholders also brought up issues of global climate 
change. Both men were viewed as local agricultural experts who often attended agricultural 
extension programs and disseminated agricultural knowledge to others in the community, but 
each told me they had learned about global climate change not at an in-person extension training 
but rather on the radio. Knowledge about global warming was not emphasized in government or 
nongovernmental extension programs and where mentioned, was usually discussed in the context 
of adaptation and preparation, not to cultivate political subjects who might organize and act on a 
broader scale. 
 Nevertheless, farmers in Uluguru repeatedly made clear to me that a lack of knowledge 
was not the problem. Many expressed strong desires to implement agricultural practices that 
would protect the watershed, promote soil health, and bring rain. On example is Mzee Sipriani, 
whose account of deforestation was examined in Chapter 2. When I asked him what could be 




to be possible, the government would need to provide seedlings (Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko, 
interview, October 22, 2018). Others similarly told me that tree planting was important to restore 
rains but suggested it would be difficult to get most people to participate without involvement 
from the government. A number of farmers, especially slightly wealthier farmers, youth, and 
progressive farmers were interested in the possibility of tree crops, such as teak.8 However, some 
felt that timber trees were not a good solution to combat deforestation and loss of rain because 
they would be cut. For example, a woman in her late 30s in Kibwaya told us that these days, 
youth were planting a lot of timber crops. Later, she told us rain had declined and that to restore 
its health, people should plant trees. However, when I asked whether the trees the youth were 
planting might be helping, she said no. “Those trees you just plant for a period. After ten years, 
you cut them. What we need is to plant a forest. In this area, there is no forest” (Amina Hamisi, 
interview, December 27, 2018). Permanent trees appeared to provide greater possibilities, but 
low prices for fruits made planting fruit trees a risky option. Indeed, Mkuyuni is rich with fruit 
trees already and fruits are the main cash crops for the region. However, low prices mean that 
large numbers of fruits are simply disposed of without sale. Jackfruits and mangoes litter the 
ground in some seasons. Spices offered better returns but upfront expenses, lack of access to 
basic processing technology, and poor market access made this option difficult as well. Overall, 
farmers wanted better market access, price supports, the construction of basic processing 
facilities, and other concrete measures that would allow them to make a living from growing tree 
crops: fruits, spices, and timber. 
 
8 The composition of those who expressed this suggests that this was seen as a relatively higher cost choice at the 




“Water is the Soul of Humanity” 
I met Sadiki Kassim Ndevu at the center of Ludewa Village, halfway up the mountain 
between Mkuyuni and Kinole. An energetic man in his 40s, he led me behind a half-constructed 
building, out of earshot of the men hanging around the shops, and immediately launched into a 
detailed explanation of his work as chairman of the new Water User Association. His account 
was marked by a sense of urgency and frustration, and it was a few minutes before I was able to 
interrupt to ask for permission to record our conversation. The WUA, which follows a 
topographic rather than administrative geography, includes eleven villages along the Mbezi 
River. A training was held in March 2018, to which each village council sent three 
representatives. These thirty-three representatives elected Ndevu chairman. During our 
interview, Ndevu spoke passionately about the need to protect the water catchment for the future 
of communities in the mountains and downstream, and he took his responsibility as WUA 
chairman very seriously, expressing personal responsibility for the health of the river. “Water is 
the soul of humanity,” he said. At the same time, he described his position as WUA president as 
fundamentally impossible, marked by logistical challenges and broader contradictions 
(interview, December 28, 2018). 
He described his job as preserving, protecting, and caring for sources of water. One 
component of this work, he said, was educating community members about what they should not 
do, especially farming close to the riverbanks, mining gold, and washing clothes or vehicles in 
the river. People were also forbidden to use irrigation or redirect water without a permit. He had 
visited mosques, churches, and schools to teach about how to protect the river and had worked to 
educate people individually and in groups. He often tried to intervene when he saw violations of 
water policy, threatening people with fines. However, he said, most of these rules “had no teeth,” 




the rules were so broad as to essentially make life in the catchment impossible, were they to be 
followed to the letter. Moreover, local politicians were undermining his work, promising an end 
to the rules in exchange for votes in the then-upcoming 2020 elections.9 
The central government, Ndevu said, tended to prioritize urban needs and to ignore the 
problems in rural areas. Because their concern was primarily about the downstream supply, they 
made broad rules against “human activities” (shughuli za kibinadamu) in upstream rural areas 
like Uluguru. When asked what people in rural areas should do, however, the government was 
largely silent. After all, all run-off from washing or agriculture would ultimately end up in the 
river, sending pollution downstream, even if the activity was done away from the river itself. 
Ultimately, Ndevu described his job as impossible. Despite his efforts to stop people from 
breaking the rules, he knew full implementation would make life untenable, and he had no 
solutions to offer. In addition, Ndevu complained that the wealthy tended to act as if they were 
above the law, leaving the poor to shoulder the brunt of regulations and work. Overall, he 
described the burden of environmental issues flowing from urban to rural and from the rich to the 
poor. 
However, the resources that should be dedicated to alleviating these burdens, Ndevu 
noted, were absent. He remarked that his work was “dangerous” and that he was called to handle 
conflicts over eleven villages. These villages, while all within a few kilometers on a map, sit at 
vastly different elevations on rugged terrain and to reach them, you must either walk several 
hours on foot or hire a motorcycle for few thousand shillings—more than a day’s earnings for 
many in the hills. He had no budget for these travels. He also wanted to plant trees, as had been 
 




encouraged in his training, but he had no budget to purchase saplings. The World Bank gives 
money to Tanzania to protect water, he said, but none reached the village: 
SKN: At the meetings, many times, I have asked: “you all have cars to make 
visits that cost four million, six million shillings. I am doing difficult work to visit 
all the sources of water at my own expense. What if I got even a motorcycle, a 
million, two million shillings? I would be successful. It’s possible!” 
JF: Are you paid for your work? 
SKN: I’m not paid. 
JF: Even a little? 
SKN: Not one cent (senti)! 
He described his work as “kazi kubwa” (“a big job”), which straddled ministries of water, 
irrigation, agriculture, and even health, since the disposal of medicine was also a potential source 
of pollution. This work was not only unpaid, but indeed, was carried out at Ndevu’s expense. 
 While scholars have critiqued participatory models of resource management like 
participatory forest management and WUAs as serving as mere window-dressing for the 
continued centralization of power and resources, Ndevu’s account shows us that this is not all 
these programs achieve. Rather, they also serve as a site for the extraction of unpaid ecological 
labor, not only from WUA representatives like Ndevu but all those in the catchment who have 
been tasked with changing their own agricultural practices, planting trees, learning beekeeping, 
cleaning up pollutants, or terracing. This is, in some ways, a continuation of the long extraction 
of unpaid labor under the guise of “community development” outlined above, in which, since the 
late colonial period, rural Tanzanians have been expected to contribute labor and resources in 
lieu of adequate funding from the central government. However, as a focus on the catchment lays 
bare, this labor does not only serve the community itself. Rather, the benefits of this ecological 




 This work is done under threat of eviction. As van Koppen et al. (2016: 601) point out, 
“the overwhelming majority of informal water users in Tanzania [are] de jure criminals” under 
current water laws. Because these laws have focused on surface water, assumed to be a zero-sum 
game, eviction threats have been most serious in areas that practice informal irrigation. This is 
not the case in Mkuyuni, where a small amount of furrow and hosepipe irrigation is visible but 
only used by a small minority of farms. However, Choma Village, high in northern Uluguru, 
where hosepipe irrigation is widespread, did face an order of eviction in 2006 (Harrison and 
Mdee 2017). Choma was vulnerable both because of the widespread use of irrigation and 
because of its location directly above Morogoro. Water shortages in Morogoro city provided the 
impetus for eviction. Because this water supply was relatively local, reaching the town just at the 
base of the mountains, drawing connections between urban shortages and specific upstream 
villages such as Choma was more straightforward than tracing links between eastern Uluguru 
and Dar es Salaam.10 In the end, the residents of Choma averted eviction by appealing, with the 
help of SUA faculty, directly to the Prime Minister. This drew the situation to the attention of 
President Jakaya Kikwete, who forbade the eviction unless adequate compensation for the 
relocated villagers could be raised, which proved beyond the capacity of the Morogoro municipal 
government. However, Kikwete’s intervention left the door open for future attempts at eviction. 
Especially in view of the Tanzanian government’s long history of mass evictions, fears of more 
largescale evictions from the mountains persist (Harrison and Mdee 2017: 417–418). 
 
10 It is unclear whether the shortages were in fact due primarily to water usage patterns in Choma or whether they 
were an effect of the expansion of urban Morogoro on the lower slopes. In other words, what made Choma an easy 
target was not the ability of the government to definitively prove the cause of the water shortages, but rather the 





The extraction of ecological labor, however, is not made explicit. It is obscured through 
programs that promote “participatory” resource management, but which engage in centralized 
knowledge dissemination and top-down planning. It is further hidden from view by persistent 
understandings about the relationship between forests and humans in Tanzania. The study by 
Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga (2020) noted the persistent belief that forests and human settlement 
are naturally distinct and that humans can only serve to threaten the forest equilibrium. They 
write: 
Students [of forestry at SUA] believe that any divergence from their imagined 
climax community—large and mature trees—is an indication of human 
disturbance. Proper forest management to them equals keeping people out, so that 
trees can grow to maturity and thus research their imagined climax community 
(361). 
Chapter 1 highlighted the inability of European explorers and colonial administrators to 
recognize signs of agroforestry in Uluguru. Instead, they remarked upon the clusters of “wild” 
fruit trees near human settlements as a sign of natural abundance. Human habitation was marked 
by areas without trees, leading the German naturalist Stuhlmann (Chapter 1) to believe that much 
of the drier areas of Uluguru had been subject to massive deforestation. Tanzania’s short period 
of enthusiasm for agroforestry notwithstanding, these assumptions persist today, leading the 
WRRBO officers to the paradoxical position that planting fruit trees was not a human activity. 
 In contrast to these views, research since the 1980s has highlighted the importance of 
humans in managing forest ecosystems long considered “wild” and “natural” (Balée 1989, 2013; 
Fairhead and Leach 1996). By rendering human activity as only harmful to forest ecosystems 
and watersheds, the forest and water policies that dominate state and international intervention in 
Uluguru render the labor of planting and tending trees, protecting water sources, and supporting 
diverse ecosystems invisible. Demands placed upon smallholders emphasize the reception of 




these policies in fact demand much more significant forms of labor, including travelling further 
for water and wood, planting and maintaining trees, and implementing anti-erosion measures 
such as terracing and clearing fields without burning. Such activities are also often gendered as 
the feminization of agriculture and the deagrarianization of young men shift burdens related to 
agriculture and care of the land increasingly onto women (Bryceson 1996; Deere 2005). 
Moreover, the material basis of this labor is precarious. The threat of eviction means control over 
land in fundamentally insecure. Cash from participatory programs is limited at best and unlikely 
to be received by the most vulnerable (Vyamana 2009). Like other forms of reproductive labor, 
this ecological labor is often erased in official accounts, uncompensated, and drawn out under 
conditions of coercion that threaten the continuation of communities themselves. 
Ecosystem Services 
One attempt to manage these dynamics has been the implementation of Payment for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) projects in Uluguru. The PES framework attempts to account for the 
uneven distribution of environmental costs and benefits through direct payments to those 
identified as managers or owners of natural resources. In a watershed framework, this means 
implementing a system through which downstream water users pay upstream watershed residents 
to undertake measures that are understood to protect and improve flows and water quality. The 
concept of “ecosystem services,” along with the closely related concept of “natural capital,” 
came to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s (Costanza and Daly 1992; Costanza et al. 1997; 
Daily 1997a; Daly 1992; De Groot 1992; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 
2010). Originally developed as a pedagogical tool aimed at educating the public about the value 
of “nature” and as an attempt to make space for environmental concerns in the pro-market 




services emphasized not the work of humans tending the environment, but rather “services” 
provided by non-human entities such as plants and even soils (Balmford et al. 2002; Daily 
1997b; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Grimes et al. 1994). By the late 1990s, the idea began to 
take hold in policy and development circles and its inclusion in the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment in 2005 cemented its mainstream status. PES was lauded for its potential to assistant 
with poverty alleviation in addition to bringing positive environmental change (Daily 1997c; 
Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Grieg-Gran, Porras and Wunder 2005; Pagiola 2008; Wunder 
2005). Some also hoped that the ecosystem services framework could address global inequality, 
with a few early proponents noting that because benefits from ecosystem services accrue in 
wealthier countries, Global North countries should transfer funds to the Global South to offset 
these costs (Balmford and Whitten 2003; James, Gatson and Balmford 1999). 
Uluguru was the site of an early PES pilot project implemented by CARE International 
and WWF Tanzania which began in 2005 and centered on Kibungo Juu high in the southeastern 
mountains. Although the project was intended to be the first stage of a larger program that would 
be implemented across the mountains, it was discontinued after the pilot period, largely due to 
lack of willing downstream purchasers. The project was conducted under the assumption that 
declining flows downstream, along with increased turbidity, were caused, at least in part, by soil 
erosion and loss of tree cover high in the mountains, although a report on the project noted “a 
lack of firm evidence” to back this assumption (Lopa et al. 2012: 37).11 When I spoke to a 
 
11 The hydrological data presented has left open several critical questions. Most importantly, measurements showing 
declining flows were taken at the Morogoro Road Bridge, which the article describes as “mid-way between Uluguru 
and Dar es Salaam” but which is closer to the latter both in terms of the river’s route and as the crow flies. As such, 
flow measurements there capture not only changes that originate high in the mountains but also significant lowland 
agricultural and residential usage between. It is also noteworthy that the article suggests there has been no 
discernable change in rainfall over the same period (1950s–2000s), thus presumably eliminating global climate 
change as a major factor. However, rainfall data used is a dry season average of three stations in the Ruvu Basin (not 
specified), even though rainfall varies significantly within the mountains and between the mountains and the 




former staff member on the project, Acquiline Wamba, she told me that out of a desire to avoid 
colonial-era mistakes by simply giving orders, the project began with a period of research in 
which project staff asked community members about their needs. Ultimately, the project secured 
an agreement from two major downstream water users, the Dar es Salaam Water Company 
(DAWASCO) and Coca Cola Kwanza Limited, to pay for services rendered upstream, with 
CARE, WWF, and village authorities acting as intermediaries. The upstream “services” 
consisted of the construction of terraces (bench and fanya juu fanya chini), tree planting 
(reforestation and agroforestry), the cultivation of grass strips, and “riparian restoration.” Tree 
species used included a mix of timber and fruit trees, most of them exotics but with several 
indigenous species also included. In addition to payments, farmers were provided with extension 
services and were encouraged to use organic inputs such as fertilizer, although inputs were not 
directly provided. Payments themselves were calculated on the basis of opportunity costs 
associated with removing land from productive use during the first year alongside labor costs 
calculated at a rate of USD 1.20 per day, the local rate of day labor at the time (Lopa et al. 2012; 
Acquiline Wamba, personal communication, December 17, 2018). 
While PES programs such as this may appear to compensate residents of Uluguru for 
their labor in tending for the environment, the truth is more complex. Payments were directly 
tied to land ownership and all payments, including those intended to compensate for labor, went 
to the owner of each plot regardless of who carried out the work of planting or construction. 
Despite the explicit concerns of the institutions that initiated the program with question of 
poverty alleviation, it was ultimately have found to have primarily benefited middle-income 
 
weather station in the mountains themselves). Moreover, averages obscure changes in distribution such as greater 
concentration of rainfall in fewer days, which many of my informants reported and which could lead to higher levels 
of erosion. In addition, declines in forest cover in the mountains in recent decades have been concentrated in the 




farmers and to exclude the poorest in the community, who were typically landless.12 Women and 
youth were at a particular disadvantage due to lower rates of land ownership, and indeed, women 
only accounted for one-third of official project participants. Moreover, households were left to 
determine how to carry out the labor of terracing and tree planting and the individual recorded as 
owning the land was entrusted with all payments. Notably, the project did not rely on formal 
titling, which is rare in Uluguru, but it did require an individual to be designated as a de facto 
owner. Those who worked on the project noted that this process seemed to favor men in cases of 
joint land ownership. It also excluded land held in trust by lineages (Lopa et al. 2012; Acquiline 
Wamba, personal communication, December 17, 2018). Because rented land was also excluded, 
landowners were also motivated to expel renters or borrowers, leading to a loss of land access for 
some (Mndeme 2016). Chapters 1 and 2 showed that associating land with exchange values and 
cash income, favoring individual over collective tenure, the construction of terraces and tree 
planting all served to undermine lineage land ownership and matrilineal inheritance. It is likely 
that the PES project had a similar effect in Kibungo Juu, shifting some of the remaining lineage 
lands to individual forms of tenure (George Kajembe, personal communication, July 2016). 
The prioritization of land ownership over labor in PES is the result of two related moves: 
first, the neoclassical economic practice of collapsing of nature into the category of “capital” and 
basing its valuation in terms of production and second, the rendering of ecological labor as 
largely nonexistent or at best marginal to the question of ecosystem services. Scholars of 
ecosystem services and natural capital have pointed out the role of nature in processes such as 
the production of clean water and air, which are fundamental to social reproduction. However, in 
 
12 Poverty alleviation was an explicit aim of the program, and indeed, Lopa et al. (2012) explain that being at or 
below the poverty line was a prerequisite when the site was selected, although they do not explain how poverty at 




their attempts to calculate values, scholars of ecosystem services focus almost exclusively on 
productive potential. For instance, in her influential volume, Gretchen Daily wrote, “the erosion 
control service will appear less valuable in regions where low-priced subsistence crops are 
grown than in areas where high-priced cash crops for export are produced, all else equal” (1997c: 
367). PES is conceptualized as a payment to an owner of “natural capital” to compensate them 
for limiting extraction or destruction, which would otherwise generate returns on the investment, 
and some of its leading proponents have argued forcefully against the idea that PES could or 
should serve as a “just reward for poor rural people who take care of the environment and 
continuously produce environmental services” (Wunder 2007: 53).13 In short, PES is designed to 
transfer rents (understood as returns on investment) to landowning classes (understood as 
investors), based on the profits they could otherwise derive by extracting and depleting their 
natural capital. 
The second, related move, relies upon the rendering invisible of ecological labor. As 
noted above, “ecosystem services” were originally conceptualized as services rendered by 
“nature,” independently of human labor. Humans feature in these processes primarily in the form 
of “disturbance” or “disruption” (Daily 1997b; Daly 1992; Costanza et al. 1997). In this way, the 
literature on ecosystem services has tended to maintain a distinction between “nature” and 
humans, despite the simultaneous emergence of work in historical and political ecology showing 
the role of human labor and knowledge in creating and maintaining ecosystems previously 
thought of as “natural” (Amanor 1994; Balée 1989, 2013; Fairhead and Leach 1996; Fraser, 
Leach and Fairhead 2014; Johannes 1989; Scoones 1999). While there were a few early attempts 
to bring these two bodies of work into conversation, the results tended to focus on cultural 
 
13 For an example of an approach to PES that centers labor, see van Noordwijk, Chandler and Tomich (2004: 27–




institutions as providing limits or solutions to the “tragedy of the commons” (Berkes and Folke 
1992; Constanza and Folke 1997; Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990).14  When the concept of 
“ecosystem services” found its way into policy circles, the same assumptions typically followed. 
Even where it was acknowledged that PES would in some cases require labor, this was 
overwhelmingly viewed as restoration of ecosystems damaged by human activity (Wunder 2005, 
2006). This was the case with implementation in Uluguru (Lopa et al. 2012). In short, PES does 
not compensate for ecological labor. It obscures it. 
Agroecology, Ancestors, and Epistemologies of Delinking  
While PES has struggled to take root in the mountains, another approach to managing 
ecological and agrarian concerns has emerged: agroecology and related forms of agroforestry. At 
the time of my research, agroecological approaches to farming appeared to be of growing interest 
to both smallholder farmers and progressive development NGOs in Tanzania. The term 
agroecology typically refers to agricultural practices that prioritize biodiversity and sustainability 
in agriculture, for example through mulching, the use of cover crops, intercropping, and the use 
of organic fertilizers and pesticides in place of chemical ones. Agroecological practices are 
typically low-input, labor-intensive, and suited to small-scale cultivation, although not 
exclusively so (Altieri 1989, 1995, 2009; Gliessman 2000; Mdee et al. 2018; Wezel et al. 2009). 
While the term dates to the late 1920s, agroecology gained prominence globally first as a field of 
study and then as a social movement in the wake of the Green Revolution which brought heavily 
industrialized forms of agriculture to much of the Global South in the 1950s and 1960. The 
Green Revolution dramatically increased yields in many regions, including parts of Tanzania, but 
 
14 These works primarily engaged with work from historical ecology rather than political ecology, and thus tended to 
downplay or overlook questions of politics (Fraser, Leach and Fairhead 2014). For a similar attempt to bring 
together ecological economics and the “new ecology” at this time, though outside the “ecosystem services” 




it came under significant criticism for causing widespread environmental and social ills. In 
particular, the high-input approach to agriculture adopted during the Green Revolution tended to 
favor the increasing concentration of land in fewer hands, resulting in landlessness and growing 
inequality along lines of class and gender (Agarwal 1994; Byers 1981; Dawson, Martin and 
Sikor 2016; Griffin 1979; Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 2011: 110; Rasmussen 1986). For those 
critical of Green Revolution-style industrial agriculture, agroecology has offered an alternative 
pathway for agrarian transformation (Mdee et al. 2018: 2–4; Wezel et al. 2009: 505). 
Agroforestry, for its part, can refer to a wide range of agriculture systems in which crops and 
trees coexist (Leaky 1996; Nair 1993). It is not necessarily agroecological (Ollinaho and Kröger 
2021), but in eastern Uluguru agroecology and agroforestry often go hand in hand. 
Farming techniques associated with agroforestry and agroecology have a long history in 
Uluguru. As Chapter 1 discussed, early European visitors to the mountains described patterns of 
plant growth that are consistent with agroforestry, although they often mistook cultivated forest 
farms for signs of natural abundance. At the time of my research, many farmers in Mkuyuni 
maintained fruit trees on their farms and grew grains, vegetables, and root crops below. 
Likewise, farmers in Uluguru employed practices like crop rotation, the planting of cover crops, 
and the use of organic inputs long before explicit discussions of “agroecology” and “organic 
farming” began to circulate widely (Jones 1999; Miyashita 2015). Such methods have been 
attractive to smallholders in the mountains because the cost of inputs is low, because growing a 
variety of crops can bolster against both ecological and market volatility, and because such 
practices have proven useful in maintaining healthy soils and slowing erosion.  
 Interest in agroecology, agroforestry, and organic farming has begun to grow in 




Foundation-funded Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and related pushes for 
high-input, commercial farming across the continent (Altieri 2009; Holt-Giménez 2008; Holt-
Giménez and Shattuck 2011; Mdee et al. 2018; Monjane 2018). In eastern Uluguru at the time of 
my research, the main organization involved in agroecology was Sustainable Agriculture 
Tanzania (SAT), a local NGO that supports the creation of farmers’ cooperatives to grow organic 
crops.15 SAT has been active in Uluguru since 2009 and uses participatory approaches to build 
on and support existing livelihood strategies in the mountains (Mdee et al. 2014; Mdee et al. 
2018; Joel Paul, personal communication, October 24, 2018). In October 2018, I met with a 
young SAT staff member named Joel Paul in a café on the main road in Mkuyuni to discuss 
SAT’s work. The organization begins a project by carrying out Participatory Rural Appraisal, he 
told me, in which SAT staff listen to the needs and challenges identified by those farmers who 
have expressed interest in forming a cooperative. Staff then work with farmers to develop a plan 
to address as many of those needs as possible. The organization helps cooperatives get access to 
credit and to develop bylaws and organizationL structures. It also provides training in 
agroecological practices, marketing, crop processing, and entrepreneurial skills like record 
keeping. Finally, it assists with market access by certifying products as organic, facilitating 
meetings with buyers, and purchasing 25% of the produce directly from each group (Joel Paul, 
personal communication, October 24, 2018). 
 A few weeks after I met with Joel, I attended a meeting of an SAT group in the lush 
valley of Gomba at the border of Mkuyuni and Kibwaya. I had been invited by SAT’s local 
 
15 Several other organizations which support agroecology were also active, including Mtandao wa Vikundi vya 
Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA), the Tanzanian member organization to Via Campesina, and Participatory 
Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM), a network of farmer cooperatives who work on land and ecology 
issues in eastern and southern Africa. However, MVIWATA membership in Mkuyuni was small and their projects 
limited (Ally R. Madenge, personal communication, December 22, 2018). PELUM carried out a land-use planning 
project in several villages in the area around the time of my research but this work focused more on land rights than 




“farmer facilitator,” Msakuzi Iddi. A native of Kibwaya with a primary school education, 
Msakuzi had become a leader with SAT due to his enthusiasm for improving local agriculture 
and the wide knowledge he had developed on the topic. Six women and seventeen men attended 
the meeting, which was loosely structured and facilitated by several of the group’s leaders.16 One 
man who had attended an SAT training reported back with more information about the 
organization’s broader activities and about potential financial support available for groups like 
theirs. Next, a woman spoke about how the group needed to set a good example for the 
community to show them what a cooperative could be. Others agreed. A discussion ensued about 
purchasing a small farm on which to begin growing spices, but the group agreed more research 
was necessary. The group then asked if I had anything to discuss. After explaining my research, I 
asked them how the environment in the area had changed. Most agreed that the weather had 
gotten hotter and drier due to the cutting of trees in the area. When I asked if there were other 
factors, Msakuzi explained that emissions from factories worldwide were also changing the 
climate. The group nodded. Although I had asked nearly everyone I interviewed in Uluguru this 
question, this was only one of two times someone had mentioned global factors as a potential 
cause of climate change. After the meeting, I walked to back to Mkuyuni with Msakuzi, who was 
enthusiastic that we might find ways to work together in the future. He told me he found cloves 
to be a particularly promising crop because once established, the trees were permanent and 
relatively easy to maintain. Growing cloves would thus increase tree cover and provide farmers 
with a potentially high-value crop. Of course, he explained, it was difficult to get a fair price 
from middlemen, which why it was important to do marketing research, establish many 
connections, and develop capacity for basic processing which would add value. 
 
16 The gender imbalance at this meeting stands in contrast to SAT data, which show higher levels of women’s 




As noted above, participatory approaches have been subject to criticism, including 
critiques that they are often used to generate a sense of community consensus without 
meaningfully incorporating community input and that they are highly vulnerable to elite capture. 
The parameters of participation in projects like these are often narrow, with the overarching 
goals rarely open to challenge. SAT appeared to me to be more responsive to farmer concerns 
than many other organizations touting participatory approaches, but it also had a specific agenda: 
supporting the cooperative farming of organic cash crops. More broadly, SAT avoided many of 
the pitfalls of Water User Associations and participatory forest management projects because 
engagement with SAT was voluntary and not at the level of the wider community. This also 
means SAT was limited in its impact. It could help bring agroecology to individual farm plots 
but the management of common resources like village forests or water was beyond its scope.17 
For related reasons, the SAT cooperatives I observed did not seem to be targets for elite capture. 
The farming SAT promotes requires high levels of labor, making it largely unappealing to those 
who can invest in non-agricultural activities or larger commercial farms outside of the 
mountains. Instead, participants in the groups I observed were mostly middle-income farmers.18 
Agroecological approaches like those promoted by SAT can result in increased yields and 
profits for farmers. They are also growing in popularity among farmers because of increasing 
concerns that food produced with chemical inputs may be harmful to health (Mdee et al. 2018; 
Miyashita 2015). Several people during my research attributed perceived increases in disease in 
 
17 SAT was involved in advocating for water rights for villagers in Choma during their conflict with the Morogoro 
municipal water authority described above (Harrison and Mdee 2017; Mdee et al. 2018). 
18 My observations of SAT groups were limited and I did not gather data on participants’ socioeconomic status 
beyond my observations at meetings and informal conversations with group members. I cannot say whether my 
observations reflect SAT participation more broadly but SAT’s own data suggests a range of low- and middle-




the area to the abandonment of traditional/natural foods (“vyakula vya asili”).19 In addition, 
while such farming practices and indeed agriculture in general are still associated with 
backwardness for many Tanzanians, institutional support and growing global discourses around 
agroecology and organic farming have begun to reframe these approaches as progressive and to 
attribute more value to longstanding forms of agroecological knowledge (Mdee et al. 2018). 
Institutionally supported cooperatives were only one way in which farmers sought to 
maintain a healthy environment through agriculture. As we have seen, practices now glossed 
agroecology and agroforestry have been continually employed in Uluguru since the mountains 
were settled several centuries ago. In her research across 20 villages in Uluguru, Chie Miyashita 
(2015) found that three-fourths of farmers who were not engaged in NGO-run agroecology 
programs nevertheless practiced intercropping and used cover crops, while only one in five used 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. This finding is consonant with my observations in Mkuyuni. 
As discussed above, many I spoke with also expressed strong support for tree-planting although 
most said they were limited in their capacity to do so without financial and logistical support 
such as the provision of saplings by the state. 
At the time of my research, Mzee Abdallah Ally Rufezuwa, the brother of Bibi Zaina, 
was widely regarded in Mkuyuni as the most knowledgeable person on local history. He became 
one of my most important interlocutors and I frequently dropped by his house to discuss my 
research. In addition to his work as a farmer, Mzee Rufezuwa cultivated and sold saplings in 
Kivuma, Mkuyuni, and Morogoro city. One day, in August 2018, I stopped by his home to 
discuss traditional healing. I mentioned that I had heard from some healers that the loss of forests 
also meant a loss of access to medicine. He said this was true and then began showing me some 
 
19 Duni Waziri Kibena, personal communication, June 23, 2018; Sadik Seleman, Shukuru Hossien, Nari Joseph, 




of his saplings, which included medicinally important species that had become rare in the area. 
Later in our conversation, I mentioned stories I had heard about people living and farming 
beneath the earth and asked if these people were mizimu. He said yes, and that these spirits also 
lived in trees, especially those species associated with powerful medicines. On his own land, 
Rufezuwa maintained a variety of trees for fruit, medicine, and shade, interspersed with other 
crops. 
Expanding upon the work of Samir Amin, Max Ajl (2020) has suggested that 
agroecology can serve as a space of “delinking” because it allows for choices that incorporate 
ecological use values alongside market-based exchange values: 
By not merely aggregating all agricultural technologies and their output effects, 
we can think of technological choice and its relationship to ecology as part of the 
delinking strategy…. They involve a series of short-term and long-term trade-offs 
between productivity, eco-system, and human health, and biospheric and socio-
ecological resilience. By giving more consideration to ‘traditional’ technologies, 
we may think of the popular law of value not merely in productivist terms, but as 
rooted in a holistic production of use values—including, of course, the ultimate 
use value: the ecology within agriculture rests. Such a move allows for a rupture 
with the law of capitalist value, breaking with its technology and breaking with its 
epistemology, and truly taking local knowledges as the base for a new 
development from below, appropriately informed by modern science, but as a 
method of investigation and experiment rather than one necessarily bound to the 
specific capitalist technologies with which it is often bundled (5). 
Use value is the domain of social reproduction. Delinking in this sense would allow for the 
values of social reproduction to exist alongside and not inherently subordinate to, those of 
exchange. This vision stands in sharp contrast to PES, which seeks to resolve the tension 
between environmental sustainability and capitalist production by collapsing nature into 
exchange value. It also contrasts with PES because, far from seeing forests and farms as opposed 
domains, it views “human activities” (and human labor) as potentially positive for the cultivation 




 However, agroecological approaches are not inherently grounded in a “delinking” from 
the global market, and their ability to incorporate other regimes of value cannot be taken for 
granted. Indeed, the use of agroecology in initiatives that aim to build “resilience” to climate 
change highlight the ways in which agroecology can become another site for the extraction of 
ecological labor and the redistribution of responsibility for environmental ills toward the Global 
South and the rural poor. Holt-Giménez, Shattuck and Van Lammeren (2021) have recently 
shown that using agroecological techniques without a political program that addresses inequality 
and injustice may reproduce inequitable and unsustainable social conditions.20 In such situations, 
both ecological labor and “local” knowledge can be extracted and used to subsidize and expand 
capitalist cycles of production. 
For Amin and Ajl, delinking rests on three mutually reinforcing pillars: the rejection of 
exchange values set by the global market as the basis for economic choices, a political program 
of redistributive and egalitarian reform, and an epistemological opening up in which knowledge 
and technology are developed in accordance with the new value regime (Ajl 2020: 4; Amin 
1990: 60). SAT, like many organizations that promote agroecology, has centered the practice’s 
potential to increase yields and incomes. It suggests that this increased productivity on market 
terms can go hand in hand with less soil erosion, more efficient water usage, and increasing tree 
cover, albeit at the cost of a significant expenditure of labor (Mdee et al. 2018). This continued 
centering of exchange value is not surprising; farmers must engage with the market to meet their 
own needs and an organization such as SAT that aims to raise standards of living would be 
remiss to render such concerns secondary to environmental ones. Rather, what this limitation 
 
20 Scholars have made similar critiques of “resilience” discourse in general, which extends beyond agroecology (e.g. 




reveals is the need for a broader political program which would support agroecology as a site of 
delinking. 
Mzee Rufezuwa’s careful tending of both local history and Uluguru’s trees highlights the 
continued inseparability of questions of human health, forests, spirits, and farming in discourses 
of social healing. Agroecology and agroforestry offer frameworks for understanding society and 
nature not as separate spheres but as overlapping and interlinked. The discourses of social 
healing and the mizimu spirits who reside in trees also suggest the inseparability of humans and 
forests. Mizimu, “those who died long ago,” are bound up with the trees that bring rain and the 
herbal medicines that heal the sick. However, these types of relationships remain largely 
invisible to the development state and even to progressive, agroecology-focused organizations 
like SAT. While NGOs and the state occasional note the use of forests for “ritual” purposes, they 
do not explore content of these rituals, the relationships they entail and maintain, or the forms of 
knowledge they enable. Yet, for many in Mkuyuni, such issues are neither irrelevant nor 
incompatible with the scientific knowledge that links deforestation with an unstable climate or 
agrochemicals with health concerns. Rather, they speak to the same issues—the contested but 
vital concerns of social reproduction and social health. If delinking and agroecology converge in 
an epistemological opening up, as Ajl tells us, this suggests not only a search for forms of “local 
knowledge” legible to science, like the medicinal value of particular plants, but other ways of 
knowing. Like science, the epistemologies of social healing are inflected by politics, and are 
spaces of ongoing debate and change. They do not point toward a timeless and harmonious 
relationship to nature, but they do suggest a regime where the supremacy of the values set by 




their potential contributions to ecological and agricultural knowledge but for the kinds of politics 
they make possible. 
 Kingalu’s GPS 
 The holder of the name Kingalu at the time of my research, Kingalu Mwanabanzi XV, 
assumed the title in 2013 upon the death of his brother, Kingalu Mwanabanzi XIV. At the time 
he inherited his position, Kingalu Mwanabanzi XV was living in Morogoro town and early in his 
career, he hoped to remain in Morogoro, returning to Kinole only for ceremonial occasions. In 
town, he was enmeshed in party politics and was rumored to spend time hobnobbing with 
political elites. He also lived in a large, modern house and drove a Land Rover. 
Prior to assuming his title, Kingalu had also converted to a heterodox sect of Islam 
known as Ahmadiyya.21 Ahmadiyya is known for its belief in continuing revelation, leading 
many Muslims to view it as un-Islamic. The sect is also strongly opposed to the continued 
practice of non-Islamic traditions, posing a direct conflict with Kingalu’s ritual duties. There are 
a handful of members of Ahmadiyya in Uluguru, most attending a small mosque in Kibwaya. 
The mosque was founded by the late Mwishehe Juma, who told me that he had personally helped 
end the practice of ngoma in the area and that practicing matambiko was tantamount to 
witchcraft. He expressed strong opposition to Sufi practices like hitima, ziara, and zikiri and to 
the practices of traditional healers, taking a harder line than even most of the Ansar Sunna 
followers I interviewed (interview, April 12, 2018). However, Kingalu had joined Ahmadiyya at 
the main mosque in Morogoro town and his affiliation with the sect was little known and little 
discussed in Mkuyuni. When I asked Kingalu about his religious affiliation, he told me openly 
 
21 Ahmadiyya originates in Punjab and was originally brought to Morogoro town in the 1950s by self-described 





that he belonged to Ahmadiyya. When I asked about his predecessors, he shrugged and said he 
thought they were all Ahmadiyya. However, Kingalu’s cousin Asman Kingalu Said Setembu, 
introduced in Chapter 2 as the oldest member of the family and the keeper of much of Bena clan 
knowledge tradition, told me he had openly criticized Kingalu’s affiliation with the sect and that 
it had been a source of conflict in the family (personal communication, December 30, 2018). 
Beyond the family, where people had become aware of the conversion, it was a source of 
distrust, as people in the mountains wondered whether Kingalu would continue to carry out his 
ritual obligations. 
All this had brought Kingalu under fierce criticism from many in the mountains. Early in 
our research, Gerald asked Mama Kimwe (see Chapter 2) if anyone could make rain. She said 
no. “What about Kingalu?” he asked. She replied that there was no Kingalu. Confused, we said 
we thought the position had been inherited. Yes, she admitted, but he lives in town and rides in a 
car, so he’s not Kingalu. Plus, he’s messing around with politics. The old Kingalu didn’t leave 
Kinole. Mwanahawa, an older woman and another of my key interlocutors, likewise remarked 
that only tourists today would participate in Kingalu’s matambiko. “This new one rides in cars,” 
she quipped. She also criticized the construction of buildings with metal roofs at Kinole. Halima 
Musa, a woman in her 50s in Changa, told us that Kingalu had lost the ability to bring rain 
because he had flouted tradition. In particular, he was known to stay at guest houses, angering 
the mzimu. Ramadhani Jenera, who was once chairman of Mkuyuni, was also unconvinced of 
Kingalu’s abilities, due to his absence from Kinole: 
RJ: There [at Kingalu’s compound in Kinole], it is not allowed to build a house 
with a metal roof. But the Kingalu who died [Kingalu XIV] built a big house 
there. 
[…] 




RJ: He [Kingalu] says it goes with the times (“inaenda kwa wakati”). 
JF: But he broke the taboos [miiko]? 
RJ: Yes, he broke his taboos. 
JF: What happens if you break the taboos? 
RJ: You die. And he himself died. 
[…] 
JF: And the new Kingalu, has he broken taboos? 
RJ: Yes, he doesn’t live there. He lives in Morogoro town. If he has any business, 
he returns home [to Kinole]. 
JF: It breaks the taboo to live in town? 
RJ: Yes, because ruling (utawala) means you are expected to stay right there [at 
Kinole]. […] 
JF: Does the new Kingalu have the ability to help people? With issues of rain, 
with issues of sickness, does he have the ability? 
RJ: He hasn’t shown it…. The one who died had the ability. The one who died 
had that ability. 
JF: Why can’t the new [Kingalu do these things]? 
RJ: You know, ruling (utawala), you have work. For example, that one [Kingalu] 
is the leader of the country [Uluguru]. I am not the leader. He is not here. I am 
here, I stay here. (Ramadhani Jenera, interview, April 17, 2018). 
As Mzee Jenera describes, Kingalu’s role is deeply connected to place and indeed, Kingalu’s 
absence from Kinole was a common source of concern and anger. Chapter 1 described how the 
nineteenth-century Kingalu Mwanashaa struggled to navigate conflicting sources of political 
power, including his military strength, his role as a rainmaker, and his connections to Islam and 
Indian Ocean trade networks. Kingalu Mwanashaa had also tried to avoid residence in Kinole, 
building a new base in Mfumbwe before submitting to pressure to relocate (Alpers 2005). 




rainmaker with his bureaucratic position in the Native Authority by relocating to the primary 
court at Mkuyuni. While Kingalu Mwanabanzi’s involvement in other forms of power is 
different from his predecessors, linking him to the elites generated by neoliberalism and party 
politics, his authority in the mountains remains inseparable from the sacred places that weave 
kinship through the landscape. 
While many critiques of Kingalu focus on his mobility and absence from Uluguru, the 
metal roof on the ceremonial building at Kinole raises another set of issues. Around 90% of 
houses in Mkuyuni Ward are roofed with corrugated metal and purchasing such a roof is a high 
priority for most households. The building in question at Kinole, however, is a house for 
ancestors who are used to thatch. Will these mizimu recognize the building and its new roof? 
Will they stay or will they depart? For Kingalu, the metal roof offers protection for valuable 
historical artifacts housed beneath it, allowing them to be preserved without the constant 
maintenance required by thatch and without its inevitable leaks. But for those concerned about 
the metal roof, these artifacts—lineage stools and other instruments of rainmaking and 
matambiko—are living, material manifestations of social relationships, part of the kinship 
networks and relations of care through which intergenerational relationships are maintained. The 
ongoing work of tending to them requires not only presence in place but also deference to other 
temporalities. The apparent contradiction—risking the preservation of sacred items in order to 
preserve the architecture that surrounds them—can only be understood through the relationships 
each entails. 
 For many, Kingalu’s behavior was a direct threat to social reproduction. Indeed, these 
critiques echo the woman described in Chapter 1 who confronted Kingalu Mwanashaa in 1870 




would bring illness and ecological catastrophe, contemporary critics link Kingalu’s absence and 
his embeddedness in other forms of power as direct threats to the health of the land and its 
people. As Abdallah Ali Kawambwa, a seventy-five year old man in Luholole, explained, loss of 
control over the environment was linked both to the loss of forests and Kingalu’s loss of 
knowledge and authority: 
JF: Has the weather changed? 
AAK: The weather has changed. It’s hotter than it used to be. 
JF: Why? 
AAK: The reason is like I said before, people have cut down the forests. This 
leads to drought, and rain falls less often. Heat has increased. 
JF: So rain has decreased? 
AAK: Yes, rain has decreased. 
[…] 
JF: Is there anything people can do to restore the rain? 
AAK: The ability has declined. The one who can bring rain is Kingalu. But now, 
the situation with this Kingalu, he’s still a youth. He is caught up in his personal 
affairs and modern things [mambo ya kisasa]…. He’s still a youth, he has no 
ability…. Everything had to be forced on him. He tried to refuse. The name 
Kingalu, he refused it, but he was compelled by his relatives [to take it]…. He 
doesn’t like it (interview, October 9, 2018). 
Kingalu, whose role was described by Mzee Jenera as work, is thus subject to similar criticisms 
to the men discussed in Chapter 2 who refused to inherit their uncle’s names. Like these men, 
Kingalu has threatened his community’s ability to control the environment by refusing to carry 
out the work of tradition, leaving many, especially women, without recourse to heal the land. 
 However, during my time in Mkuyuni, public opinions about Kingalu began to shift. 
Kingalu increased the time he spent in Kinole, visiting nearly every weekend, and sometimes 




telling me that he had received explicit permission from the mzimu at Nguru to reside parttime in 
Morogoro. He also told me that cars were not in fact forbidden and that prior Kingalus had not 
ridden in them because the technology had not yet arrived, and not because of any mwiko. 
Further, he explained that the new building with the metal roof was important for the safe 
preservation of the important sacred items housed there, including the large collection of lineage 
stools and several drums. Moreover, between our conversations in April and October 2018, he 
seemed to become more fluent in his descriptions of his role and of clan history, although he still 
called on his cousin, Mzee Asman, to answer many of my inquiries. 
 During both of my interviews with Kingalu, he pointed to the gold bangle on his wrist, 
and said “this is my GPS.” He explained that it allowed him to see the whole world and warned 
me that if I behaved poorly, he would know. In this comment, Kingalu accomplished several 
things. First, he linked traditional regalia with modern technology, not only equating them but 
indexing his facility with both and suggesting their ultimate compatibility. Indeed, GPS devices 
had only recently achieved the technological abilities long held by holders of the name Kingalu. 
It was mila that marked the future, and mambo ya kisasa (modern things) like GPS that lagged 
behind. In addition, he tied this technology to a sacred knowledge that was distinctly spatial. 
“Every place [popote] is visible,” he told me. 
 During my first visit, Kingalu also shared with me a stapled, twenty-page packet titled 
“Working Plan of the Council of Chiefs of Uluguru for the Year 2018.” The document begins: 
The living conditions of the residents of Uluguru [including] culture (including 
ethics), economics, environment, and social services, especially health, education, 
clean and safe water, road infrastructure in the mountains especially in rural areas, 
and broad understanding of the struggle against the three national enemies, that is, 
Ignorance, Disease, and Poverty are not yet satisfactory. Chiefs, wandewa, 
washenga, and their assistants including traditional elders along with development 




governmental institutions to address the challenges facing their community 
(Kingalu Foundation 2018: 1). 
The document describes the organization’s vision (“to unite the community of Uluguru and its 
surroundings for sustainable development”) and objective (“to bring development to the Uluguru 
community and surrounding areas by fulfilling their responsibilities to develop, strengthen, 
improve, protect and sustain their cultural heritage and to use surrounding resources 
accordingly”) (1). It outlines accomplishments from 2017, which include the passing of a 
resolution and strengthening relationships with the government and “development stakeholders,” 
and outlines upcoming goals, including opening a museum and “building capacity” through 
“seminars, workshops, and short-term and long-term training” (1–2). The latter are intended to 
“build the capacity of community members to bring about development without negatively 
affecting their ethics, tradition, customs, and culture (maadili, mila, desturi na utamaduni)” (2). 
This document, which reinscribes the role of Kingalu and other “customary” leaders in Uluguru 
in the language of development, speaks to the role of development discourse in Tanzanian 
politics. Rather than juxtaposing mila and development, the document brings them into harmony 
and positions customary authorities like Kingalu as bringers of development alongside 
governmental and nongovernmental authorities. Importantly, it also positions the accompanying 
organization, the Kingalu Foundation, as a legitimate recipient of development funds. Indeed, 
one of Kingalu’s reasons for showing me the document was to ask whether I had any 
connections to potential donor organizations. In this sense, it is typical of development 
documents as described by Green: “Project documentation is not intended to present an objective 
account of a social and economic situation, or a discursive assessment of how best to address the 
kinds of issues that might come under the ambit of current policy concerns, but to support 




Near the end of my fieldwork, Kingalu was in the midst of organizing a major ceremony 
around the return of a traditional Luguru stool to Kinole. The stool, it was said, had been stolen 
or purchased by Europeans long ago but had caused considerable trouble for its new owners, its 
spirit demanding return to Uluguru.22 It was brought back to Kinole and Kingalu organized 
several ceremonies to “cool” the stool and welcome it back to its proper home. I was told he held 
a tambiko ceremony for only Luguru lineage elders and was planning a more public ceremony to 
which I was invited. However, the event was repeatedly postponed and ultimately did not take 
place before my departure from Tanzania. Rumor had it, the delays were largely because Kingalu 
hoped to negotiate the attendance of President Magufuli or at least some high-ranking 
government officials. This move would serve to bring into alignment Kingalu’s involvement 
with party politics and his customary authority as a rainmaker and keeper of Luguru tradition, 
although ultimately, he failed to draw Magufuli to Kinole. 
 Kingalu’s attempt to consolidate his political position by bringing into alignment mila, 
development discourse, and party politics, like his efforts to balance residence in Morogoro town 
and at Kinole, is reminiscent of Kingalu Mwanashaa. In the nineteenth century, power built 
through access to Indian Ocean trade, the growing role of guns, and the emerging presence of 
Europeans vied with the politics of rainmaking. Today, it is the intertwined politics of 
development and political parties that offer competing geographies of power, with the center of 
gravity resting in Morogoro and Dar es Salaam rather than Bagamoyo. In this new constellation, 
Kingalu’s GPS serves as a claim not to a particular geography but to geography as such, to a 
 
22 I was unable to ascertain the origin of this stool. Images of the stool shared on Facebook and by the media show a 
tall three-legged stool with a high back and arms, which contrasted with the shorter, backless, three-legged stools 
kept by lineage heirs in Mkuyuni as well as the similar clan stools kept by Kingalu at Kinole (Mwananchi Digital 
2019; Chief Kingalu 2019). It also did not feature the carved figures of the high-backed “Luguru stools” typically 
pictured on auction websites. Whatever the origin of this stool, I heard numerous stories in Uluguru about lineage 




broad authority legible in terms of modern technology but rooted in the esoteric knowledge of 
mila. Because claims on Kingalu are often articulated in terms of his entanglement with political, 
technological, and economic regimes outside the mountains, this claim to space can also be 
understood as a response which authorizes his movement through space. On the one hand, the 
GPS shows that the knowledge attached to his position extends beyond the mountains, parallel 
the claims by Kingalu and his predecessors to regional, national, and even global rainmaking 
powers. At the same time, it serves to mediate his absence from any space at any time, 
suggesting he is always everywhere. 
Although public opinion of Kingalu in the mountains remained deeply divided during my 
research, not all saw him as having abandoned tradition. Others blamed Kingalu’s critics and 
those who failed to respect him, arguing that he had been unable to successfully bring rain due to 
a lack of popular participation in mila. Several elders explained that Kingalu was powerless 
unless he was requested to make rain by the residents of Uluguru, and that they must cooperate 
for rainmaking to be successful. Because some individuals had withdrawn from mila, those who 
continued were severely hampered in their efforts. As Masunya Ramadhani Maulidi, a traditional 
healer in Kivuma, put it: 
Now, only a few people go to Kingalu. They go when they have problems, like 
when they need money…. If the sun is shining a lot [there is a lack of rain] in 
Kivuma, you can collect some money and take it there [to Kingalu] and pray for 
rain, and it might rain only right here. It won’t even reach Mkuyuni…. But before, 
everyone would go together and pray, and the rains would come (interview, 
August 13, 2018). 
For this reason, many people, among them Mzee Rufezuwa and Bibi Zaina, were adamant that to 
restore the ecosystem, it was necessary for young people to stop disrespecting Kingalu and the 
followers of tradition. The lack of unity in the community made the environment spiral 





Uluguru has long been subject to pessimistic predictions that it cannot support its 
burgeoning population and that it is destined for environmental catastrophe and economic 
decline. This narrative, first issued by German naturalists and colonial authorities in the late 
nineteenth century, was repeated by British administrators in the final decades of colonial rule to 
justify the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme and again by researchers in the 1990s during Tanzania’s 
long period of economic contraction (Jones 1996; Magayane 1995; van Donge 1993). It has also 
been reproduced in numerous project documents in recent years that justify intervention in the 
mountains for the sake of preserving the watershed. Yet, as we have seen, over a century of 
predictions that the mountains would soon become uninhabitable have not come true. Recently, 
researchers have challenged the narrative that communities in Uluguru are doomed to decline, 
finding instead that people in the mountains have used a diversity of livelihood strategies within 
and beyond agricultural production to support their families and to achieve rising standards of 
living (Harrison and Mdee 2017; Mdee et al. 2018; Ponte 2001). Likewise, although there are 
signs of environmental problems such as declining soil fertility and tree loss in some areas, 
farmers in the mountains are also engaged in forms of ecological work through what today might 
be termed agroecology and through the planting and tending of trees (Jones 1999; Mdee et al. 
2018). These practices, although often fragmented and carried out under conditions of economic 
constraint, challenge the narrative of irreversible decline. Such practices have a long history in 
the mountains, one marked by continual change as farmers respond to new conditions and 
incorporate new information. 
At the same time, the declining power of lineage institutions has resulted in uncertainty 
about who is responsible to care to for the environment and how they should do so. Moreover, 




reproduction such as matambiko and care for forests and water sources. Those who do manage to 
carry out this work often see benefits accrue downstream. The appropriation of ecological labor 
and the extraction of resources (especially water) have gone together in the catchment since the 
colonial period. As a result of these convergences, technical solutions without political content 
offer little promise to alter longstanding patterns of impoverishment, inequality, and 
environmental harm. 
As an assemblage of national and international institutions, the development state 
exercises significant control over Tanzania’s forests, watersheds, and land. It has the capacity for 
a range of engagements with the environment and has embraced different models of natural 
resource management over time and even simultaneously. However, despite the varied 
approaches of the state and its development partners, several features have tended to recur. First, 
it has centered technical and “expert” knowledge which must be disseminated to rural people to 
change their behavior. This flow of knowledge reinforces the boundary between professional 
classes who bring development and rural people who need it. Especially since the breakdown of 
socialism in the 1980s, development projects have also served to depoliticize questions of natural 
resource governance and poverty alleviation by proposing technical solutions to social problems 
rather than opening possibilities for structural change (Ferguson 1990; Li 2007). Magufuli’s 
resource nationalism marked a partial shift away from this trend but it focused on export 
commodities and had a limited impact on policies related to forests and water in Uluguru. At the 
same time, development projects have extended the control of the state over the everyday lives of 
rural people. Development has also been a site for the extraction of forms of unpaid ecological 




Work that disaggregates the state is helpful for understanding both contradictions and 
consistencies in the state’s approach to development and the environment (Green 2014; Shivji 
1976; Verdery 2002). The different and changing approaches of the state to managing natural 
resources and ecological change reflect the different priorities of agencies like the World Bank, 
UNDP, and JICA as well as the varied interests of foreign development experts, politicians, local 
project staff, and other groups who constitute the state and carry out its day-to-day operations. 
Projects come into being through negotiations among these groups and tend to support their own 
perpetuation, reinforced by patterns of project-based employment. Significant financial transfers 
move through the state to enable this process. To say that development professionals tend to 
promote strategies for development that are built around their expertise and that perpetuate 
opportunities for their employment is not to suggest that these experts do not really believe in 
ending poverty and protecting the environment. Most who took the time to speak with me cared 
a great deal about these issues. However, despite the ability of individuals to act against their 
class interests, the development state is still largely apparatus of a “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” 
working under parameters and values set by global capital (Shivji 1976). As long as this is the 
case, it is likely to perpetuate these patterns and to work against radical political, economic, and 
epistemological change. 
Kingalu’s attempts to reframe his authority in the language of the development state are 
an index of development’s power. At the same time, the shifts in his engagement with mila in 
response to popular criticism suggest that the politics of social healing remain a potent 
counterforce. Despite Kingalu’s claims to transcend space and place through his GPS, 
obligations placed upon him by his critics continue to bind him to the mountains. They demand 




accountable when the rains fail. Such discourses, of course, exist alongside many others—those 
of science, Islamic law, and even the embers of Ujamaa. Nor does Kingalu bear sole 
responsibility for the rain, even under the paradigm of social healing. Other authorities may be 
implicated in changing weather patterns, including the President, as can the youth who disrespect 
tradition, the elders who fail to pass on their knowledge, and men who refuse to inherit lineage 
names. The persistence of discourses of social healing are due in part to their capacity to 
encompass a multiplicity of viewpoints. Yet, in each case, human and environmental wellbeing 
are linked through intergenerational relationships which weave past and future through the 
landscape. 
The politics of social healing are thus distinctly spatial. As Cindi Katz reminds us, social 
reproduction is less mobile than production (2001: 709–711). The process of ungrounding 
described in Chapter 3 can only be partial. A politics rooted in social reproduction such as social 
healing, then, is bound to place in ways that come into friction with the ungrounded and mobile 
demands of global capital. It is tempting to see “place” in this sense as a natural conjuncture, a 
more authentic realm that can resist the ecological and social harms of modernity and 
development. However, I use the term here instead in Doreen Massey’s sense, as a locus of 
relations that stretches beyond the local and that is always both porous and contested (1994: 4–
5). The political demands of social healing in Uluguru emerged through the same struggles 
which rendered the mountains a site of unequal relationships across space. Seen this way, 
objections to Kingalu’s movement are not objections to movement as such but rather to the 
uneven relations to place shaped by a global economy that both demands and curtails mobility. 




and social resources created through the labor of Uluguru’s residents constantly flow away from 
the mountains. It is in this context that social healing demands a return. 
These asymmetrical spatial relations have also made efforts to care for the environment 
in Uluguru into sites for the extraction of ecological labor. Chairman Ndevu’s attempts to protect 
the watershed according to the terms of the WUA, Mzee Rufezuwa’s careful tending of his 
saplings, lineage elders’ work to guard the sacred forest at Kolero, and SAT members’ use of 
cover crops and organic fertilizers all stand as examples of such work. Like other forms of 
reproductive labor, ecological labor is at once obscured by and essential to the functioning of the 
capitalism system. The persistence of ecological labor reminds us that consumption, extraction, 
competition, and depletion need not define our relation to the non-human world. However, 
meaningful relationships of care have become coerced in the face of impending ecological 
disaster as well as more immediate threats of eviction from the catchment by the state. Such 
coercion ensures the work will continue even under conditions of increasing material scarcity 
and political constraint. The result, then, is the increasing fragmentation and precarity—but not 
the disappearance—of these forms of labor. 
Masunya Ramadhani Maulidi, quoted above, remarked that today, people visit Kingalu 
on an individual basis but that rainmaking is not possible without a more collective participation 
in mila. He also commented that some go to Kingalu when they need money while others bring 
money to get rain, but only for their own fields. The connection drawn between money and the 
loss of rainmaking abilities can be understood as a conflict between exchange values and 
practices of social and ecological healing. Money itself is not new in Uluguru. As Chapter 3 
discussed, it has increasingly come to serve as the material basis for social reproduction. Yet, as 




relationships. Exchange values determined on a global market have come to dictate the terms of 
life in Uluguru as elsewhere, but other relationships and other values have persisted despite these 
pressures. These are evident in practices like matambiko and agroforestry. 
Amin’s (1990) conceptualization of “delinking” is useful to imagine how a new economy 
might be constructed in which alternate values and the politics and epistemologies that emerge 
from them are pried loose from the dictates of the global market. Although Amin’s work focused 
on largely on economics of production at the national scale, I have argued, building on the work 
of Ajl (2018, 2020), that we can carry “delinking” further to challenge the subordination of 
social reproduction itself. In this sense, delinking would allow not only the emergence of regimes 
of values grounded in social reproduction, but also the flourishing of other ways of knowing 
alongside of and in dialog with science. Critically, this would entail not only a rejection of 
attempts to collapse nature into exchange value, exemplified by PES programs, but also a deeper 
interrogation of frameworks that see humans and nature as necessarily distinct and opposed. 
Under these conditions, agroecology and agroforestry can serve as part of a broader program of 
radical change in which new relationships with trees, waterways, and the climate can be built. 
The deep tangle of connections residents in Uluguru describe between human illness and 
environmental damage speak to relationships that exceed and evade the dictates of global capital. 
Social healing provides a framework for tending these relationships, one which challenges not 
only the values established by the market but also the temporality of development. Instead of a 
vision of progress which defies the binds of space and place, the politics of rainmaking answer to 
a past that remains present in the landscape. The wandering spirits described by Bibi Zaina, 
dislodged from their homes by social and environmental change, place ethical demands on the 




Uluguru draw on the language of social healing to make demands on Kingalu and others, calling 
them to answer to values delinked from circuits of global exchange. The demands of social 
healing are not monolithic, nor are they inherently liberatory. However, by moving against the 
currents of capitalism and by placing social reproduction at the centers of politics, they offer a 
space from which to begin building a different future, one in which those in power are held 
accountable when the rains fail and one in which the environment and the human work of caring 





Uluguru is a nexus of social relations, traced through the winding paths of rivers and 
through the movement of people, commodities, money, and knowledge across and beyond its 
slopes. Its history can be told in many ways, but it cannot be disentangled from struggles over 
nature, from nineteenth-century conflicts over rainmaking shrines and mizimu spirits to forced 
terracing in the 1950s and to “sustainable development” projects today. The relationships that 
render the mountains a water catchment traverse scales, at once reinscribing and troubling the 
bounds of “global” and “local.” An economic geography shows Uluguru at the frayed margins of 
the map, inescapably bound to the centers of capital but with only fragmentary access to its 
circuits of value. An atlas of nature, however, would place the mountains in the center, the 
nucleus at the heart of a tangle of streams and rivers that wind outward from its peaks. If “water 
is life,” as myriad social movements tell us, the catchment is where life is remade and sustained 
(Estes 2019). 
It would be easy, then, to project onto the mountains the image of the womb. However, as 
I have argued in the preceding chapters, we must begin by “historicizing rather than 
ontologizing” both the relationship between humans and nature and gender itself (Coronil 1997: 
26). Social reproduction is political. As Deodat’s recollection of a time when men could carry 




shaped by social relations (Chapter 2). Social reproduction’s attachment to certain bodies and 
certain places is not ordained by nature but rather is a product of history. To confront the 
inequalities it entails, then, requires not a romantic valorization of those tasked with carrying out 
its labor, but an examination of the relations of power which structure the uneven distribution of 
its costs. 
Cindi Katz (2001: 709–710) has argued that social reproduction is less mobile than 
production. As a result, she wrote, “there is a rejigging of the geography of social reproduction 
so that the costs of social reproduction…are borne away from where most of the benefits accrue” 
(715). Drawing on Fernando Coronil’s concept of the global division of nature, I have argued 
that one manifestation of this rejigging has been the shifting of the environmental costs of social 
reproduction toward the Global South (1997: 29). This can be seen in uneven circuits of 
ecological exchange and in the widespread dumping of waste in poor countries (Doringer et al. 
2021; Givens, Huang and Jorgenson 2019). It is also visible in the appropriation of land and 
nature in the Global South for carbon sinks and wildlife preserves (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 
2012; Green and Adams 2015; Nelson 2003; Neumann 1998). However, it is not just resources 
and land which the unequal division of nature demands—it also extracts largely unseen and 
unpaid forms of ecological labor. 
The uneven distribution of this labor does not only fall along a North-South axis. It is 
also structured along the multiple overlapping and interlinked divides of race, class, and gender 
and the asymmetrical relations between urban and rural spaces. In this way, environmental crises 
serve to reproduce and deepen longstanding forms of inequality. At the same time, ecological 
labor has been rendered largely invisible, rarely glimpsed in official accounts and seen as 




outside of human activity and by the discursive reduction of the rich range of relationships 
between humans and ecosystems to the anemic paradigm of extraction and harm. In Uluguru, the 
labor of environmental care encompasses many things: the forced construction of terraces in the 
1950s, the planting of trees and filing of permits today, and the longstanding work of matambiko, 
mila, and rainmaking. Which of these forms of work is effective in ensuring the health of the 
environment remains open to debate, but struggles over its distribution animate politics in the 
mountains. 
Social reproduction is a powerful framework because it can illuminate the connections 
between gender, environment, and labor across multiple scales. The “unhinging” of social 
reproduction from production and its subordination to the laws of exchange value underlie the 
increasing exploitation of women’s labor and cascading crises of care around the world (Katz 
2001: 710). This has also marked a path of environmental disaster, as the demands of the market 
erase the value of both ecosystems and the labor that tends them. Everywhere, the work of 
sustaining life has been rendered increasingly invisible and precarious, its material basis and its 
fruits alike appropriated by the endless appetite of exchange value. Global divisions of nature 
and labor also shape the contours of these processes, retracing the lines marked by old colonial 
maps. Seen in this way, the climate crisis is inseparable from the structures of racism, poverty, 
patriarchy, and colonialism. 
I noted in the introduction that in the face of these interconnected crises, Katz has called 
for “a politics focused around social reproduction [which] reconnects culture, environment, and 
political economy in opposition to capitalist globalization across a wide and differentiated 
terrain” (2001: 718). I have argued throughout this text that social healing offers such a politics. 




heart of political legitimacy and have served as key sites of political critique. As Katz cautions, 
social reproduction is not in itself revolutionary. This also true of rainmaking. In the nineteenth 
century, it served to bolster Kingalu’s political consolidation even as it provided language to his 
critics. Today, it also appears in service of power. For example, in one interview, a man named 
Ali Ramadhani told me, “from long ago [zamani] until now, rain has increased. There was a time 
when it decreased a lot…. Now there is a lot, even flooding.” When I asked why, his wife 
interjected. “There is a new president” (Ali Ramadhani and Tausi Mohamed, interview, May 17, 
2018). While rainmaking can serve as a site of social criticism, it can also be used to bolster 
power and to justify undemocratic and regressive politics. What makes rainmaking important, 
then, is not its specific content but its premise, the centrality it gives questions of social 
reproduction and environmental wellbeing in political struggle. Moreover, rainmaking, whether 
used in support of or against established power, shifts responsibility for ecological crises and 
other crises of social reproduction upward onto those in power, rather than downward onto 
individuals. When the rains fail, those in power must be held to account. 
Social healing places human health, environmental flourishing, and care for the dead at 
the heart of political struggle. If capitalism has subordinated social reproduction and the use 
values it entails to the tyranny of exchange value and the logic of the market, the language of 
social healing moves in the opposite direction, grounding its claims in use values which are 
always situated in place. In this sense, it resonates with Amin’s (1990) call for delinking as a 
rejection of the capitalist law of value and a turn instead to values determined within the nations 
of the Global South themselves. Such an undertaking, Amin suggested, would stem the flow of 
value away from the South and would allow those at capital’s margins to develop on their own 




suggests one possible path toward the creation of system of value which places social 
reproduction at its core. 
Social healing not only challenges the structures of value wrought by global capital but 
also upends the totalizing sense of time it imposes on the world. Rainmaking is bound up in 
unruly temporalities, in which past and future generations make demands upon the present. The 
politics of rainmaking is shaped not only by the living but by ancestors who strike their 
descendants with illness or bless them with rain. It is also shaped by an obligation to future 
generations, highlighting the inseparability of human and agricultural fertility. When Bibi Zaina 
suggested that deforestation had rendered the ancestral spirits homeless (Chapter 4), she 
suggested a responsibility to the past and future bound up in the protection of forests. Her 
statement can also be understood as a critique of the growing precarity of social reproduction—
ancestors and elders cannot care for future generations because the resources needed have been 
appropriated, privatized, and lost to other logics. The result is illness. Indeed, many in Mkuyuni 
told me that illness had increased and people no longer lived as long as in the past. I expected 
explanations for the rise in illness to relate to the proximity brought by villagization and its 
attendant risks of pathogens like cholera as well as witchcraft. However, most often, I was told 
that it was an imbalance of relationships to ancestors and the loss of mila that had caused the 
crisis in health, opening people to new diseases like high blood pressure and diabetes. Discourses 
of social healing provided a language which could bring into the same frame questions of 
ecology and questions of bodily health—both crises of social reproduction related to a loss of 
control over the environment. Through this discourse, the breakdown of relations of care 




These temporal relations are bound up with nature, linked to sacred sites in the landscape 
including springs, pools, and forests, as well as sacred species like pythons, baboons, and the 
yellow migude trees that still dot the landscape. Because these sacred places and sacred species 
also marked the abodes of ancestors and other helpful spirits, their loss too was implicated in the 
crisis of social reproduction. The breakdown of intergenerational connections and the breakdown 
of the environment were one and same. As we have seen in Chapter 3, kinship itself was woven 
through the landscape, with graves and natural places composing a sacred geography to which 
the wellbeing of the living was tied. This complex relation of space and time, humans and nature, 
exceeds the relationships wrought by global capitalism, which disciplines time through regimes 
of speculation and debt. It invokes land in its multiplicity, not as capital but as a place of 
intersecting lives. Here too, the discourses of social healing provide a space to think beyond the 
limitations of other forms of politics and to imagine radically different forms of relationality. 
Such an imagination is not inherently revolutionary, but it could be. 
Thinking with rainmaking and the catchment also offers the possibility for critical and 
counter-topographies. The catchment is the product of an uneven topography that distributes the 
costs and benefits of environmental change and environmental labor unevenly across the 
landscape. Katz (2001: 719) argues that “topographical knowledge is integral to maintaining and 
advancing uneven development.” Such topographical knowledge, claimed by government 
hydrologists trained at SUA and by Kingalu through his GPS, permits the perpetuation of 
political and environmental inequality. At the same time, the topography of the catchment offers 
other possibilities. The rivers and streams of Uluguru only mark a site of competition when water 
is understood as a zero-sum game. Viewed from the farms along the river, they trace vectors of 




Rituals through which lowlanders visited (and still visit) Uluguru to pray for rain can be spaces 
of inequality, but they have also been sites of cooperation and reciprocity among farmers at 
different elevations and in different climate zones. 
Beyond this, the catchment can allow us to think counter-topographically (Katz 2001: 
720–726). To think counter-topographically is to read topography along the grain, tracing the 
horizontal elevation lines across space to draw connections between spaces typically considered 
disparate. A true counter-topography is beyond the scope of this research, which remains bound 
to one small mountain range in Tanzania. Yet, it could be read as part of a counter-topography, 
considered alongside other thick accounts of catchments, mountains, forests, glaciers, and similar 
sites where indigenous people, forest-dwellers, and peasant farmers work to maintain the world’s 
clean water and air. Such a reading would provide a richer understanding of capital’s relationship 
to place-bound reproductive labor and allow for organization along the lines of social 
reproduction across physical and political boundaries. 
In the Introduction, I suggested that one of the major themes of discourses of social 
healing was the way in which they tended to center questions of labor, expansively defined, over 
and above relations of property. This was especially true in gendered conflicts over tradition, 
when women complained that men had withdrawn from their roles in the lineage and in 
matambiko (Chapter 2). Work was also the basis of the WUA Chairman Sadiki Kassim Ndevu’s 
demands for increased material support from the international organizations that had tasked him 
with protecting the watershed (Chapter 4). While he was doing the difficult and dangerous work 
of protecting the Ruvu, NGO staff appeared sporadically in pricy vehicles to give seminars 
before disappearing again toward the cities below. Claims based on labor, whether those of 




as demands for wages, but rather for the material conditions of social reproduction. This labor, 
moreover, was often envisioned as necessarily collaborative. The work of mila had fallen 
increasingly on the shoulders of certain people, but their failures to bring social healing were not 
a result of a lack of time, skill, or energy. Rather, it was because the work itself required a 
collective effort. The atomization of labor meant that the institutions of social healing had lost 
much of their ability to bring rain. Individual afflictions could be treated by waganga, but the 
loss of an ability to work collectively had resulted directly in environmental breakdown. The 
lack of cooperation was expressed most often in generational terms, with elders claiming that 
youth disrespected mila and youth claiming that elders had failed to teach them the knowledge 
they needed to participate. At the heart of this fissure lies the rupture of villagization and the real 
loss of knowledge it entailed, especially among men. At the same time, many I spoke with in the 
mountains, both youth and elders, were working to rebuild collective institutions of social 
healing and care, albeit under conditions of precarity and constraint. 
None of this should be read as a romanticization of the matrilineal lineage, which as we 
have seen, was also a site of gendered and generational oppression epitomized in the sale of 
wapwa into slavery. The vision of villagization aimed ultimately not to atomize but to build new 
structures of collective work and self-determination. It was a project most of my interlocutors 
valued both for what it could have been and for the benefits it actually brought. It made room for 
new forms of social reproduction through the construction of schools, clinics, and the 
provisioning of cleaning water. These forms of social reproduction, as we have seen, were not 
adequate to replace the institutions they ultimately served to dismantle, but neither were prior 
structures adequate to provide for new and rightly desired forms of self-development—access to 




essential to avoid the romanticization of poverty. As the Introduction explained, the conditions of 
life toward which social reproduction is oriented can and do expand. Today, they include cell 
phones, school uniforms, and metal roofs. What is necessary is not to cling to old structures and 
old thresholds of life, but to create the space for the building of collective institutions, under old 
or new names, that will center social reproduction in its messy richness. 
I ended nearly every interview by asking people about their hopes for their children. I 
expected that some would speak of their children getting salaried jobs and moving out of 
farming, but to my surprise, the response was almost universal: for their children, people wanted 
a good education, good health, and land in the mountains on which to farm. These modest 
desires have been rendered precarious for myriad reasons, among them the rising costs of 
education and healthcare, unfavorable agricultural markets, and an increasingly volatile climate. 
As the costs of climate change accrue in places like Uluguru, on the margins of the global 
economy, humanity needs new forms of politics which place responsibility for social 
reproduction at the center of demands on the state and on capital. These politics must center 
labor and build spaces for collective action, care, and self-determination by working people and 
the generations past and future with which they are entangled. Discourses of rainmaking do not 
offer a simple solution, but they do offer a possible starting point. Highlighting the inseparability 
of human and environmental health, the need for collective action, and the responsibility of those 
in power for current crises of social reproduction, they invite us to answer the threat of 
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